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I wanted to post something here to stoke some discussion on a number of ideas that have interested me for some time. If you follow pop-sci cosmology, you may have taken note of the recent proliferation of discussions about simulated universes. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/...e-question.html The idea that we live in a fundamentally 'unreal' universe of this sort dates back to ancient philosophers. Modern thinkers such as Nick Bostrom have put a more 'scientific' spin on it, relying on a variant of the Anthropic argument to demonstrate that if it is at all possible to simulate a world as complex as ours, it may indeed be probable that we live in such a simulation. In my own personal ontological journey, I've come up against a wall in knowing that we may never be able to answer the question of "what is out there, and why". One potential solution that I've considered from time to time may be in fact a way out: what if the observable world is, in some sense which I can't rigorously define, a logical necessity? Heuristically, the argument would be that, an external reality does exist, and thus it necessarily exists, and thus it should be derivable from some set of axioms. Specifically, some set of axioms within some logical (formal?) system should predict our universe exactly as is. The question is then, why those axioms and why that specific system? I think that this would lead to the conclusion that essentially any consistent system (possibly with some logical restrictions) should produce a distinct 'reality'. This year I was happy to find that I am not alone in pursuing this line of thought. Physicist Max Tegmark, known for his work on mapping the cosmic background radiation, just released a book on precisely this concept, titled "Our Mathematical Universe". Sure enough, his work has faced down a lot of detractors in mainstream physics. It doesn't seem to be realistically testable (though Tegmark claims it is) and has some potential logic problems when it faces up with Godel's incompleteness theorems. However, I don't believe that this is a reason to throw it out entirely. While his formulation of the theory may not be perfect, I can't shake the feeling that there is something to be said for the underlying idea, and believe that pursuit of this sort of topic could be fruitful in a philosophical, if not strictly scientific sense. Going back to the simulated universe concept, which Tegmark also touches on in his book, I could argue that, IF you accept even the possibility of a simulated universe, it necessarily demonstrates that the Mathematical Universe hypothesis is in some sense correct. To show this, take as your starting point a physical computer (generically speaking, any system capable of running the simulation) performing a universe simulation in time, where each moment is represented in memory by the instantaneous configuration of the system. I would argue that the temporality of the iterations does not contribute anything to the simulation in concept: an observer inside the simulation is not reliant on the external time frame through which the simulation is being run. You could equally print out the instantaneous configurations in sequence on paper, and this would be entirely isomorphic to the simulation itself. This in itself is isomorphic to a performer reading the page entries in sequence, etc. etc. And this leads to the question, if this simulation represents an 'experienced' reality or universe, where is this universe contained? I think the only solution is that it exists outside of any physical realization of the simulation. It exists in the fact that the simulation CAN be performed at all. I think that there are 2 possible solutions to this: Either a simulated reality is somehow fundamentally different from REAL reality, and cannot actually contain conscious observers, or ALL realities (simulated or not) are fundamentally abstract and mathematical, in line with Tegmark's description. Have at me. e: Oops, I don't start threads often. I don't believe this is a poo poo post :p mrParkbench fucked around with this message at 10:20 on Feb 9, 2014 |
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Feb 9, 2014 06:40
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If there's no testable hypothesis of the simulated universes they aren't real.
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Feb 9, 2014 06:43
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If we are living in a simulated universe, might there be some computational limits the simulation has that could somehow be tested? Presumably, every computer has finite resources, even a universe-sized one. So if there's some analog to floating-point numbers in this simulation, we could in principle "break" the simulation by traveling too far in one direction, or perhaps probing some energy level that was beyond anything we currently witness in the universe.
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Feb 9, 2014 06:52
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I'm not here to discuss whether or not this hypothesis is testable. Though as I mentioned, Tegmark would argue it is, and you may or may not choose to agree with his rationale (I'm not sure that I do). What I am asking is maybe more fundamental than that, and probably depends on our understanding of the words 'real' and 'exist' mean, probably falling on borderline between metaphysics and science (okay that's being generous). If you want to impose the testability criterion, it's basically limiting what we are allowed to discuss in terms of reality, and I'm not cool with that. It implies that there are questions that can be rigorously posed, which science will never be able to answer. I accept that this means that such questions are 'unscientific' but I don't accept that they are without meaning. e: That was in response to Dusseldorf. The testability discussion is valid and maybe this is a good place for it, but I don't believe that the argument necessarily falls without it. mrParkbench fucked around with this message at 06:55 on Feb 9, 2014 |
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Feb 9, 2014 06:53
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It's basically not interesting if there isn't anything testable. It's make believe.
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Feb 9, 2014 07:00
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Dusseldorf posted:It's basically not interesting if there isn't anything testable. It's make believe. It's "what if you're just a brain in a jar" but another order of magnitude up.
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Feb 9, 2014 07:03
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Dusseldorf posted:It's basically not interesting if there isn't anything testable. It's make believe. Unscientific != uninteresting as far as I'm concerned, please provide an argument with more substance.
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Feb 9, 2014 07:08
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Dusseldorf posted:If there's no testable hypothesis of the simulated universes they aren't real. People are working on testable hypotheses. e.g. http://www.technologyreview.com/view/429561/the-measurement-that-would-reveal-the-universe-as-a-computer-simulation/ plus the experiments posted in the OP
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Feb 9, 2014 07:12
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mrParkbench posted:What I am asking is maybe more fundamental than that, and probably depends on our understanding of the words 'real' and 'exist' mean, probably falling on borderline between metaphysics and science (okay that's being generous). If you want to impose the testability criterion, it's basically limiting what we are allowed to discuss in terms of reality, and I'm not cool with that. It implies that there are questions that can be rigorously posed, which science will never be able to answer. I accept that this means that such questions are 'unscientific' but I don't accept that they are without meaning. TBH I'm not really sure what you're asking. Is it "Why is there something rather than nothing?" Because I'm not sure what that has to do with simulated universes. And if you don't allow testability in to the discussion, then asking whether or not we are in a simulated reality is no better than asking whether or not God exists, because we can simply define God to be that which is doing the simulating.
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Feb 9, 2014 07:15
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Jacobeus posted:Is it "Why is there something rather than nothing?" Because I'm not sure what that has to do with simulated universes. I'm posing the argument that if you believe in the 'reality' of a simulated universe, then you may end up with an answer for that question, namely that the mathematical universe hypothesis follows. My argument is by no means rigorous, I can easily come up with several questions for it, I just want to see what others notice.
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Feb 9, 2014 07:24
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mrParkbench posted:Heuristically, the argument would be that, an external reality does exist, and thus it necessarily exists, and thus it should be derivable from some set of axioms. Specifically, some set of axioms within some logical (formal?) system should predict our universe exactly as is. This is actually not correct.
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Feb 9, 2014 08:00
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mrParkbench posted:I'm not here to discuss whether or not this hypothesis is testable. Though as I mentioned, Tegmark would argue it is, and you may or may not choose to agree with his rationale (I'm not sure that I do). Without some external logical (physically or mathematically whatever they mean) basis there isn't a way to communicate whatever dumb idea ( and that gets more interesting, WTF do you think an idea is ) is going through your head to someone else. You're not having a discussion, it's just noise. You can talk all you want, but there's no information content. As such, if you can't measure, it isn't. What a measurement is gets interesting. As for the simulated universe bullshit, you can always measure some local parameter e.g. maximal information density - you can't get around thermodynamics, and therefore information penetrating into your "simuverse", from your "simulator" and visa versa ( gently caress this, I'm going to give the pair a proper name "fagulator" <- { simulator : simuverse } ). You can't even "reset" something on one side and have it be hidden on the other, as your fagulator has information conserved across that pair. This is because, a fagulator, which is formed from two manifolds and a shared surface which forms an information boundary ( wheyhey, manged to get holographic theory into it ) can't isolate either of those sections from each other as any attempt to do so just creates a new sub-fagulator and holographic boundary. This applies everywhere all the time. Well I suppose you could avoid that by either a) Having no evolving state on either side or b) Being in a maximum entropy state on either side, but at that stage, the containing fagverse is either a billion degrees and has no size, a black hole, or never existed in the first place. In short; gently caress you.
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Feb 9, 2014 09:50
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Plexiwatt posted:This is actually not correct. Don't give Godels theorem more import than it actually has. Godels incompleteness theorem states that there are limits to proving arithmatic in self contained mathematical system. But it really doesn't tell us anything about the provability of metaphysics. For that you need philosophers, not mathematicians and guys theres plenty of proof that yes, it would be logically unsound for an external reality to not exist, going back to dudes like Kant (who did NOT use arithetic to prove it). Now as to whether the externl reality is just a computer simulation. I'd suggest philosophers get less useful and it becomes a question for physicists. But its sufficient to say that whilst Godel has proven a pain in the arse to mathematicians, mathematics is for all purposes, good enough.
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Feb 9, 2014 10:41
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There is an argument to be made from an astrophysics standpoint. Here's the story as I remember it: Hubble's Constant was called "Spooky" by one of my cosmology professors, mainly because it violated the concept of an isotropic and homogenous universe- a place without a particular time and a particular place. Hubble's Constant is dependent on the ratio of energy densities of the universe. We coincidentally existed in a time and place where its value was very convenient.
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Feb 9, 2014 10:50
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duck monster posted:Godels incompleteness theorem states that there are limits to proving arithmatic in self contained mathematical system. But it really doesn't tell us anything about the provability of metaphysics. For that you need philosophers, not mathematicians and guys theres plenty of proof that yes, it would be logically unsound for an external reality to not exist, going back to dudes like Kant (who did NOT use arithetic to prove it). I thought Godel's incompleteness theorem states that any mathematical/logical system that is sufficiently powerful (that is, you can use it talk about arithmetic) can not be used to prove that the system itself is consistent. So the question isn't whether or not you would use arithmetic to prove whether or not an external reality exists - it's whether the logical system you use to prove whether or not an external reality exists is powerful enough to make sufficiently detailed statements about arithmetic. If it is, Godel's incompleteness theorem applies, and you can not use the logical system to prove that the system itself is consistent. So you're left with a proof that an external reality exists, but no proof that the system you used to prove an external reality exists is consistent. Of course, you can probably define another system that can be used to prove that the first logical system you used is consistent, but you can't use the second system to prove that the second system is consistent.
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Feb 9, 2014 12:05
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Job Truniht posted:There is an argument to be made from an astrophysics standpoint. Here's the story as I remember it: Hubble's Constant was called "Spooky" by one of my cosmology professors, mainly because it violated the concept of an isotropic and homogenous universe- a place without a particular time and a particular place. Hubble's Constant is dependent on the ratio of energy densities of the universe. We coincidentally existed in a time and place where its value was very convenient. I thought the universe before the big bang was exactly that - something where time and space where "the same". After the boom it expanded and a space-time developed. How can time and place be "convenient" regarding the constant expansion after the big bang?
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Feb 9, 2014 13:04
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I used to think about simulated universe a lot. Eventually I decided, if it is or isn't simulated, or simulations in simulations, what difference does it make? It's still the reality we exist in, so it wouldn't change anything about our lives or thoughts really. Hell, we could be in a simulation that started two seconds ago, with everything in the past being an illusion, but we wouldn't know and it wouldn't matter if we did.
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Feb 9, 2014 17:37
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Iirc, Bostrom's point is that it is testable: the day we make a convincing simulation of our world is the day we can know with near certainty that we live in a simulated world ourselves. The basic idea is this: once we start making such simulations, we will have to agree that we live in a world where the vast majority of experiences like ours are simulated, and so, as a matter of probability, it follows that our current experience is simulated. The logic is basically the same as the thinking behind the doomsday argument - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doomsday_argument So if you believe people in the future (perhaps distant future) are likely to have at their disposal computational power sufficient to run a convincing simulation of life as you're experiencing it now, and will have the will to do so, you have to accept that your current experience is likely a simulation. I think that's a pretty interesting argument, and it isn't just, "What if we're in the Matrix?" etc.
prick with tenure fucked around with this message at 17:56 on Feb 9, 2014 |
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Feb 9, 2014 17:53
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I was going to post this in the creation debate thing but it was too off topic. This probably belongs in TCC, but gently caress it. At least it relates to creation debate. Im a physicist. I did a lot of work in high energy, but Im in industry now. I still have friends in academia who do work that has relevance to universe birth-death scenarios and we have some interesting conversations. I give up trying to think about the universe sometimes. I think its largely due to humans inability to grasp a scenario where our physical laws are altered or dont behave as we typically expect. We have this cause and effect thing that underpins literally everything we know. We have some things that happen that cause other things to happen. Observing these things allows us to predict things that happen in the past or future, ta-da scientific method. All of this hinges on us having 'time' that flows in a defined direction. Try to imagine a universe without time, what would that even mean. Expanding this idea you obviously end up with a "turtles all the way down" issue with everything. We can back up to the big bang fairly well and even have some ideas of what could have caused that although it quickly gets into  territory. Well, what caused that? And what caused the thing that caused that? I think its reasonable to say that causality at least has to break down at some point.But why did all those events have to happen to put us in this place at this time? Is the fact that we are here simply the result of some place (although calling it a place implies it has some spatial qualities) not having natural laws prohibiting our universes creation? Even still, why does that place exist? If you dont face the problem of causality recursion you still face spatial recursion as we only understand existence to be contained within or generated by something else. In this entire string of existence is it inconceivable that something we would call a 'god', though obviously not any version supported by an existing religion, exists? People joke about a flying spaghetti monster but I think the fact we are here at all is equally hosed up. Science will undoubtedly peel back this onion. I wonder what we find. It may be literally unknowable as observation could require energy scales beyond what we have access to in our whole existence. In which case its pretty pointless to talk about so please disregard this post.
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Feb 9, 2014 18:08
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Acelerion posted:Science will undoubtedly peel back this onion. Not necessarily. In general, a closed system can't know information about the world outside of it unless it has some sort of stimulus. So imagine you're in a box, if there's no sound or vibration or heat or anything, you can't tell anything about what the outside world is like. If you want to determine if a system exists outside of the universe, you need to determine if there are external stimuli being detected.
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Feb 9, 2014 18:15
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All conceptions of truth and falsity exist within a defined frame. This is how we segregate levels of theory and are even able to do science at all: we define the boundaries of our system or our experiment and write the rest off as ceteris paribus. There are a few logical foundations that our fetish for testability, rationality, and observability rests upon. We work from assumptions such as : *Time exists. *Causality is linear. *The limits of this universe are proven, rational, hard limits. *Because we know the constraints of our system, there are clearly ideas that are non-scientific and non-rational because they exist outside the system that we've agreed is real. *Because of the produce and explanatory effectiveness of our scientific system, we have found a good approximation of the explanation of how everything works, and further discoveries will fall more or less within this corpus, with revolutions adding domains, but never falsifying the basic premise. Assuming all this, we form the scientific game loop: We apply scientific methodology to the world. IF it can be observed, tested, and reproduced, it enters the hallowed bastion of things that are capital R Real. Else, concept is rejected as non-scientific. It's a simple and wonderful way to segregate a frame: there's an inside and an outside. If and when this whole framework loses confidence in its base assumptions, which I personally believe will not be long from now, then all your fetishistic exclusions of the non-testables, the non-provables, the non-rationals will be exposed as small-mindedness. Of course, I'm legally required to include in all my posts that I am a crazy person. In reality, you're fine: Your ideas about time, causality, and natural law are all rock-solid and fundamentally correct, so go on rejecting things that don't fit! You are on the side of the right.
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Feb 9, 2014 18:24
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computer parts posted:Not necessarily. In general, a closed system can't know information about the world outside of it unless it has some sort of stimulus. So imagine you're in a box, if there's no sound or vibration or heat or anything, you can't tell anything about what the outside world is like. I somewhat disagree with this. Not with the point, but with that our universe doesent have to be (and I would say probably isnt) a closed system. To use your box analogy it still has some useful qualities. It has boundaries, I can define locations within the box relative to those boundaries, and it has time and therefor causality. From all this I can try to make inferences about what is outside the box. They may not be good guesses, and there may not be many of them I can make, but they are there.
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Feb 9, 2014 18:27
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To address the point about Godel's theorem, I wonder about this sometimes. Tegmark gives it a lot of significance, to the point where he says that his theory collapses if you include Godel-complex structures, and he solves this by limiting the mathematical landscape to computable structures. I am not by any means an expert in interpretations and extensions of Godel, but it seems to imply that any defined Godel-complex system leads to two kinds of truths, namely those proveable within the system, and the Godel incomplete truths, those which cannot be proven. The second kind of truths are what people usually point to as problematic. However, these are still in a very real sense true within the system, but require an outside meta-reasoning to be proven. Does this make them any less 'real'? I doubt it. Would be interested if anyone could tackle this further. This extends to consistency. No, you can't PROVE that a sufficiently complex system is consistent, but consistency either is or is not a property of the system. mrParkbench fucked around with this message at 18:57 on Feb 9, 2014 |
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Feb 9, 2014 18:54
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computer parts posted:Not necessarily. In general, a closed system can't know information about the world outside of it unless it has some sort of stimulus. So imagine you're in a box, if there's no sound or vibration or heat or anything, you can't tell anything about what the outside world is like. Just go all out cave allegory on him ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allegory_of_the_Cave ), make him read The Republic.
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Feb 9, 2014 22:19
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It also depends heavily on ontological relativism. This is the claim that all objects in a mathematical continuum are the same. Once you map this into multiple mathematic continuums as a way to make movement from objects to other objects. The objects in the mathematic continuum then become mappable onto other objects like physical ones.including This is a key part of Godel's theorem that is imported from his view of logic. In practice it is the claim that I have rational access to rules that bind those continuums as well as which leaves out issues such as the possibility of transient physical , states making it impossible to have epistemic access. When you impart ontological relativism it enables you have to good explanatory power but figuring out what it means in causal control is another thing. If Hermann Weyl claim that the there may be multiple continuums or unevenness in objects, levels in other words is true empirically, assuming we could know. It may be that we are making a error by mistaking conceptual features for empirical ones. Basically, if we import the ontological continuity of objects from Godel's view of logic we may be building in his claim about unity of continuums.
Ogodei_Khan fucked around with this message at 04:50 on Feb 10, 2014 |
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Feb 10, 2014 04:38
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My issue with the Simulation Hypothesis is that it's not in any way useful. Even if we are in a simulation, that doesn't change the fact that what we observe is what we observe and the universe is still the universe. So what's the point? It's just useless, meaningless navel-gazing unless someone believes that of we can prove we actually live in the Matrix that they will become Neo.
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Feb 10, 2014 15:38
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Of course we live (edit: Should have said "are" not "live in") in a simulated universe(s) in side of a powerful computer(s). It's called a brain. Real reality necessarily precedes this simulation. But the simulation can shape, alter, and interact with reality. Alternately said: "Now I repeat: reality precedes thought. But I repeat also: thought shapes reality. These two are interdependent. You cannot abstract the one from the other." Tegmark is trying to do that, abstract one from the other. Bar Ran Dun fucked around with this message at 15:59 on Feb 10, 2014 |
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Feb 10, 2014 15:54
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BrandorKP posted:Of course we live in a simulated universe(s) in side of a powerful computer(s). It's called a brain. We don't live in our brains, nor do our brains simulate the universe.
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Feb 10, 2014 15:56
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Yes we are the computer/brain would be a more accurate statement. Edit: And of course they do the images we see are not reality itself they are the constructions of a mind, just because they get an input from the outside doesn't make them not a construction. Bar Ran Dun fucked around with this message at 16:04 on Feb 10, 2014 |
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Feb 10, 2014 15:58
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BrandorKP posted:Yes we are the computer/brain would be a more accurate statement. That's clearly not at all the topic of the thread, though.
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Feb 10, 2014 16:04
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BrandorKP posted:Yes we are the computer/brain would be a more accurate statement. But we also don't simulate the universe, so what you're saying is still very wrong. We also, to the extent we do 'simulate', know that it is wildly imperfect, and treat it as such. The overall idea that we're in a simulation doesn't really matter at all, and the real question is not actually if the universe is a simulation, it's whether we are actually self-aware or if our consciousnesses are just observational phenomenon, whether we exert free will or not. It doesn't matter at all if we're in a simulation or not if we can exert free will, and it doesn't matter if we are or not if we can't. It is the wrong question.
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Feb 10, 2014 16:07
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Who What Now posted:That's clearly not at all the topic of the thread, though. Maybe you should look at what Mr. Tegmark is asserting. That physical reality is preceded by and is from an essential set of rules (in this case math) that are universally true. Further that intelligences inside that physical reality can look at the reality they are in and conclude the essential set of universal rules back to their axioms. Why might this be wrong? What else is it like? edit: Obdicut posted:But we also don't simulate the universe, so what you're saying is still very wrong. Yes we do, we have an input device(s) that detect and then sends a signal to processor which then constructs an output from the inputs. Bar Ran Dun fucked around with this message at 16:30 on Feb 10, 2014 |
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Feb 10, 2014 16:19
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BrandorKP posted:
I'm not sure if you're trying to be funny by stating things incredibly simplistically or what, but no, that's not a good summation at all. Are you trying to indirectly and incoherently say that you don't believe in free will? I also can't tell what you're trying to achieve with the Socratic bullshit you're doing above, either. If you think the answers to those questions are significant, why not actually write them out?
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Feb 10, 2014 16:38
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Obdicut posted:I'm not sure if you're trying to be funny by stating things incredibly simplistically or what, but no, that's not a good summation at all. Are you trying to indirectly and incoherently say that you don't believe in free will? Not trying to be funny. Look at the argument of the OP it boils down to: If simulated universe then Mathematical Universe hypothesis true. If we think and have minds then there is a "simulated universe" inside of reality. But this doesn't mean the universe is mathematical. The OPs argument doesn't hold true, because: If simulated universe then Mathematical Universe hypothesis. is the same as If "I think" therefore there are universal essentials. And that's just restating Descartes and it's a variation of the ontological argument. And it's wrong. A necessary proposition about X doesn't make existence of X necessary. That a tautologically true statement can be made about X doesn't mean that X must exist. Obdicut posted:I also can't tell what you're trying to achieve with the Socratic bullshit you're doing above, either. If you think the answers to those questions are significant, why not actually write them out? Tegmark is asserting that there is a universal natural law (mathematics) that precedes physical reality ontologically and that this can be proven. It's a just another proof of God. And there aren't proofs of God. As to why not write it out: Religious nut (me) Strict materialist atheist (Who What Now) One of us should not have to tell the other that all proofs of an absolute universal abstract that governs the universe are false.
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Feb 10, 2014 17:18
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BrandorKP posted:Maybe you should look at what Mr. Tegmark is asserting. That physical reality is preceded by and is from an essential set of rules (in this case math) that are universally true. Further that intelligences inside that physical reality can look at the reality they are in and conclude the essential set of universal rules back to their axioms. You misunderstand. What's being asserted is that our universe is a simulation from some sort of outside source. For you to come in here and say "Of course the universe is a simulation if you relabel our perception as a 'simulation'  ." Isn't useful and isn't even on topic.Obdicut posted:I'm not sure if you're trying to be funny by stating things incredibly simplistically or what, but no, that's not a good summation at all. Are you trying to indirectly and incoherently say that you don't believe in free will? If Brandor ever speaks too clearly he'll explode. -EDIT- quote:Strict materialist atheist (Who What Now I'm a strict materialist? This is certainly news to me.
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Feb 10, 2014 17:20
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Who What Now posted:I'm a strict materialist? This is certainly news to me. You certainly have a history of making the arguments of one. Has that changed recently? Who What Now posted:You misunderstand. What's being asserted is that our universe is a simulation from some sort of outside source. For you to come in here and say "Of course the universe is a simulation if you relabel our perception as a 'simulation' You misunderstand me. I'm not saying of course our universe is a simulation. I'm saying of course simulations of the universe are possible because we are simulations of the universe! And that's a tautology! And that tautology doesn't make math true, in the same way a tautology about God doesn't make God true! I think the science people are getting this crap from the Austrians/Libertarians. Tautologies about Freedom don't make freedom true either. Edit: VVVVVV Pay no attention to man behind the curtain then hmmm? Edit: VVVVVV Seriously, you're saying it's objectionable to reach conclusions (about what you believe) from observed evidence (your posts)? Bar Ran Dun fucked around with this message at 17:46 on Feb 10, 2014 |
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Feb 10, 2014 17:23
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BrandorKP posted:You certainly have a history of making the arguments of one. Has that changed recently? That's not pertinent to the topic, my point was to stop making (incorrect) assumptions about people -edit- I'm also confused about what you believe you're telling me, considering I posted about how the simulation hypothesis was bunk just before you entered the thread. Who What Now fucked around with this message at 17:30 on Feb 10, 2014 |
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Feb 10, 2014 17:28
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BrandorKP posted:Not trying to be funny. Look at the argument of the OP it boils down to: If simulated universe then Mathematical Universe hypothesis true. It doesn't appear to be in the least the same, no. Do you get what's wrong about your idea that our minds simulate the universe? Our minds, when we really try, very, very roughly approximate a small chunk of the nearby universe, and we know, as we do this, that we are getting all sorts of poo poo about it wrong. We do not 'simulate' in any sort of real way, that is, we don't set up conditions and then let poo poo run. quote:Tegmark is asserting that there is a universal natural law (mathematics) that precedes physical reality ontologically and that this can be proven. It's a just another proof of God. And there aren't proofs of God. Well, you definitely write like a crazy person. Universal natural law that 'precedes' reality (not the right word at all) isn't a proof of god. Unless, I guess, you're a religious nut.
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Feb 10, 2014 18:57
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Obdicut posted:It doesn't appear to be in the least the same, no. Do you get what's wrong about your idea that our minds simulate the universe? Our minds, when we really try, very, very roughly approximate a small chunk of the nearby universe, and we know, as we do this, that we are getting all sorts of poo poo about it wrong. We do not 'simulate' in any sort of real way, that is, we don't set up conditions and then let poo poo run. Simulation is a imitation of a real world process. That the adjectives lovely and localized apply (and I agree they do) don't make our perceptions not a simulation. Our perceptions are imitations of the real physical world. And our simulations do create models in a real way, we do set up conditions and let that poo poo run. What are we doing right now? We're arguing about which model more closely conforms to observation, mine or yours. Obdicut posted:'precedes' To come, exist, or occur before in time. His arguement is that math comes before, exists before, physical reality. It's the right word. That describes Tegmark's thesis. Add to that, Tegmark thinks multiverse theory describes “the ultimate nature of reality” He claims his ideas make this testable prediction: "physics research will uncover further mathematical regularities in nature". That testable prediction is just a tautology. This is like calling this: language exists because something will be said in English, a testable prediction. Math is the language of physics. That physics will say something it hasn't said before in its language of math, is that really a falsifiable (and it has to be to really be testable and not a tautology)? No, it is not. So he's offering up a tautology (that he thinks is testable and not a tautology) as evidence for math as "the ultimate nature of reality". Bar Ran Dun fucked around with this message at 20:19 on Feb 10, 2014 |
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Feb 10, 2014 20:12
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BrandorKP posted:Simulation is a imitation of a real world process. That the adjectives lovely and localized apply (and I agree they do) don't make our perceptions not a simulation. Our perceptions are imitations of the real physical world. And our simulations do create models in a real way, we do set up conditions and let that poo poo run. What are we doing right now? We're arguing about which model more closely conforms to observation, mine or yours. This is a really common problem when you come into threads like these, Brandor, and it's an issue of you not understanding differences in magnitude. The context of the usage of everyone but you in the thread when we say "simulation" is something that is 'perceiving' all of reality at all time and with no flaws. When we 'perceive' the universe we perceive only an infinitesimally small amount of it, and that perception is highly flawed. The two usages of the word cannot begin to be compared as similar except that they both have the words 'perceive' used in their descriptions. It's like if we were discussing global banking, and you came in and started rambling about the size of your piggy bank, and what kind of sound it makes when you rattle the money inside of it. Yes, technically on the most superficial level we would all be talking about banking, but in practical terms you're talking about something completely different and you're making yourself look like an idiot doing it. Just stop, please.
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Feb 10, 2014 20:31
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