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jrodefeld posted:I am a libertarian market anarchist. I believe in individual self ownership. What that means is that each of us have the right to determine the use of the scarce resource in our physical bodies. If we have a property right in our own bodies, then we should not have the right to use aggression against the physical body of another. For example, assault, rape and kidnapping are obviously illegitimate violations of self ownership. All civilized people accept the principle, I believe. In fact, I consider it an irrefutable axiom. The act of argumentation presupposes the right to exclusive control over ones body and mind. First, not all people accept that assault, rape, and kidnapping are violations of property rights. Second, not all people accept that property rights in one's body are axiomatic. In the first place, many people accept that assault, rape, and kidnapping are immoral for reasons that don't involve property rights. For example, utilitarians maintain that prohibitions on assault, rape, and kidnapping are justified because such actions usually cause suffering and hardship. Even if such actions as assault, rape, and kidnapping violate the principle of self-ownership, the principle of self-ownership is hardly necessary to justify a general prohibition on those actions. Thus, that such actions violate the principle of self-ownership is at most evidence that the principle is acceptable. However, it's unclear whether the principle of self-ownership entails that assault, rape, and kidnapping should be prohibited. In the first place, many libertarians have argued that property rights are alienable, meaning that common examples of rape, assault, and kidnapping are permitted whenever individuals alienate their rights through contracts or binding associations. If you wish to argue that some property rights are inalienable, then you must justify their inalienability, because inalienability conflicts with principles of free associations. In the second place, you have argued that some instances of assault are justified. For example, dispute resolution organizations employ both harm and the threat of harm in order to enforce principles of retributive justice. Thus, general prohibitions on assault, rape, and kidnapping aren't guaranteed by the principle of self-ownership. Finally, whether you consider the principle of self-ownership to be axiomatic is irrelevant. If the principle is a logical axiom, then because a majority of people disagree with libertarianism, the system postulating self-ownership must be justified. If the principle is a non-logical axiom, then libertarianism stands or falls on the basis of its consequences. Like all other axioms, the principle of self-ownership partially defines a system of reasoning in which propositions can be derived. Thus, the question is whether the principle of self-ownership should be adopted, and this question turns on whether the principle can be justified and has acceptable consequences. In other words, unless you can justify the principle of self-ownership on other grounds, you must argue that libertarianism has acceptable consequences. But we have seen that whether libertarianism has acceptable consequences is either false or incidental at best. quote:If a person owns their own body and thus has the right to make decisions about how they use it, then how can they justly acquire property outside of their physical body? The libertarian argues that the only just way to acquire property is through homesteading of previously unowned or unused natural resources, otherwise known as original appropriation. If you own your physical body, then if you mix your labor with natural land then that which you transformed becomes in essence an extension of yourself and becomes your property. If you are a frontiersman and you come across previously unowned and unused natural land and you build a house, build a fence, graze cattle and plant crops, then that which you altered through your labor becomes your property. That is, no one has a better claim to maintain final decision making authority over that scarce resource than you. That nobody has "...a better claim to maintain final decision making authority over that scarce resource than you" doesn't follow from the theory of distributive justice outlined above. The point of entitlement theories of distributive justice is precisely that historical claims supersede other normative claims on holdings. Thus, you must mean that claims are better whenever they are justly acquired through a series of just transactions terminating in just acts of original appropriation. Ignoring the problems with "labor-mixing" theories of original appropriation, outlined in preceding posts, you must justify why historical claims outweigh other normative claims on the distribution and utilization of goods. For example, suppose that I acquire a piece of unused and previously unowned land containing vast deposits of rare minerals. Since you haven't justified the entitlement theory of distributive justice, on what basis do I acquire better authority regrading the utilization and distribution of those minerals than others - perhaps experts or community or government organizations? There is no guarantee that entitlement theories of distributive justice coincide with other normative theories regarding the best distribution and utilization of goods. Your entire argument is circular. My two cents. Also I'm a little drunk, so sorry if I'm a little belligerent. quickly fucked around with this message at 10:25 on Aug 11, 2014 |
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Aug 11, 2014 10:11
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