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Let us talk about Africa. Africa is a big place and lots of things are happening, so to get things started a brief overview of some of the major stories, most of them ongoing conflicts involving multiple nations, grabbing international headlines:  Boko Haram Insurgency: Nigeria continues it's operations against the jihadist insurgent group Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria. Now backed by a Multinational force made up of troops from Chad, Niger and Cameroon. Boko Haram have lost a significant amount of territory following the recent counter-offensive launched in January 2015. In March of 2015 Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram, pledged allegiance to ISIS and has begun the process of rebranding the group as Wilayat al Sudan al Gharbi tholugh it is unclear as of posting what effect this will have on the conflict.  Operation Barkhane: The French led Operation Barkhane continues in the Sahel supporting Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Chad in operations against various jihadist groups that have become increasingly active in the region since the 2012 rebellion against the Malian government led by the Tuareg ethnic group fuelled by long standing demands for regional autonomy. Mali has now concluded a peace agreement with the Tuareg fighters involved which may prove vital in the coming months.  Somalia: The Somalian government, backed by the African Union peacekeeping mission AMISOM, continues to consolidate it's control over Somalia. Al-Shabaab continues to be a regional threat but holds little territory, shifting it's tactics largely to urban attacks in Somalia and neighbouring Kenya where it's increasingly violent campaign has triggered a controversial crackdown on Somali refugees  South Sudanese Civil War: The South Sudanese Civil War, which began in December 2013, continues with no obvious end in sight as negotiations led by Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia have failed to produce a lasting peace agreement. South Sudan celebrated it's 4th birthday on the 9th July though so Happy Birthday guys   Central African Republic Peace Process: The Central African Republic's peace process continues slowly with a transitional government, backed by the African-lead UN peacekeeping force MINUSCA, slowly working towards to disarming and reintegrating fighters. Initially triggered when a majority-muslim coalition of rebels from the North of the country called the Séléka deposed the government of François Bozizé. This triggered often brutal violence between ex-Séléka fighters and Christian militias leading to a massive internal migration and a de-facto partition between the Muslim West and Christian East. General elections and a constitutional referendum are scheduled for October 2015. Huge piece from end of 2014 here - essential reading for more info.  Burundian Presidential Election: Burundi is due to vote in a Presidential Election on July 21st that could see current President Pierre Nkurunziza returned for a controversial third term. His plans to pursue a third term have raised concern internationally as they appear to threaten the peace deal that ended Burundi's violent civil war. Since his announcement there have been increasingly bloody street protests and a failed coup bid in May of this year. The coup leader remains at large. Other Important Matters To Discuss: Wizkid or Davido? Mandatory Fela Song: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X6yM6HLADbE
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Jul 12, 2015 22:20
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Long Post Incoming: South Sudan - What's Happening Again?  President Salva Kiir (left) & Riek Machar(right) On the 14th December 2013 members of the South Sudanese Presidential guard mutineed leading to series of running gun battles in the South Sudanese capital of Juba. Though the initial wave of fighting was quickly crushed and temporary order was restored to the capital, President Salva Kiir declared the mutiny an attempted coup organised by his political opponents within the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) - an organization which had gradually absorbed various different groups over the course of the last decade and had become riven with complex factional fueds that cut across regional and ethnic divides. Kiir ordered the arrest of several prominent government critics, including former vice-president Riek Machar (who Kiir accussed of being the leader of the coup attempt) who managed to escape the capital. According to Machar and his allies there was never a coup attempt, instead the mutiny had been triggered after Kirr ordered members of the presidential guard belonging to the Nuer ethnic group disarmed. Kiir is a member of Dinka ethnic group and the opposition insists that the current conflict is the result of Kiir's attempts to consolidate control in the hands of Dinka at the expense of the other ethnic groups in South Sudan. Fighting quickly escalated as Machar declared the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) with outbreaks of violence in the Eastern states of Jonglei, Unity and Upper-Nile - states with a hefty Nuer presence where large chunks of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) defect to Machar's cause (many of these generals were previously affiliated with militias in conflict with the SPLM who had subsequently been absorbed into the armed forces before independence).  Since then South Sudan has been trapped in a near constant Civil War between the SPLM-IO and the SPLA. Fighting has largely been concentrated to the North East of the country and much has been made of the increasing factionalisation between the Dinka and Nuer but there are increasing concerns that fighting could spread to the ethnically diverse southern provinces of Equatoria who have remained neutral in the conflict. In January of this year a new group formed following a mutiny of SLPA officers in Western Equatorial, the Revolutionary Movement for National Salvation (REMNASA). Though small at the moment it is a worrying indicator that the continuing stalemate in the conflict and the ethnic rhetoric involved may cause even further fracturing of a country struggling to hold itself together, this year also saw a high profile former rebel from the Shilluk ethnicity defect from the government and join with the SPLM-IO though they have refused to integrate fully into the SLPM-IO's command structure. Economic Woes:  To add to South Sudan's political difficulties the ongoing Civil War has brought major economic woes that are threathening to spiral out of control and have lead some commentators to warn that the country is on the brink of total finanical collapse. The South Sudanese economy is overly reliant on Oil exports, much of the fighting has been concentrated in major Oil producing states such as Unity leading to a sharp decline in output - from 350,000 barrels a day in 2011 to average of 169,000 barrels in 2015, a drop of 52%. Combined with the world decline in oil prices, South Sudan has suddenly found themselves in a precarious economic position at a time when security sector spending has unsuprisingly increased dramatically - the finance ministry has indicated that they are only able to raise one third of their annual budget and have been forced to take out proportionally massive loans to mantain spending levels. Even with direct aid increasing from foreign sources The government has increasingly turned to Oil companies and banks (specifically the Qatar National Bank) to raise the funds needed, often at arguably unfavourable interest rates. To plug the economic gap the government has also been dipping heavily into their reserves, completely depleting their local currency reserves and taking a hefty bite out of their forex reserves (the government refuses to disclose how much they have left in this regard). The South Sudanese economy relies heavily on imports and, with the government keeping a tight grip on forex reserves and exchange rates to continue to fund their military spending, it has becoming increasingly difficult to secure dollars to keep the domestic economy afloat. Increasingly South Sudanese businesses have turned to the booming parallel exchange market which offers a considerably less favourable rate which has lead to spiralling inflation (currently at over 60%) that the government has been unable to contain. Letters of Credit have proven to be near impossible to secure with many businesses complaining that the process is massivley corrupt and is being manipulated for personal gain. Corruption of course is another factor and the money being siphoned off is adding further pressure to an already fraught situation, for example the SPLA payroll alone accounts for 80% of defence expenditure (based on 2012 estimates) due to a ridiculously top heavy structure (they have over 700 generals) and a large number of "ghost soldiers" drawing pay checks. Give Peace a Chance?  Attempts to mediate a resolution to the conflict began almost as soon as it started but have beared little fruit. The main regional players (Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya) have co-ordinated negotiations between the beligerents through the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and have chaired numerous peace talks in Addis Ababa since early 2014. Numerous temporary cease-fires have come out of the talks but without fail these have collapsed amid mutual accusations of deception from both parties - the two camps have refused to compromise on key points (Kiir refuses to establish a formal power-sharing government with the SPLM-IO and Machar refuses to allow Kiir to remain president). After the collapse of the last round of talks there have been increasing calls for a so-called "IGAD Plus" to bring other international actors with interests in the region to the negotiating table to force a resolution - namely China (who is heavily invested in the South Sudan Oil Industry), the USA (a major funder and early supporter of the South Sudanese government) and the wider AU. Part of the reason for this may lie with one of the IGAD states - Uganda. Since the outbreak of the conflict Uganda has supported Kiir's government both diplomatically and with actual troops, diverting troops placed in the country to combat Joseph Kony's LRA to assist the government in driving back the rebels from Juba near the start of the conflict. Although Uganda initially denied their involvement, they eventually admitted their assistance to the government after repeated rumours circulated of Ugandan air force jets bombing rebel position. Repeated international calls have been made for Uganda to withdraw their troops which they have repeatedly ignored, even going as far as extending their presence in the country in Feburary of this year even when the rebel faction indicated that such an extension would lead to a breakdown in the peace talks. With Uganda being one of the major members of IGAD it's not hard to see why some observers have little faith in their ability to extract a meaningful peace deal. China has also, much to a lot of people's suprise, waded into the negotiations in an attempt to resolve the conflict. As I mentioned a bit earlier China has major interests in the Oil producing provinces currently under rebel control and the shut-down in production is doing them no favours. While the traditional understanding of China's African policy is that they refrane from intervening in domestic political situations it seems that they have made an exception with South Sudan - mediating talks between the two factions outside of the IGAD negotations. There have also been reports that China have moved to stop the flow of Chinese made arms into the country, thought others have thrown doubt on this and insist China are still arming government forces. Any stealth arming program would most likely be to counter any Sudanese support for the SPLM-IO who have reportedly recieved small arms from the Sudanese army, a possible continuation of the pre-independence dynamics that saw the Sudanese army provide material support to militias aligned against the SPLM to destablise the region. On a wider international front the EU imposed personal sanctions on various figures within the SPLA and the SPLM-IO last year in an attempt to force a peace deal. The UNSC has also given the green light to possible personal sanctions after the collapse of the last round of peace talks earlier this year. Much more detail on sanctions here The pressure is on both sides to come to some kind of peaceful agreement but whether or not this is possible has yet to be seen kustomkarkommando fucked around with this message at 22:50 on Jul 12, 2015 |
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Jul 12, 2015 22:44
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Jagchosis posted:Have there been any developments in the War in Darfur for a while? If I remember correctly the government launched an offensive earlier in the year with the Rapid Support Force, which is basically the Janjaweed reformed with a new coat of paint. I think they've been having difficulties keeping their former allies on side, a bunch of former Janjaweed volunteers split of and formed their own party a while back and have been vocally criticising the government.
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Jul 12, 2015 22:54
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R. Mute posted:What's Sudan's role in all of this? I can't imagine them staying completely on the sidelines. Kiir's government have repeatedly accused Sudan of arming and supporting Machar, something which they have consistently denied though some research has indicated that this may not be true: Small arms ammunition documented at Bentiu mosque by Conflict Armament Research posted:Two of the mosque-site cartridge cases, with features suggesting Sudanese manufacture, were manufactured in 2014.Irrespective of its origins or supply vector, this 2014 ammunition is indicative of extremely recent supply to its user, and with a comparatively direct supply chain. If this ammunition’s markings accurately reflect its date of manufacture, it cannot have been supplied to its user earlier than January 2014, after the defection of SPLM-IO forces from the SPLA in mid-December 2013. This makes it unlikely that the ammunition originated in SPLA stocks taken by defecting SPLM-IO forces, and likely that it was obtained by its user (SPLM-IO or another armed group) from an external source since the start of the current conflict. Machar was previously involved in a controversial peace deal with the Sudanese government pre-independence that favoured a federal resolution as opposed to partition, he subsequently changed this position and joined the SPLM before independence but Kiir's government has continually pointed to this as a sign that he is still on Khartoum's payroll. It is possible that this is the case but Khartoum does make hefty profits from charging fees on South Sudan for using their oil transport infrastructure, they still rely on Sudan to transport their oil to the North for export as South Sudan has not yet developed a separate pipe-line to take the Oil to the South (though there is a lot of eagerness from neighbouring East African states for this to happen). The fall in Oil production is hurting Sudan's pockets as well so it seems slightly counter-productive for them to back the rebels - that's not to say they aren't though. kustomkarkommando fucked around with this message at 23:28 on Jul 12, 2015 |
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Jul 12, 2015 23:26
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Another factor to the South Sudanese Civil War which is worth mentioning is something I cheekily call The Actvisit Front. The outbreak of violence in 2013 triggered a massive argument among people involved in Sudan in the policy arena which can be broadly separated into two camps, the Alex De Waal camp and the John Prendergast camp. Alex De Waal is a British academic heavily involved in with the mediation efforts in Darfur and is generally considered one of, if not the, pre-eminent experts on Sudan. He has vocally criticised the ICC for seeking an arrest warrant for al Bashir, supported the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur's findings that the targeted killings in the region did not constitute a genocide and (arguably) opposed the partition. To some he has become to close to Khartoum in his positions but he is still a highly respected, if not somewhat controversial, figure. John Prendergast is an American activist and former advisor to Susan Rice during the Clinton administration. As founder and director of the Enough Project he has become on of the leading figures in applying pressure on successive administrations in regards to Sudan, South Sudan and the DRC - his shadow is cast long over American and international activism in Africa. He played a prominent role in lobbying for American support in South Sudan and has consistently pressed for a more bullish attitude to Sudan, naturally pitting him against De Waal. There has been a none too polite war of words between the two camps, probably best summarised with an extract from a recent interview with De Waal explaining his position: Al-Jazeera posted:How did the U.S. and the rest of the international community get drawn into the situation in Sudan? Prendergast has been keeping mum on the criticisms, largely spending his time attempting to build support for sanctions and an expanding UN mission to stabilise the region (he's also been facing down another Academic revolt over his Conflict Minerals policy in the DRC - I will effort post about this some other time so bare with me on that one). There is one little quote that did float up though in a piece defending Clooney (singled out by De Waal for obvious reasons) who is closely associated with Prendergast's various groups and often is the "face" of his campaigns: The Daily Beast posted:Moreover, Clooney and other pro-referendum activists were always careful to caution that South Sudan’s early years might well be chaotic, but the chance of a peaceful separation was far preferable to a new civil war. And while Clooney observed the referendum, he declined invitations to attend the independence ceremony seven months later and the inauguration of President Salva Kiir. His top Africa policy pal, John Prendergast of the Enough Project, recounts Clooney explaining his concerns along the lines I heard as well: “We don't know how this new government in Juba is going to be. Remember how the U.S. liked Robert Mugabe and Charles Taylor in the early going? Supporting the South Sudanese people is one thing, but supporting the government is another. Our work is to promote human rights and peace, not support one group or another."
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Jul 13, 2015 00:20
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More South Sudan stuff, this time something a little bit more detailed that explores the military situation and a possible significant development. A long piece about the recent SPLA offensive in Unity State that ended in June, there's a lot of detail in it about the interplay between different factions but it's got some interesting stuff in it: quote:By the end of May, SPLA forces had seemingly won a consummate military victory, driving the SPLA-IO from southern Unity. However, the southern campaign was noticeable for its lack of actual military battles. The SPLA-IO troops tended to withdraw into the bush before the advance of the SPLA, and Simon Maguek Gai, the SPLA-IO commander of the 4th Division in Unity state (which the SPLA-IO call Lich state), reportedly restrained the Nuer youth of southern Unity, who were angry about the offensive and prepared to attack the SPLA. Militarily, this means that southern Unity is full of SPLA-IO forces that will now be able to wage a guerrilla war against the SPLA during the rainy season. Indeed, as of the end of June, there is an SPLA-IO presence in Guit, Koch, and Leer counties. For this reason, despite the thoroughness of the SPLA offensive, it has not substantively changed the balance of power in the state: the government forces are still militarily dominant, but the SPLA-IO control the rural areas of southern Unity once again. The only substantive changes wrought by the offensive are the resources extracted from the region and the massive disruption to civilian life caused by the SPLA’s movement. Slightly more optimistic that some reports I've read. Regarding Pagan Amum, here's an article explaining his recent (and unlikely) rehabilitation from treasonous coup plotter to party grandee: Pa’gan Amum’s return to the SPLM posted:President Salva Kiir watched, motionless, as Pa’gan Amum was sworn in, and then the two men shook hands as the cameras flashed, before ululations and the customary celebratory chants of ‘SPLM Oyee’ filled the room. Shortly afterwards thunderclaps rumbled above SPLM House in Juba, and the rains began to fall: a blessing, or so many believe.
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Jul 13, 2015 21:24
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Jagchosis posted:South Africa appears to be intentionally loving up it's tourism sector with new harsh visa application rules that require long form birth certificates and apparently for India specifically, biometric data? KKK can you provide any insight into the impetus behind these changes? They are meant to crack down on human trafficking and most of the birth certificate stuff is targeted at adults travelling with minors (proving legal guardianship etc), the biometric data push is to force individuals to apply for their own visas rather than through third parties which the government insists have been abused by people smugglers. I would like to say that it is solely motivated by a concern for human welfare but considering that some of the newer legislation is coming after the recent Xenophobic riots in April there is a concern that SA is deliberately trying to make the lives of migrant workers difficult, some of the biometric stuff pre-dates that though so It may just be a case of a completely bungled policy having massive unintended consequences - something the ANC isn't exactly unfamiliar with.
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Jul 13, 2015 22:08
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Berke Negri posted:Has there been any recent developments on the creation of an African Monetary Union? How I remember it there's several economic regional blocs that are slowly to be overlapping with each other to one Continental currency but I'm not as familiar with the technical details. There are still paper plans to developed a common African currency but the major focus in recent years has been merging Free Trade areas to establish a unified economic community as a foundation. At the recent AU summit this year the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) was announced after years of negotiation unifying the three major Free trade zones in the Eastern/Southern half of Africa (COMESA, SADC and the EAC). To give you an idea how big the TFTA is, here's a map of the various nations covered:  Much has been made of the "Cape to Caio" factor. The EAC has also committed themselves to establishing a common currency by 2023, the relative good relations between it's members and increasing economic co-operation on big projects like Kenya's much vaunted Lamu transport corridor makes this seem increasingly more likely - there are of course still political aspirations from it's individual members that may get in the way of implementing the plan and it really isn't off the ground properly yet but it probably is one of the more realistic projects at the moment. Kenya's Lamu plan is massively ambitious and is all about developing a new deep-water port to relieve pressure from Mombasa, opening up East Africa for further Chinese maritime trade, developing regional transport infrastructure to improve the flow of goods and (very importantly) constructing a separate southern oil pipeline to transport South Sudanese crude to Lammu for export. A lot of money is riding on the project, Chinese companies have been picking up contracts left right and centre and have tossed a fair amount of capital into the project to get it off the ground and most of the regional actors are rubbing their hands in expectation - Kenyan fears of terror attacks on the Lamu development are part of the reason they have cracked down so ferociously on coastal violence. kustomkarkommando fucked around with this message at 20:29 on Jul 14, 2015 |
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Jul 14, 2015 20:26
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Berke Negri posted:Any future AMU regardless of size will naturally bring up the EMU and its problems to mind. Is there anything on paper what the actual structure of it will be is or is still kind of in a "hopefully we have this figured out by 2030" kind of stage? All I've seen is some "Wouldn't it be wonderful if..." statement papers, actual proper white papers may be out there but I've never encountered them - but monetary policy really is not my forte so even If I did I doubt I would understand them. If someone else has any idea maybe they can chime in? Foppery posted:Hey KKK, I visited Tanzania a few years a go and it seemed like a really lovely place. Is there anything interesting going on there right now and how is it doing as a whole? There are elections due in October which will pretty much rubber-stamp the ruling party's candidate (they've just selected a fellow over the weekend who I don't know much about, think he's considered a bit of an outsider?). There was meant to be a referendum on a new constitution that would radically overhaul how the government currently works, as is Zanzibar has it's own devolved government and can legislate for any issue that is deemed not to effect the Union as a whole while the Mainland assembly legislates for the Union and matters reserved from Zanzibar - this has been heavily criticised by Zanzibar opposition groups (though the ruling party still dominates politics on the Island) as increasingly more and more matters have been declared to be Union issues putting them beyond the scope of the Zanzibar assembly. The new constitution is meant to shift things to a more federal system with a Zanzibar Assembly, a Mainland Assembly and a National Assembly that would deal exclusively with Union matters appointed in a federal manner. There has been some resistance to this from within the ruling party, though the current President has pushed for it. When he steps down it's not clear how the reforms are going to progress - if at all. The big issue is about the opening up of trade, specifically with China. Tanzania has been slowly privatizing for over a decade and China has taken a noted interest in the country, practically throwing money at them and committing to massive transportation projects and development schemes. Tanzania has been experiencing a bit of an investment boom that has seen it become one of the richest East African Countries. However much of the wealth is not filtering down and Tanzania still has extremely high poverty levels and immense inequality, the boom hasn't seemed to have helped a great deal to alleviate this issue. Corruption has been a problem and I know there have been some very public drives to tackle it tapping into Nyerere's repeated attacks on personal self-enrichment, how successfully they've been is another thing. It's also looking like Tanzania may have hit a natural gas bonanza that will only exacerbate the problem as the government tries to juggle keeping foreign investors happy with trying to tackle endemic poverty. Frankly, the relative boringness of Tanzania is a pretty good thing. kustomkarkommando fucked around with this message at 23:11 on Jul 14, 2015 |
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Jul 14, 2015 23:06
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Volkerball posted:I hadn't seen this thread yet. Loving the picture of the Boko Haram dude holding up an ISIS flag with a cigarette hanging out of his mouth. Those are Nigerian soldiers showing off the spoils of war.
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Jul 15, 2015 00:40
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Major stuff happening in the next week to keep your eye on. Number 1 being the Burundian presidential election on Tuesday. So here's a bit of a primer If you have somehow avoided hearing about it all together: First a bit of background: Burundi's post-independence history has many similarities with neighbouring Rwanda. Like Rwanda, Burundi is seen to have three major ethnic groups - the agrarian Hutus, the pastoral Tutsis (comprising between 13-14% of the population) and the minority hunter-gatherer Twa (about 1% of the population). The degree to which these groups should be considered ethnicities or castes is a complicated question much debated by historians - Belgian pseudo-scientific racialism interpreted what many believe was largely a caste-based system along racial lines and divided the population cleanly into Tutsis and Hutus, often using bizarre identifiers such as height or the amount of cattle an individual owned as racial signifiers. This created a rigidity in a system which previously had a great amount of fluidity, Hutus could 'become' Tutsi and vice versa. Power was largely concentrated in the a third princely caste called the ganwa who served under a single monarch, viewed as Tutsi using Western definitions but traditionally considered a distinct group who drew support from Tutsi and Hutu alike. Like Rwanda land ownership was a major issue, land was largely concentrated in the hands of the Tutsi and princely caste who presided over an almost feudal system of complex allegiance. As Burundi entered the post-colonial period ethnic tensions between Tutsis and Hutus crystalised into a back and forth jockeying for political power through the multi-ethnic UPRONA party which had won 90% of the seats in the 1961 election. In 1965 the king dismissed a Tutsi prime minister for his perceived closeness to China and replaced him with a Hutu, Pierre Ngendandumwe, who was assassinated days later by a Rwandan Tutusi refugee. With ethnic tensions increasing an election was called in 1965 which saw UPRONA returned to power with a distinct Hutu majority in the Assembly, however rather than appoint a Hutu candidate as Prime Minister the King chose to appoint a princely Tutsi/Ganwa politician from the powerful Bezi clan. The Hutu were enraged and Hutu members of the armed forces launched a coup (allegedly with the intention of toppling the monarchy), killing the Prime Minister in the process. However the coup was ultimately crushed by army loyalists and the subsequent reprisals saw the armed forces purged of Hutus and every major Hutu political figure was either arrested or executed, ultimately consolidating Tutsi control of the both the military and the political apparatus. This brought to a head rivalries within the Tutsi political establishment who subsequently turned on the Crown and lead several decades of successive Tutsi-dominated miltiary governments that only exacerbated Hutu-Tutsi tensions leading to often brutal violence, including a failed Hutu uprising in 1972 that was brutally suppressed killing hundreds of thousands by some estimates. In 1987 Pierre Buyoyo came to power through another military coup and, following another outbreak of violence in 1988 and the outbreak of the Rwandan Civil War over the border, decided to embark on a gradual policy of reform to increase Hutu participation in the government. Elections where held in 1993 and Melchior Ndadaye became the first elected Hutu President, quickly moving to build an inter-ethnic government. However extremists within the military moved against him and he was murdered in a subsequent coup that triggering uprisings brutally supressed by the military. Attempts where made to stem the tide of violence by appointing another Hutu President Cyprien Ntaryamira, who was also ultimately killed in the same plane crash that killed the Rwandan president Juvénal Habyarimana - the event considered the trigger for the Rwandan genocide. With a massive influx of refugees from Rwanda and the attempts at political liberalisation seemingly in tatters Burundi descended into a brutal Civil War that killed approximately 300,000 people. Pressure from the international community eventually lead to an agreement for a transitional government and a limited ceasefire in 2000, though many groups rejected the compromise and there where attempts from within the military to seize power once again. Ultimately a sense of progress came in 2003 when Buyoyo, who had been made the president of the transitional government, stood down and allowed Pierre Nkurunziza (a Hutu) to replace him - kick starting a new round of ceasefire talks and paving the way for relatively peaceful elections in 2005 that saw Nkurunziza's political party, the CNDD–FDD, win a commanding majority and Nkurunziza himself become president. The current crisis  President Pierre Nkurunziza On April 25th of this year Nkurunziza announced that he would be seeking a third term in office. Almost immediately protesters took to the streets in opposition, the Burundian constitutional only allows for a maximum of two terms in office but the CNDD-FDD argued that Nkurunziza's first term in office does not count as he was not directly elected by the people - instead he was nominated and elected by the Senate and Assembly. As protests turned bloody and hundreds where detained, opposition politicians announced a boycott of the upcoming elections. In response the government refereed the issue to the Constitutional Court asking them to rule on the legality of a third term. Things took a violent turn when on May 1st a grenade attack killed two police officers. The president quickly denounced the protests as containing terrorist elements working to overthrow the government and launched a huge crackdown attempting to bring them to an end through mass arrests. Attempts where made by organisers to try to bring calm to the streets and opposition politicians made repeatedly calls for peaceful protests. However, these calls largely fell on deaf ears when on May 5th the Constitutional Court ruled in favour of the CNDD-FDD and gave a green light for Nkurunziza to run for a third term. However, the Vice-President of the court fled the country shortly before the judgement was delivered and denounced the government, accusing them of strong-arming the courts to rubber-stamp Nkurunzia's bid. Reports have indicated at least four of the other seven judges had also fled the country in fear of their lives following government pressure. COUP!  Coup leader Godefroid Niyombare on his way to officially announce the coup On May 13th Major General Godefroid Niyombare, a Hutu military figure who had publically opposed Nkurunziza's bid for a third term and lost his position because of it, took to the airwaves and announced a military coup had dismissed Nkurunziza, who was visiting Tanzania at the time. This is where things get a let bit hard to follow, a lot of claims about fighting in and around the capital spread like wildfire but what is certain is that there were intense battles to seize control of the state broadcaster - government troops and loyalists had descended on (and in some cases burnt to the ground) independent radio stations accused of being aligned with the plotters. One by one radio stations went silent and the trickle of news concerning the coup dried up. None the less people took to the streets to celebrate what they saw as a victory. The jubilation did not last long however as later that evening the head of military announced on the state broadcaster that the coup had been crushed and the leaders had been placed under arrest, except Niyombare who appears to have escaped and remains at large. In the days that followed the coup the independent radio stations remained silent, a situation that continues to this day with government controlled mouthpieces remaining the only source of news in the capital (and the country at large). There's a longer Al-Jazeera piece on this here if you're interested. Since then violence has continued on a slow boil. Nkurunziza promptly returned to the capital and drew comparisons between the coup plotters and al-Shabaab. He immediately moved to dismiss several key ministers and ordered the army onto the streets to restore order. The international community attempted to step in and mediate an agreement between the CNDD-FDD and opposition politicians, requesting that the assembly elections be pushed back and the presidential election be postponed. However, these talks hit a significant snag when Zedi Feruzi- an opposition politician - was shot dead. Opposition parties broke off mediations with the government and again reiterated their boycott of the Assembly election. Nkurunziza refused to back down and pressed ahead with the elections on June 29th, even after AU and EU monitors withdrew from the country and the UN denounced the elections as neither free or fair. Unsurprisingly the government won a hefty majority. The Presidential elections themselves are scheduled for this coming Tuesday (21st July). Last minute crisis talks attempting to mediate a solution appear to be collapsing with opposition politicians formally withdrawing from the election. The international community is pretty united in their condemnation of the elections progressing as planned but it doesn't seem to have dissuaded the CNDD-FDD. Spectres of War The current crisis did not come out of the blue though. Since 2014 there has been increasingly alarm among rights groups active in the country and international observers about a growing atmosphere of political repression under Nkurunziza that was linked to the coming elections. Much of the concern has focused on the CNDD-FDD's "Youth Wing", the Imbonerakure.  Imbonerakure members Formed in 2010 from members of the parties former Civil War era militia, the Imbonerakure (meaning "those who see far") have effectively continued their role as a party militia and have become increasingly prominent in the country - working alongside the police at the local level and becoming one of the most visible security forces in many parts of the country. In 2014 a confidiental UN cable was leaked that demonstrated the deep concerns about the Imbonerakure's activity: UN Envoy Parfait Onanga-Anyanga posted:After information gathered from key informants, there was distribution of weapons and outfits military and police during the months of January and February for youth affiliated to the CNDD-FDD (IMBONERAKURE) party and the demobilized AIMP Rumonge... Parallels with the infamous Rwandan Interahamwe have been drawn by some observers - there have even been some unsubstantiated reports that some members of the Imbonerakure may have been sent to the DRC for training from the FDLR, a Rwandan Hutu armed group in exile that includes/included former members of the Interahamwe in it's ranks (none of this is really beyond rumour level though). This may seem extreme but some of the language being used at the street level are a chilling reminder of the Civil War: IRIN posted:For those who lived through the civil war, the Kirundi word “kumesa,” used to issue a threat, is nothing new. Survivors of kidnappings and atrocities by rebels and soldiers alike recall armed men shouting “mumese!” an imperative form of the same verb meaning “kill him!” Regional Players:  Museveni (In the hat) alongside Nkurunziza Burundi of course does not exist in a vacuum and the influx of refugees to neighbouring countries is a significant crisis on it's own and has prompted a drive from neighbouring states to attempt to mediate a resolution in Burundi. This week Uganda's Yoweri Museveni stepped into the breach and chaired a series of interparty talks attempting to reach a peaceful solution. The irony of sending Museveni, a man currently preparing to run for his fifth term in office who amended the constitution of Uganda to allow him to extend his stay in office beyond two terms, was not lost on some international observers. He left the country on Wednesday with nothing, though he did indicate the government had agreed to disarm the Imbonerakure. This appears to be a commitment in principle though as so far there have been no reports of Imbonerakure militias being disarmed in the run-up to the coming vote. The choice of Uganda, a powerful regional militarly player, is a wise one due to their close relationship with Burundi's neighbour who is watching the events unfolding along their Southern border very closely - Rwanda Rwanda under Paul Kagame has increasingly become something of a concern. Their support for the Congolese rebel group M23 and their occasional exchanges of fire with the Congolese military have demonstrated that they are not afraid to flex their military muscles even if it means Western condemnation. Their rather public assassinatin campaign targetting former members of Kagame's inner circle abroad has been rather hard to sweep under the carpet for Western government's who intialy weclomed Kagame when he assumed power following the Rwandan genocide. With Burundi teetering on the brink of a political crisis there are worries Kagame will step into the fray to restore order and prevent a flare up of Tutsi-Hutu violence that could spill into Rwanda. The accusations of FDLR involvement have circulated widely in Rwanda and any sign they may be active in Burundi will enrage Kagame. The FDLR themselves are currently under pressure from the Congolese government who launched a new offensive against the group earlier this year after an amnesty program expired, the possibility they may shift over the border to escape the renewed miltiary campaign does exist if the security situation in Burundi continues to unravel. This is a bit of a hypothetical of course so I wouldn't be too concerned. On July 10th a mysterious armed group launched an attack against Burundi Defence Force positions near the Northern Border with Rwanda. The attack was immediately claimed by Leonard Ngendakumana (here speaking with the Kenya news agency KTN), a former deputy to the Coup Leader Niyombare who he insisted he was still in communication with, who announced the beginning of an insurgency against the government - claiming not only the border attack but the wave of grenade attacks that had been ongoing for months. Although he denied foreign involvement and insisted their troops where still in Burundi, this seems unlikely because of the sheer size of the country. Eyes are glancing nervously at Rwanda, eye-witness reports claimed the attackers at Kayanza came from the Rwandan side of the border - the possibility that Rwanda is allowing Burundian exiles to use their territory as a staging ground for attacks into the country is deeply worrying. So all we can really do is sit back and see what happens in the next few days. If the election goes ahead as planned on tuesday Nkurunziza will most likely win. What happens next though is anyone's guess. If you like moving pictures VICE has done some video dispatches that are worth a gander: https://news.vice.com/topic/burundi kustomkarkommando fucked around with this message at 23:55 on Jul 18, 2015 |
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Jul 18, 2015 22:26
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Popular Thug Drink posted:i hope it's called the Afro Rather boringly it will be called the East African Shilling (a thing that used to exist pre-independence).
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Jul 19, 2015 13:05
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Peel posted:How is this plan responding to the Euro's problems? After looking up some more detailed policy docs there seems to be a great emphasis on enforcing fiscal discipline bearing the Eurozone issues in mind For the record the current convergence targets for the EAC common currency are: Headline inflation <8% Fiscal deficit (including grants) <3% of GDP Gross public debt at <50% of GDP Reserve coverage of 4.5 months of imports These need to be reached and maintained for three years, I think Kenya is the closest to achieving them off the top of my head but they are the strongest economy in the region - it seems massively unlikely Burundi could ever hit targets like that. There are also three "indicative criteria" which don't appear to be prerequisites and are pretty out there: Ceilings on core inflation <5% Fiscal deficit (excluding grants) <6% of GDP A tax-to-GDP ratio floor of 25%
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Jul 19, 2015 13:14
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R. Mute posted:Kagame's also working towards extending the allowed terms in office, isn't he? He's still pretending that's not what he's interested in, but party's pushing 'spontaneous' petitions to call for a constitutional change. Unsurprisingly considering Rwanda's political climate, they're ostensibly getting massive amounts of support - so it looks like it's a forgone conclusion. The main difference with Burundi being that the West isn't making as much of a fuss about Rwanda as it is about Burundi. A pretty prominent Africa commentator in Belgium raised this point in an op-ed piece this morning, but couldn't really find a reason for the difference in approach towards both countries. Personally, I feel like the donor countries are still very wary about getting involved in Rwandan politics, still having the genocide on their minds. It's easier to just let Rwanda be than to possibly gently caress something up. I think part of it has to do with concerns that in Burundi third-termism is a destabilizing concern, Nkurunziza's grip on power is nowhere near as absolute as Kagame's and attempting to game the system to his advantage is widening political cleavages in such that the security situation is at threat - the situation in Rwanda is markedly different as Kagame's third term has barely met with a peep of opposition so the concern here is more about establishing a healthy democratic process rather than preventing a humanitarian crisis. There have been some mumbled complaints from donor countries about Kagame's plans to go after a third term, it may mean some slashed funding when he goes ahead with it but this is hardly something to dissuade Kagame who has been on the donor naughty books for the last few years after the Congo Group of Experts accused him of directly funding armed groups in the DRC. There has been some news in regards to this with the Rwandan parliament voting 99% in favour of a referendum on eliminating term limits, arguably this is quite smart as a popular referendum (which Kagame would undoubtedly win) is a hard thing for donor countries to discount as "undemocratic". Rwanda will probably play out a bit like Uganda back in 2005, a lot of gnashing of teeth and complaints from donors that eventually die down when people remember the regional importance of the nation in question and decide that it's better to stay on their good side. In contrast, the vagueness about whether or not Joseph Kabila in the DRC will go after a third-term is considered a much much bigger concern. He didn't make it much of a secret that he was contemplating it at the end of last year which sparked protests violently suppressed by the police and army earlier this year, the unravelling situation in Burundi and the successful street protests in Burkina Faso against Blaise Compaore's third term plans in October of last year seem to have given him cold feet though and he has publicly denied he wants a third term - not that many people believe him though. Kabila's grip on power again is nowhere near absolute and the idea of him getting a third term has proved massively unpopular, even among members of his own party and the ruling clique around him. Donor countries have been applying huge amounts of pressure to get him to stand down at the end of his current term as a third term will undoubtedly prompt a political crisis that may reverse some of the gains the UN has made in the East of the country working alongside the Congolese armed forces. Again, the focus is on the security situation primarily with the health of democratic institutions being a concern but one that takes second place to the threat of violence. For example Denis Sassou Nguesso in the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) is currently working to eliminate term limits so he can run again - but he's already been in power for 31 of the last 36 years (a lot of it before the introduction of the current constitution) so no one is kicking up much of a fuss. See also Faure Gnassingbe in Togo getting a third term earlier in the year with barely anyone batting an eye, his family have ruled the country since 1967 so no one was much surprised.
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Jul 19, 2015 16:17
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surrender posted:Also, I highly recommend Congo: The Epic History of a People by David van Reybrouck for anyone interested in the country's history. There's not much out there about the current political situation bar stuff in Foreign Affairs, but Radio Okapi is far and away the best news source in the country. This is a good book and I second this Other good source of Congo political stuff is Congo Siasa, horrible looking blog run by Jason Stearns probably best known for writing Dancing in the Glory of Monsters but is big old wonk who was also a member of the Congo Group of Experts for a while. surrender, hows the FDLR disarmament thing being received in your neck of the woods - most of them are getting shunted to Kisangani aren't they?
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Jul 19, 2015 19:22
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edit is not quote dummy
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Jul 19, 2015 19:23
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Barack Hussein Obama is returning to his country of birth tomorrow to receive new instructions from the secret Kenyan Muslim Communist cabal. This is the first time Obama will be visiting Kenya, not for a lack of opportunities - he visited neighbouring Tanzania in 2013 but decided against a visit to Kenya, something interpreted regionally as a very deliberate snub to President Kenyatta who was at the time indicted by the ICC for allegedly funding a Kikuyu ethnic militia during the 2007/2008 Kenyan Post Election Violence (PEV). Kenyatta's trial has subsequently collapsed amid mutual accusations of bad faith from both sides, the ICC has attacked the Kenyan government for withholding information they requested and Kenya has attacked the ICC for proceeding with a trial solely on witness testimony (most of which was retracted after the initial indictment - some after the witnesses where threatened, some after it became evidence witnesses where unreliable). Though Kenyatta's trial collapsed Vice President William Ruto is still facing charges, the White House has ruled out Obama meeting him - Kerry snubbed him earlier this year as well during his recent visit in May, much to Ruto's anger. Not really surprising especially when you consider that a witness in the trial recently turned up hacked to pieces. In a bit of a face saving exercise he's decided to double down on a populist religious line and has been doing a bit of pulpit bashing condemning Obama's stance on same sex marriage and vowing to stand firm against foreign pressure to decriminalise homosexuality. Snippet: Daily Nation posted:“Homosexuality is against the plan of God, God did not create man and woman so that men would marry men and women marry women,” said the Deputy President on Sunday at the Africa Inland Church (AIC) Ziwani in Nairobi. Seems to be working well enough as this has suddenly become an issue around the visit with lots of international media carrying the story. kustomkarkommando fucked around with this message at 23:36 on Jul 23, 2015 |
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Jul 23, 2015 23:29
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Also, polls are closed in Burundi and counting is underway. The inter-party talks chaired by Uganda have been temporarily suspended but are due to resume. Whether or not they have anything to discuss after the results are announced is another issue. And as per Reuters, the EU has gone public that they are ready to impose sanctions if/when the inevitable is announced: Reuters posted:"The European Union is preparing ... to adopt, if necessary, targeted restrictive measures against those whose actions led to acts of violence, repression and serious human rights abuses or hinder the search for a political solution," Mogherini said in a statement.
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Jul 23, 2015 23:33
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the_paradigm_shift posted:The US is also planning to review aid for Burundi. The US has threatened to cut military aid, it's a bit of grey area though as the military (as far I have seen) have generally not been implicated in the violence with most of the accusations of rights abuses being laid at the feet of the police and imbonerakure. The military are generally seen as a stabilizing force, ethnic quotas have ensured representation from both communities and the post-conflict military is generally considered a bit of a success in terms rebel reintegration, I think there are fears that cutting foreign aid to the military could have knock-on effects to their relative impartiality in politics and general cohesion - I mean there was an attempted military coup only a few months ago. Also, Burundi are currently the force leader and the second largest contributor (about 25% of troops) to AMISOM, the African Union Mission to Somalia. If Burundi pulls out their troops in protest to foreign military aid cuts (or because they can not afford to continue to participate) the other member states would have to pick up the slack, something not many people are particularly keen on considering Al-Shabaab's recent attacks in AMISOM contributing countries like Kenya. Here's an article in more detail from a Great Lakes wonk published in *shudder* the washington post of all places
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Jul 24, 2015 22:00
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Jagchosis posted:Grats to Pierre Nkurunziza on winning a third term
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Jul 24, 2015 22:13
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V. Illych L. posted:So what's going on with those nascent border conflicts in South Sudan? Are the neighbouring countries nibbling off their preferred bits during the civil war, or are they worried about destabilising the area further or what? I haven't really heard much about the border disputes with Kenya which have always taken a back seat to the much more divisive border disputes with Sudan. For reference, here's a handy map showing the various Sudanese border disputes:  The big one is Abyei, which has been a major source of contention between South Sudan and Sudan since before independence. In the run up to independence there was a major dispute about who should have control of Abyei - both parties have nominally agreed that the future of the region is to be decided by a referendum. The issue is who gets to vote in the referendum; South Sudan believes that only permanent residents should be allowed to vote (who are overwhelmingly Ngok Dinka, a subset of the one of the largest ethnic groups in South Sudan) while Sudan also believes the vote should be extended to the nomadic Misseriya Arab's who graze their cattle in Abyei in the summer months but are not permanently resident. After a series of clashes between the respective armed forces of Sudan and South Sudan in 2011 an agreement was signed in Addis Ababa to demilitarize the area and allow a UN mandated monitoring mission to oversee the truce, at the moment I think there are about 4,000 odd troops deployed by Ehiopia in Abyeia under the banner of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) who have been keeping the peace. Sudan isn't going to wade into that any time soon because of the possible international implications. The area is administered by a temporary autonomous body who have held their own referendum on the issue back in 2013 that was internationally ignored (as it excluded the Misseriya). Arguably the current situation is favourable to Sudan as it puts UNISFA in the place of attempting to keep the peace between the two communities, there are still rolling clashes every grazing season, and allows them to focus their troops elsewhere. Another major issue surrounding the Abyei problem is what exactly constituted Abyei. This was settled in 2009 by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague which defined it's boundaries. Massive map below showing how Abyei has been gradually redefined over the years as part of the border negotiation:  Now the big issue here is that the 2009 arbitration notably cuts out Heglig in the East. Why is this an issue? Well, here's another map!  Yep, Oil. And lots of it. Heglig was at the centre of a major crisis back in 2012 that you could describe as war (if you're being generous) that saw Sudan and South Sudan directly combat each other over control of the oilfield. The conflict was rooted in bitter negotiations over oil fees, I mentioned it briefly earlier but South Sudan relies on Sudan to transport it's oil for export and increasing anger over transport fees and the failure of post-independence negotiations to settle the issue was a major motivator for South Sudan to move against Heglig. The war/skirmish (whatever) was a bit of catastrophe for South Sudan economically though, Sudan responded not only with military force but also by completely shutting down South Sudan's access to their oil network - preventing them from exporting a single barrel and almost completely crashing the South Sudanese economy. Eventually, on 27th September 2012 an agreement was reached between Sudan and South Sudan that halted the violence and reached something of an agreement on the border issue - not the demarcation of the border but the establishment of a 10km DMZ on either side that would be monitored by UNISFA (who where already in the area anyway). The final demarcation of the border is to be decided by a technocratic panel set up by the AU but god knows how long that will take. For reference here's a map with the DMZ marked:  Both sides have not exactly stuck to the DMZ though, they move troops in and out of it all the time and the monitoring mission has found it difficult actually keeping track of what is happening so it is a bit of a mess - but it does seem to have stabilized the situation a bit and at least stopped direct military confrontation like in 2012. The DMZ agreement did not go down well in South Sudan and I've seen some people make a connection with it and the ongoing rebellion, the idea that Kiir has abandoned the people in the DBZ/contested regions under Sudanese control has apparently been used as a mobilizing force by the rebels. The other big area way in the west, Kafia Kingi, has been in the news recently as reports seem to indicate that the LRA leadership is hiding out there. Yes, Kony and all that. Also in the news South Sudan-wise, it seems there has been a bit of a split in the SLPM-IO as that assessment I posted earlier theorized: Radio Tamazuj posted:Political and military differences have led to a major split within the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), prompting the group's leader Riek Machar to relieve two of his top commanders. Gatdet is a major military commander and a repeat rebel, he's a pretty important figure in terms of the troops he can deliver to the SPLM-IO so him splitting off will most like damage them in military terms. Having another rebel leader running around isn't great news though...
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Jul 25, 2015 20:22
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So, Obama actually met Ruto in Kenya. You know, the guy currently up in front of the ICC... 
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Jul 26, 2015 15:20
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PT6A posted:This is like when all the Cuban exiles flipped their poo poo when Obama shook hands with Raul Castro. Just because you greet someone cordially doesn't mean you approve of everything they've ever done. True, but I still think avoiding being photographed shaking hands with someone actively being tried for crimes against humanity is advisable - especially considering the fact the US has been supporting the ICC in Africa against a growing tide of criticism. It may have been outside of the US's control but it's still an awkward situation for sure 
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Jul 26, 2015 16:29
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Also, some twitter people are mad at France24 for changing a headline to a story they posted online after the Office of the President in Burundi complained about it on twitter of all places The complaint:   They changed it from Low Participation, Violence, Criticisms: The Presidential elections in Burundi aren't fooling anyone to Presidential Elections: The Opposition denounce a "masquerade" A letter of thanks posted shortly after the change was made:  The article in question
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Jul 26, 2015 16:47
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Jagchosis posted:Hey so even though Diskendo Fox posted in this thread gently caress goons for letting it die. Brief update to try to spur its revival: I've been meaning to post in this for like a week but was to sickly to effort post. In other Burundi news there has been a major split in the opposition who where previously unified against a third term. Agathon Rwasa, who officially came second in the presidential election even though he boycotted the poll, took his seat in parliament alongside his party and was elected deputy speaker with the support of Nkurunziza's CND-FDD indicated some kind of back room deal was probably worked out. Its a move which has somewhat undermined the oppositions negotiating power in the ongoing inter party talks as you can imagine.
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Aug 5, 2015 10:20
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the_paradigm_shift posted:In some good news the Nigerian army freed more boko haram victims: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33754769 Museveni himself has backed away from them and appointed another government official to continue the talks, they are currently suspended though with no progress and it's not looking good for their resumption any time soon - the continuing attacks from still mysterious groups and the government striking a deal with a section of the opposition puts them in a strong position to push ahead.
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Aug 5, 2015 11:24
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Quick South Sudan update. The newest round of peace talks have been convened as of yesterday in Addis Ababa under the meditation of IGAD-Plus; the newly expanded international meditation group that includes Representatives of IGAD (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda), Representatives of the High Level African Union Ad-hoc Committee on South Sudan (Algeria, Chad, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa) as well as representatives from the EU, China, UK, USA, Norway and the UN. The current talks have a deadline of August 17th and there have been repeated statements from various figures, including Obama, that if the talks fail a new stricter round of sanctions will be imposed on both the Government of South Sudan and the SPLM-IO. The major belligerents have been gathered to discuss the proposed IGAD Compromise Peace Agreement which they published at the end of July. If you are a nerd like me full pdf here but here are the choice extracts and major bones of contention: IGAD Compromise Peace Agreement posted:1. Establishment, Seat and Term of TGoNU Nudging the percentage points in their favour of course will be a primary aim for both parties but the idea of effectively handing control of the three major rebellious states to the SPLM-IO has infuriated the government (the fact these are all major oil producing states may have some bearing on that). Shortly after the IGAD-Plus proposal was published President Kiir shot back with an official letter of complaint, attacking the Proposal and what he interpreted as threats from the international community to accept it "or else" . Full scan here, selected snippets below: President Kiir posted:The decision making process in the Council of Ministers at the national level and the structure and composition of state governments in the conflict-affected states (Upper Nile, Jonglei & Unity states) as per the clauses; 10 and 15 of Chapter 1 respectively, pose huge challenges to the peace process. Such proposals suggest undeclared Confederation structure for South Sudan, which, if applied as it is, would undermine the sovereign authority of the independent South Sudan and would prepare a ground for the three regions of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile to seriously demand for independent entities of their own in the short term. Thus, this would be the end of South Sudan and would constitute a beginning for the real conflict that would put the region on the real historical predicament... The eminent result is the total disintegration of the country! And let it be on record that; our government will not encourage such a move. Sure enough early word out of the peace talks, leaked by sources (I wonder who) to VOA confirms the Government's general unhappiness with the IGAD-Plus proposal: VOA posted:A source at the talks, who asked not to be named, said the government asked that it be given 70 percent of seats and portfolios in the proposed transitional government, that the armed opposition group led by former vice president Riek Machar be given 20 percent and other political parties 10 percent. The "reincorporation" of detainees mentioned has to do with Pagan Amum re-entering the government, I posted a more detailed article about that a little bit earlier. The SPLM-IO's demands for 70% of the seats seems pretty counter-productive, it's hard to see how the two parties can be negotiated to a crompose in one week - some of the early optimism that the SPLM-IO political leadership is now more willing to hammer out an agreement may have been a bit premature. Also, the official parliamentary opposition (the SPLM-DC) who have stuck to politics and steered clear of the conflict where invited to the conference but the Government denied them travel visas. Not exactly a fantastic sign. kustomkarkommando fucked around with this message at 20:07 on Aug 8, 2015 |
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Aug 8, 2015 19:37
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News out of Nigeria is that Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram, may have been ousted from his position - according to Chad anywayFrance24 posted:Chad’s President Idriss Déby declared Tuesday that efforts to combat neighbouring Nigeria’s Boko Haram jihadists had succeeded in “decapitating” the group and would be wrapped up “by the end of the year”. Shekau has been notably absent in the last two videos released by Boko Haram (both of them released under their new branding of Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyyah, replacing their old formal name of Jama'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihad). This lead to a lot of speculation he may be injured or has gone underground as Boko Haram shifts back to more conventional smash and grab tactics after the somewhat successful military operation by the new regional alliance against territory under their control. Of course, Déby could just be completely making this up - rumours have been swirling for a while and taking advantage of the talk to big up the effectiveness of their operations clearly has it's benefits. Ceasefire talks involving Déby have a bit of a track record of possibly being complete fiction. Also, Buhari has given the military three months to sort this whole insurgency thing out. No pressure guys. kustomkarkommando fucked around with this message at 23:34 on Aug 13, 2015 |
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Aug 13, 2015 23:32
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Interesting piece via African Arguments that gives some of the only detail I've seen about the supposed new leader of Boko Haram:Who is Boko Haram’s ‘new leader’? posted:If this who I think it is then this news is significant. First of all, his real name is Muhammad Daud. He is said to be about 38 years old and is a Shuwa Arab from Maiduguri with a Kanambu mother from Chad. He is one of the earliest students of Muhammad Yusuf, Boko Haram’s original leader, and is said to have been one of the few amongst the close circle of Yusuf’s students that disagreed with the 2009 Uprising in which the group launched attacks on Nigerian security forces. Daud apparently argued that Boko Haram was not yet strong enough to take over the area. If true this could be a signal of an internal feud inside Boko Haram reminiscent of the Hassan Dahir Aweys/Godane split in al-Shabaab, similarily fuelled by internal discontent with re-aligning the movement to more internationalist jihadi aims.
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Aug 15, 2015 19:06
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South Sudan wise things aren't exactly going well. A meeting of the "Front Line States", basically IGAD without the other international bodies, in Kampala earlier this week seems to have yielded some backing for the Government of South Sudan's demands in regards to power-sharing in the major rebellious states:Sudan Tribune posted:The group calling itself the “Front-line States” composed of Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan were invited for a meeting to Entebbe, Uganda, by president Yoweri Museveni. Riek Machar, leader of the SPLM-IO, has blasted these proposals publicly - specifically blaming Museveni who has militarily supported Kiir's government since day one. The deadline of August 17th is on the horizon and this set-back makes it pretty unlikely that the talks will conclude productively. To add even more woes to the process Machar's position as leader of the SPLM-IO seems to be in jeopardy. I mentioned earlier that he had dismissed prominent repeat rebel Peter Gatdet from his command, the initial concern was that Gatdet would form a splinter group but it seems he has instead used his influence to try to oust Machar from his position as leader with the aim of scuttling the peace talks. Full pdf here: quote:We reject any peace agreement that includes President Kiir and Dr. Riek Machar in the leadership of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGONU). The two leaders have become symbols of hate and conflict and are obstacles to peace as both leaders wrangle over who should lead. Similarly the two communities of Nuer and Dinka have bcome so polarized and divided to the extent that one community will reject the leadership of the other. Other sons and daughters of South Sudan should be allowed to lead during the transitional period and both President Kiir and Dr. Riek should wait for the next coming elections and contest for the presidency if they so desire. If this should not be the case then we suggest that a military led Transitional government comprising officers from both parties be formed until next elections are conducted. How much support the dismissed leaders can muster in the movement is questionable but it is a worrying sign of a significant split within the movement, rather than manifesting through a splinter group it looks like it will play out as a power play within the group itself. Sure enough it looks like hawks in the Government of South Sudan are using the signs of a possible split to try to scupper the peace talks by recalling their negotiation team: VOA posted:Cabinet Affairs Minister Martin Elia Lomoro told reporters in Juba the government has also decided to recall the entire negotiating team from Addis. Some doubt there but another source seems to has spoken to press backing up the claims by Lomoro Radio Tamazuj posted:The Council of Ministers has announced their decision to suspend the South Sudanese government's participation at the peace talks in Addis Ababa with the armed opposition leadership, led by former Vice-President Riek Machar. It requested President Salva Kiir not to travel to Ethiopia, despite mounting global pressure on him and Machar to reach their deal by Monday 17 August, and international threats of sanctions. Not looking good is it.
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Aug 15, 2015 19:58
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The South Sudan deadline has passed with no final deal. Machar has signed as has Pagan Amum, the "rehabilitated" detainee who was reinstated into the ruling party recently, but Kiir has not signed. He's asking for a 15 day extension for "consultations" with his party - ostensively to convince hawks in his government to accept the deal.
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Aug 18, 2015 08:51
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IGAD has published the final treaty text signed by Machar that's still awaiting Kiir's signature. Seems Kiir did manage to make some inroads on some of the more contentious clauses. I think it's worth doing a quick side by side from the initial IGAD-Plus proposal to the final version for anyone interested in this kind of thing:Original text posted:15.1. State Governments in the States most affected by the current conflict in Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile shall be reconstituted. Final Text posted:15.1. Not later than one month of the commencement of the Transitional Period, Transitional Governors of Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states shall be appointed for the duration of the Transition. For two of the Governors position in Upper Nile and Unity States, the South Sudan Armed Opposition shall nominate the candidates which the President shall appointrespectively. The GRSS will nominate the Governor of Jonglei State. So the government has managed to secure Governorship of one out of three "conflict states" and has had the power-sharing formula for these states drastically rewritten to favour them (the national formula in the original document stays the same) but at the expense of introducing general power sharing in all other state governments - something not included in the original document. One of the more interesting changes is in another contentious clause, clause 5 chapter II, which covers the demilitarization of the capital. Again a quick side by side: Original text posted:The National Capital, Juba, which is the seat of TGoNU, shall be demilitarised within ninety(90) days from the signing of this Agreement in order to create conducive conditions for the formation of the TGoNU and the return of the SPLM/A-IO and SPLM Leaders (Former Detainees) to Juba. Consequently, Juba shall be designated as a Special Arrangement Area(SAA). Final text posted:5.1 All military forces within Juba shall be redeployed outside a radius of 25km from the center of the national capital beginning thirty (30) days after the signing of this Agreement and complete after ninety (90) days. The demarcation of the area shall be agreed during the PCTSA workshop. Exceptions to this provision are as follows: Interesting all reference to a neutral foreign deployment under IGAD/AU/UN authority has been scrubbed and replaced with reference to a new unified force to police both the capital and other contentious cities and towns - something not floated in the original document. I wonder if opposition fear of likely Ugandan involvement in any "neutral" force, which would have been pretty likely, was the driving force behind scrubbing that clause. Specific reference to a Vice Presidential guard has been removed, under the proposed system the Vice Presidency would go to the SPLM-IO - I'm unsure if that's covered in "Presidential Guards" or if that has been dropped. Language isn't the clearest. kustomkarkommando fucked around with this message at 22:19 on Aug 19, 2015 |
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Aug 19, 2015 22:16
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 Kiir signed the peace deal. It's peace well if you ignore the generals who have refused to recognise the deal Kiir only signed after being a bit of a dick though BBC posted:And then in a long, slow speech, pausing regularly to remove his glasses and wipe his face, it wasn't quite clear if President Kiir was going to sign the deal or not.
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Aug 26, 2015 22:18
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As an aside the UK released Gen. Karake after deciding against extradition to Spain and I believe he's now back in Rwanda.
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Sep 20, 2015 00:51
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Effectronica posted:“After careful consideration we do not believe an extradition offence can be established under UK law. The main reason is that the relevant laws on the conduct alleged in this case do not cover the acts of non-UK nationals or residents abroad." It's even funnier when you know who lead his legal defence Cherie Blair
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Sep 20, 2015 00:57
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Boko Haram posted:So more terrorists holding hundreds hostage at once, this time in Mali. I'm hearing that right now a few people managed to escape, so maybe the counterassault is working? The latest news is that the hostage situation is over with the remaining people holed up in the hotel freed after special forces cleared the hotel floor by floor. Seems the gunmen, may be three of them, have holed up on the seventh floor. Estimates of about 27 dead from unofficial sources. Ansar Dine seen to be main suspect now according to sources, to my knowledge this is the first time they've explicitly targeted foreigners (the hotel in question was a preferred one for foreign visitors) and this is the most sophisticated attack they have ever staged in the capital.
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Nov 20, 2015 18:14
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Actually scratch that Al-Mourabitoun have claimed responsibility. Also, the gunmen are dead
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Nov 20, 2015 18:24
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Slaan posted:I've never heard of Al-Mourabitoun and Google isn't turning up much other than that they were formed after the recent Malian civil war from a few radical North African Islamist groups. Does anyone know much about them? Al-Mourabitoun is the union of two groups, MUJWA and a splinter faction of AQIM loyal to veteran insurgent Mokhtar Belmokhtar who has clocked in time in Afghanistan and Algeria and has built a reputation as a competent commander. Both groups originated within al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, with MUJWA splitting off under the command of Mauritanians and Malian Arabs who attempted to shift the focus away from AQIM's Algerian/Arab-centric leadership to entice Black Africans to their cause (though they still retained good links with their mother organization as far as anyone can tell) Belmokhtar is more of a surly fellow who got into AQIM's bad books by pretty much completely ignoring the leadership and doing things under his own power, something that didn't exactly go down well with AQIM's commanders in Algeria when he was off messing around in Northern Mali. There are reports he is married to a Tuareg and has built support among some tribes based on this, he was cooperating rather closely with MUJWA before Al-Mourabitoun were formed. Both groups where heavily involved in smuggling both they merged, much more so than probably any other insurgent groups in Northern Mali. Belmokhtar pulled in a large amount of money from trans-Sahara cigarette smuggling, which AQ apparently found to be a tad distasteful, and MUJWA are apparently knee deep in the trans-Sahara drug smuggling network - they controlled the key smuggling node of Gao until the French/Malian operations drove them out of the town. Al-Mourabitoun aren't exactly considered the biggest threat in Mali though. Ansar Dine, which draws its leadership from Tuaregs and largely sees MUJWA and Belmokhtar as foreign interlopers in Mali, have been gradually uniting various jihadist factions in the North and have managed to cause several MUJWA commanders to defect to them and have severely undermined Al-Mourabitoun, whittling them down to a handful of holdouts. This attack seemed more like their handiwork as it specifically targeted foreigners and seemed to be an attempt to take hostages, something that Belmokhtar and his followers are well known for. It's something more out of their playbook than any of the local groups. kustomkarkommando fucked around with this message at 19:56 on Nov 20, 2015 |
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Nov 20, 2015 19:50
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Burundi back in the international headlines after the biggest outbreak of violence in Bujumbura since the failed coup bid back in May, with armed assailants (so far unidentified) launching co-ordinated attacks on Military bases around the capital. The military is claiming 90 people have died, though most sources are stating that the majority of bodies where found in opposition neighborhoods (some with their arms tied behind their backs) - something that has become a trend since Nkurunziza's third term began, people disappearing and then turning up dead dumped in the streets. Since we last touched on Burundi there have been a couple of notable developments. One of the major ones was the Bujumbura Disarmament back at the start of November which gave civilians a few weeks to hand over any privately held weapons or face being treated as enemies of the state, when the deadline passed Nkurunziza ordered a series of security sweeps throughout the capital focusing specifically on opposition neighborhoods - the lead up to the expiration of the disarmament deadline saw thousands flee the capital fearing the subsequent security forces crackdown. In the last few months the unrest in Burundi has shifted away from street protests and riots and moved towards gun battles and assassinations, the disarmament has done little to curtail the violence:  source Nkurunziza seems to have become increasingly paranoid, preferring not to stay in the presidential palace. There has been a wave of assassinations targeting senior military figures since the election so you could say that his paranoia is justified and it's clear there are some concerns from the President's inner circle that a second coup attempt could be in the works, there have been claims that the assailants in several of these high profile assassination attempts where wearing military fatigues. I think I mentioned it before but generally the Burundian army are held up as a model of post-conflict rebel integration and are considered one of the more stable state institutions, uniting members of the FDD (the military element of Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD) and former members of the pre-Ashura armed forces (referred to as ex-FAB). The coup back in May was organised by a CNDD-FDD aligned general and was put down with the assistance of ex-FAB personnel but it seems that as the security situation has become increasingly unstable Nkurunziza has begun purging/sidelining ex-FAB officers fearing a possible coup from within their ranks. Good piece on this here: IRIN News posted:“There is an increased crackdown on members of ex-FAB who are accused of being behind the killings of police and army officers in Bujumbura,” Anschaire Nikoyagize, president of the Burundian League for Human Rights, told IRIN. There has been a renewed push in the UN to look into possibly sending peacekepeers to Burundi considering the continuing violence (some people have talked about a threat of a repeat of the Rwandan genocide but this doesn't really fit the conflict as it is developing, it's primarily political and not ethnic). Targeted sanctions have been introduced by the US, EU and AU, a lot of international donors have suspended direct aid to the government already. Nkurunziza has attempted to placate international critics by setting up a new body, the Inter-Burundian Dialogue Commission, with the aim of negotiating a peaceful settlement - though the CNDI (to use the French acronym) was immediately blasted by the largest opposition faction CNARED, an umbrella organization formed in exile, as members are appointed by the President and all talks are held within the country without international mediation (though Uganda is apparently helping oversee the process, though if you remember some of the past posts on South Sudan that may not be a good thing...). Nkurunziza also effectively banned the 10 largest civil society groups in the country, who had all been involved in protests against his third term, accusing them of involvement in the failed military coup. This means that the CNDI is made up largely of church figures, a handful of representatives from NGOs that escaped the government's ire and reps from opposition political parties outside of CNARED - hardly a recipe for successful peace talks. Blue helmets might be on to their way to Burundi some time soon, something that is darkly ironic considering Burundi's hefty contribution of peacekeepers to Somalia. However most plans for dispatching peacekeepers to Burundi I've heard have involved peeling away numbers from the UN contingent in the Eastern Congo which seems like a pretty dumb idea but whatever
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Dec 13, 2015 17:33
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Rwanda has given a resounding thumbs up to third termism with the constitutional referendum to extend term limits passing with 98% in favour, paving the way for Kagame to not only serve another seven year term after his current one expires in 2017 but also a fourth and fifth term (though these have been reduced from 7 years to 5 years). Some grumpy mumbling from donor countries but I doubt it will go anywhere.
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Dec 21, 2015 17:46
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