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Important thing to remember is that there's a lot of ruin in a nation, and when the inevitable financial crisis finally occurs, it is not likely to reverse all of that growth.
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Mar 18, 2014 12:55
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| # ¿ Apr 27, 2024 20:43 |
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there are almost certainly quite a few insolvent banks, we just don't know which ones they are, and the panic when the wave of bankruptcies starts will take at least a few years to sort out.
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Mar 19, 2014 14:21
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dilbertschalter posted:Taiwan wasn't affected much at all. Second, to say that they countries fall under the category of "booming growth and lax government regulation" is sort of the opposite of the situation. South Korea's government was played a major role both in setting broader goals for the economy and in setting micro level policies. In return it gave businesses all the credit they wanted and more, which led to the later crisis, but that's not the same thing as lax regulation by any means. Let's call it 'lax termination of insolvent creditors', instead, since that would be a good rough characterization of the 1997 crisis.
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Mar 20, 2014 08:11
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Labour-intensive low-productivity industry is not intended to be superior to capital-intensive high-productivity industry; it is intended to be superior to agricultural productivity, which is always very low. China has not yet finished mobilizing its rural population, far from it, so it has a while to go before it stops adding more labour-intensive production
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Mar 21, 2014 07:32
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The main difference between strategic protection of infant industries between import-focused and export-focused, gauging from the postwar growth periods from the 50s to 70s, is indeed political - it is harder to bullshit export numbers. You cannot coerce Westerners to choose your stuff, the products really have to get better as the subsidies are withdrawn. Latin American governments pursuing import substitution, on the other hand, had much more difficulty policing the quality of investments, and distinguishing between policies that are supported to gain protection from imports versus protection from domestic competition. The point extends to other nominally interventionist trade policy, like capital controls. Malaysia can carry out capital controls well, because its particular variety of domestic corruption (involving cronies maneuvering themselves into leading the export industries) dislikes the controls. If Mahathir had not been locked in a power struggle with his finance minister Anwar Ibrahim at the time, Malaysia would have hiked interest rates instead; the controls were never popular and the limits were discarded soon after Anwar was moved out the way. Argentina and Brazil cannot carry out capital controls well, because their domestic dysfunctions interact badly with it; you can tell because it is actually popular policy. That is to say, perversely, the polities which want intervention the most, will implement it the worst.
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Mar 22, 2014 08:36
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one of the understated points of the high pay is to maintain loyalty when someone powerful orders the judiciary and executive to go after someone only marginally less powerful, but with potentially more money
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May 8, 2014 17:29
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OwlBot 2000 posted:What happens when everything collapses, does China blame the market and start rolling back liberalization measures? reversal of neoliberalization didn't happen in indonesia in 1998, despite collapse of the regime - if anything, it accelerated under an easing of anti-chinese laws the political quid pro quo being sold is not "i'll give you growth if you accept me taking away the iron rice bowl", which was a bargain that was only ever reliable in the heavy industries of the northeast anyway, it's "i'll give you growth if you accept me being wantonly corrupt". therefore the backlash, like in Indonesia, is liable to be against perceived corruption rather than neoliberal reform ronya fucked around with this message at 05:34 on May 10, 2014 |
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May 10, 2014 05:31
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Southeast Asia also entered the 97 crisis with, generally speaking, good fiscal books. the problem was all the private debts racked up by politically linked crony companies, which (because they were politically connected) some investors thought would be bailed out, but (because they were not on-the-book debts) some investors thought otherwise. these debts were large enough that, if considered on the books, the good fiscal status would have evaporated it was a gigantic bet on whether political connections would come through. that's how one selects people to pay the costs of the recession: you pick those who, it turns out, didn't actually have the political importance that they thought they did. when push comes to shove in China, it'll be the central govt sending the PLA to distribute food, whilst local govt officials do their best to kick each other off the cart, so it seems safe to say that the central govt will have enormous latitude - provided it can remain united. No Zhou Yongkangs permitted.
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May 10, 2014 15:18
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| # ¿ Apr 27, 2024 20:43 |
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Economic crisis-wise, Indonesia did liberalize following 97. Singapore liberalized following 85. Middle-class protest - Taiwan in 1990, South Korea in 1988. Of course these did not then become Western liberal countries, but this is a matter of degree, surely. Singapore in particular represents an ideological precedent for consciously controlled non-multiparty liberalization under the flag of an allegedly unique Asian interpretation of democracy.
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May 11, 2014 08:51
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