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evol262 posted:The RHC(SA|E) book arrived today and is huge. Maybe twice as large as the official training docs A review says it isn't for beginners, so what would be a good book before that? Would utilizing training docs with the book be the way to go?
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# ? May 22, 2015 04:19 |
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# ? May 5, 2024 14:15 |
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Tab8715 posted:That's the 06' version and there is a newer one but it's interesting so I'll pick it up.
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# ? May 22, 2015 04:26 |
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icehewk posted:A review says it isn't for beginners, so what would be a good book before that? Would utilizing training docs with the book be the way to go?
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# ? May 22, 2015 04:26 |
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icehewk posted:A review says it isn't for beginners, so what would be a good book before that? Would utilizing training docs with the book be the way to go? The RHCSA is our beginner cert, but RH certs are practical. You need to be able to actually do it. LPIC training would be a good first step if you don't know Linux at all.
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# ? May 22, 2015 04:47 |
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I'm gonna pace these chapter summaries at about one per day. I'm posting these so it's easy to quote parts we want to discuss. It's a fairly short book, so if you haven't started yet, it should be pretty quick to catch up until I get towards the end. Chapter 3: The Hindsight Bias This chapter is an introduction to the next several chapters, which also deal with similar themes. Reactions to failure are retrospective, counterfactual, judgmental, and proximal. These features interfere with your understanding of failure. As an investigator, hindsight provides you with information that was not known to the people making decisions as the situation unfolded. This information includes outcomes, critical indicators that were overlooked, and actions that may have prevented the outcome. Hindsight makes it impossible to look objectively at historical scenarios because of cause-consequence equivalence, which says a bad outcome necessarily followed from a bad process. (This is a kind of survivor bias). As a result, we tend to automatically view the process as flawed. Dekker emphasizes that to people inside the situation, the outcome likely had an infinitesimally small probability, and many possible pathways based on the available information, not a linear process from initial condition to catastrophic failure. We hyper-aggressively couple effects to preceding causes without considering that these causal relationships are not as clear to people in the middle of the situation.
Vulture Culture fucked around with this message at 07:30 on May 22, 2015 |
# ? May 22, 2015 06:49 |
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Sheep posted:Are we done with powershell already? I shelved it on day three for a variety of reasons. I haven't even had a chance to start, thanks to some stupid things. I won't be able to get to it until mid-late June Oh well, I'll catch up.
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# ? May 22, 2015 20:06 |
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I just wanna comment and say that these chapter summaries are 5 star posts
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# ? May 22, 2015 20:25 |
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Since I didn't make it explicit in previous chapter summaries, anything in parentheses is my own original thought, and not a note from the original text. Chapter 4: Put Data in Context This chapter continues explaining the hindsight bias introduced in Chapter 3. Here, Dekker encourages us to put data in context by asking the following three questions:
We take data out of context by micro-matching, cherry-picking, and presenting a shopping bag full of missed indicators. When we micro-match, we search for deviations from protocol or best practice, and we look for missed cues that would have been critical in understanding the situation. However, pointing out that a mismatch existed between procedure and practice is merely a starting point, and explains neither why this mismatch happened, or why this is necessarily important, because deviations from procedure often are simply part of daily life when the procedure does not match the reality that operators face. Dekker distinguishes between data availability, the data that was physically present as a situation unfolded, and data observability, which considers human factors including the interface to that data, and the conflicting priorities individuals may have faced versus correctly looking at and interpreting it. When we cherry-pick, we take data out of context, group it together, and label fragments that support the narrative we wish to convey. In doing so, we miss critical details that do not support our presupposed interpretation of events, and we exclude other pieces of important information that sit chronologically between the data we have chosen to support our version of events. Lastly, when we sweep cues together into a shopping bag, we provide ourselves as investigators with an unlimited amount of pre-interpreted data that was not available to people immersed in the situation as it unfolded. We also cognitively group them in ways they were not grouped during the situation. Instead of following these biases, we should try to initially limit our understanding to the data that was available to each person at the time, and imagine ourselves bound by the same constraints and conflicting priorities. Choice quotes:
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# ? May 23, 2015 00:07 |
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evol262 posted:The RHCSA is our beginner cert, but RH certs are practical. You need to be able to actually do it. LPIC training would be a good first step if you don't know Linux at all. Perfect, thanks.
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# ? May 23, 2015 00:11 |
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icehewk posted:Perfect, thanks. Yeah there's almost no way you can study up and pass the RHSCA cold. It suggested you have a couple years of Linux experience first. With out a job that specifically exposes you to Linux its a big challenging to build that up. I recommend you just try to get Centos or Fedora working as your daily driver laptop for six months. If you can manage that then you'll get a decent exposure to Linux and have enough familiarity to it to be able to handle the tests. By a working daily driver I mean everything has to work, WiFi, sleep/hibernate/keyoard special keys, etc. Each of them is a huge hassle in Linux, so going through it will toughen you up.
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# ? May 23, 2015 00:17 |
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SIR FAT JONY IVES posted:Yeah there's almost no way you can study up and pass the RHSCA cold. It suggested you have a couple years of Linux experience first. With out a job that specifically exposes you to Linux its a big challenging to build that up. I recommend you just try to get Centos or Fedora working as your daily driver laptop for six months. If you can manage that then you'll get a decent exposure to Linux and have enough familiarity to it to be able to handle the tests. Every industry certification recommends 1-3 years of professional experience and I'm awfully unsure how they've reached that conclusion. Plenty of technical schools have excellent teachers and with technology today it's incredibly easy to teach yourself nor do I understand how anyone remains an "IT Intern" for more than a year. Granted, it's unique that Red Hat's certifications are practical tests with a live environment but I've heard of some people passing with a semester class or previous IT experience and self-study. Or maybe I'll eat my words when I take the exams
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# ? May 23, 2015 01:12 |
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Tab8715 posted:Every industry certification recommends 1-3 years of professional experience and I'm awfully unsure how they've reached that conclusion. Plenty of technical schools have excellent teachers and with technology today it's incredibly easy to teach yourself nor do I understand how anyone remains an "IT Intern" for more than a year. There's almost no way you can pass the RHCSA exam with out having at least some previous Linux experience. I've studied and passed a ton of certs, but really, it's quite a bit harder to get started if you have no experience. They sit you down in front of a RH desktop running KVM, with a couple VMs already setup, and there's a list of things you have to get working on them. Item #1 is reset the root password and log into the VMs. If you have RH6 or under experience, this process is completely different on RHEL7. A few guys in my bosses test group didn't realize it was different, they had years of RH6 experience, and just ended up walking out of the test after a half hour because there's no way to figure it out with out knowing before hand. Of course you can read that from a book, but the rest of it is really specific, and requires you to know your way around grep, find, yum, repo management, installing packages, configuring shares, authentication, services. It's a lot to just study and memorize.
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# ? May 23, 2015 01:48 |
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Just finished chapter 2 of Ghori's RHCSA. The book is definitely thick but there's a screendump or chart on almost every page so it goes quickly despite the content. I've been using Linux for about a year now, hosting a few Tomcat servers/nginx reverse proxies at work and then running bind + dhcpd at home. Not coming in fresh, but I never learned much about the kernel itself or how to use unix tools. Here's my notes from ch 2 (chapter 1 has no exam content): "ll" as a default alias for "ls -l" is cool and I'm putting that on all of my servers now. Vim has even more key commands than I thought. [#]G and [#]D are indispensable. I don't know what view mode is supposed to do. bzip2'd and gzip'd files do not get a .bz2 extension by default. That's going to gently caress me up constantly. When I was looking at yum's default repos for bzip2 I found a package that auto adds these extensions by default, which at least tells me I'm not in this alone. Bolded Exam Tip: tar + compressing at the same time uses less disk space than tar + compressing afterwards I hate manpages compared to powershell's help. I learn best with quick concrete examples, something PS does an incredible job at and manpages don't seem to do at all? I also couldn't find an info module that tabbed to anything besides a man page. Kind of confused when I'd ever use it, or use any of the built in documentation when I have Google. A couple of the chapter review questions wanted to know what actual files that "who" and "last" referenced (/var/run/utmp and /var/log/wtmp). I did not pay attention to this at all during the chapter as it just didn't seem like practical info. Will the RHCSA ask similar questions to this? Roargasm fucked around with this message at 18:46 on May 23, 2015 |
# ? May 23, 2015 18:44 |
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Roargasm posted:Just finished chapter 2 of Ghori's RHCSA. The book is definitely thick but there's a screendump or chart on almost every page so it goes quickly despite the content. I've been using Linux for about a year now, hosting a few Tomcat servers/nginx reverse proxies at work and then running bind + dhcpd at home. Not coming in fresh, but I never learned much about the kernel itself or how to use unix tools. The RHCSA I took didn't ask about that specifically. There are no actual questions. Its just a list of practical tasks you have to do in sequence since they slightly overlap and some depend on each other. Understanding how to use man pages will really help. You know know how to find what help you need with out google. Learning how to search packages through Yum is also essential since it asks you to install some commands but doesn't reference what specific package you need.
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# ? May 23, 2015 20:47 |
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Chapter 5: "They Should Have ..." Another short chapter dealing with a specific aspect of the hindsight bias, this one focuses on avoidance of "they should have" thinking. (As you'll recall from previous chapters, this is not a valuable way of approaching human factors because it encourages us to focus on the missed cues that immediately preceded an accident, rather than why people made decisions that seem, in retrospect, like poor judgment.) Dekker refers to these "they should have" suppositions as counterfactuals, because they are literally "counter the facts" because they talk about a supposed reality that did not happen. The goal of an investigator is to understand why people's behavior made sense to them at the time. Even knowing the outcome puts investigators at a disadvantage when attempting to model the situation from the points of view of its participants. This counterfactual reasoning may be useful for recommending countermeasures to prevent similar failures in the future, but should not be used as a starting point for the investigation. When we attempt to discover the causes of failure, we inherently look first for other causes of failure. As a result, we end up with a narrative of events that is "one incremental slide into bad judgment," comprising a series of poor assessments, miscommunications, and bad decisions. Instead, we should work the other way, working forward rather than backwards, retracing the incident from the inside rather than the outside. This helps us to avoid the temptation of hindsight. Dekker also recommends the use of the word "failure" when framing your understanding of an issue, because it inherently passes a value judgment on people's understanding of the situation, rather than seeking to understand why those people made the decisions they made. Critical point: you cannot ever correctly judge the quality of a decision someone made by working backwards from the outcome. Choice quotes:
Vulture Culture fucked around with this message at 05:48 on May 25, 2015 |
# ? May 24, 2015 07:50 |
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Picked up the powershell book so hoping that's still on the list!
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# ? May 24, 2015 15:04 |
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RHCSA & RHCE Redhat Enterprise Linux 7 - Preface and Chapter 1 The author is an experienced Linux,Unix professional and even wrote a few books about HP-UX. Stunningly, his email is provided through Yahoo. The book is designed as a reference or self-study to pass both certifications. The test structure is reviewed it's a live, practical test with no internet access and he recommends installing GNOME in order to speed things along while I'm under the impression with the RHEL7 exam we aren't allowed access to any GUI Tools. The book is split between RHCSA and RHCE content with the first 13 chapters for the former with it taking up 2/3 of the book. It's a lot of content. First chapter discusses how Linux was born out of Unix. Richard Stallman wanted to free create software (not in the text but in the 80s all computers were strictly proprietary) and created a group called GNU to do so but didn't have a kernel. Linus Torvalds came around had programmed a kernel. The two groups eventually merged and became GNU/Linux or just Linux. I'm a little perplexed as to why Stallman came up with the name GNU or "GNU Not Unix"? Apparently, it's easy to pronounce or sing. Either way, Linux was released in 1991 and since then has been tremendously successful. Red Hat was established in 1993 and created the Fedora project and is a test bed for Red Hat Linux. Fedora is free and RHEL is paid and runs on everything from standard desktops to IBM Power. Installation types are discussed - CLI, GUI (called Anaconda) and Kickstart (Network) along with hardware requirements which are self-explanatory plus installation screens and logs. The lab setup is only two VMs but the will eventually include multiple network adapters and disks which gets a little but it's something I need to get comfortable with. One thing of particular note, is the author recommends Virtual Box, VMware but I've been recommended to use KVM as the live exam runs on it which is sort of annoying unless you have existing hardware lying around. I'll probably just use Nested Virt with VMware Workstation. Gucci Loafers fucked around with this message at 05:39 on May 25, 2015 |
# ? May 25, 2015 05:27 |
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I have a few nitpicks already (at the end of chapter 2), but I'll probably write a consolidated post about them tomorrow or Tuesday. Fedora also runs on everything RHEL is supported on (and then some). CentOS and SL are fine. They're perfectly appropriate to use instead of RHEL in many cases, especially testing stuff like this. You can also get self-support RHEL subscriptions for $100 if you want to use it cheaper. Or a trial. You can use RHEL as long as you want for nothing, you just don't get updates. You can plausibly add the centos repos to RHEL, though not supported. I'm guessing he suggests vbox because it's free and readers are likely to be running Windows. Why not VMware player, though? Teaming/bonding/iscsi multipathing are important exam goals, though
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# ? May 25, 2015 05:53 |
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Thanks for the write up, Tab. Appreciated Also if you are completely perplexed by Stallman that just means your brain is working as intended. RMS is... something else. Dude has made irreplaceable contributions to the software world. But he is also crazy as gently caress. Edit: also yeah, CentOS is literally RHEL in all ways that matter. Do not bother paying for a license just to get the cert. Open Source software at work. Docjowles fucked around with this message at 06:04 on May 25, 2015 |
# ? May 25, 2015 05:57 |
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Met RMS. Smells like he looks.
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# ? May 25, 2015 06:02 |
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Re: installing GNOME -- it's probably faster and more efficient to run GPM as a daemon (should be able to just background it) and use that to copy/paste between virtual consoles.evol262 posted:Met RMS. Smells like he looks. ...ew.
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# ? May 25, 2015 08:41 |
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Vulture Culture posted:Chapter 5: "They Should Have ..." I felt this one closely recently when we ran into an issue with some data being loaded into a database incorrectly; two immediate causes were responsible: the new guy was checking the log files daily but didn't interpret the error messages correctly, and the batch file that was responsible for the error ran an order of operations that allowed the issue to occur by failing a previous check. Trouble is, the error messages are really similar to one we routinely get about a network connection issue; it's easy to think "stupid new guy, he should've done 'X' when the error message popped up" but the reality is the actions he took made sense because he thought the error message meant something else, and the reason he thought that was because the error messages are not descriptive enough to distinguish to someone not experienced with the system. In hindsight he himself probably thinks "I should've recognized these errors were different" when the better question is "how can we improve the descriptions of our errors so someone who is new can differentiate between them easily" (and also "why is the batch file ordered the way it is to allow the secondary failure to occur, and can we restructure it to change that behavior". ----- Powershell-wise I'm up to Chapter 5; the end of chapter "quizzes" are actually really good primers for what I've been doing at work as I put together a script to read, compare and modify CSV files.
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# ? May 25, 2015 22:50 |
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For an alternative RHEL spinoff go for Oracle Linux, you are more likely to get updates than CentOS and the repo is public.
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# ? May 25, 2015 23:06 |
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MrMoo posted:For an alternative RHEL spinoff go for Oracle Linux, you are more likely to get updates than CentOS and the repo is public. CentOS is public. CentOS is now run directly by Red Hat, and they're building on the same infrastructure. Oracle is faster with major updates (historically). That should no longer be the case. All EL rebuilds (OEL, CentOS, SL, maybe Red Star) are pretty equal. Don't overcomplicate it. Also, Oracle is a terrible company
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# ? May 25, 2015 23:29 |
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evol262 posted:All EL rebuilds (OEL, CentOS, SL, maybe Red Star) are pretty equal. Unless I'm thinking of a different Red Star, one of these things is not like the other. Unless:
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# ? May 25, 2015 23:48 |
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Ah, I meant Red Flag, the other official communist party Linux. General comments:
But in general, the {} should be placed wherever you expect a filename to go. It's not a magic thing, and it's not always at the end. I hope he'll go through it a bit more in the next chapter, because `find` is extremely useful, but clarifying in case he doesn't.
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# ? May 26, 2015 00:14 |
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evol262 posted:I just wanna comment and say that these chapter summaries are 5 star posts I'm returning to this thread specifically for them. For book suggestion I'd be interested in anything that helps turn me from "self taught ugly scripter" to "guy who can write good code". Language doesnt matter.
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# ? May 26, 2015 00:30 |
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I missed a day this weekend because I wasn't reading, and you shouldn't have been either. Moving right along: Chapter 6: Trade Indignation for Explanation Much of this chapter comprises excellent examples of aeronautical case study. Dekker reiterates that as a failure investigator, you must choose between actually understanding the situation or passing judgment on the people involved; you cannot do both. This is because it is fundamentally impossible to make sense of people's actions when you already do not view those actions as sensible to them. The local rationality principle says that what people do makes sense to them at the time given their goals, knowledge, and focus of attention. To help realize when we are being judgmental, and hindering our ability to understand the situation, we should avoid counterfactual language like "should have" or "if only." We must also avoid what Dekker calls "ugly" language, consisting of words like "illogical," "disbelief," and "dumbfounding," which contribute nothing to understanding actual contributors to failure. Choice quotes:
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# ? May 26, 2015 02:26 |
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Docjowles posted:Thanks for the write up, Tab. Appreciated Thank for you kind words, very much appreciated. I still want to do the first lab despite messing around with plenty of Linux VMs prior but this week at work is going be vicious and I've got another certification I also need to study for and I hope I don't fall too far behind.
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# ? May 26, 2015 04:22 |
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Swink posted:For book suggestion I'd be interested in anything that helps turn me from "self taught ugly scripter" to "guy who can write good code". Language doesnt matter. There are no real suggestions here. The Practical Programmer, Design Patterns, and others can be really helpful, but your best bet is to subscribe to the subreddit for the language you like, the CoC thread for it, read hackernews if it's a trendy language, the stackoverflow tag for it, and buy " $language Cookbook" if O'Reilly has it But learn best practices and code a lot. There's no other real way. Write a lot of code and read a lot of code by good developers.
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# ? May 26, 2015 05:42 |
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evol262 posted:There are no real suggestions here. The Practical Programmer, Design Patterns, and others can be really helpful, but your best bet is to subscribe to the subreddit for the language you like, the CoC thread for it, read hackernews if it's a trendy language, the stackoverflow tag for it, and buy " $language Cookbook" if O'Reilly has it Agreed on reading good code from other developers -- my developer interviews heavily focus on reasoning about other people's code more than the candidate writing their own -- but books on thinking around clean abstractions are really helpful at understanding why some developers are doing what they do as you read their code.
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# ? May 26, 2015 06:17 |
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I really like this idea! I'll throw in Applied Cryptography for fun, but I get that not everyone will be interested in that. I'll also recommend anything on Coding Horrors Required Reading.
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# ? May 26, 2015 22:16 |
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Applied cryptography looks pretty fun. I've always been interested in the math, but never curious enough to really bear down on it. Continuing the RHCSA/E deconstruction: Please let me know if this is too nitpicky, or confusing for new users. I'm trying to expound on errors and bad generalizations, though it may get a little more technical than is necessary. Chapter 4: This chapter sucks
Chapter 5:
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# ? May 27, 2015 05:34 |
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I've ordered that RHCSA/E book and plan to read it, and this kind of nitpicking is exactly what I want. So please go hog wild!
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# ? May 27, 2015 09:25 |
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Wow, I've been too busy to do keep up with these recently. I've got a lot of catching up to do! Chapter 7: Sharp or Blunt End? A few great longer quotes from Dekker in this chapter. When we analyze failures, we tend to put the focus on the operators, who are the people closest to the incident. However, this is short-sighted. Instead, we should view the system in which those people worked as something like a surgical scalpel: it has a sharp end, which does the cutting, and it has a blunt end, a grip, which allows that sharp end to be manipulated in service of some goal. In this analogy, the operators are the sharp end, who are directly involved in safety-critical processes. The blunt end is responsible for steering: this is the organization, which gives the sharp end resources to accomplish what it needs, but also adds its own pressures and constraints which can divert attention away from the task at hand and introduce potential for error. When we focus on the sharp end, we focus on the scalpel blade and ignore the surgeon. When investigating failure, organizations often focus on what Dekker calls "local miscreants," or the people nearest to the incident. When this happens, whether intentionally or not, the investigators are de facto "yes men," unwilling to or incapable of presenting views that implicate the status quo of the organization in the incident. Productive change toward system safety cannot occur while this mindset prevails. Choice quotes:
Vulture Culture fucked around with this message at 07:25 on Jun 4, 2015 |
# ? Jun 4, 2015 07:23 |
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Chapter 8: You Can't Count Errors Faced with the task of explaining and reducing human errors, managers often fall prey to the trap of trying to quantify them. There exists a common myth which states that 70 percent of mishaps are due to human error. This is a falsehood: safety is not something that inherently exists in a system until some human comes along to screw it all up. Safety in a complex system is something that is continuously created by people working in that system, who tailor their tasks to their own strengths, creating their own "buffers, routines, heuristics, double-checks, memory aids." Furthermore, we don't really know what errors even are except in hindsight; they are often indistinguishable from real work, especially because many "errors" are deliberate deviations from procedure as part of some problem-management strategy unknown to the people who oversee and count errors. Quantitative-only attempts to document errors without context will always fall short, and we should endeavor to consult with the people observed to ensure that our observed "errors" are, in fact, errors. When we count and categorize errors, we invariably lean towards oversimplified explanations like "human error." As Dekker reiterates, errors are not explanations of failure: they are starting points for investigation that themselves require explanation. Often, investigators fall into the trap of blaming either what Dekker refers to as "the head" (of the operator) or "the world." Instead of compartmentalizing in this way, we should begin by reconstructing and understanding the situation, and drawing connections between that situation and individual behavior. We must recognize that people change the situation, but the situation also changes people's behavior. Because of this, we cannot begin by trying to understand an operator's thought process independent of their situation. (More importantly -- and oddly ignored completely by Dekker -- compartmentalizing in this manner ignores one of the most important places to look: the interface between that operator and the broader system context in which they operate.) Choice quotes:
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# ? Jun 4, 2015 08:04 |
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Last one for tonight. This is a really short chapter. Chapter 9: Cause is Something You Construct When we search for the "root cause" or primary cause of an issue, we fundamentally deny that there are many systemic factors that play into an incident's occurrence. This chapter begins by looking at one false dichotomy that's very relevant to technology: mechanical failure versus human error. Dekker points out that this dichotomy reflects a variant of the bad apple theory: the idea that a system is basically safe, except for a handful of unreliable components. However, there are complicated relationships between the mechanical and human components of the system, and "human error" is often introduced by humans attempting to juggle the limitations of a nominally-functioning mechanical system with the real-world need to perform a task. Dekker proposes that cause is something you construct (like a story), not something you find while sifting through data of the incident. Keeping in mind the local rationality principle -- that people inherently try to do a good job and what they did probably made sense to them at the time -- a lot needs to go wrong for an accident to occur in a well-defended system (which most mature systems are). We call those things contributory factors. When we use the word "cause," we make a judgment that this event or circumstance is sufficient as the only thing that needed to occur for the accident to happen. This is rarely the case. Instead, it is more helpful to think in explanations than causes, and these explanations will typically detail how many contributory factors were necessary and only jointly sufficient to cause the accident. Choice quotes:
Related reading: John Allspaw - "Each Necessary but Only Jointly Sufficient" Vulture Culture fucked around with this message at 08:24 on Jun 4, 2015 |
# ? Jun 4, 2015 08:20 |
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Chapter 10: What is Your Accident Model? There are more or less three models for accidents. The first is the sequence-of-events model, which views the situation as a series of events with a cause-effect relationship that lead up to an eventual failure. In this model, accidents may be prevented by removing one link from the chain or by inserting a barrier between any two dominoes. This can be useful for modeling clear technical cause-effect relationships and explaining how failures cascade. This perspective is, however, too linear and too narrow in focus to capture organizational contributions. Additionally, the starting point is often completely arbitrary, since earlier events can always be added. Dekker reminds us that it is critical to understand the ways that entire parts of a system can contribute to system failure in different circumstances. The second is the epidemiological model, which views accidents as being related to latent failures which hide in every aspect of the system. This is often an improvement over the sequence-of-events model, because it provides opportunities to explain how organizational pressure factored into an accident. This is also a problematic model, because after the fact, nearly everything within the organization can be viewed as a latent failure (consider corporate post-mortems in which everyone is pointing fingers at one another). Compartmentalizing these factors into linear layers of defense, as in the "swiss cheese" analogy, may not produce an accurate model of what makes a system risky or safe. The third is the systemic model which sees accidents as coming from interactions between components and processes, rather than within them. We cannot use failures to explain failure (turtles all the way down); we must instead understand why those decisions were viewed as normal or acceptable at the time. Systems models build on two ideas: that safety is emergent, and is not something inherent to its constituent parts, and that control over processes and designs is based on past (often incorrect, in retrospect) ideas over how these parts interact. System accidents occur not because of failures in these constituent parts, but because during development, design, and operation, there is insufficient control over the constraints which build upon each other to keep these systems safe. These controls must be dynamic in order to be effective in circumstances that are constantly evolving. Choice quotes:
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# ? Jun 5, 2015 03:44 |
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Chapter 11: Human Factors Data This is a really short, really dense chapter. Where previous chapters have excessively focused on unlearning bad habits -- in other words, teaching how not to conduct failure analysis -- at this point the book starts to dive pretty deep into things you should be doing to get at the data and information you need to inform yourself on contributing factors to the accidents you're studying. Human factors is about "how features of people's tools and tasks and working environment systematically influence human performance." In this chapter, Dekker looks at two sources of this data: debriefings of participants and recordings of performance parameters. (As technologists, we're intimately familiar with the latter; typically, not so much with the former.) The goals of a debriefing are to reconstruct the situation that each person found themselves in and to obtain their points of view. However, human memory is imperfect. Memories are not photographic and cannot be recalled in perfect chronological order. Counterintuitively, it also tends to order and structure events more than they were (see the sequence of events model from last chapter). These memories are a tangled web that influence the recall of each other, so a person may not be able to separate back what they did or didn't know or notice at a certain point in the situation. To avoid distortions, Dekker posts a debriefing order, paraphrased from researcher Gary Klein, and re-paraphrased by me:
At each of the critical moments, try to determine which cues they noticed, what knowledge was used as they dealt with the situation (especially of past experiences in similar situations), what they expected to happen, what options they felt they had, and how outside forces impacted their understanding or decision-making in the situation. As an investigator, you should expect the accounts to be inconsistent, even multiple accounts from the same person given at multiple times. These inconsistencies and disagreements should be noted in your incident report. Make explicit which ones you chose to incorporate as canon and why. These disagreements are not impairments, but additional human factors data that may point to differing priorities of people inside the situation. We always want more data. However, our ability to make sense of this data is limited. While the data is objective (as long as it's correct), people's behavior in these settings is always more complex and nuanced than the corresponding data. We must combine the data with understandings of people's actions to properly grasp the situation. Much of people's work involves interacting with systems which automate away many manual or repetitive processes. Because many errors begin at the interface between human and machine, this is one of the most crucial places to record data on what those interactions were. This is often not adequately done. As a result, we must interpolate the different forms of information available to us.
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# ? Jun 5, 2015 04:58 |
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# ? May 5, 2024 14:15 |
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The current book is too expensive for me. How much is left of it before a new book is started?
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# ? Jun 8, 2015 22:19 |