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The Belgian posted:Because language is formed by common use and not just someone's whim. Positive claims without backing bother you, and yet... Prescriptivists are a thing in linguistics. Edit: And atheism is not a positive claim by any definition. A lack of belief cannot be a belief. It can be a thought. But not a belief. An atheist, however, can have a multitude of beliefs relating to his atheism. Judakel fucked around with this message at 06:21 on Mar 19, 2016 |
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Mar 19, 2016 05:49
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Juffo-Wup posted:So your first argument is mistaken because the kind of afterlife Kant needs requires an ultimate judge. Your second argument seems not to distinguish between proof, justification, and having a reason,which is an important distinction here. quote:There is no proof to ground that hope, but Kant does think there is a reason (read: that it is reasonable) to adopt theistic faith signalnoise posted:Knowledge and belief are not the same thing. To believe that and to know that have very different requirements. signalnoise posted:I appreciate your logical positivist stance for what it is but I think there's an element of psychology that you're not giving credit, which is that people are very very capable of everyday cognitive dissonance. twodot fucked around with this message at 18:56 on Mar 21, 2016 |
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Mar 21, 2016 18:54
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twodot posted:You're asserting some authority over these words I don't buy. There is no such thing as capital-K Knowledge, there are only varying levels of certainties. You can use believe and know to describe different levels of certainties, but that's not fundamentally different. Through what mechanism would belief and knowledge be different? Most authorities on the subject, and I agree with them on this, would say that knowledge is at minimum not just a belief but a justified and true belief. Belief alone is not enough to know something. Knowledge requires some level of certainty, but a belief does not. You can have the illusion of certainty but that is not actual certainty. That said there is some debate over what constitutes knowledge exactly, but all of the experts on epistemology I've read and talked to agree that belief is a necessary part of knowledge but not sufficient by itself. Like I said at the beginning of my posts in here though this all depends on your own epistemological system. There's not going to be any proof here. If there was, epistemology would be in the sciences and not philosophy.
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Mar 21, 2016 19:10
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twodot posted:Again, a judgemental afterlife requires a system through which people are judged, it doesn't require a god figure and once again it doesn't require a god figure who can't demonstrate its existence, which is the issue at hand. On that topic, wouldn't induction into the afterlife prove that God exists? 1.) I have no clue where you're getting this idea that the God of Kant and Kirkegaard somehow has to be incapable of revealing himself. It is a doctrine of the Christian faith that both men embraced, for example, that God revealed himself when he gave Moses the laws. They merely hold that, barring that kind of revelatory divine intervention, it is not possible to give an empirical demonstration of God's existence. 2.) You are once again conflating knowledge with proof. It is one thing to say that Moses' experience on the mountain gave him knowledge of God's existence, it is quite another to say that by virtue of this experience he therefore has proof of God's existence. If you had happened upon him afterwards, and he had shown you his stone tablets, he would not thereby have transferred his transformational experience to you. What is at issue is rational proof and not subjective knowledge. 3.) In order for the universe to be such that happiness is rewarded in exact proportion to morality, it is not only necessary for there to be a lawlike relationship between human action and the moral law, but also between human action and representations of the moral law. The morally evaluable unit for Kant is not the action but the maxim, which has a mental component (which for now it is reasonable to gloss as 'intent'). Kant's metaphysics is not going to be okay with a material causal principle that operates on the basis of mental things, so for him the organizing principle of the universe had better itself be a thing with a will and an understanding. twodot posted:I also dispute that such a person believes God exists. Kant is that dude from The Mummy invoking various gods as strategy. If you think that belief is something other than a disposition, all else being equal, to assent to a given proposition, then I have no idea what you are trying to mean by that word. twodot posted:You're asserting some authority over these words I don't buy. There is no such thing as capital-K Knowledge, there are only varying levels of certainties. You can use believe and know to describe different levels of certainties, but that's not fundamentally different. Through what mechanism would belief and knowledge be different? The verb to know is factive: If A knows that P is true, then P is true. The same doesn't hold of A believes that P. One might think that what grounds this fact is that beliefs and knowledge take fundamentally different objects. On this view, beliefs are of propositions (which are abstracta) and knowledge is of facts (which are concreta). Juffo-Wup fucked around with this message at 20:55 on Mar 21, 2016 |
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Mar 21, 2016 20:48
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Juffo-Wup posted:1.) I have no clue where you're getting this idea that the God of Kant and Kirkegaard somehow has to be incapable of revealing himself. It is a doctrine of the Christian faith that both men embraced, for example, that God revealed himself when he gave Moses the laws. They merely hold that, barring that kind of revelatory divine intervention, it is not possible to give an empirical demonstration of God's existence. quote:The verb to know is factive: If A knows that P is true, then P is true. The same doesn't hold of A believes that P. signalnoise posted:Most authorities on the subject, and I agree with them on this, would say that knowledge is at minimum not just a belief but a justified and true belief. Belief alone is not enough to know something.
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Mar 21, 2016 21:18
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twodot posted:Revelatory divine intervention is an empirical demonstration of God's existence. A god that can't be proven shouldn't be performing miracles or what not. 'Can't be proven to exist' and 'Can't be proven by humans to exist' are different things, and only the latter thing is at issue. twodot posted:Is this tautological or are you claiming no one has ever known a false thing? If you're definition of knowledge is "the set of things people believe and are also true", that's fine, but individuals has no capacity to distinguish between things they merely believe and what they know, since they think the things they merely believe are true. If by 'tautological' you mean 'definitional' then sure, I guess. I am in fact claiming that no one has ever known a falsehood. But since I was only giving necessary, and not sufficient conditions for knowledge, we cannot infer from what I said alone that the extension of 'knowledge' is any particular set of mental states. What do you think is the significance of your claim that individuals can't distinguish between knowledge and mere beliefs? If it's true, what follows from it?
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Mar 21, 2016 21:31
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Juffo-Wup posted:'Can't be proven to exist' and 'Can't be proven by humans to exist' are different things, and only the latter thing is at issue. quote:What do you think is the significance of your claim that individuals can't distinguish between knowledge and mere beliefs? If it's true, what follows from it?
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Mar 21, 2016 21:38
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twodot posted:Investigation of a miracle is still a proof performed by humans. God might be the guy making statues of Mary cry blood, but it's humans who investigate the blood crying and come to conclusions about what's going on. But it is still a substantive claim to say that, absent direct intervention (contrasted with the indirect intervention of e.g. making the laws of physics just so) human faculties not up to the task of giving a rational demonstration of God's existence. Were you actually not able to reach this interpretation on your own or are you being deliberately obtuse for some reason? twodot posted:If knowledge and beliefs can't be distinguished, then they are the same thing, which is what I said earlier. Someone telling me "I know God exists" and "I believe God exists" is making the same claim. If you are asking whether knowledge and beliefs are distinguishable in principle, I've already made that distinction: one is factive. If you are asking whether I can determine whether a given mental state is a case of knowledge or of false belief, well, that just requires determining whether the relevant fact obtains in the world. If you think that we can never make that determination in any case, you are committed to the view that truth and falsity are indistinguishable. If you are asking whether I can determine whether someone's belief in the existence of God amounts to knowledge, well, that's just what's at issue, isn't it? And yes, you're right that the utterances 'P' and 'P is true' have the same truth value, but this doesn't entail that 'A believes P' and 'P' also have the same truth value.
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Mar 21, 2016 22:06
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Juffo-Wup posted:But it is still a substantive claim to say that, absent direct intervention (contrasted with the indirect intervention of e.g. making the laws of physics just so) human faculties not up to the task of giving a rational demonstration of God's existence. quote:If you are asking whether I can determine whether a given mental state is a case of knowledge or of false belief, well, that just requires determining whether the relevant fact obtains in the world. If you think that we can never make that determination in any case, you are committed to the view that truth and falsity are indistinguishable.
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Mar 21, 2016 22:28
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twodot posted:Same to you, through what mechanism could an individual distinguish between their knowledge that is true, and beliefs which they believe are true and justified, but are false, without just jettisoning the entire notion of beliefs? This question is why I say each person has to set their own structure of what is good enough to know something. You are a logical positivist, that's your stance. I'm a pragmatist. There's a line somewhere between belief and knowledge, and I don't know where exactly it is, but I believe it exists.
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Mar 21, 2016 23:17
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twodot posted:Why is this substantive? Human faculties aren't up to giving a rational demonstration of quarks without <whatever tool detects quarks>, but if you think that the thing that enables humans to demonstrate quarks exist (in this analogy, a god that intervenes in reality), you wouldn't claim that humans are incapable of demonstrating quarks exist. twodot posted:Through what mechanism can you know you've correctly gathered relevant facts versus merely believe you've gathered the relevant facts? If you can only ever believe that something is knowledge, who cares about the distinction? There is no perfect knowledge, only relative certainty. What signalnoise says. Whatever mechanism you think is sufficient to distinguish truth from falsity will by virtue of that also distinguish between knowledge and mere belief. If you think no such thing is possible, then so is knowledge impossible. If you think truth comes in degrees, then do does knowledge. I'm generally partial to the methods of natural science, but I'm not inclined to be partisan about it just now.
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Mar 21, 2016 23:59
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Juffo-Wup posted:What signalnoise says. Whatever mechanism you think is sufficient to distinguish truth from falsity will by virtue of that also distinguish between knowledge and mere belief. If you think no such thing is possible, then so is knowledge impossible. If you think truth comes in degrees, then do does knowledge. I'm generally partial to the methods of natural science, but I'm not inclined to be partisan about it just now.
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Mar 22, 2016 00:18
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twodot posted:Knowledge as you are defining is impossible to know whether you have it or not. It's obviously possible to have correct beliefs, but if you had a mechanism that could reliably distinguish correct beliefs from incorrect, why would you ever hold an incorrect belief? If I can't know whether I know something, why does it exist as a verb? Because it's different than belief
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Mar 22, 2016 00:21
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twodot posted:Knowledge as you are defining is impossible to know whether you have it or not. It's obviously possible to have correct beliefs, but if you had a mechanism that could reliably distinguish correct beliefs from incorrect, why would you ever hold an incorrect belief? If I can't know whether I know something, why does it exist as a verb? Yeah, you can't distinguish between knowledge and belief at a moment. They're phenomenologically identical. But that does not mean they are identical simpliciter. Having a person standing behind me and not having a person standing behind me are phenomenologically identical, but I can still look back and discover whether, at a past time, someone was standing behind me. Being in a dark room in Paris and being in a dark room in Milan are phenomenologically indistinguishable, but it would be perverse to conclude from this fact that they are the same property. I noticed you've stopped talking about Kant. Are we done with that discussion?
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Mar 22, 2016 00:38
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twodot posted:Ok, but existence is still provable via personal experience of the divine. As far as I'm aware, the "personal experience of the divine," amounts to "I feel the warmth of God in my heart, I swear," and holds as much water as the guy next door who knows for a fact that his "personal experience of gang stalker radio signals messing with my brain" is evidence that a group of dozens of people is coordinating to stalk and intimidate him for no clear reason. Or straight-up Pegged Lamb's ramblings, now that I'm catching up. I'm sad that I missed it. I think it's silly to suppose that 'atheist,' in the standard colloquial sense when you put the label on someone on a TV show for the masses, is anything other than "I've heard about this God concept and I don't buy it." We can talk about more rigid definitions about someone's thresholds in probability terms for calling something "untrue," but you have to make those definitions clear with formatting from the outset. I don't think people are expected to take the "agnostic" stance on whether they're going to win the lottery three times in a row, even though they hold a nonzero probability of that happening. twodot posted:Investigation of a miracle is still a proof performed by humans. God might be the guy making statues of Mary cry blood, but it's humans who investigate the blood crying and come to conclusions about what's going on. So what did the DNA test turn up in that case? Or was there one?
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Mar 22, 2016 18:47
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Juffo-Wup posted:Having a person standing behind me and not having a person standing behind me are phenomenologically identical, but I can still look back and discover whether, at a past time, someone was standing behind me. quote:I noticed you've stopped talking about Kant. Are we done with that discussion? twodot fucked around with this message at 19:37 on Mar 22, 2016 |
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Mar 22, 2016 19:34
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twodot posted:You can not do this for your definition of knowledge, you can only believe someone was standing behind you. There may be a correlation between your experience of seeing a person behind you and a person actually standing behind you, but people experience untrue things frequently. JW's definition of knowledge so far is simply "subject believes it" and "it is true." If it was true that a person was standing behind me two seconds ago (and still is standing behind me), then I can turn my head, see the person, and correctly believe—thereby knowing, under Juffo-Wup's definition—that somebody was standing behind me two seconds ago.
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Mar 22, 2016 19:50
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Stinky_Pete posted:JW's definition of knowledge so far is simply "subject believes it" and "it is true." If it was true that a person was standing behind me two seconds ago (and still is standing behind me), then I can turn my head, see the person, and correctly believe—thereby knowing, under Juffo-Wup's definition—that somebody was standing behind me two seconds ago.
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Mar 22, 2016 19:53
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Everyone read the Gettier article http://www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
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Mar 22, 2016 19:56
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twodot posted:They said "discover". Yes, you can coincidentally know a thing, but you can't know whether you know it or not, which is how I would interpret discover (aka this definition is garbage). Under this definition, if you believe that you know something, and that something is true, then you do indeed "know" that you know it. It would be an objectively true fact that cannot be verified with probability equal to one. No fact can be verified with probability equal to one, because there is always the infinitesimal chance that your entire life was a carefully controlled and fabricated trick by superpowerful aliens, or brain-in-a-jar simulation that could be changed by its developers, etc. Regardless, our ability to use induction to obtain probabilities about things very close to one, I think, is a better frame for establishing "knowledge." I prefer to talk about "knowledge" in terms of the expectations it generates. Stinky_Pete fucked around with this message at 20:04 on Mar 22, 2016 |
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Mar 22, 2016 19:59
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twodot posted:You can not do this for your definition of knowledge, you can only believe someone was standing behind you. There may be a correlation between your experience of seeing a person behind you and a person actually standing behind you, but people experience untrue things frequently. You're smuggling a hidden premise into the argument. twodot posted:Your representation of Kant's beliefs is that he believed in a provable God. The proof is tricky, but that's not relevant to what I was saying. What do you think is left of your representation of Kant that's worth talking about? Edit: Nevermind. Juffo-Wup fucked around with this message at 20:25 on Mar 22, 2016 |
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Mar 22, 2016 20:02
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Stinky_Pete posted:Under this definition, if you believe that you know something, and that something is true, then you do indeed "know" that you know it. It would be an objectively true fact that cannot be verified with probability equal to one. Juffo-Wup posted:You're smuggling a hidden premise into the argument.
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Mar 22, 2016 21:10
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twodot posted:Is the hidden premise that a useful definition of "know" should allow human beings to know whether they know things or not? How is that useful? No, seriously, in what way is existence made measurably better by the ability to describe something you believe as "knowing" it? What's the practical reason that you absolutely, positively, must use the word "know"?
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Mar 22, 2016 21:27
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Who What Now posted:How is that useful? No, seriously, in what way is existence made measurably better by the ability to describe something you believe as "knowing" it? What's the practical reason that you absolutely, positively, must use the word "know"? twodot fucked around with this message at 21:39 on Mar 22, 2016 |
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Mar 22, 2016 21:36
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twodot posted:Uh... it's not. I'm the person arguing know and believe are the same concepts which is why the gnostic/agnostic distinction is bad and people shouldn't use it. It's the other people that think it's useful to distinguish between things people know and believe (edit: But supply definitions such that people can't know what they know). I would be happy to abandon the word in place of believe. You can know what you believe though.
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Mar 22, 2016 21:40
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Who What Now posted:How is that useful? No, seriously, in what way is existence made measurably better by the ability to describe something you believe as "knowing" it? What's the practical reason that you absolutely, positively, must use the word "know"? Coming from the person who posted this thing.
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Mar 22, 2016 21:43
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twodot posted:Is the hidden premise that a useful definition of "know" should allow human beings to know whether they know things or not? No one is arguing that reflexive knowledge is impossible, just that it is not entailed by knowledge. Sometimes, when we know P, we know that we know P. Sometimes not. You're the one who's making a claim about necessity. Who What Now posted:How is that useful? No, seriously, in what way is existence made measurably better by the ability to describe something you believe as "knowing" it? What's the practical reason that you absolutely, positively, must use the word "know"? The definition is stipulative. If we ignore Gettier cases for the moment, then the concept of knowledge tracks distinctions between true and false beliefs, and between justified and unjustified beliefs. If 'knowledge' is a vacuous concept (which is ultimately where twodot is headed) then it can only be by virtue of the fact that one or both of the the true/false and justified/unjustified distinctions are also vacuous.
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Mar 22, 2016 21:46
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twodot posted:If you can't verify the fact how can you claim to know it? You can claim to be reasonably certain about it, but my point this whole time is that know and believe can at best only be distinguished by being different levels of certainty. I'm not supporting the value of the definition, just affirming how its rules work. A person can claim to know something, under that definition—the claim simply has no bearing on whether they do, in fact, know the thing under that definition, because it's in Logic Land. I think the gnostic/agnostic concept frames belief in a false dilemma. I put that we can determine with as much confidence as any other material fact, whether a model of reality invoking a "god" is accurate, and that so far no models invoking a "god" has proven accurate. If an unfalsifiable definition of such "god" is put forth, then Occam's Razor kicks in, and the appropriate level of confidence for the claim is equally infinitesimal to that of invisible intangible dragons who don't breathe, me being about to win the lottery thirty times in a row, leprechauns guarding an iron cauldron full of gold at the "end" of a rainbow (just get to the end of it!), etc. The primary question to be asked of a belief: If I am to believe "X," what observations shall I anticipate because of "X?" Stinky_Pete fucked around with this message at 22:41 on Mar 22, 2016 |
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Mar 22, 2016 21:52
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The Belgian posted:Coming from the person who posted this thing. I can post challenges to people's arguments without actually holding a certain position myself.  A for effort though. twodot posted:Uh... it's not. I'm the person arguing know and believe are the same concepts which is why the gnostic/agnostic distinction is bad and people shouldn't use it. It's the other people that think it's useful to distinguish between things people know and believe (edit: But supply definitions such that people can't know what they know). I would be happy to abandon the word in place of believe. Ok, let me rephrase, why is knowing what you know so important? Assuming we're talking about the philosophical definition of knowledge and not the colloquial usage.
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Mar 23, 2016 01:25
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The last several pages of this thread has seems rather absurd to me I would like to share this gem and see what youz guys think about it. G K Chesterton posted:It is idle to talk always of the alternative of reason and faith. Reason is itself a matter of faith. It is an act of faith to assert that our thoughts have any relation to reality at all. If you are merely a sceptic, you must sooner or later ask yourself the question, "Why should ANYTHING go right; even observation and deduction? Why should not good logic be as misleading as bad logic? They are both movements in the brain of a bewildered ape?" The young sceptic says, "I have a right to think for myself." But the old sceptic, the complete sceptic, says, "I have no right to think for myself. I have no right to think at all." It seems silly to me that skeptics are willing to doubt everything, up to and including the Divine Reason, but they won't doubt themselves, as evidenced by putting logical positivism on a pedestal.
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Mar 23, 2016 01:31
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Commie NedFlanders posted:The last several pages of this thread has seems rather absurd to me Lmk when induction stops working. I don't know who claimed to know anything with logical certainty (i.e. probability equal to 1) but they are wrong because there's always an infinitesimal chance that your memory of your whole life was a special brain fart contrived by aliens or whatever. Stinky_Pete fucked around with this message at 02:01 on Mar 23, 2016 |
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Mar 23, 2016 01:57
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Commie NedFlanders posted:The last several pages of this thread has seems rather absurd to me Lots of people have offered (secular) responses to both global and constrained skepticism and to problems with induction. Most of them aren't logical positivists, especially since the latter half of the 20th century. signalnoise says earlier on this page that they're a pragmatist, meaning (most likely) that they take successful application of a hypothesis as constitutive of its justification. We try to describe the world, and it's hard, but it seems like we've made some headway, as a species, over the past five millennia or so. As for why we should think our thoughts have any relation to reality, here's a famous argument from recently deceased Hilary Putnam.
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Mar 23, 2016 01:58
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Stinky_Pete posted:Lmk when induction stops working. I don't know who claimed to know anything with logical certainty (i.e. probability equal to 1) but they are wrong because there's always an infinitesimal chance that your memory of your whole life was a special brain fart contrived by aliens or whatever. How can you estimate such a probability enough to even suggest it is small? No feelie weelies, show me the data
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Mar 23, 2016 03:32
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Sorry I didn't recognize induction and pragmatism was cool in here, that's really good though Here's an informal, pragmatic proof: All you have to do is sincerely accept Christ as your Lord and Savior and begin a regular practice of prayer and reading his Word to cultivate your relationship with God. You really gotta want it, for your eyes to be opened to His truth. This is the pragmatic part Avoid the temptation to chase your doubt down the rabbit hole, inductive reasoning is okay here. Report back after a few weeks to share your findings.
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Mar 23, 2016 03:36
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Juffo-Wup posted:pragmatist, meaning (most likely) that they take successful application of a hypothesis as constitutive of its justification. Yes. More specifically, the point at which a perfect illusion is identical in experience to the real thing is the point at which I stop giving a gently caress if I'm wrong. There's a concept for confidence in a projection called an alpha value, or significance level. It is essentially the acceptable level of probability that you're wrong. My alpha value is pretty tight, I like to think. If you set your alpha value too low, you'll never accept anything. Being aware of your own alpha value with regards to reality is important. The difference, for me, between knowledge and belief, is whether a hypothesis has been tested. You can believe something all day and not know until you test for it. Belief is to knowledge as trust is to verification.
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Mar 23, 2016 03:43
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Commie NedFlanders posted:Here's an informal, pragmatic proof: This is not what pragmatism means.
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Mar 23, 2016 03:48
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Chesterton was a manchild who lacked basic functioning and could not get home from the train station. It's no surprise he couldn't tell the difference between faith and reason; reason never was a faculty he could engage.
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Mar 23, 2016 03:57
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Commie NedFlanders posted:Sorry I didn't recognize induction and pragmatism was cool in here, that's really good though I did it for 20 years and didn't discover poo poo, ergo by this logic God doesn't exist.
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Mar 23, 2016 12:58
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Commie NedFlanders posted:
Can we use experiences in the past, or do we have to start the few week cycle over again? Also, 'you really gotta want it' is a set of wheels on a goal post if I've ever seen them, because if the findings don't conform to your own, you can simply say that we didn't want it enough. Hence the argument continues forever.
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Mar 23, 2016 14:13
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Commie NedFlanders posted:How can you estimate such a probability enough to even suggest it is small? So far I have zero observations of your memory of your whole life having been a special brain fart contrived by aliens or whatever, and while I'm not an expert on the circumstances necessary for a special brain fart contrived by aliens or whatever, I'm fairly confident given what I've learned so far that they are exceedingly rare, and if it is the case then the aliens or whatever are clearly not inclined to change my experience from one that is consistent with scientific findings, so I don't gain any new predictive power by believing that it is the case. So it is an unfalsifiable hypothesis that gets to share the kids' table with the infinity of other conceivable unfalsifiable hypotheses, each no more likely than the next, giving a nearly uniform probability distribution across an infinite space, hence "infinitesimal." Commie NedFlanders posted:Sorry I didn't recognize induction and pragmatism was cool in here, that's really good though I'm not sure what your point is, with this "All you need to believe in God is to believe in God" slop. We generally understand the psychological mechanisms that make people believe by wanting to, the short explanation being that the brain's reward system is promiscuous, especially if the subject is motivated to notice doubt and suppress it. No, I don't think that authoritarianism is a necessary aspect of reasoning with induction. Were you trying to poke a hole in what you thought was me saying "well if you feel something that supports it then you know it's more true" I think you thought I meant "induction" in some naive way that ends up really being confirmation bias, but I was using the word in order to reference and diminish the "problem of induction" in philosophy, which basically says "induction is incomplete because the physical laws that govern our relationship with our environment have only been consistent so far  "
Stinky_Pete fucked around with this message at 16:37 on Mar 23, 2016 |
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Mar 23, 2016 16:33
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