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I think that the ideals beneficence and non-maleficence should be the focus of animal welfare. Not the bestowing of rights. Rights, in an ethical sense, are a claim or potential claim by a moral agent to other moral agents acting within a moral community. Apes or any animal for that matter, dont engage with humans on any sort of moral code. Rights are an intrinsically human construct. We should value the interests of animals but not at the cost of the rights of a person.
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Dec 6, 2014 17:58
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| # ¿ May 15, 2024 09:36 |
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Also there is no moral imperative to end suffering, as moral beings we are obliged to not cause suffering as we can understand the intrinsic value of living beings. You are not immoral if you don't spend every waking moment ending suffering.
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Dec 6, 2014 18:14
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furiouskoala posted:It's strange to see how many people think rights and duties are inextricably linked; there are plenty of human beings with rights and no corresponding duties. The bestowal of rights on a being is dependent on them being moral agents. According to Kantian ethics, at least, moral agency is dependent on a being's ability to perform their duties. So in this sense, rights and duties are actually intrinsically linked. e: moreso, the idea of moral agency is not a test to be performed on any individual organism. It's a classification based on the participants in a moral community as a whole. When we say "all humans have rights" we are really saying "All humans, which are beings that can participate in morality, have rights." So when you look at an individual human you give him the rights bestowed on ALL humans not just that one man in himself. The reason the metaphysical argument of personhood (The character of 'consciousness' of an individual being) falls apart, is because it doesn't allow for the variations in consciousness among a group. If a human falls below the intelligence of a primate due to brain injury, does that make him have less rights? or does that give that primate more rights than that man? It's a clumsy theory that makes no logical sense. Rexicon1 fucked around with this message at 16:59 on Dec 7, 2014 |
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Dec 7, 2014 16:39
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Hieronymous Alloy posted:: Its my general problem with a theory based on utilitarianism like the way singer does. "Value" is not a contiguous thing that can be quantified in the way Singer likes to do
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Dec 7, 2014 17:18
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Cantorsdust posted:There's an entire class of anesthetics that basically operate on this principle: the dissociative anesthetics, including ketamine and PCP. They don't directly block peripheral pain signals like lidocaine or induce unconsciousness like propofol or halofurane or whatever. Instead, you don't perceive the pain as applying to you. With higher doses, you can lose your sense of self entirely. The pain is there, but it doesn't have any attachment to your body. What are you defining as "sense of self". I've read a bunch of cognition psychology papers and I still have a very hard time figuring out how to determine what creatures have a "sense of self". Are you saying that they have the ability to identify that what is happening is happening to them? Are you thinking about second-order cognition where they are able to think about themselves as separate from everything else? It's important to understand these terms that we often take for granted in order to avoid specious arguments about "self". There's the idea of self-concept vs. self-awareness vs. self-knowledge and each has its own implications.
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Dec 7, 2014 18:38
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| # ¿ May 15, 2024 09:36 |
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Can we all at least agree that just because a thing does an action like people do, does not make them people?
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Dec 10, 2014 22:00
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