Register a SA Forums Account here!
JOINING THE SA FORUMS WILL REMOVE THIS BIG AD, THE ANNOYING UNDERLINED ADS, AND STUPID INTERSTITIAL ADS!!!

You can: log in, read the tech support FAQ, or request your lost password. This dumb message (and those ads) will appear on every screen until you register! Get rid of this crap by registering your own SA Forums Account and joining roughly 150,000 Goons, for the one-time price of $9.95! We charge money because it costs us money per month for bills, and since we don't believe in showing ads to our users, we try to make the money back through forum registrations.
 
  • Locked thread
crowoutofcontext
Nov 12, 2006

Kilroy posted:

You're telling me this? ;) I'm the one trying to get a sense of why you privilege some representations of you over others. Oh dear me's soup analogy falls flat for me, because it doesn't seem that I'm suggesting a recipe for anything. Sure, if you had just a static table of inputs and outputs and the diffs lying on a HDD somewhere, that would not constitute a dynamic you. But, why wouldn't the process of calculating the input and output, and creating the diff after each step, while you're doing it, capture your "mental world" just as well as anything else?

On a purely philosophical level it would.

But on a visceral level I privilege representations of myself where it wouldn't be easy for some exterior entity to have complete control over.

Adbot
ADBOT LOVES YOU

GlyphGryph
Jun 23, 2013

Down came the glitches and burned us in ditches and we slept after eating our dead.

Kilroy posted:

It's been said a dozen times already, but bears repeating on a new page: the premise is flawed and it is literally physically impossible - as in, prohibited by the laws of physics - to create a clone of yourself to arbitrary precision. You can make another person with all your memories, and they might even think they are you, but they will be distinguishable in principle from the original you.

So, with that in mind, for the most of you who will still insist that classical teleportation is a perfectly great thing and not a theoretical holocaust, what I'm curious to know is, how imprecise can you be when make the copy, and still be "you"? Is it enough to just map out the neurons? What?

I'm gonna ignore the rehashing being done and just focus on this question.

For me, I can break it down for the answer:
"functionally indistinguishable" - Maybe not atomically perfect, but it acts like me and thinks like me and basically doesn't experience any process I wouldn't have. Definitely fine.
"externally indistinguishable" - I never take any actions or interact with the world any differently than I would have without the imperfections. Definitely fine.
"slight variance" - In keeping with the differences I'd experience just by living a few days, which is actually quite a bit. A couple memories shuffled around, probably some different chemical makeup. But still fine. Would probably avoid teleporting a bunch of times in quick succession though, that stuff can add up!
"moderate variance" - Someone who knew me could tell there was something "off" about me, even though I was mostly myself and it never amounted to much. Might be missing a chunk of memories. Not particularly fine with that. I might be fine with a chance of this I guess since it's mostly me in the important ways, but only if the risk was worth the reward. It's something I could live with, but it's about as appealing as getting brain damage. Still me, but definitely an incomplete and damaged version, which I'm not super keen on being!
"large variance" - So basically at this point, we're getting into the question of what it's worth to me rather than whether I'm okay with the result - if the person coming out the other end is someone we can all agree is not much like me, maintaining a few of my traits and some of my memories but overall having a different personality, then it's not me - or at least not enough to consider it as such.

I mean, I'm obviously okay with some level of variance, because change is something I actively seek out for myself in my day to day life... not that it can be avoided! I'd obviously prefer those changes be for the better, and I doubt any random variation by the machine would be, so I'm probably more cautious about change here than I would be in normal life, since there's a higher chance of the change being "bad".

ianmacdo posted:

Would you take a trip with this system?
That seems kind of messed up. Probably not. I don't want to be responsible for my super-death if I end up chickening out on the suicide or something, and it sort of implies my preferred method of teleportation (while unconscious) is out. Don't really want to spend half an hour stressing out about my impending death. Also this alien has a corpse room, even if I somehow know they're being truthful they seem pretty damned sketchy.

GlyphGryph fucked around with this message at 04:29 on May 3, 2016

OwlFancier
Aug 22, 2013

I find it hard to distinguish the possibility of coming out of a teleporter with a different personality or set of feelings, meaning you are literally dead, from the belief that sustaining a major head injury resulting in amnesia or personality changes also making you literally dead.

Kit Walker
Jul 10, 2010
"The Man Who Cannot Deadlift"

Shao821 posted:

So what exactly is the difference between dreamless sleep and death anyway?

The fact that your body and mind continue to function in all sorts of ways when you're asleep. Hell, aside from people who have had certain brain injuries, everyone dreams. You just don't remember it. Your brain continues to function unconsciously, and that's still you.

Oh dear me
Aug 14, 2012

I have burned numerous saucepans, sometimes right through the metal

Kilroy posted:

But, why wouldn't the process of calculating the input and output, and creating the diff after each step, while you're doing it, capture your "mental world" just as well as anything else?

Why would it? My mental world isn't a process of calculating the input and output, and creating the diff after each step. (And surely the whole point of a diff is that it's not the full thing.)

WampaLord
Jan 14, 2010

Shao821 posted:

So what exactly is the difference between dreamless sleep and death anyway? You are off for around 8 hours a day. The fact is that we are so comfortable with it that it doesn't matter that I'm currently executing my 10,900th version (abouts) of "myself" that if you were to pick a random one of those 10,900 you wouldn't really be able to make a connection between them. I don't even remember most of those versions to any significant detail.

If someone makes a loud noise or shakes you hard enough, you will wake up from sleep, but not from death.

Mulva
Sep 13, 2011
It's about time for my once per decade ban for being a consistently terrible poster.

Shao821 posted:

So what exactly is the difference between dreamless sleep and death anyway? You are off for around 8 hours a day.

That's something stupid people think because they never actually researched the issue. You are totally processing information while asleep. You are aware of the world around you. Your conscious self, what everyone is masturbating about as their 'you'ness here, may have hosed off from input into the process but the rest of you is still at work. You are never off. And that's not even getting into the issue of the consciousness and dreams. You are just in an altered state of consciousness while asleep, you aren't gone. How do you think people wake up when shaken or when a loud noise goes off as was said, magic?

Oh dear me
Aug 14, 2012

I have burned numerous saucepans, sometimes right through the metal

Boogaleeboo posted:

That's something stupid people think because they never actually researched the issue. You are totally processing information while asleep. You are aware of the world around you. Your conscious self, what everyone is masturbating about as their 'you'ness here, may have hosed off from input into the process but the rest of you is still at work. You are never off. And that's not even getting into the issue of the consciousness and dreams. You are just in an altered state of consciousness while asleep, you aren't gone. How do you think people wake up when shaken or when a loud noise goes off as was said, magic?

This is like pointing out that our blood is still circulating (by which I mean, it's egregiously unnecessary). You even acknowledge that what people are actually talking about is their conscious self, which has 'hosed off'. And we're talking about our conscious selves because it's the existence of those which we want to preserve. I would have absolutely no interest in staying alive if I had to be asleep the whole time.

OwlFancier
Aug 22, 2013

I'm not sure I would notice a difference if I died tonight or if I just stayed asleep for the next fifty years.

wateroverfire
Jul 3, 2010

OwlFancier posted:

I'm not sure I would notice a difference if I died tonight or if I just stayed asleep for the next fifty years.

If you were dead you wouldn't notice anything at all.

If you were asleep you wouldn't stop being you. You'd just be you, who is asleep.


OwlFancier posted:

I find it hard to distinguish the possibility of coming out of a teleporter with a different personality or set of feelings, meaning you are literally dead, from the belief that sustaining a major head injury resulting in amnesia or personality changes also making you literally dead.

In the first case you're literally dead and in the second you're not. What is indistinguishable about that?

Kilroy
Oct 1, 2000

Oh dear me posted:

Why would it? My mental world isn't a process of calculating the input and output, and creating the diff after each step. (And surely the whole point of a diff is that it's not the full thing.)
Then what is your "mental world"?

And, if the static scan along with the diff after each step isn't the full thing, then what is?

Oh dear me
Aug 14, 2012

I have burned numerous saucepans, sometimes right through the metal

Kilroy posted:

Then what is your "mental world"?

My conglomeration of beliefs, emotions, memories, and mental habits. Not a description of them, but the things themselves. In other words, an entity must believe what I believe - not merely know what I believe, or be able to calculate what I believe. The only things that we know have emotions and beliefs are brains. So show me something with a brain constructed like mine and expressing the emotions and beliefs I have, and I'll think it plausible that my mental world lives on. Show me a machine that says the same, and I'll be more inclined to think it's a mechanical version of your clever impersonator.

quote:

And, if the static scan along with the diff after each step isn't the full thing, then what is?

I don't know why you would even think a scan of a thing would be the same as the thing; scans generally aren't.

GlyphGryph
Jun 23, 2013

Down came the glitches and burned us in ditches and we slept after eating our dead.

OwlFancier posted:

I find it hard to distinguish the possibility of coming out of a teleporter with a different personality or set of feelings, meaning you are literally dead, from the belief that sustaining a major head injury resulting in amnesia or personality changes also making you literally dead.

In both cases their is someone alive but the person is no longer me so yeah I am functionally dead, as far as I an concerned

wateroverfire if you ever want to go back to actually discussing things instead of rehashing tired unsupported assertions let me know, I actually felt like we were getting somewhere for a little while

GlyphGryph fucked around with this message at 19:16 on May 3, 2016

crowoutofcontext
Nov 12, 2006

Kilroy posted:

Then what is your "mental world"?

And, if the static scan along with the diff after each step isn't the full thing, then what is?

It's dynamic, temporal not static. Self is in a constant state of movement. You wouldn't call a simulation of a stream of water down a hill a " flowing stream" if you were just calculating where the hypothetical water molecules would have moved and inputting that at leisure.

I mean you could *probably* create an illusion of self-hood through your method but your screwing with time. Part of my what I value about my self is external to my brain-the fact that I identify as the guy who takes care of family, friends ect. It's hard for me to see how a scan with output and input would be interacting with others in real-time, when a clone would.

Brutal Garcon
Nov 2, 2014



Oh dear me posted:

So show me something with a brain constructed like mine and expressing the emotions and beliefs I have, and I'll think it plausible that my mental world lives on. Show me a machine that says the same, and I'll be more inclined to think it's a mechanical version of your clever impersonator.

Even if the machine were simulating your brain neurone-for-neurone? (With some other poo poo to emulate hormones and other brain chemistry stuff)

Oh dear clone
Apr 8, 2016

Dzhay posted:

Even if the machine were simulating your brain neurone-for-neurone? (With some other poo poo to emulate hormones and other brain chemistry stuff)

If we built mechanical brains in that way, from the bottom up, and they started to behave like us, it would be much more plausible that they were like us than it would if we deliberately built them to behave like us in the first place. I'd be substantially less sure about it than with a human, though, and I wouldn't want to teleport and become a machine unless the alternative was death (or some terrible fate). I'd definitely try it then, though. :)

wateroverfire
Jul 3, 2010

GlyphGryph posted:

wateroverfire if you ever want to go back to actually discussing things instead of rehashing tired unsupported assertions let me know, I actually felt like we were getting somewhere for a little while

We can talk about whatev, but I think the teleporter thought experiment has played itself out in terms of aiding the discussion since the thread is focusing on how to game the experiment rather than the conversation about identity the experiment is supposed to provoke.

Let's go back to the less loaded Grandfather's Axe thought experiment (or whatever formulation you like that doesn't involve personhood) for a bit.

TLDR for anyone who hasn't seen the experiment before: You have an axe. It was your grandfather's axe. He gave it to your father, and in his turn your father gave it to you. Over time the axe has needed some maintinence - your father replaced the head, you replaced the haft. No part of the axe is original. Is it still your grandfather's axe?

Now, nerds are still arguing about how to solve this millenia later so I'm not going to propose I have the one true solution that is going to put it to rest. But in the interest of not sperging out and getting stuck at this stage let me propose a resolution to this (not my work...thousands of years of nerd argument to draw on, remember) that we can maybe agree to agree on.

The question "Is this my grandfather's axe" contains an ambiguity that doesn't matter until we intentionally slide up the autism spectrum and become philosophers. "My grandfather's axe" is a label that refers to different things depending on the context in which it's used. In one sense, "my grandfather's axe" can refer to the literal object given to your father by your grandfather. It can also refer to something like "the object that carries the tradition of being called my grandfather's axe by virtue of sharing history in the right kind of way with the original, even though it's not literally the identical object handed down by my grandfather". So the proper response to being posed this paradox is to ask "in what sense do you mean, exactly?" then never invite the questioner to another party. I just destroyed so many academic careers, right here in this post.

If you can't tell from the context, I don't think questions rooted in philosophical identity are very interesting. They arise from common language being kind of bad at specifying references (because, to be fair, unless we are trying to be philosohy dicks or we're writing code it's usually not necessary) and once we adopt more precise language they go away. That is to say, the engineers have been right all along.

So with that in mind let's revisit the teleporter problem.

A teleporter is invented that THROUGH MAGIC (ie: the particulars are not important. This is not an engineering question) scans you at one end, then simultaneously (for now) copies you on the other end and destroys the original. Would it be you on the other end? Would you use the teleporter?

Let's disambiguate the question to strip off the uninteresting bits.

Is the copy on the other side literally you? No. That object was destroyed, and a new object with a history that started at the moment of the original's destruction was created.

Is the copy you in some sense? Yes, in some sense. Your copy shares all of your qualities except two.

Which two? Well, your copy is at a different location. And literally speaking, you're dead and your copy isn't.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Above this line I don't think there´s anything to discuss. We end up arguing only about ambiguities caused by imprecise language. It's the most tedious and uninteresting way to talk about what "you" means.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ok, but if no one can tell the difference, what does it matter?

I think this is the realm where interesting (or at least less uninteresting) discussion can be had. My response would be "I like being alive. Don't you like being alive?" and I don't understand the perspective of someone who honestly* holds forth "Well sure I'd be dead, but someone identical would take my place so it's ok."

edit: To be clear. A number of people are going to say "no no that's not someone identical to me, that's ME" and I would ask you to explain how you are not just engaging in the use of ambiguous language.

IE: The copy is not the same as you in all respects. You and the clone differ in at least two as argued above. Therefore, if you´re not just being imprecise, how is it that the copy comes to be you? And how does that mechanism hold up if the original you is not destroyed?

wateroverfire fucked around with this message at 16:06 on May 5, 2016

Juffo-Wup
Jan 13, 2005

Pillbug

Okay, but then what was once a question about identity comes to be a question about reference, and theories of reference aren't really less fraught (or at least, no obviously so). For example, say you follow Kripke and give a historical-causal account of reference - in that case, in order to pin down exactly what 'my grandfather's axe' refers to is going to require telling the prior metaphysical story anyway, which means the identity problem doesn't actually go away at all.

If you think speaker intent wholly determines reference then (in addition to all the weird problems that causes) the answer is going to be messily neuro-empirical, and that's assuming that 'intent' is actually a coherent concept when applied to really existing minds.

More likely, you want to tell a Wittgensteinian story about public language, in which case the resolution to the reference question (i.e., what does the noun phrase 'my grandfather's axe' refer to?) is still going to be messily empirical, but the unit of study might end up being the set of all intelligible English sentences, rather than a single brain. And even then, we might still need to tell a metaphysical causal-historical story (because plausibly, if you want language to be essentially public, then it had better essentially refer to publically accessible objects).

Or maybe not, maybe you have an entirely different account of reference that dodges all these problems, but we should not mistakenly think that no such account is needed, especially if we're going to go around solving philosophical problems by declaring that we just need to get clear about reference.

wateroverfire posted:

intentionally slide up the autism spectrum and become philosophers.

:(

wateroverfire posted:

Above this line I don't think there´s anything to discuss. We end up arguing only about ambiguities caused by imprecise language. It's the most tedious and uninteresting way to talk about what "you" means.

:( :(

wateroverfire
Jul 3, 2010

Juffo-Wup posted:

Okay, but then what was once a question about identity comes to be a question about reference, and theories of reference aren't really less fraught (or at least, no obviously so). For example, say you follow Kripke and give a historical-causal account of reference - in that case, in order to pin down exactly what 'my grandfather's axe' refers to is going to require telling the prior metaphysical story anyway, which means the identity problem doesn't actually go away at all.

If you think speaker intent wholly determines reference then (in addition to all the weird problems that causes) the answer is going to be messily neuro-empirical, and that's assuming that 'intent' is actually a coherent concept when applied to really existing minds.

More likely, you want to tell a Wittgensteinian story about public language, in which case the resolution to the reference question (i.e., what does the noun phrase 'my grandfather's axe' refer to?) is still going to be messily empirical, but the unit of study might end up being the set of all intelligible English sentences, rather than a single brain. And even then, we might still need to tell a metaphysical causal-historical story (because plausibly, if you want language to be essentially public, then it had better essentially refer to publically accessible objects).

Or maybe not, maybe you have an entirely different account of reference that dodges all these problems, but we should not mistakenly think that no such account is needed, especially if we're going to go around solving philosophical problems by declaring that we just need to get clear about reference.


:(


:( :(

:thesperg:

More seriously, though, because we're not trying to turn an internet discussion into a PHD, 5 books, and tenure, we can be practical about many subjects. We manage to communicate* , so by whatever means we are successfully making reference to things. That's good enough for me. It can be a black box.


*Citation needed, maybe, but god I hope not.

Kilroy
Oct 1, 2000

wateroverfire posted:

A teleporter is invented that THROUGH MAGIC (ie: the particulars are not important. This is not an engineering question)
There is no such thing as magic though. The particulars probably are important. If you propose a thought experiment which relies on breaking physics in some way, then it might make for an interesting discussion, but not much more than that. Not for those of us living in reality. You can't make a complete copy of yourself. Full stop. You also can't encode your complete present state on an HDD somewhere, or a sheet of paper, or any string of bits.

I think we agree on this point, or at least we agree that the copy is a new object, and you are dead. We might not agree whether quantum teleportation, which does not (and cannot) create a copy, also kills you. I think it probably doesn't kill you any more than moving around normally does, or for that matting sitting perfectly still would.

Brutal Garcon
Nov 2, 2014



Sorry, I'm going to have to argue with something "over the line".

wateroverfire posted:


Is the copy on the other side literally you? No. That object was destroyed, and a new object with a history that started at the moment of the original's destruction was created.

Is the copy you in some sense? Yes, in some sense. Your copy shares all of your qualities except two.

Which two? Well, your copy is at a different location. And literally speaking, you're dead and your copy isn't.

That "second property" seems to be, to put it mildly, slightly begging the question (as is your assumption that we agree on what you seem to mean by "literally").

I can't really be bothered to repeat myself here, but click the little question mark for my posts in this thread.

wateroverfire
Jul 3, 2010

Dzhay posted:

Sorry, I'm going to have to argue with something "over the line".


That "second property" seems to be, to put it mildly, slightly begging the question (as is your assumption that we agree on what you seem to mean by "literally").

I can't really be bothered to repeat myself here, but click the little question mark for my posts in this thread.

If you like, You(0) is dead. You(1) is alive. The english language is bad at this sort of thing. Tell me why your objections are not just about imprecise language?

GlyphGryph
Jun 23, 2013

Down came the glitches and burned us in ditches and we slept after eating our dead.
I agree with you for everything above the line right up until the last paragraph where you start doing the exact same ambigous language thing you were previously criticizing by changing definitions mid sentence and just assuming the in what sense question was asked and answered with "whatever sense is most convenient to wateroverfire at any given moment", and then right after the line you dive straight into nonsense cuckoo land with stuff that doesn't make any sense at all.

Hey though at lead we clearly have some common ground.

GlyphGryph
Jun 23, 2013

Down came the glitches and burned us in ditches and we slept after eating our dead.
his objection is about more than just imprecise language because you are packing your language use with bogus assumptions other people dont agree with, the most important being that future dead person is literally me which seems absurd since the dead person also differs from me in both the two qualities you named and several more to boot.

In what sense is the dead guy me where the clone isnt?

GlyphGryph fucked around with this message at 17:59 on May 5, 2016

wateroverfire
Jul 3, 2010

GlyphGryph posted:

If the clone isnt me, why is the dead guy? Thats the bit you seem to be missing

Why would you argue that dead future you isn't you? How does that work?

GlyphGryph
Jun 23, 2013

Down came the glitches and burned us in ditches and we slept after eating our dead.

wateroverfire posted:

Why would you argue that dead future you isn't you? How does that work?

No, this one is on you to justify first and unpack your unspoken assumptions where our disagreement obviously lies - in what sense is it me, the original me. I am not trying to say you are wrong I am trying to figure out your "in what sense" here because the conclusions you are drawing from that statement don't work in any sense I could come up with

I will say some senses the dead guy is not me after that if you still want me to, but I want to know where you are coming from first

GlyphGryph fucked around with this message at 18:15 on May 5, 2016

wateroverfire
Jul 3, 2010

GlyphGryph posted:

No, this one is on you to justify first and unpack your unspoken assumptions where our disagreement obviously lies - in what sense is it me, the original me. I am not trying to say you are wrong I am trying to figure out your "in what sense" here because the conclusions you are drawing from that statement don't work in any sense I could come up with

I will say some senses the dead guy is not me after that if you still want me to, but I want to know where you are coming from first

No. I do not have to justify the proposition that when you die, you died. That it is you that just died, and not somebody else. Or that you're not actually alive in some sense.

That is a thing we all, I sincerely hope, understand to be the way the world works. If you want to argue otherwise then convince me you're not just engaging in word play. This is a tedious game that has played out for pretty much the entirety of the thread so let's skip it this time if you really want to talk.

Kilroy
Oct 1, 2000

GlyphGryph posted:

In what sense is the dead guy me where the clone isnt?
Because the dead you, just before being killed, is distinguishable in principle from the cloned you just after being created at the destination.

Your reasoning relies on the assumption that a thing that has all your memories, and that believes itself to be you, is you. If it wasn't obvious, when I was "rehashing tired unsupported assertions", I was trying to define different creatures that would meet that criteria, but which the so-called "pro-teleportation" crowd could agree is not the same thing that went in the teleporter.

OwlFancier
Aug 22, 2013

wateroverfire posted:

No. I do not have to justify the proposition that when you die, you died. That it is you that just died, and not somebody else. Or that you're not actually alive in some sense.

That is a thing we all, I sincerely hope, understand to be the way the world works. If you want to argue otherwise then convince me you're not just engaging in word play. This is a tedious game that has played out for pretty much the entirety of the thread so let's skip it this time if you really want to talk.

That isn't how I understand the world to work. Certainly death in 99% of circumstances is one way, but you could be medically dead for a while and resuscitated, I don't count that as two people. You can replace much or even all of your componenet matter without becoming two people.

I don't see a distinction between that and constructing a copy, even an imperfect one. If it's close enough for government work, it's you, you cease to be dead when the copy comes into existence.

Piell
Sep 3, 2006

Grey Worm's Ken doll-like groin throbbed with the anticipatory pleasure that only a slightly warm and moist piece of lemoncake could offer


Young Orc

OwlFancier posted:

That isn't how I understand the world to work. Certainly death in 99% of circumstances is one way, but you could be medically dead for a while and resuscitated, I don't count that as two people. You can replace much or even all of your componenet matter without becoming two people.

I don't see a distinction between that and constructing a copy, even an imperfect one. If it's close enough for government work, it's you, you cease to be dead when the copy comes into existence.

Is a robot designed to act exactly like you (and no one would ever discover it's not actually you) , you? Would you have a problem getting your head blown off with a shotgun and the robot taking over your life? If you do have a problem with that (and I assume you would, because if you are ok with that you're dumb as gently caress), then how is that different from the copy scenario?

Piell fucked around with this message at 18:34 on May 5, 2016

GlyphGryph
Jun 23, 2013

Down came the glitches and burned us in ditches and we slept after eating our dead.

wateroverfire posted:

No. I do not have to justify the proposition that when you die, you died. That it is you that just died, and not somebody else. Or that you're not actually alive in some sense.

That is a thing we all, I sincerely hope, understand to be the way the world works. If you want to argue otherwise then convince me you're not just engaging in word play. This is a tedious game that has played out for pretty much the entirety of the thread so let's skip it this time if you really want to talk.

The tedious game is you always falling back on loudly asserting that anyone who disagrees with your unfounded nonsense is wrong and not worth because of the same stupid "obviously it is my grandfathers axe and i refuse to talk about in what sense that is true or consider there might be any sense where it is not" stupid thing you were just complaing about. Do you have no introspection?

God drat man just tell me the sense you mean so we can move on to a discussion that isnt based on you intentionally using ambigous language to confuse the issue

GlyphGryph
Jun 23, 2013

Down came the glitches and burned us in ditches and we slept after eating our dead.

Kilroy posted:

Because the dead you, just before being killed, is distinguishable in principle from the cloned you just after being created at the destination.

I am not saying they arent distinguishable, I just think they are both distinguishable from me in the here and now. If that concept makes sense to you we are on the same page

GlyphGryph
Jun 23, 2013

Down came the glitches and burned us in ditches and we slept after eating our dead.
Here let me unpack my own undestanding a bit so you can all rush to call me insane or whatever.

There is no such thing as "dead me". The state of me being dead is identical to the state of me not existing. You can not reference dead me because there is no me there - you can reference my corpse but I hope we can all agree that current me is not a corpse and not being a corpse is a rather important element of who current me is.

I am dead when I no longer exist. If I start existing again after that then I have returned to life! But there is no "me" to compare to between those points, my death is intrinsically defined by my absence.

This all seems pretty straightforward and non controversial to me but apparently you guys see this understanding of the situation as insane while refusing to explain your own more sensible alternative.

Maybe you cant, but if thats the case it seems unlikely that I am the insane one here

GlyphGryph fucked around with this message at 18:55 on May 5, 2016

Piell
Sep 3, 2006

Grey Worm's Ken doll-like groin throbbed with the anticipatory pleasure that only a slightly warm and moist piece of lemoncake could offer


Young Orc

GlyphGryph posted:

Here let me unpack my own undestanding a bit so you can all rush to call me insane or whatever.

There is no such thing as "dead me". The state of me being dead is identical to the state of me not existing. You can not reference dead me because there is no me there - you can reference my corpse but I hope we can all agree that current me is not a corpse and not being a corpse is a rather important element of who current me is.

I am dead when I no longer exist. If I start existing again after that then I have returned to life! But there is no "me" to compare to between those points, my death is intrinsically defined by my absence.

This all seems pretty straightforward and non controversial to me but apparently you guys see this understanding of the situation as insane while refusing to explain your own more sensible alternative.

Maybe you cant, but if thats the case it seems unlikely that I an the insane one here

The perspective the other side is coming from (or at least I am): You are the brain in your body, that's why messing around with your brain matter messes up you. If that brain dies, you die. Copies don't matter.

Brutal Garcon
Nov 2, 2014



Piell posted:

The perspective the other side is coming from (or at least I am): You are the brain in your body, that's why messing around with your brain matter messes up you. If that brain dies, you die. Copies don't matter.

But why don't copies matter? This is why I've been trying to reframe this as an ethical/moral issue, rather than a physical one. I'm not sure anyone ITT disagrees about what's happening in this scenario, in terms of molecules and the like, but we seem to be falling down on (roughly) "what's the right way to wrap words around these lumps of things?".

Wateroverfire: how is your "you(0)" and "you(1)" significantly different from "you(now)" and "you(a week ago)"?

Piell
Sep 3, 2006

Grey Worm's Ken doll-like groin throbbed with the anticipatory pleasure that only a slightly warm and moist piece of lemoncake could offer


Young Orc

Dzhay posted:

But why don't copies matter? This is why I've been trying to reframe this as an ethical/moral issue, rather than a physical one. I'm not sure anyone ITT disagrees about what's happening in this scenario, in terms of molecules and the like, but we seem to be falling down on (roughly) "what's the right way to wrap words around these lumps of things?".

Wateroverfire: how is your "you(0)" and "you(1)" significantly different from "you(now)" and "you(a week ago)"?

Because there's absolutely no connection between the original and the copy. You can do whatever you want to the original, and (assuming the copy doesn't see a video of it or something) it will never be affected by anything that happened to the original, because they're two separate individuals who merely look and act identically (at least at first).

Let's say you take a fertilized egg, and split it into two. You raise the twins until 18 years old, and then shoot one of them in the head. Did you kill someone? Did anyone die?

What if you split up the twins, raise them in two separate but identical environments with exactly equivalent inputs, so that their memories, personalities, bodies and everything else are exactly the same. When they are 18 years old you shoot one of them in the head. Did you kill someone? Did anyone die?

Let's say you take a brain scan of someone, then take someone else of similar height and build, and give them plastic surgery and superimpose the brain scan so they look and act like the original person. Then you take the original person and shoot them in the head. Did you kill someone? Did anyone die?

wateroverfire
Jul 3, 2010

GlyphGryph posted:

I am dead when I no longer exist. If I start existing again after that then I have returned to life

Yeah, this is failing to track references because you're using language in a fuzzy way.

GlyphGryph posted:

I am dead when I no longer exist. If my copy starts existing after that then I have returned to life

This is what the anti-teleport people are trying to point out to you. Something that is similar to you in most respects has started existing, but you continue to be dead (or not exist, if you prefer). That something can probably assume your name, comfort your loved ones, and live your life, but you continue to be dead.

Like...here is a visual representation.

GG(0) ---------------------------------------- GG(0) is dead in this space. GG(0) still dead.

GG(1) gets to bang GG(0)'s ==> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
widow starting here.

wateroverfire
Jul 3, 2010

Dzhay posted:

Wateroverfire: how is your "you(0)" and "you(1)" significantly different from "you(now)" and "you(a week ago)"?

You(a week ago) is just a manner of speaking about someone as they were a week ago. It's just you(0) at time t-1 week.

you(1) is a copy of you(0) coexistant with a dead you(0).

Here is more ascii art.


..............T-1 Week..............T.......................T+1 week.
You(0) --------*--------------------*---xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
You(1) ....................................---------------------*-

wateroverfire fucked around with this message at 19:43 on May 5, 2016

Brutal Garcon
Nov 2, 2014



Two copies that have been allowed to diverge is a very different scenario to a presumably destructive teleporter. Here's my take on your hypotheticals:

Piell posted:

Because there's absolutely no connection between the original and the copy. You can do whatever you want to the original, and (assuming the copy doesn't see a video of it or something) it will never be affected by anything that happened to the original, because they're two separate individuals who merely look and act identically (at least at first).

Let's say you take a fertilized egg, and split it into two. You raise the twins until 18 years old, and then shoot one of them in the head. Did you kill someone? Did anyone die?
Of course.

Piell posted:

What if you split up the twins, raise them in two separate but identical environments with exactly equivalent inputs, so that their memories, personalities, bodies and everything else are exactly the same. When they are 18 years old you shoot one of them in the head. Did you kill someone? Did anyone die?
Right, time to get called insane: no.

Piell posted:

Let's say you take a brain scan of someone, then take someone else of similar height and build, and give them plastic surgery and superimpose the brain scan so they look and act like the original person. Then you take the original person and shoot them in the head. Did you kill someone? Did anyone die?
Yes, the guy you've overwritten. You've also done something to the guy you restored from (a presumably slightly outdated) back-up which is definitely immoral but we don't have a word for yet.

Adbot
ADBOT LOVES YOU

Piell
Sep 3, 2006

Grey Worm's Ken doll-like groin throbbed with the anticipatory pleasure that only a slightly warm and moist piece of lemoncake could offer


Young Orc

Dzhay posted:

quote:

What if you split up the twins, raise them in two separate but identical environments with exactly equivalent inputs, so that their memories, personalities, bodies and everything else are exactly the same. When they are 18 years old you shoot one of them in the head. Did you kill someone? Did anyone die?
Right, time to get called insane: no.

You had two living people, now you have one living person and one cooling corpse. How is this not someone dying?

What if you just cut off the hand of one of the twins? Did a hand get chopped off? If you say yes, how is this different from one twin getting their head chopped off and being killed? If you say no, I have absolutely no idea how to debate this with you because I can't even possibly understand your position.

Piell fucked around with this message at 19:57 on May 5, 2016

  • Locked thread