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Oh man I'm sorry I'm late to this thread. To add to this discussion, Vox had a good article recently about the decline of neoconservatism within the Republican party. http://www.vox.com/2016/3/10/11189350/twilight-of-the-neoconservatives Twilight of the neoconservatives posted:The once-fringe neoconservative movement, in the space of a few short years, had seized first their party's intellectual power centers, then its legislative agenda, and now the commanding heights of American leadership itself. Against all odds, they had won. Obama is not unique in his support for a realist foreign policy, the Iraq war has discredited interventionists even on the right. Or alternatively as this article argues, the neoconservative ideologues were never popular among the American public, and are now losing their grip on Republican policymakers. I'm curious how the experience in Iraq has shaped the ideology of liberal interventionists like Hillary Clinton, which I have trouble distinguishing from neoconservatism. As an unapologetic fan of Obama's foreign policy I really want to jump into this debate but I'll have to wait another day I think to catchup with this thread. If anything I think he's been too aggressive militarily in a number of places, though I'm heartened by the thoughtfulness he displays in the Atlantic piece. I'm terrified by the kind of people who seriously believe America should be willing to spend billions and kill thousands to defend American pride or save face over statements like Obama's Red-line. It's truly shocking how much policy is driven by the needs of individual policy makers to affirm their own self-esteems which they have projected onto national policy.
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Mar 13, 2016 17:32
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Oh I couldn't help myself. icantfindaname, you have 1) said in this thread that Obama did not intervene in 2012, and that Obama's Syria policy has been one of complete "inaction"(I'm paraphrasing your third post itt), 2) you have argued that America could have ameliorated the suffering of the Syrian people through a more assertive policy, and 3) implicit itt, and expressed in the Middle East thread previously, you have argued America is in such a unique position of global power and influence that it is necessarily responsible for the outcomes of events in places like Syria (correct me if you think this is a mischaracterization of your position). I disagree with 1, America was always involved with the Syrian opposition and worked to undermine Assad. As for 2, I agree it's possible America COULD have done it, but I will argue trying to argue policy purely on the basis of hindsight is recipe for disaster, because American power is far more limited than suggested by 3, if for no other reason than because American policy makers often fail even to understand what is happening right NOW, let alone what the future will bring. First America was always involved with the opposition. Much of the support was non-military, putting sanctions on Assad, non-military assistance, and the facilitation of Gulf military aid. You can argue it was not enough which is a fair criticism, but you cannot in good faith argue nothing was done. I do not disagree that it is possible a better outcome could have been obtained through more muscular policy, but we must remember the context in which decisions were made. A man flips a coin and calls it heads. If it comes up tails, can we say he made the wrong decision? What does it even mean to be wrong or right in this context? America is uniquely powerful, but we can't expect to miracles even from well designed policy if it is premised on a false understanding of the present. We all remember Iraq how badly American intelligence failed on Iraq, but it Obama's policies in Syria have also suffered from intelligence failures. For example, the Atlantic article makes two important points, in 2011 Analysts were telling Obama Assad would soon fall just like Mubarak. And in 2014 General Lloyd Austin believed IS was “a flash in the pan.” These mistakes are indicative a fundamental flaw in the premise that America could have prevented these disasters, that is you can't stop something you didn't know was going to happen. People like Volkerball can truthfully say they saw these events coming and hence could have prevented them. But realistically American policy is necessarily limited by uncertainty, and in that foreign policy is no different than say economic policy. Hindsight is 20/20, but policy must be written in a confused an uncertain present.
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Mar 13, 2016 19:11
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Volkerball posted:I wouldn't disagree with that assessment in that there's an aura of uncertainty around every decision in foreign policy. That's why I try to avoid saying that an intervention in Syria would've ended with an ideal resolution. It would've provided a greater potential for a better resolution, but there's certainly no sure things when it comes to a situation as volatile as the Syrian civil war. The thing is, you can't shut out whatever doesn't jive with your perception and expect to make rational decisions, and that's exactly what Obama did. Sure, a lot of analysts were saying the end was nigh, and I'd say it was the most common perception in regards to Syria well into 2012, as every development was in favor of the opposition. But that wasn't so universal that dissenting voices weren't visible. Joshua Landis is one of the most prominent academics when it comes to Syria, and he gave many lectures and wrote many articles during that time period explaining why anyone who thought Syria was Egypt was kidding themselves. And the death toll cracked 1,000 and 2,000 really, really quickly, and at that point, there were a lot of voices saying "something is going to need to be done about this, or it's going to degrade quickly." My main memory of 2011 is how divided all my usual sources of information were on the path forward. In the opinion pages of every major paper you could find pieces by serious folk arguing to defend Mubarak, to let Iran waste lives and money in Syria, to repeat the Libyan intervention, how repeating a Libyan intervention was impossible. There was so much disagreement even basic assumptions of what America's interest was at the time. Yet there's one thing I never remember hearing; what comes next? That is I think at the heart of Obama's refusal to do stupid poo poo. What would an intervention achieve? End the violence? Force a coup by Alawite Officers? Simply enforce a no fly zone? What was the end game? How long could we expect to be involved? Nobody had answers. And that I think is what really held off a stronger intervention. Without clear objectives an intervention caries great risks without little hope of gain. And what was to be gained? In the Atlantic article Obama says the planned strikes in 2012 weren't even directed at defeating the Assad regime, but merely at limiting his ability continue launching chemical attacks. If the Assad government was defeated, what then? Would anyone be paying those engineers still running Syria's power plants? Would Russia today be bombing in the name of an Alawite rump state? Questions without answers. No target to aim for. In my opinion, American Middle East policy often undermines itself because it has three often contradictory goals: To defeat radical Sunni groups threatening America, to isolate and contain Iran, and lastly to promote Democracy and humanitarian goals. Iraq was such a disaster because we sought to accomplish all three at once, instead we achieved none. To succeed on one front we must concede defeat on the others. I believe in Syria Obama's early actions were directed towards bringing down the Iranian aligned Assad regime with an economy of force, he then de-emphasized that goal and turned more towards defeating radical Sunni groups as IS rose. In Yemen, America has tried to fight Al Qaeda and opposed the rise of Shia Iranian aligned forces, and has failed to accomplish anything against either. In Egypt Obama refused to use military funding as leverage against Sisi, probably because it's a bribe to keep the peace with Israel. Protecting Israel should probably rank above those other three American middle East policy goals. That was the priority, and concerns about about Democracy didn't compare. At least there's a clear focus.
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Mar 14, 2016 06:31
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