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crowoutofcontext posted:Depending on the X it could be too expensive or take too much energy to replicate food all day long and end world hunger but enough to give the global elite a novelty to play around with. Can't work that way. Literally can not. The only limiting factor is the power needs. There is either a revolution in power generation, some highly efficient form of fusion say, or we are using massive amounts of nuclear. Nuclear is not the sort of thing the rich can plop down wherever they want, and if we crack useful fusion game over. I suppose you could try to run that poo poo off battery, but that's actually even more transformative. Anything that could reliably store and release that much power that fast is orders of magnitude beyond the batteries we have now, and there are so many fields held back by the ability to store and release large amounts of power. You can not do this on the sly. You can't do it at all, but if you *could* do it you couldn't keep it to a small elite short of force, and I don't even see how that works. If you don't crack the power needs it'd be so niche that I can't see why you'd bother, or you *do* crack them and again....world transformed. quote:Or you could assume whoever has their hands on it has no interest in ending capitol, or thinks that would be a bad, chaotic thing. They don't get to make that decision. There is no technology that managed to see wide use by the public *and* stay entirely black box. And once you know how to make anything, you can't put that genie back in the bottle. Moreover restraint isn't really something capitalism is built to support. quote:You could probably say the same thing about a lot of today's technology that people initially thought had the power to create utopias, end capitalism or herald new social orders. No you couldn't, a single device that is a superior means of production of all physical objects is basically the end of most industries. You can destroy entire ecosystems cutting down lumber and shipping it around the world, or you can just make wood in a replicator. You can drive species to extinction overfishing, or you can just whip up fish as needed. You can try dealing with third world assholes and their suicide factories to get the cheapest price on processed materials, or you hit a button and magic them up at will. You could run a giant fleet of massive and costly ships, or you can just boop out whatever they were shipping wherever they were going to go in the first place. Not everything would be instantly replaced by a replicator, but so much would that capitalism as it exists couldn't continue. You see towns die when the industry they were built around disappears and they can't adapt to the change. Well now imagine the industry is all industry and the town is the world. If we don't adapt away from the mindset that we have to work in the same way we always have, everything collapses. If this technology was real, the entire principle of wealth is dealt a serious blow. You can absolutely cynically talk down what the telephone or the internet mean to our interactions with each other, but there's no basic and forgettable way to say "Make anything". It's not a fact you can just put back in the box and continue as you have been. And again, that's just the end result. You'd need all *sorts* of technologies to even make a thing like that work [Theoretically, as again none of these are possible]. Cheap limitless power is transformative, hilariously efficient and powerful batteries are transformative, insanely detailed matter scanners are transformative, and on and on. This wouldn't be one major technology, this would be a series of them. The world as is doesn't get to go on like it did. The principles of capitalism alone would dictate someone use a machine like this to undercut their competitors, who in turn would have to adapt and use them too, and fast or slow eventually industries would start to die off. Probably faster than slower. The more steps of resource gathering, production, shipping, marketing, storing you cut out of the process the more money you save, and the more jobs you eliminate. Which also means less people you have to pay, which the capitalist loves but the capitalist system requires. Capitalism isn't concerned with the long term though. It's about profit. If you can eliminate 90% of your cost by focusing only on making replicator plants, why would you really care that 20 or 30 years down the line money will have no value? That's 3 decades of winning until then! And once 20, 30, 60, 80% of the world no longer has a job because their industries are no longer required? You start having to ask some real serious questions about the feasibility of ever balancing an economy ever again. And it only gets worse as time goes on. This wouldn't mean capitalism dying off overnight, but it would be the thing that forces transition away from it. Especially as smaller nations realize they can just opt out of the global economy without downside. Capitalism is a game rigged against a lot of the players, but if those losers don't play in the first place the game can't continue. tl/dr: Magic being real would be big. Mulva fucked around with this message at 20:19 on Apr 20, 2016 |
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Apr 20, 2016 20:14
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Boogaleeboo posted:People are dumb, see: your posts, so what? Their stupidity does not negate their existence. [b] You still have to deal with them. See again: your posts, that you keep making.[ /b] Christ the guy I was talking to says he wouldn't do it because he has people that care about him that would grieve his loss, why are you calling them dumb? What did they ever do to you? No you don't. You could just ignore the posts and not respond if Something Awful User Boogaleeboo is upsetting you. Boogaleeboo posted:You can destroy entire ecosystems cutting down lumber and shipping it around the world, or you can just make wood in a replicator. You can drive species to extinction overfishing, or you can just whip up fish as needed. You can try dealing with third world assholes and their suicide factories to get the cheapest price on processed materials, or you hit a button and magic them up at will. You could run a giant fleet of massive and costly ships, or you can just boop out whatever they were shipping wherever they were going to go in the first place. I dunno, it would take a shitload of time and planning to do all that poo poo. With time and energy restraints mass production might be outta the pictures. It could take decades of planning before using it to teleport/replicate the simplest of materials. I wasn't exactly picturing FedEx employees chucking airmail boxes into transporters like a Jetsons episode. But kind of Boogaleeboo posted:[Theoretically, as again none of these are possible]
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Apr 21, 2016 02:42
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This is question for pro-teleportation side. I know how the no duplicate people would feel about this. I want to get an idea of your opinions on a version of the system in "practice" So say aliens come to earth (well a robot probe comes first, and builds a base on the moon then aliens come out), they have teleportation. We can join their space UN and they will share the whole galaxy spanning network with us, but all the teleporter rooms are built and run by the aliens. They let humans inspect them, and we are satisfied they do exactly as we are told. You go in one room, and on the other side of the galaxy an exact perfect copy of you comes out. The scan is not destructive, and there is no instant disintegration rays. BUT the big rule the aliens have is NO COPIES filling up the galaxy. If you tele-copy, one of you has to kill themselves within 30 minutes, or the alien space cops will kill all of you and anyone trying to hide you. No automatic suicide machines either, the facilities the aliens run don't have space and the aliens think that kind of thing is immoral. So you2 walks out of the room on the other side of the galaxy and goes and has space adventures, and you1 walks out still on earth and then has to go somewhere else and kill themselves. The aliens think this is perfectly fine and do it all the time. The alien technician could show you his own pile of corpses on the moon from his to and from trips back home on the weekends. Would you take a trip with this system?
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May 1, 2016 06:30
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ianmacdo posted:No automatic suicide machines either, the facilities the aliens run don't have space and the aliens think that kind of thing is immoral. Without automatic suicide machines, the benefit that would be gained from my travelling would have to be rather large to overcome the disbenefit of me having to kill myself in some unpleasant way, and it seems unlikely that my location would ever matter that much. So I probably wouldn't use this system; but I'd be glad it existed, just in case. If I could do something really good somewhere else, I should (and hope I would), but that goes for suicide without replication as well. If I were going to martyr myself I'd be delighted to be replicated first, of course.
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May 1, 2016 10:29
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It's been said a dozen times already, but bears repeating on a new page: the premise is flawed and it is literally physically impossible - as in, prohibited by the laws of physics - to create a clone of yourself to arbitrary precision. You can make another person with all your memories, and they might even think they are you, but they will be distinguishable in principle from the original you. So, with that in mind, for the most of you who will still insist that classical teleportation is a perfectly great thing and not a theoretical holocaust, what I'm curious to know is, how imprecise can you be when make the copy, and still be "you"? Is it enough to just map out the neurons? What?
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May 1, 2016 14:23
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Kilroy posted:So, with that in mind, for the most of you who will still insist that classical teleportation is a perfectly great thing and not a theoretical holocaust, what I'm curious to know is, how imprecise can you be when make the copy, and still be "you"? Is it enough to just map out the neurons? What? It can't be a physical answer, we don't know enough about the physiological basis of our mental worlds. I would want my memories of things I value, my intelligence, and my moral and political attitudes, to survive. I'd want my remaining family not to notice any changes in memory and attitudes, nor any personality changes they found distressing. But if I could be improved, from my and their point of view, that would be cool.
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May 1, 2016 14:38
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Oh dear me posted:It can't be a physical answer, we don't know enough about the physiological basis of our mental worlds. I would want my memories of things I value, my intelligence, and my moral and political attitudes, to survive. I'd want my remaining family not to notice any changes in memory and attitudes, nor any personality changes they found distressing. But if I could be improved, from my and their point of view, that would be cool. On the other hand, if most of the pro-teleportation crowd has retreated to "yeah I'd die but who cares" then I think this argument is pretty much over, isn't it? Otherwise, if you can claim that the teleportation isn't a death, and that an imperfect cloning can still create two original "yous" somehow, then it seems you can describe at least in very broad detail at what point the copy would become too imperfect to actually constitute a second original.
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May 1, 2016 15:20
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Kilroy posted:On the other hand, if most of the pro-teleportation crowd has retreated to "yeah I'd die but who cares" then I think this argument is pretty much over, isn't it? No, it obviously remains exactly where it was, with you continually ignoring the fact that the death of an organism is granted by both sides, while the death of a person is not. Kilroy posted:Otherwise, if you can claim that the teleportation isn't a death, and that an imperfect cloning can still create two original "yous" somehow, then it seems you can describe at least in very broad detail at what point the copy would become too imperfect to actually constitute a second original. Yes, as I just did: something like a family Turing test.
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May 1, 2016 17:26
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Kilroy posted:In your case I'm not sure it matters since you don't seem to even be talking about teleportation anymore, and would be satisfied with a sufficiently advanced hologram. As long as every neural pathway is exactly the same and functions the same way I don't see why it wouldn't be me. As soon as the imperfections in a copy interfere with my neural circuitry in major ways I guess I would say it wouldn't be me but I can't give a precise answer. It would amount to a sort of brain damage and the area gets really grey. If I hit my head and lost the last year of my memories I'd consider my identity somewhat preserved, but if I hit my head and only kept my memories from seven year old self and earlier it would be like I died. ianmacdo posted:The alien technician could show you his own pile of corpses on the moon from his to and from trips back home on the weekends. Maybe, if I was on heroin. Couldn't do it if I was sober.
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May 1, 2016 18:05
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Oh dear me posted:No, it obviously remains exactly where it was, with you continually ignoring the fact that the death of an organism is granted by both sides, while the death of a person is not. Hey buddy, only one side grants death of an organism and that's your side.
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May 1, 2016 18:11
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Kit Walker posted:Hey buddy, only one side grants death of an organism and that's your side. What, you don't think people or animals are organisms? I think that is an unusual view, but have it your way: it's a choice of words, not a matter of substance. The OP specified that something, whatever you want to call it, is destroyed in the transporter.
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May 1, 2016 18:54
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Oh dear me posted:What, you don't think people or animals are organisms? I think that is an unusual view, but have it your way: it's a choice of words, not a matter of substance. The OP specified that something, whatever you want to call it, is destroyed in the transporter. I was saying that no one dies in the anti-teleporter side. Kit Walker fucked around with this message at 19:44 on May 1, 2016 |
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May 1, 2016 19:42
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Oh dear me posted:No, it obviously remains exactly where it was, with you continually ignoring the fact that the death of an organism is granted by both sides, while the death of a person is not. Oh dear me posted:Yes, as I just did: something like a family Turing test. Did you really die? Kilroy fucked around with this message at 22:04 on May 1, 2016 |
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May 1, 2016 21:55
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crowoutofcontext posted:As long as every neural pathway is exactly the same and functions the same way I don't see why it wouldn't be me.
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May 1, 2016 21:58
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Kilroy posted:What does this even mean? Are you suggesting the existence of a soul? No I am not. I have said what I mean quite often already and don't want to go over the same old ground yet again; use the little question mark under my name if you actually care. quote:the death of the organism is the death of the person. Creating a facsimile of the person somewhere else doesn't change that. Certainly at the moment the death of an organism is the death of the person, because we have no replicas. In teleporter world, it will not be. This is the point under dispute and using italics doesn't change that. If there were some process by which one person could transform their own mental world (memories, attitudes etc) into someone else's, I think it would be reasonable to say that they became that person, and ceased to be the person they were. But memorizing facts about memories is not the same as having those memories, so no, your impersonator is not me.
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May 1, 2016 22:32
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Oh dear me posted:Certainly at the moment the death of an organism is the death of the person, because we have no replicas. In teleporter world, it will not be. This is the point under dispute and using italics doesn't change that. If there were some process by which one person could transform their own mental world (memories, attitudes etc) into someone else's, I think it would be reasonable to say that they became that person, and ceased to be the person they were. But memorizing facts about memories is not the same as having those memories, so no, your impersonator is not me.
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May 2, 2016 00:24
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Kilroy posted:But, the impersonator would pass your family turing test. So, somewhere between this impersonator and the impossible-in-principle "perfect copy", there is a copy of you with enough fidelity that you consider it "you" and are not distressed anymore if you die and are replaced by it. Can you elaborate what additional tests this higher-fidelity version of you would need to pass, for you to consider it good enough to start using the teleporter? You are shifting from ontology to epistemology. I said I'd want my mental attitudes etc to survive, which they would not with your impersonator, and I'd want my family to be happy (the Turing test being to show that they were). Now you are essentially asking how we could prove we weren't being fooled by some deceptive demon, sorry, actor, and as with all such questions we cannot be certain, if the deceiver is supposed to have such extraordinary power. But at a certain point the deception becomes more incredible than the alternative. If a teleporter assembled an organism, giving it a structure almost identical to mine, and tada! that organism seemed just like me, the most plausible explanation would be that it is just like me - not that it's some fiendishly clever impersonator.
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May 2, 2016 00:52
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Oh dear me posted:if a teleporter assembled an organism, giving it a structure almost identical to mine, and tada! that organism seemed just like me, the most plausible explanation would be that it is just like me - not that it's some fiendishly clever impersonator. The point I'm getting at, is that now that we have finally agreed on a thing that isn't you, I want you to walk back from that description to the thing that is you, and tell me what the difference is.
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May 2, 2016 01:26
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Kilroy posted:Forget the demon / actor, then. Suppose a sufficiently powerful intelligent entity took a static scan of your brain, and projected a very convincing hologram of you into the world. All actions taken by this hologram are performed by the intelligent being after performing a lookup against the backup it has of your brain. In a sense, I suppose you might even say it's you doing the stuff, although the computational process the entity performs to figure out what you will do, need not match what your brain would have done. The difference is that an impersonator is acting as you but does not posses your actual thought processes, it is a simulacrum created by a more advanced entity using a portion of its capabilities. It's the difference between an N64 and an emulator. A teleporter actually creates more N64s, or "you"s, so saying they aren't really you is akin to complaining it's not really an N64 unless it was produced in the original factory on the original production run. Which, while that is a thing some people would do, a more reasonable position is to say that a thing is a thing when it is built to the thing's specifications.
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May 2, 2016 01:50
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Kilroy posted:We've already established that "exactly the same" can't be accomplished via classical means. Do you just mean that, if you were to map out the neurons, connection by connection, that that would be the same? Yes Kilroy posted:
I'm defined by my limitations as much as my capabilities. The entity you describe wouldn't be me because he could theoretically make decisions I would never make for reasons I would never conceptualize. A clone doesn't have that ability. A clone and I have the exact same capabilities and the exact same limitations. crowoutofcontext fucked around with this message at 02:29 on May 2, 2016 |
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May 2, 2016 02:21
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OwlFancier posted:It's the difference between an N64 and an emulator. So acting according to specifications is not enough to be a thing; it must be built according to specifications to be (an instance of) that thing? The thing's history matters?
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May 2, 2016 02:28
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If I build a typewriter using plans from 1930, I am building that model of typewriter, and what I have at the end is that model of typewriter, exactly as truly as if I had one that was produced in 1930. If I build a machine capable of rapidly casting and impressing lead blocks in the same typeface as the 1930 typewriter, I have not got a 1930 typewriter, though I it can produce the same results as one. History doesn't matter but what the thing is does and there is a difference between an emulation of a thing, and a thing itself. Emulation does not recreate the processes by which a thing operates, it just tries to recreate the results. If you build a human that thinks like me, talks like me, looks like me, and feels like me, you have built me. If you build a human that can convincingly act like me but thinks and feels differently, you haven't built me. OwlFancier fucked around with this message at 03:04 on May 2, 2016 |
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May 2, 2016 03:02
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OwlFancier posted:If you build a human that thinks like me, talks like me, looks like me, and feels like me, you have built me. If you build a human that can convincingly act like me but thinks and feels differently, you haven't built me.
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May 2, 2016 03:29
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crowoutofcontext posted:I'm defined by my limitations as much as my capabilities. The entity you describe wouldn't be me because he could theoretically make decisions I would never make for reasons I would never conceptualize. A clone doesn't have that ability. A clone and I have the exact same capabilities and the exact same limitations. Kilroy fucked around with this message at 03:38 on May 2, 2016 |
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May 2, 2016 03:36
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Kilroy posted:The entity is just taking your static brain scan and inferring what you would do from it. You might consider it a form of mind uploading, if you want. It's never going to decide to do something else, and in fact might not be capable of doing that or even wanting to do it. It's simply a scan of your brain and a table of every input to and output from the brain since the scan, and a diff of the change in your brain after each step (for computing later brain states). Is it you? Your going to have to be more specific. If its indistinguishable from a functioning brain, what with its squirting endorphin's and adrenaline, eye sockets taking in light, ect it is me. My material brain has been shaped from birth and if its replicated exactly as is elsewhere I don't see why it wouldn't be the same thing, experiencing things in the same way. I have no idea if a computerized brain-emulator can experience things viscerally like that when it is "processing" Maybe, maybe not.
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May 2, 2016 05:09
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OwlFancier posted:History doesn't matter but what the thing is does and there is a difference between an emulation of a thing, and a thing itself. Emulation does not recreate the processes by which a thing operates, it just tries to recreate the results. Ok, the whole process is included in personhood, not just the observable effects. (Which means you don't agree with the other "teleportation acceptance" guy that a Turing test would be all that useful.)
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May 2, 2016 05:12
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Kilroy posted:Say another person studies you in great detail, to the point that they actually look at a scan of your brain to figure out what your memories are, and then memorize those memories. ... I believe the answer is, "yes, you did die, but it's not permadeath. You could be resurrected later by using the stored information to recreate all of the processes that constituted your mind and memories." I assume you would call that a death followed by a possible eventual cloning. Would you say that suspended animation is a form of death?
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May 2, 2016 05:13
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Phyzzle posted:I believe the answer is, "yes, you did die, but it's not permadeath. You could be resurrected later by using the stored information to recreate all of the processes that constituted your mind and memories." This is a side-note, but there is the idea that our perception comes in pulses, with spaces of non-perception in between. Of course, our consciousness is only part of perception, so it's not really an argument against "continuous perception" but it would be interesting to me to see if non-teleporters have a disgust at conceptualizing their conscious as something that flicks on and off like this: quote:What this means is that the brain samples the world in rhythmic pulses, perhaps even discrete time chunks, much like the individual frames of a movie. From the brain’s perspective, experience is not continuous but quantized…This is not to say that the brain dances to its own beat, dragging perception along for the ride. In fact, it seems to work the other way around: Rhythms in the environment, such as those in music or speech, can draw neural oscillations into their tempo, effectively synchronizing the brain’s rhythms with those of the world around us. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/10/opinion/sunday/its-not-a-stream-of-consciousness.html
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May 2, 2016 06:20
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Phyzzle posted:I believe the answer is, "yes, you did die, but it's not permadeath. You could be resurrected later by using the stored information to recreate all of the processes that constituted your mind and memories." So, suspended animation is not a death.
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May 2, 2016 06:32
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Phyzzle posted:Ok, the whole process is included in personhood, not just the observable effects. (Which means you don't agree with the other "teleportation acceptance" guy that a Turing test would be all that useful.) No, I agree with Owl fancier. I said I would want my mental world to survive. The question of how we know that it has survived is separate. If my behaviour was only being emulated by a creature with a vastly different mental world, I would not have been recreated, whether we knew it or not. But this does not mean that all my processes would have to be preserved identically. If I could have an illness cured or a missing limb restored while teleporting, that would be cool. If my mental world were truly recreated in a completely different physical substrate, that would be good too, but the problem of how we could tell would become pressing. Oh dear me fucked around with this message at 13:00 on May 2, 2016 |
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May 2, 2016 12:02
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Oh dear me posted:No, I agree with Owl fancier. I said I would want my mental world to survive. The question of how we know that it has survived is separate. If my behaviour was only being emulated by a creature with a vastly different mental world, I would not have been recreated, whether we knew it or not. Okay, so a Turing test doesn't help to define if a person survived, but is just a piece of evidence that makes survival more likely. Kilroy posted:anything that writes you out as a string of bits then destroys your body is a death. But suspended animation does write out a great portion of you as bits. The velocities of the particles must be recorded, stored, and put back in. Otherwise, how do the atoms in your heart 'know' if they are in mid-contraction or mid-filling? A lot of states and conditions in the human body can't be summed up by matter positions alone. I assume most velocity configurations would just result in a corpse.
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May 2, 2016 14:59
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Phyzzle posted:But suspended animation does write out a great portion of you as bits. The velocities of the particles must be recorded, stored, and put back in. Otherwise, how do the atoms in your heart 'know' if they are in mid-contraction or mid-filling? A lot of states and conditions in the human body can't be summed up by matter positions alone. I assume most velocity configurations would just result in a corpse. e: However, I don't see why suspended animation as you've defined it wouldn't also qualify (though, as you mentioned, it is physical nonsense). Cloning is ruled out by it, after all. Kilroy fucked around with this message at 16:10 on May 2, 2016 |
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May 2, 2016 15:57
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Oh dear me posted:But this does not mean that all my processes would have to be preserved identically. If I could have an illness cured or a missing limb restored while teleporting, that would be cool. If my mental world were truly recreated in a completely different physical substrate, that would be good too, but the problem of how we could tell would become pressing.
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May 2, 2016 16:07
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Kilroy posted:If we can't make the copy with perfect fidelity, what is the minimum level of accuracy required for the copy to still be you? What are the consequences of not meeting the standard? Is there any benefit to achieving a better copy anyway? I mean, say that mapping the neurons is sufficient. Is there any reason then to prefer also cataloguing the levels of different neurotransmitters in each neuron, if we know we're going to get you back either way? I would suggest that the minimum level of accuracy is up to the person to decide but I would also say that you should aim for the absolute minimum amount of damage. I would look at it like the moon landing. In order to go to the moon the astronauts had to pass through the van allen belts which would have irradiated them, causing potential genetic damage. However we consider it worth it because going to the moon is worthwhile. Same with x rays, the possibility of harm outweighs the benefits. So, a teleporter would be the same, if we assume it makes imperfect copies, the required level of accuracy depends on how important the trip is. Would you be willing to risk memory loss or personality changes to travel to the other side of the galaxy to live on another planet? Possibly. Would you use it to go down the shops? Probably not. Phyzzle posted:Ok, the whole process is included in personhood, not just the observable effects. (Which means you don't agree with the other "teleportation acceptance" guy that a Turing test would be all that useful.) Unless your teleporter for some reason builds highly advanced person-emulation doppelgangers instead of just copying people, a turing test would be a pretty useful method of determining how well a person has been copied. As in, using teleporters should probably mean you go get a psychological evaluation every now and then to make sure it's not degrading your brain or something, or giving you cancer.
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May 2, 2016 16:18
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Kilroy posted:So a static brain scan, followed by a table of subsequent inputs and outputs, and a diff of your brain state after each transaction. Good enough? Edit: Oops, I see you were addressing the 'test' part, rather than what I want to survive. I don't know whether such a test would be good enough, I'm not hugely interested in the epistemological side. Oh dear me fucked around with this message at 16:29 on May 2, 2016 |
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May 2, 2016 16:24
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Oh dear me posted:Edit: Oops, I see you were addressing the 'test' part, rather than what I want to survive. I don't know whether such a test would be good enough, I'm not hugely interested in the epistemological side.
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May 2, 2016 16:49
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Kilroy posted:Actually I wasn't. The original brain scan accompanied by the subsequent series of diffs seems to encapsulate your "mental world", doesn't it? No. My mental world doesn't contain a series of diffs. You might perhaps create it from the original scan and a series of diffs, but it wouldn't exist until you had. Just as you don't have soup, when you have a recipe for soup. Oh dear me fucked around with this message at 17:32 on May 2, 2016 |
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May 2, 2016 17:29
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map is not the territory, like.
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May 2, 2016 23:34
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crowoutofcontext posted:map is not the territory, like.  I'm the one trying to get a sense of why you privilege some representations of you over others. Oh dear me's soup analogy falls flat for me, because it doesn't seem that I'm suggesting a recipe for anything. Sure, if you had just a static table of inputs and outputs and the diffs lying on a HDD somewhere, that would not constitute a dynamic you. But, why wouldn't the process of calculating the input and output, and creating the diff after each step, while you're doing it, capture your "mental world" just as well as anything else?
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May 3, 2016 00:57
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| # ? May 2, 2024 08:49 |
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So what exactly is the difference between dreamless sleep and death anyway? You are off for around 8 hours a day. The fact is that we are so comfortable with it that it doesn't matter that I'm currently executing my 10,900th version (abouts) of "myself" that if you were to pick a random one of those 10,900 you wouldn't really be able to make a connection between them. I don't even remember most of those versions to any significant detail.
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May 3, 2016 02:00
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