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(Once upon a time D&D had threads that actually discussed discrete individual topics rather than covering a huge geographical region or sprawling subject matter. I thought I'd see if there's still any appetite for more narrowly focused discussions.) Emerging markets have been one of the relative success stories of the last decades and helped push up global growth at a time that the developed world was doing poorly. I thought it would be interesting to discuss their prospects for future growth given that their role in the global economy has increased so substantially. The topics covered in this article - the relationship between credit buildups, economic crises and future growth rates - also seem to have a more general relevance to the global economy these days. The title of the thread may be slightly misleading, insofar as the article below isn't quite predicting a dramatic crash. It would seem the worry here, at least as far as the Economist is concerned, is the risk of much lower global growth. Of course other economists like Nouriel Rourbini have been warning that the global economy is much less stable than this article suggests. And other economists like Paul Krugman and Larry Summers have also sounded the alarm about potentially lower growth rates in the future. It hardly needs to be said that plenty of heterodox or radical economists have also warned about debt buildups, the instability of the global economy, or emerging markets. I encourage others to bring those analyses into this discussion but I thought for the OP I'd focus on what certain "mainstream" economic commentators are saying, both for the sake of brevity and because I think it's interesting to see how the "establishment", so to speak, articulates it's concerns about the global economy and tries to conceive of solutions. Summers and Krugman, for instance -- though not responding specifically to the concerns raised in this article -- are both advocates of more aggressive monetary and fiscal policy to deal with the risks of global "secular stagnation". The Economist posted:Pulled back in
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# ? Nov 17, 2015 19:53 |
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# ? May 4, 2024 14:14 |
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The article suggests the crisis would be less damaging than Mexico 1994 or East Asia 1997, which raises the question- if it happens, will anyone in the West who doesn't read the business section even notice?
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# ? Nov 17, 2015 20:06 |
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There's been an "emerging markets" euphoria since the 2008 financial crisis that has completely ignored fundamentals in lieu of making a quick buck, because investors have the memories of goldfish. That it will probably end badly seems like it 'ought to have been apparent for some time.
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# ? Nov 17, 2015 20:08 |
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Guy DeBorgore posted:The article suggests the crisis would be less damaging than Mexico 1994 or East Asia 1997, which raises the question- if it happens, will anyone in the West who doesn't read the business section even notice? During the 2000s I think that emerging markets helped prop up global growth rates. Countries like Canada and Australia, for instance, have sold a lot of minerals and other raw resources to China, and the Chinese have bought up lots of foreign assets in the West. An emerging market slowdown or crash could hurt the rest of the global economy. Even if the citizens of other countries don't "notice" the connection they'd still be effected. Fojar38 posted:There's been an "emerging markets" euphoria since the 2008 financial crisis that has completely ignored fundamentals in lieu of making a quick buck, because investors have the memories of goldfish. That it will probably end badly seems like it 'ought to have been apparent for some time. My impression - and others may want to challenge me on this - is that the pool of global funds looking to be invested is far greater than the available investment opportunities. I wonder if this isn't going to be a structural feature of the global economy for some time.
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# ? Nov 17, 2015 20:25 |
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I think that a lot of it is just perception and the nature of capitalism. If there's a perception that a certain investment has guaranteed returns then people are going to take it for easy money, which I think is one of the big reasons why these debt crises keep on happening repeatedly and nobody ever seems to learn anything. In this case economists, investors, and business strategists were swooning at the BRICS to such a degree that they became convinced that emerging markets were the future, and consequently they inadvertently created a vested interest in ignoring the fundamental problems that these countries have both politically and economically.
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# ? Nov 17, 2015 20:37 |
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Helsing posted:During the 2000s I think that emerging markets helped prop up global growth rates. Countries like Canada and Australia, for instance, have sold a lot of minerals and other raw resources to China, and the Chinese have bought up lots of foreign assets in the West. An emerging market slowdown or crash could hurt the rest of the global economy. Even if the citizens of other countries don't "notice" the connection they'd still be effected. Yeah, absolutely. And if something serious happens in China that'll make headlines. But it's depressing that nobody remembers, say, the East Asian crisis of 1997, unless they're a serious follower of business news. quote:My impression - and others may want to challenge me on this - is that the pool of global funds looking to be invested is far greater than the available investment opportunities. I wonder if this isn't going to be a structural feature of the global economy for some time. I wouldn't phrase it that way exactly. There's no limit to the amount of investment opportunities out there, but they vary in how safe they are. It would be more accurate to say that there's not enough safe investments, so funds are are channeled towards riskier investments like those in emerging markets. And it definitely seems like there's a structural excess of savings over investment that's lead to a series of bubbles. Before emerging markets there was the sub-prime mortgage market, before that there was dot-coms, before that there were emerging markets again... I wonder if it's driven by the advent of computers and the information revolution? Each of the recent crises originates in new and technologically-driven markets. And they've been enabled by the information systems that allow investment money to go anywhere in the world easily and quickly.
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# ? Nov 18, 2015 04:33 |
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This guy beat the economist to the story by a couple of months and makes a few good points: https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2015/08/01/the-emerging-market-crisis-returns/, tl;dr unemployment is up and profits are down, emerging markets are approaching a crisis of profitability, much like the first world. The norm is probably goign to be large amounts of capital hunting down every decreasing rates of profits. edit: whoops, hosed up the link rudatron fucked around with this message at 17:08 on Nov 18, 2015 |
# ? Nov 18, 2015 06:07 |
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rudatron posted:This guy beat the economist to the story by a couple of months and makes a few good points: https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2015/08/01/the-emerging-market-crisis-returns/, tl;dr unemployment is up and profits are down, emerging markets are approaching a crisis of profitability, much like the first world. The norm is probably goign to be large amounts of capital hunting down every decreasing rates of profits. that thesis exactly the opposite of the Economist's thesis, which is of capital failing to move to the higher-growth higher-return industries, in order to maintain high employment that aside, the question of (1) who owns the private debt and (2) in what currency is the debt denominated, both seem like salient questions. They're also not answered in the article.
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# ? Nov 18, 2015 07:00 |
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quote:The most highly indebted emerging markets, such as China, South Korea, Singapore and perhaps Thailand, mostly fall into Mr Pradhan’s second category. They are unlikely to suffer an abrupt crash brought on by capital flight; most of them have formidable defences against a balance-of-payments crisis. But that stability also means the problems brought on by excess debt are likely to linger for years. With inflation absent interest rates can be kept low; that makes the carrying cost of debt manageable, at least for a while. And banks heavily influenced by governments may be unwilling to tackle non-performing corporate loans, because they will result in factory shutdowns. Instead the debt overhang is perpetuated as bad loans are rolled over, creating zombie companies and industries. Overcapacity pushes down factory-gate prices, which hurts profits and investment. Capital is trapped in underperforming businesses and sectors, which steadily saps GDP growth totally lost me around here. a lot of 'logically i think this will happen, they're doomed!', no actual examples given that this is happening. Also, for an article with a big focus on trade and exchange rates, no mention at all at how the TPP might play into this analysis....and then reckons Russia will be fine since it cant go down any further (without mentioning commodity prices.) Reading the article Rudatron linked and IMO it does a way better job without getting sidetracked by random guys the author interviewed or the stilted Godfather reference.
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# ? Nov 18, 2015 11:20 |
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It seems more or less indicative of a under-consumption crisis that has been predicted for a while (especially after 2008). Emerging markets (i.e middle income countries) by and large don't have the domestic consumption to promote continued appreciable growth and even if they did they would struggle to promote manufacturing due to the rock bottom nature of manufacturing wages of their competitors (low and very low income countries). These states during the 2000s benefited from a commodity/credit bubble which kept growth robust but ultimately obscured the very real problems that existed with their economies but this has become clearer over time. You can argue some of these states benefited more than others from commodity exports (rather than credit bubbles) but by and large exports at first swelled then there was a second wave of investment that followed. At this point the higher income economies (including the US) don't have the excess consumer spending to promote imports they need to, and with the march of austerity/wage suppression across the developed world, there isn't any real chance for consumption to increase as a whole. While the Fed has talked up been talking up rates, inflation in the US is still completely flat and while consumer confidence in some ways as returned, the ultimate issue is in the terms of scale the US needs to essential buy versus the debt overhang elsewhere. The TPP may make a moderate difference in the relevant economies, but ultimately most of the members of the TPP have been trading very liberally with each other for a while. The TPP seems much more about compliance and enforcement than anything else. Edit: I am surprised the Economist article didn't end with the "need to cut public spending and liberalize labor markets." Ardennes fucked around with this message at 13:08 on Nov 18, 2015 |
# ? Nov 18, 2015 12:56 |
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Guy DeBorgore posted:I wouldn't phrase it that way exactly. There's no limit to the amount of investment opportunities out there, but they vary in how safe they are. It would be more accurate to say that there's not enough safe investments, so funds are are channeled towards riskier investments like those in emerging markets. And it definitely seems like there's a structural excess of savings over investment that's lead to a series of bubbles. Before emerging markets there was the sub-prime mortgage market, before that there was dot-coms, before that there were emerging markets again... My impression is that the driving force here is what rudatron mentions in his post: while the mass of profits may have increased the rate of profit, at least by some measures, has declined. The result is both an increase in speculative activity and a rolling series of crises that are never fully resolved so much as they are shifted around. Part of the result of that is that periods of strong growth seemingly are either caused by bubbles, or else what is initially strong growth based on economic fundamentals rapidly turns into a bubble. rudatron posted:This guy beat the economist to the story by a couple of months and makes a few good points: https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2015/08/01/the-emerging-market-crisis-returns/, tl;dr unemployment is up and profits are down, emerging markets are approaching a crisis of profitability, much like the first world. The norm is probably goign to be large amounts of capital hunting down every decreasing rates of profits. Unfortunately that link is broken for me. Is there any chance you can re-link the article? TheDeadlyShoe posted:totally lost me around here. a lot of 'logically i think this will happen, they're doomed!', no actual examples given that this is happening. Well keep in mind that The Economist is: 1) A newspaper, not a scholarly journal 2) Advocating a hard right economic perspective What interests me about this article (and about musings from other orthodox economists like those mentioned in the OP) is that they seem to be describing, in broad strokes and with some analytical differences, a rather Marxian sounding prediction of crisis. Declining investment opportunities for capital leading to speculative activities which inflates bubbles that result in an economic crisis. Whether or not we think that certain heterodox economists have provided better analyses of the same trends (and I'd be inclined to say that they have) part of what interests me about this article is the way that a mainstream conservative economic voice is alluding to the crisis prone nature of contemporary capitalism.
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# ? Nov 18, 2015 16:58 |
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Helsing posted:Well keep in mind that The Economist is: I think the key difference though (from their perspective) they see this largely as situational and/or the result of incompetence rather than a systemic problem with actual economic structure. They have to refuse any overarching explanation for what is happening because then they are practically critiquing capitalism itself. That said, I think there is a broader story that isn't necessarily only economic in nature but political and historical and reliant on not only key economic assumptions but very clear political choices made after the Second World War. Not only austerity and triangulation, but the structure of international trade as well as the building of Cold War alliances.
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# ? Nov 18, 2015 17:08 |
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Helsing posted:What interests me about this article (and about musings from other orthodox economists like those mentioned in the OP) is that they seem to be describing, in broad strokes and with some analytical differences, a rather Marxian sounding prediction of crisis. Declining investment opportunities for capital leading to speculative activities which inflates bubbles that result in an economic crisis. Whether or not we think that certain heterodox economists have provided better analyses of the same trends (and I'd be inclined to say that they have) part of what interests me about this article is the way that a mainstream conservative economic voice is alluding to the crisis prone nature of contemporary capitalism. I don't know if it's that surprising that investors themselves come to similar conclusions as Marxist economic theorists do. Many of the ways in which "orthodox" economics typically diverge from marxian analyses have, I would say, more to do with the political role of the discipline in shaping state policy for the benefit of shareholders, or in reassuring the public that the job creators know what they're doing and everything's going to be fine. In terms of investors themselves actually trying to figure out where to put their capital and understanding the economy rationally, it makes sense to me that the analysis would converge.
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# ? Nov 18, 2015 17:11 |
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I know very little about economics so I wont try to comment intelligently. But I did notice that after Piketty's Capital In the Twenty-First Century came out, that a number of articles came out arguing that the emerging markets in South America and Asia countered PIketty's argument that there was growing inequality because of the changing value of labour and capital. For example:quote:Much has been said to refute Thomas Piketty’s important book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, from the perspective of developed countries, but not from the standpoint of emerging markets. His contention that the rate of return of capital, roughly twice the rate of growth of the economy, leads to increasing inequality is not consistent with what has happened in the developing world. His notion that the economy is destined for a modest rate of growth and that the capitalists’ share of aggregate income will increase at the expense of workers runs against the evidence coming out of up-and-coming economies. There's also an article that focuses on Asia here. My impression is that these are free market economists and experts who aren't pleased with some of Piketty's suggestions about their economic views and have been using the emerging markets elsewhere to disprove his assertion about the growing prevalence of income inequality under a relatively free market. Is that perception changing? Is that even the right question to ask?
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# ? Nov 18, 2015 21:40 |
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Dreylad posted:I know very little about economics so I wont try to comment intelligently. But I did notice that after Piketty's Capital In the Twenty-First Century came out, that a number of articles came out arguing that the emerging markets in South America and Asia countered PIketty's argument that there was growing inequality because of the changing value of labour and capital. For example: One of the reasons Piketty has shaken up classical economists so much is that he more or less proves there is a dramatic problem with inequality using more or less neo-classical methods. The funny thing though he completely dismisses Marx in a rather formulaic manner at the same time. It is sort of a weird situation when at least some elements of Capital are at least supported by data from a neo-classist who also seems to not really grasp Marx beyond pretty very swallow critics. "The devil is completely unknowable and wrong, but here is some data that says he is kind of right."
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# ? Nov 18, 2015 22:40 |
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Dreylad posted:I know very little about economics so I wont try to comment intelligently. But I did notice that after Piketty's Capital In the Twenty-First Century came out, that a number of articles came out arguing that the emerging markets in South America and Asia countered PIketty's argument that there was growing inequality because of the changing value of labour and capital. For example: Please note the thesis Helsing is suggesting is not really compatible with Piketty (nor is Marx). Piketty's thesis is that rate of return on capital is comparatively high and destined to stay that way. The proposal in this thread is largely the opposite. Ardennes posted:I think the key difference though (from their perspective) they see this largely as situational and/or the result of incompetence rather than a systemic problem with actual economic structure. Yes and for pretty good reason given history.
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# ? Nov 19, 2015 01:52 |
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Capitalism has had one crisis after another in a fairly predictable fashion for centuries now. Even if a person really believed that the cause is incompetence and not systemic, by now they should see that incompetence or mismanagement is part of the system. The complaint that "capitalism works fine, your're just doing it wrong" sounds a lot like the old complaint that communism would work if done correctly.
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# ? Nov 19, 2015 18:02 |
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WorldsStrongestNerd posted:Capitalism has had one crisis after another in a fairly predictable fashion for centuries now. Even if a person really believed that the cause is incompetence and not systemic, by now they should see that incompetence or mismanagement is part of the system. The complaint that "capitalism works fine, your're just doing it wrong" sounds a lot like the old complaint that communism would work if done correctly. Well this thread is based on the claim that the next one is going to be different. I think the main challenge, in light of what you correctly point out (crisis and bubbles for centuries), is to explain why.
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# ? Nov 19, 2015 20:47 |
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Ardennes posted:I think the key difference though (from their perspective) they see this largely as situational and/or the result of incompetence rather than a systemic problem with actual economic structure. They have to refuse any overarching explanation for what is happening because then they are practically critiquing capitalism itself. I agree with you, but I'm curious about whether you'd be willing to elaborate? Bob le Moche posted:
Part of why this interests me is because some of these debates also track theoretical disagreements within the contemporary left. Right now, for instance, we have a fairly substantial disagreement between those, such as David Harvey or David McNally, who argue that the neoliberal period under Thatcher and Regan saw a restoration of the (Marxist) rate of profit, but with the result that the economy became increasingly financialized and labour's share of GDP was decreased. According to adherents of this analysis the result has been to create a persistent instability in the system, in which consumer credit has had to replace rising wages as the primary way to generate demand for consumer products. On the other hand you have guys like Andrew Kliman who argue that the (Marxist) rate of profit never recovered from the 1970s crisis, and that the underlying cause of the crisis is a low rate of profit rather than financialization or low demand. There's a related discussion, in which the left is also divided, about the extent to which capitalist advocates of austerity are rationally defending their class interests vs. irraitonally threatening their own future profits through the immiseration or the working class and setting the stage for further rounds of crisis. I feel like following debates within the business press and mainstream economics can help provide context on these internal debates within the left. WorldsStrongestNerd posted:Capitalism has had one crisis after another in a fairly predictable fashion for centuries now. Even if a person really believed that the cause is incompetence and not systemic, by now they should see that incompetence or mismanagement is part of the system. The complaint that "capitalism works fine, your're just doing it wrong" sounds a lot like the old complaint that communism would work if done correctly. So far as I can tell based on previous debates and arguments with him asdf32 adheres (whether consciously or not) to some variation of Say's Law, and thinks that in the long run a capitalist economy necessarily and inevitably achieves full capacity utilization. As long as there are skilled people and usable plant and equipment, his reasoning seems to go, the economy will grow at full potential and persistent shortfalls or mismatches between supply and demand caused by, say, lack of purchasing power or a dearth of profitable investments, are impossible or so unlikely as to be effectively impossible. asdf32 posted:Well this thread is based on the claim that the next one is going to be different. Can you explain why you think this?
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# ? Nov 19, 2015 23:06 |
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Helsing posted:I agree with you, but I'm curious about whether you'd be willing to elaborate? It is quite evident that crises in capitalism have happened before, and yet it is still here but there is a clear historical relevance to why a "final crisis" was avoided and this is usually the result of some form of reformism or the result of localized nature of a crisis. During the late 19th century/early 20th century there were the progressive reforms, during the Great Depression there were more reforms and of course after the Second World World there were even more especially in the West in the guise of liberal democracy . During the Great Depression and the Second World War, there was most likely a political motive, especially the threat of Marxist-Leninism and during the "progressive" era there was the early threat of socialism/anarchism/unionism. However, we ultimately very may well live in a different era than those crises, specifically because there simply is not a robust left to act as a challenge to liberalism and therefore force reformism as a compromise solution that ultimately kept the system running. If anything world leaders seem to have doubled then tripled down on a non-reformist course for the most part. In addition, the structure of capitalism is even more interconnected than it was during the nineteenth-century/twentieth-century and there has been a broad shift of using globalization as a global wage suppressor that in many ways was not possible earlier. Of course, also the world is simply far more industrialized/post-industrialized than before at the same time. More clearly, we are on untested ground here, never has liberalism since the mid 19th century have liberals felt more confident and yet the world is far different than it was there and is far more interconnected and in many ways brittle. There seems to be little room for compromise yet far more at stake.
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# ? Nov 20, 2015 09:29 |
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Ardennes posted:It is quite evident that crises in capitalism have happened before, and yet it is still here but there is a clear historical relevance to why a "final crisis" was avoided and this is usually the result of some form of reformism or the result of localized nature of a crisis. Interestingly enough it seems as though certain "emerging markets" have also been perceived as providing an alternative model to liberalism, in which neoliberal economic policies of corporate boosterism and pro-corporate dirigiste policies are welded toward an appeal to national chauvinism and "traditional values". To varying extents we can see China, Turkey and Russia, among others, charting this kind of course. quote:Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban said he wants to abandon liberal democracy in favor of an “illiberal state,” citing Russia and Turkey as examples. quote:MOSCOW — At the height of the Cold War, it was common for American conservatives to label the officially atheist Soviet Union a “godless nation.” It will be interesting to see whether any of these regimes can respond effectively to a crisis in emerging markets - or to another generalized global downtown - or whether these hybrid regimes were just a temporary byproduct of an emerging markets' bubble. Either way, I think the statements and behaviors of these groups lends credence to your claim that the liberal global system is more fragile than it appears.
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# ? Nov 20, 2015 15:26 |
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Helsing posted:Interestingly enough it seems as though certain "emerging markets" have also been perceived as providing an alternative model to liberalism, in which neoliberal economic policies of corporate boosterism and pro-corporate dirigiste policies are welded toward an appeal to national chauvinism and "traditional values". To varying extents we can see China, Turkey and Russia, among others, charting this kind of course. I see more as compensation of liberal social values (which by and large the public in those countries are often indifferent to) in return for hopeful state stability and the continuation of liberal economic values. They are simply are farther along the "authoritarian curve" than Western states but many of the same politics match up pretty closely (especially in the last few years). Look at Poland for the latest example of a "model" liberal state following this course. However, while this turn to the authoritarian right socially may distract people for a while there is the bigger question of economics, and that these regimes are still not in essence moving forward with any meaningful type of reformism. They are doubling down on the same programs but with a new packaging. Populism and nationalism can buy time, but there is the ultimate question still of where middle income states/emerging markets can go beyond struggle to stay afloat. For the West, populism is rapidly growing stronger and yet there is still no appetite to reverse any economic course. Ardennes fucked around with this message at 16:15 on Nov 20, 2015 |
# ? Nov 20, 2015 15:57 |
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Ardennes posted:It is quite evident that crises in capitalism have happened before, and yet it is still here but there is a clear historical relevance to why a "final crisis" was avoided and this is usually the result of some form of reformism or the result of localized nature of a crisis. I think the far right was a more potent influence on liberalism to reform itself than the left. People complain about the sad state of the left today, but was it ever a potent force outside of, to speak perfectly frankly, freak historical accidents/exceptions like the USSR? I think you're giving liberalism too little credit for reforming itself in response to the far right, and too much credit to a far left that doesn't really deserve it IMO icantfindaname fucked around with this message at 03:51 on Nov 21, 2015 |
# ? Nov 21, 2015 03:46 |
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icantfindaname posted:I think the far right was a more potent influence on liberalism to reform itself than the left. People complain about the sad state of the left today, but was it ever a potent force outside of, to speak perfectly frankly, freak historical accidents/exceptions like the USSR? I think you're giving liberalism too little credit for reforming itself in response to the far right, and too much credit to a far left that doesn't really deserve it IMO
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# ? Nov 21, 2015 05:45 |
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bite me commies. leftist revolution was never a real danger in US or in Western Europe, so ascribing any reforms to fear of it makes no sense
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# ? Nov 21, 2015 07:44 |
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icantfindaname posted:bite me commies. leftist revolution was never a real danger in US or in Western Europe, so ascribing any reforms to fear of it makes no sense counterpoint: the New Deal saved the US from the Depression and prevented communist revolution by satisfying the American working class in the long run I don't see how the far right had anything to do with that
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# ? Nov 21, 2015 10:36 |
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icantfindaname posted:bite me commies. leftist revolution was never a real danger in US or in Western Europe, so ascribing any reforms to fear of it makes no sense e: a less sarcastic/more clear reply: There was a whole Thing that happened after the industrial revolutions in Europe and the US involving trade unionism, anarchism, democratic socialism and revolutionary socialism in reaction to the intolerable conditions of those times; those efforts serve as the basis for a lot of the protections we have now. This is often glossed over in basic US history textbooks, and someone who relies too heavily on only the basic history laid out for them in primary school without supplementing it with other readings of history will miss that. You come off as that kind of person here and I think I've said something to you before in regard to making assertions that sound too boldly confident when paired with what you actually know about economic history. Politicians of those times were often clear in their intentions that they viewed those leftist blocs as the reason to enact reforms, not the right wing - mostly because the populist nationalism as a galvanizing force which acted as an existential threat to the state that you speak of started springing up with WWI, which was partly a result of nation-states trying to counter class consciousness with patriotic/nationalist consciousness. The progressive Milwaukee Journal summed up pretty well that conservatives "fight socialism blindly, while the Progressives fight it intelligently and seek to remedy the abuses and conditions upon which it thrives." And Theodore Roosevelt said in regard to progressive era legislation: "I think [railroad lobbyists] are very shortsighted not to understand that to beat [antitrust acts] means to increase the movement for government ownership of the railroads." Or expressing concern that workers compensation laws being ruled unconstitutional will serve "immensely to the strength of the Socialist Party." tl;dr: various strains of leftism were very strong for a while there (during a good stretch of modern history which is mostly left out of standard US history books). The modern situation is much different, with stronger organized right wing elements and an almost non-existent organized left. It's not helpful to assume current conditions for all of history. Rodatose fucked around with this message at 12:07 on Nov 21, 2015 |
# ? Nov 21, 2015 10:45 |
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icantfindaname posted:bite me commies. leftist revolution was never a real danger in US or in Western Europe, so ascribing any reforms to fear of it makes no sense Eh remember there was a failed communist uprising in Bavaria, Hungary was briefly independently communist and Western governments were getting pretty nervous when they saw Soviet forces moving toward Warsaw back in the 1921 and that is just around World War One. Oh yeah, and there was that whole" Cold War" thing as well, including the growth and success of communist/non-social democratic leftist parties in Western Europe. From 1917 to the 1970s, there was actually something to be nervous about (of course before then too as well). Liberalism was forced to reformist because there was actually a real political threat inside and outside the borders of Western countries and their empires. The West obviously always had the upper hand but that doesn't mean there was a real challenge they had to face. As far as the far right, Mussolini and Hitler never had such long-standing influence, and anyway it doesn't make sense in the context of the development of post-war welfare states.
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# ? Nov 21, 2015 12:09 |
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yeah it's not like the history of government reforms and social movements is this secret mystery that you get to make poo poo up about, like you can just look it up
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# ? Nov 21, 2015 15:55 |
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Helsing posted:Unfortunately that link is broken for me. Is there any chance you can re-link the article? Here's the article. Michael Roberts has done a nice series of articles investigating the continuing sluggishness of the global economy (as a consequence of a low rate of profit), and I'd encourage taking a read through his blog to evaluate his evidence and arguments. He actually posted a new article today about the possibility of a new recession next year if there is indeed a rate hike in the U.S.
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# ? Nov 21, 2015 16:21 |
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icantfindaname posted:bite me commies. leftist revolution was never a real danger in US or in Western Europe, so ascribing any reforms to fear of it makes no sense 1848 1871 1914 1918 1919 1922 1936 1968 this all being strictly confining oneself to europe, of course, and leaving out a number of other incidents did you know that bismarck explicitly designed his welfare programmes to undercut the popularity of the marxist SPD and prevent a revolution and, i mean, this is ignoring militancy in the form of industrial actions &c and assuming the victories of the reformist labour movement to be a facet of the "far-right" or w/e which is even more staggeringly ignorant than whatever ill-conceived point you're trying to formulate here V. Illych L. fucked around with this message at 17:10 on Nov 21, 2015 |
# ? Nov 21, 2015 17:05 |
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V. Illych L. posted:1848 1871 1914 1918 1919 1922 1936 As to be clear, it isn't just revolution on it's own that was the issue but also broader geopolitics especially after 1917, especially the constant fear that leftist parties were allies or would ally themselves with Moscow. They way to defeat them was simply give most of what people wanted in the first place. That said, the "victory" of the Cold War wasn't just against the Soviets but against socialism as a concept so it many ways it is a battle that could have easily said to go from 1848 to 1991. It is just 1917 to 1991 was the main phase of the struggle because there was a great power contest that went a long with it. That said, we no longer live in that era and even compared to the mid-19th century leftism is at a very low ebb and liberalism is nearly completely ascendant, and ideologically hardened.
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# ? Nov 21, 2015 17:16 |
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V. Illych L. posted:1848 1871 1914 1918 1919 1922 1936 1968 a big long string of failed revolutions (besides one) that got the poo poo stomped out of them: proof that the left is responsible for all victories of reformist liberalism
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# ? Nov 21, 2015 22:47 |
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Most historians agree that there was significant unease in Western governments about the prospect of a socialist uprising. If you want to argue otherwise then that's great but could you actually cite historical examples, correspondances between political leaders, etc. to make your case instead of this low effort garbage posting? There are a million other threads for you to poo poo up if you don't want to make effort posts.
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# ? Nov 21, 2015 23:30 |
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icantfindaname posted:a big long string of failed revolutions (besides one) that got the poo poo stomped out of them: proof that the left is responsible for all victories of reformist liberalism meanwhile your argument that reaction to the right being responsible for reform rests on??
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# ? Nov 22, 2015 00:11 |
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Zas posted:meanwhile your argument that reaction to the right being responsible for reform rests on?? If the argument is just based on fear/likelihood of the far left / far right coming to power, the far right actually came to power much more often than the left did. The actual takeaway IMO is that it's not at all clear that far left agitation is what drove liberal reformism, at least not to the degree pushed by a lot of people
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# ? Nov 22, 2015 00:55 |
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That's not really the basis of the argument, the argument is that a lot of the architects of various welfare states and programs straight up have said "We're doing this to hold off/undermine socialism/communism." Now I could see a counterargument that they were lying or just as strongly influenced by the right, but you'd have to make it.
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# ? Nov 22, 2015 01:02 |
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Icantfindaname, what you're over looking -- in addition to the points raised by Zas -- is that many of the right wing regimes you're referring to came into power as a direct reaction to the threat of socialism. Even before Mussolini came to power in Italy his fascist brown shirts had ingratiated themselves with the establishment by breaking strikes and beating or murdering socialist leaders in regions such as the Po valley. In Germany Hitler was invited into the government by the ruling Nationalist party and given substantial economic assistance from industrialists specifically because of the growing strength of the German communist party and anxiety over both the existence of the USSR and the failed German revolution in 1918-1919. After World War II it's true that the Keynesian system of demand management was justified in part on the belief that it would dampen the risk of political extremism from both the left and the right but you're displaying a lot of confusion over the sequence of historical events as well as the very real and widely expressed concerns of the establishment during the late 19th up to the mid 20th century about the prospects of a socialist uprising, or at least highly disruptive industrial actions. Ardennes posted:I see more as compensation of liberal social values (which by and large the public in those countries are often indifferent to) in return for hopeful state stability and the continuation of liberal economic values. They are simply are farther along the "authoritarian curve" than Western states but many of the same politics match up pretty closely (especially in the last few years). Look at Poland for the latest example of a "model" liberal state following this course. I think that we've seen some very modest pressure toward reformism in the North America. Obamacare is a huge gift to insurance companies but it represent a neoliberal attempt to correct a market failure in the healthcare industry, and in Canada we've seen Liberal governments (and in rare cases parties with a vaguely social democratic flavouring) replacing conservative parties, in part by promising tax increases on the wealthy and deficit financed infrastructure spending, government run pension plans and limits on carbon emissions. Of course all these measures were mainstream a generation ago, and it's unlikely these measures will be enacted on a sufficient scale to respond effectively to the scale of the economic malaise that seems to be settling over the globe, but I see them as cracks in the neoliberal monolith. As for the organized left, I think that the financial crisis and the incoherence of the Occupy Wall Street movement (at least at the national level) represent a sort of nadir for the left, a real and depressing example of how weak and irrelevant the left had become. Since then, however, I think we've seen some sporadic examples of grass roots mobilization that might yet bear fruit in he coming decades. The real question is whether local eruptions like Black Lives Matter, Fight For 15, the Bernie Sanders campaign, etc. can actually link together into some kind of organic coalition. Much in the way that the fight against segregation, opposition to Vietnam and various other left wing causes in the 1960s built upon and accelerated each other, pulling many liberals to the left in the process. We're not at that stage yet but we many eventually arrive there. As for the ruse of conservative anti-liberal regimes in emerging markets, I wonder where some if them won't be able to use their authoritarian political structures to pivot toward some kind of reformism more rapidly than liberal governments, much in the way that fascist governments were able to implement public works projects and targeted economic relief without generating the kind of conservative and corporate backlash that was triggered by the New Deal. My point here being that the situation seems quite fluid and while the lack of anticapitalist states internationally and socialist movements domestically may reduce the pressure toward reformism, that doesn't necessarily mean that some kind of rupture won't form within the coalition of forces upholding the current neoliberal orthodoxy. If nothing else, we might see the looming threat of global warming getting used as justification for a huge economic reordering of society.
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# ? Nov 22, 2015 23:08 |
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icantfindaname posted:If the argument is just based on fear/likelihood of the far left / far right coming to power, the far right actually came to power much more often than the left did. The actual takeaway IMO is that it's not at all clear that far left agitation is what drove liberal reformism, at least not to the degree pushed by a lot of people icantfindaname posted:I think the far right was a more potent influence on liberalism to reform itself than the left. People complain about the sad state of the left today, but was it ever a potent force outside of, to speak perfectly frankly, freak historical accidents/exceptions like the USSR? I think you're giving liberalism too little credit for reforming itself in response to the far right, and too much credit to a far left that doesn't really deserve it IMO these statements are not mutually coherent. which of them bests sums up your position e. i mean, this is not a matter of opinion. the historical record just doesn't bear out your point of view - the ruling classes explicitly, rightly or wrongly, feared a left-wing revolution, and this created a space to work for the more reformist left. if you want to make a counter-argument to this view you cannot simply say "BUT WHAT IF THE FASCISTS WERE THE REAL HEROES ALL ALONG" and expect to get away with it
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# ? Nov 22, 2015 23:16 |
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# ? May 4, 2024 14:14 |
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quote:As for the ruse of conservative anti-liberal regimes in emerging markets, I wonder where some if them won't be able to use their authoritarian political structures to pivot toward some kind of reformism more rapidly than liberal governments, much in the way that fascist governments were able to implement public works projects and targeted economic relief without generating the kind of conservative and corporate backlash that was triggered by the New Deal. What incentive do authoritarian regimes have to use their unchecked power to commit to reform? Particularly when reforms would involve them giving up some power?
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# ? Nov 23, 2015 00:09 |