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Lol, the bomb was probably a fusion bomb in that it had some hydrogen added and probably not even deuterium or tritium anyway. Do the Norks even have a heavy water facility, let alone a way to produce tritium?
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Jan 6, 2016 14:08
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They obviously mined it from their outpost on the moon.
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Jan 6, 2016 14:14
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Morbus posted:... Oh crap that makes a ton of sense!
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Jan 6, 2016 18:43
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Blind Rasputin posted:They obviously mined it from their outpost on the moon. No no no, the sun.
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Jan 6, 2016 18:47
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Man, we're all gonna feel quite foolish then North Korea conquers the world with their army of Gundams...
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Jan 6, 2016 23:42
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jivjov posted:Man, we're all gonna feel quite foolish then North Korea conquers the world with their army of Gundams... please they can't even produce a decent nanosuit, no way can they build proper Gundams
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Jan 6, 2016 23:45
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jivjov posted:Man, we're all gonna feel quite foolish then North Korea conquers the world with their army of Gundams... You joke, but even our top scientists never considered to land on the sun during the night. We are intellectually so far out of their league that we are like mere ants compared to humans.
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Jan 7, 2016 00:19
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BattleMaster posted:Lol, the bomb was probably a fusion bomb in that it had some hydrogen added and probably not even deuterium or tritium anyway. Do the Norks even have a heavy water facility, let alone a way to produce tritium? AFAIK North Korea's nuclear program has focused mostly on plutonium production, not uranium enrichment, and if you can make plutonium you can make tritium. In any case, a "real" thermonuclear bomb would not use tritium in appreciable quantities.
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Jan 7, 2016 00:25
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Maybe Kim Jong Un is a Newtype 
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Jan 7, 2016 01:04
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Morbus posted:In any case, a "real" thermonuclear bomb would not use tritium in appreciable quantities. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W88 W88 uses tritium, so actually, yes, they do. And Uranium Enrichment is still necessary for the spark plug in thermonuclear designs.
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Jan 7, 2016 01:13
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CommieGIR posted:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W88 Concrete statements about the design of particular warheads are dubious for obvious reasons but: 1. The only place tritium is mentioned in your link is as part of a fission boosted primary. This involves tiny amounts of tritium for purposes other than prompt generation of energy. I mentioned this in my post. 2. I referenced the likely use of HEU in secondaries like less than a page ago. But you do not necessarily need HEU to make a working staged implosion bomb. Plutonium could just as well be used (though this only makes sense if you lack uranium enrichment capability), and a fissile spark plug is not an absolute requirement to ignite the secondary anyway, if it is well enough designed and/or incorporates small amounts of a D-T / Li-T starter (see for example the design of ICF targets). I would eat my hat if any practical weapon uses tritium (excluding that which is bred from Lithium by D-D neutrons) in any "appreciable quantity"--meaning as a means of generating weapon power in and of itself. It just never makes any sense.
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Jan 7, 2016 01:44
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Do we know anymore about the actual NK bomb or what the UN decided?
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Jan 7, 2016 03:30
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GlitchThief posted:Maybe Kim Jong Un is a Newtype
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Jan 7, 2016 05:19
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Blind Rasputin posted:Do we know anymore about the actual NK bomb or what the UN decided? Its only a threat to North Korea at best they could mine the country with nukes so if anyone every invaded they could wipe out the country. It is a gimped version of Israel's arrangement - where they have nuclear sovereignty insurance but no treaty obligations. If the USA didn't backstop them with the special relationship they might burn half Eurasia down. Pyongyang wants to make Beijing an offer it can't refuse - be my friend or I'll kill myself. What a time to be alive.
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Jan 7, 2016 05:48
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I've recently been interested in the foreign policy of nuclear non-proliferation, and this seems like a reasonable thread to talk about it in, especially in view of the recent DPRK test. Last summer, Foreign Affairs published two articles by John Delury and Robert Gard trying to identify where the failures occurred in the US attempt at nuclear containment in North Korea, and how those lessons can be applied to the current situation with Iran. (Both articles are behind partial paywalls. Can I get away with reposting them in their entirety? Would anyone be interested?) Delury makes the relatively boring argument that the source of failure in the case of NK was that attention was focused entirely on hammering out a nuclear deal, and that a lasting agreement would have required an accompanying change in the character of US-NK relations. The lesson being that political rapprochement with Iran must accompany the JCPOA in order for it to last effectively. Gard's argument is more provocative - he argues that the US had many opportunities to prevent or roll back NK's nuclear breakout, and blew all of them by failing to follow through on commitments, even when NK fulfilled theirs unilaterally. The implication here is that the danger we face with regard to Iran is that any kind of marginal success will generate a temptation for the US legislature to try to renege, either because extremist elements want to torpedo the agreement, or because the moderates start to think they can squeeze out more than what was originally agreed on. It's been difficult for me to independently verify Gard's argument, because it depends heavily on a particular order of events, and it's really hard to find a very thorough timeline of events related to the Agreed Framework or the falling apart of the six-party talks. Can someone better informed about the relevant history say whether Gard is just blowing smoke? And more generally, I wonder if the 2016 elections will be seen in part as a referendum on the JCPOA, and whether the incoming president will be able to sabotage it the way GWB apparently did with the Agreed Framework.
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Jan 11, 2016 04:58
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I'm not sure about the details, but the general thrust of Gard's argument is solid. I'd say that, due to lack of trust and domestic political considerations, neither side completely adhered to the conditions; once those violations became clear, due to lack of trust and domestic political considerations, each side used the other's violations as excuses to break the agreement further and eventually torpedo it completely. In other words, Delury is right on point - it's impossible for such an agreement to last if the nasty diplomatic relationship otherwise remains the same. These countries feel deeply threatened by the US, and aren't very happy giving up weapons (especially when the US is the one taking the lead in insisting on it), so they'll be very distrustful of the US and not very inclined to truly take meaningful steps toward disarmament at the beginning of the agreement, especially if relations remain poor. After all, a country they regard as an enemy is pushing very hard for them to give up a powerful weapon that said enemy country already has. On the other hand, Congress likes to dictate to our enemies exactly what they should do without any concern for their needs, since we don't usually expect them to listen and it makes them look tough for their constituents, so any time the regime does something we dislike (whether it's connected to the agreement or not) Congress will respond with new sanctions or defundings or hostile rhetoric. Even if that doesn't directly impact the implementation of the agreement, it will still damage the underlying trust and be taken as evidence of US hostility and lack of commitment. Why do these countries pursue nuclear weapons in the first place? Because major countries with large nuclear-armed militaries are opposed to them, and because (at least in Iran's case) they see themselves as a blossoming regional power that wants to secure their dominance over the surrounding countries while insulating the area from open interference by global powers. They're not going to give up their nukes easily if it doesn't look like they're going to have those worries ended through the agreement. Main Paineframe fucked around with this message at 18:04 on Jan 11, 2016 |
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Jan 11, 2016 18:00
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Main Paineframe posted:I'm not sure about the details, but the general thrust of Gard's argument is solid. I'd say that, due to lack of trust and domestic political considerations, neither side completely adhered to the conditions; once those violations became clear, due to lack of trust and domestic political considerations, each side used the other's violations as excuses to break the agreement further and eventually torpedo it completely. This would be much easier if every other country just accepted their status as America's bitch 
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Jan 15, 2016 14:15
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I CANNOT EJACULATE WITHOUT SEEING NATIVE AMERICANS BRUTALISED!
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Speaking of thermonuclear weapons I decided to make a lazy Sunday trek out to the last remaining Titan II silo today for fun. As someone who has lived in Tucson all of his life it's still crazy to think we had 18 W-53 warheads surrounding the city. I will say it was a bit of a trip being walked through the launch sequence in the control room and also the heavy blast doors are so balanced that we had a 9 year old girl moving a 3-ton door by herself. If anyone is ever in Tucson they should find some time to go to the Titian Missile Museum to actually see an ICBM silo in person. A decent shot from above. Those sliding silo doors are crazy.  A view from floor 8 of the silo.  A deactivated W-53 warhead.  A path from the control center to the silo.  The refueling spacesuits needed for hypergolic fuel.  The launch control room.  Time for the buddy system. Conelrad fucked around with this message at 04:02 on Jan 18, 2016 |
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Jan 18, 2016 04:00
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Coolness. Thanks for the pictures. I don't recall ever seeing the refueling suits like that before.
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Jan 18, 2016 15:12
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What an abandoned missile complex looks like. http://imgur.com/gallery/ZhxAQ http://imgur.com/gallery/IDES6 My personal favorite of those pictures. 
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Jan 18, 2016 17:03
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crabcakes66 posted:What an abandoned missile complex looks like. That would be a pretty awesome/spooky place for an urbex!
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Jan 18, 2016 21:24
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crabcakes66 posted:What an abandoned missile complex looks like. I'm intrigued by the homophobic epithets. I wonder if the...artist was making a commentary on nukes, or just felt like being an rear end in a top hat.
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Jan 18, 2016 23:00
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It's an Enola Gay tribute.
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Jan 19, 2016 01:06
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jivjov posted:I'm intrigued by the homophobic epithets. I wonder if the...artist was making a commentary on nukes, or just felt like being an rear end in a top hat. It's a humongous hole built to receive a giant apocalyptic phallic symbol. If that's gay, sign me up.
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Jan 19, 2016 03:03
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