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GlyphGryph posted:The best possible outcome - I get to be two people. I would hope to hell I'd still get to have rights despite there being two of me, that would be pretty hosed up otherwise. You wouldn't get to be two people, though, you'd still only ever be you. Its just that now there's a separate person who happens to share an identical set of memories up until the point of replication with you.
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Apr 6, 2016 00:14
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Reason posted:Even if the you on the other side was an exact copy molecule for molecule it wouldn't be exactly you because it would be made from different molecules. Unless it broke you down, then transported all your original matter to the new destination and re-made you. Both ways though "you" would die and the exact copy no matter how similar would actually be a different person. I agree, but there is a practical level where I would call this different person a "continuation" of the previous one, though.
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Apr 6, 2016 00:18
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Reason posted:Besides philosophical issues what about moral issues with this kind of teleportation? If you teleported someone against their will could it be some kind of murder? Possibly! There are a lot of variables that would change this answer, like how this teleportation technology works, and are there more pressing issues to be worried about such as as whether we are talking about being in some dystopian techno-hellscape universe or are we in some sort of utopia where the only conceivable crime is teleportation-murder.
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Apr 6, 2016 00:26
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1secondpersecond posted:The question of how continuity of consciousness would operate under the circumstances of duplication is interesting though. Say that you were expecting to be instantaneously 'teleported' by scan and duplication followed by destruction of the original within a single room. You stand with a red wall behind you and a blue wall in front of you and close your eyes, expecting to open them to a blank red wall. The process malfunctions, creating a duplicate facing you but failing to destroy the original. Obviously, you can't have the experience of 'being' both copies, so does your continuity of experience have you facing a copy of yourself standing in front of a red wall or a blue wall? Easy, you still see a blue wall. Because you didn't actually move. There was always a 0% chance of you being moved, because that is expressly not how this technology works. Your clone, however, is having a much different experience. And that difference in experience has already made them a being unique from you. Maybe not very unique, but still not a perfect copy, either.
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Apr 6, 2016 00:31
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GlyphGryph posted:[...] The majority of the first half of this post (which I assume is at least partially directed towards me) is largely just a difference in definition. And the short response to this is that I don't think the definition of "me" that you laid out is the least bit useful for this type of discussion. And, actually, calling it "me" or "I" or "you" is confusing, so let's just settle on "self" for a useful shorthand, yes? For this discussion, I think the concept of "self" is most usefully described as* "the accumulation of memories and the current brain state possessed by your physical brain". This, to me, works because it is a two-part definition, and the two parts are vital to this discussion. First is "the accumulation of memories", which is basically the sum total of your lived experiences up until the current present. The second part, "the current brain state" is the "self" reacting to the external stimuli you're experiencing. Ergo, even if the former part, "the accumulation of memories", is literally identical for two individuals if the second part is not then they are considered to be unique and separate. And the only way to have identical "brain states" is to occupy identical points in space-time, otherwise even being a single nano-meter to the left would give you a fundamentally different "brain state", even if the difference would be normally considered negligible. *I have used a lot of shorthand here, and we can hopefully suss this out later, but I hope this explanation at least gives some sort of groundwork we can work with. It makes sense to me, at least. No, lemme address some more specific questions you posed. GlyphGryph posted:By what right would you argue that either I would not be me? I don't think "right" is really valid here, but regardless, I'd argue that this is the case because you would not have direct access to the thoughts and experiences of your other self. If you were separated into different rooms, and if one "you" was shown a piece of paper with a complex message on it (say the first chapter of a randomly chosen book) then the other "you" would not know what was on that paper, just the same as if we had chosen to random people off the street. Assuming, of course, that the hypothetical teleportation technology did not also give you telepathy between all "yous" because it was made by Gandalf the White. GlyphGryph posted:Would you argue the same of a split brain patient, since one half of their mind can think thoughts the other can not detect? Yes, actually. I'm fully willing to accept that there can be two distinct "selves" within one brain. EDIT: rudatron posted:SOMA was a bad game that used the exact same plot twist thrice. Honestly, the whole WAU vs. ARK conflict was more interesting, but not explored enough imo. Agreed. It was frustrating that the player character didn't pick up on the concept even after experiencing it multiple times. Who What Now fucked around with this message at 03:51 on Apr 6, 2016 |
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Apr 6, 2016 03:46
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Kilroy posted:What if you're frozen in liquid nitrogen and resurrected 500 years later? Assume the freezing process went flawlessly and all your memories and behavior / personality were preserved. Are you 'you'? Is this equivalent to teleportation as described in the OP? It depends on how you define "equivalent". 
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Apr 6, 2016 05:21
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Dzhay posted:What "old you"? The "you" that existed prior to teleportation, I would assume.
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Apr 6, 2016 21:55
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Dzhay posted:Was that not clear? To put it more explicitly: After the teleport, pre-teleportation-you is indeed incapable of experiencing/distinguishing things; how is this different from the claim that after waiting 5 minutes, 5-minutes-ago-you is incapable of experiencing things? Because 5-minutes-ago-me doesn't exist in the present.
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Apr 6, 2016 22:45
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Dzhay posted:Nor does pre-teleport you. Yes, but he would had I not teleported. Post teleport I'm dead and there is a new person who just happens to share my DNA and memories.
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Apr 7, 2016 00:51
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Boing posted:Normally you have your consciousness in one body. However, as soon as you've cloned yourself, you now have two consciousnesses in two bodies. Which one is 'your' consciousness? You could say that you are the original person, since of course you are, but the clone has the exact same memories as you. If you are the clone, you would remember making the decision to clone yourself, but would be surprised to find that you are the clone and not the original. Since there are two of you, and the same memories lead up to each case, I've interpreted that as a 50% chance of you being killed, rather than of you killing the clone. No, there's a 0% chance of you being the clone. Your consciousness isn't being moved anywhere, it's being copied and a brand new copy is being made somewhere else. When you step into that machine you are never coming out.
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Apr 7, 2016 16:14
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Oh dear me posted:Yes. How could I possibly tell them apart? How could they? They could tell each other apart because they would have different memories and experiences post-cloning.
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Apr 7, 2016 16:15
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Oh dear me posted:But they could not tell which was the original and which was the clone. Sure they could. The clone is the one who came in to existence somewhere where the original did not. If I go into a room that is red knowing that a clone of me will be created in a room that is blue then when the clone comes into being seeing a blue room he will know that he is the clone.
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Apr 7, 2016 16:28
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Boing posted:Yeah but what if at the moment of cloning you alter the clone's memory so that he thinks the clone comes out of the red room That's what the secret contingencies I left for myself to discover come into play. Also, regardless of who is the clone and who is the original, both my clone and I are distinct individuals who just share some memories prior to the cloning event. In no sense are we literally the same person twice just as soon as our sense experiences differ in even the slightest way.
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Apr 7, 2016 16:32
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Oh dear me posted:So the only difference between them would be utterly unimportant, both to them and to me. It's like suggesting I should love my sister less because she woke up in a different room. It's largely an academic difference, yes. I don't actually give a poo poo if you love your clone-sister or not, and on a practical level I'd agree with you. Agents are GO! posted:I don't get how folks in a post Phinneas Gage world can think any sort of essentialism here makes any sense. If damage to my brain can change my personality - who "I" am, then an utterly identical reconstruction of my brain is also me. "I" am a group of atoms arranged in a particular pattern, not a particular group of atoms arranged in a particular pattern. Yes, but your clone will immediately have a distinct and unique brain pattern the moment it experiences something different than you do, making it a different person, albeit one that is veeeeeeeery similar to the original you.
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Apr 7, 2016 16:37
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deadly_pudding posted:Here's another angle: Yeah, that's still you. That's also a completely different scenario than the one in the OP, which specified that the original is destroyed and a copy is made.
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Apr 7, 2016 16:40
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Peta posted:You don't think that, if you chose the clone, your decision would haunt you in a way that choosing the original would not? Wait, now I have to choose which one dies?
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Apr 7, 2016 16:42
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Peta posted:Or choose which one to keep as your sister or w/e. Why wouldn't I just value both of them?
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Apr 7, 2016 16:51
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Agents are GO! posted:Yes. No, you don't understand, even standing in a different spot is functionally non-identical. Even if you and your clone stand side by side one of you will have a memory of standing on the left while the other has a memory of standing on the right. Every single second of every single day you and the clone are becoming more and more different. Let's say that you are cloned, but your clone is then immediately sent off to fight ISIS. Your clone undergoes training and spends five years in an active warzone with local militants. When you meet that clone, are you still going to assert that he is overwhelmingly you, despite having a completely different set of experiences and memories of the last five years? How long does the separation have to be before you consider the clone to be a unique individual? deadly_pudding posted:In such a case, what if we don't index as thoroughly, and what if we use an entirely different batch of atoms at the other end? What makes one specimen of the atom Carbon-14 different from another one, for example? If we map all the exact same varieties of matter to where they were before, is it still a different body? Then that would be a new person. Albeit, again, one that is completely indistinguishable from you in any practical sense. quote:I suppose, probably, it is. But where's the difference, then? The difference is that it's a new body and brain. quote:If we had the medical capacity to transplant a brain into a new body, identical to its old one, without telling that person, and without complications, the brain would go about its life not knowing that it's in a different body. If they were never told then yeah, they would probably never know. But that person not knowing the truth doesn't change the fact that their brain is not in its original body. I'd argue that that's the same person, though, because I believe personhood is largely tied to the functionality of a brain. quote:What if you could do it one lobe at a time, in such a way that the brain is very much dead and in pieces, but somehow undamaged damaged, and then reactivate it after everything is back in order? What if all you could do was copy the electrochemical state of a brain into a new brain of identical physical composition and structure? First scenario is the same as the first except needlessly hosed up. The second creates a new person, yes. GlyphGryph posted:As i have pointed out to you now multiple times this argument means the original me no longer exists because it is equally true of both organisms. They are both almost but not quite current me and the only property people are claiming one has that the other doesnt is meaningless and irrelevent even to those desperate for it to matter by their own admission I've also said multiple times that the differences don't really matter in any practical sense, so maybe unbunch those panties a bit.
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Apr 7, 2016 17:22
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If you don't understand, you just need to say so and I'll gladly use smaller words for you.
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Apr 7, 2016 19:15
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Tuxedo Catfish posted:My point is that if you take away everything about a person which is replicable, there's nothing left -- unless there's a soul. That doesn't make a replica literally the original, it's still a replica. Otherwise you'd be saying that anything mass-produced in a factory is the exact same singular item, rather than distinct individual items that are identical in appearance and construction.
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Apr 8, 2016 14:50
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skeet decorator posted:That's assuming in the hypothetical I am cloned and not instantaneously zapped into / out of existence. In which case I would argue the two consciousnesses are one in the same. Who's to say the just because they're separated by space that they could not be entangled in such a way that the experiences of one are the experiences of the other. If one was shot in the head the other could still experience it, after which that part of me would cease being. Just as I can experience my hand being chopped off, yet after doing so the sensation of poking my hand is no longer part of my experience. Because that's not a thing that happens to identical twins, despite effectively being clones of one another. Nobody would seriously say that twins are actually one person in two bodies, but rather that they are two people in bodies that happen to be identical.
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Apr 8, 2016 15:03
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Shbobdb posted:Which twin is the original twin? They used to be a single organism and split. I dunno, I don't know enough about fetal development off hand to say. If I had to give an answer, it would probably be that neither is the original, the original split into the two new entities. quote:As for perdurantism still needs a mechanism. Absent a soup, we're all just Buddha/Hume bits. What?
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Apr 8, 2016 16:25
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Control Volume posted:What if you teleported yourself faster than light across worlds, and then teleported back, and somehow ended back up in time, only you haven't done this yet and future you is the one telling you to step in the suicide teleportation box and that you need to teleport or this universal construct will collapse upon itself. Would you go in the box? What if your posting was good? 
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Apr 8, 2016 16:59
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Agents are GO! posted:Another thing to note is that the truth only matters if you're aware of it. If I was to slip you a roofie, run you through the teleporter, then sneak you into your bed, you'd never even suspect, and it wouldn't matter. I think it would definitely matter that you roofied someone.
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Apr 8, 2016 18:20
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Control Volume posted:If you were cloned and forced to face yourself in a battle to the death in a gladiatorial arena, would you fight? Would you win? Yes and yes. Because there is no one I hate more than myself.
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Apr 9, 2016 23:36
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OwlFancier posted:I think i would probably use my dying moments to place my testicles in my own mouth and fart on my head. Ahh, the good old Eggs Benedict maneuver. A classic.
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Apr 10, 2016 01:53
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Tuxedo Catfish posted:Here's a thought experiment: suppose we do the opposite. Let's say we completely wipe your memories, destroy your body, but somehow preserve your consciousness (which we'll say does persist, for the sake of the argument) and put it in a new body with new memories. No, that's not still you. That's an entirely different person.
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Apr 10, 2016 22:04
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Tuxedo Catfish posted:If it walks like a Tuxedo Catfish, and it talks like a Tuxedo Catfish, and it gets in abstract internet arguments about identity like a Tuxedo Catfish, it's a Tuxedo Catfish. So basically, any member of a class of bodies that sufficiently resemble each other to the extent that they can be recognized as me, are all me. So where does this stop? When are you no longer you? If we clone you and the clone goes off to live a vastly differently life than you over the course of 50 years are they still you or they their own distinct person? If they are still "you", do you also consider identical twins to be only one person?
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Apr 11, 2016 17:22
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GlyphGryph posted:The never stop being me (or him). They pretty much immediately stop being each other. We've tread this ground over and over again, it has been explained multiple times. And the explanations continue to be unsatisfactory. If the two instances are not one-another how can you then turn around and say that they are the same person? It's a direct and total contradiction that you need to resolve in order to have a claim of consistency. quote:What is it about this explanation that so fundamentally clashes with your understanding of the universe that you can't accept it as a valid way to see the situation, since you clearly can't? See the part about it being contradictory and inconsistent.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:35
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GlyphGryph posted:Okay, so you've completely changed what I said. It's like you've got some sort of mental block that so immediately rejects my explanation that you can't even honestly consider it. Let me try to break it down for you. I get what you're trying to say, yes, but I believe you to be wrong on the assertion that "me two b" has a shared past with "me one". In this scenario "me two b" (I'm just going to refer to them by their numbers and letters for ease of typing on my phone), 2b has no past prior to being brought into existence using the duplicator. 2b has the same memories as 2a of events prior to the duplication process, of being 1 and 0, but that's not the same as actually sharing a history between them. If we were to map this out (which I sadly cannot do on my phone) you would view the path of 0 to 1 to 2a as presumably a straight line, as do I. I'm going to assume that you would then view 2b as a connected fork in that line, diverging to run parallel. That's not how I see it, though. 2b starts completely separate from the 2a line, because 2b came into existence separately. Now, on a practical level there's absolutely no real issue with acting under the assumption that they do. You can be reasonably certain that 2a and 2b would react similarly to most situations, perhaps even identically. It would be right to acknowledge 2b's memories prior to the duplication as real and valid. But, in a purely academic sense 2b is no different than someone who had another person's memories implanted in them artificially except that he is also genetically identical to the person from whom those copied memories came from. Now do you understand what I'm trying to say?
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Apr 11, 2016 18:21
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GlyphGryph posted:Okay, I'm fine with you thinking something I've said is wrong. The issue at hand was that you saw the argument is contradictory and inconsistent, not just wrong, and I was trying to demonstrate that not to be the case. Are we back to not agreeing with each other, or do you still assert that point of view I've described doesn't agree with itself? (and if so, where, how, and why?) I'm willing to admit that having explained your answer more fully it is more consistent, albeit I believe it still has problems. To whit: quote:On to the new arguments: Ok, but without your father and mother you wouldn't exist in the same way that 2B wouldn't exist without 1, does this mean that you are also your mother and father? Does this line of thinking only apply to people, or are you also the bottle of scotch that got your parents drunk to lead them to making you? What's the cutoff for causation in this scenario? I view causal events as separate from (but related indirectly to) what makes a person a unique individual. Tangentially related, is it possible for 2B to ever no longer be you? If 2B loses all his memories prior to the duplication, and so loses the "link" between themselves and 2A, are they still the same person? What if 2B loses all memories, still you? As for the memory transference, let's say it's a wipe (ignoring that this would be murder), and then implantation. So you say this new person is still you, despite having none of the same physical identifiers or genetics. What happens if some of the host body's memories start to resurface? Is this person now both simultaneously you and the person they were before? How much of their old memories would they need to regain and your memories would they need lose before they are no longer you?
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Apr 11, 2016 18:51
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GlyphGryph posted:That's fair. Somewhat how? The way I'm looking at things you either are or are not you. I don't understand how something can be "somewhat" you. quote:I think we definitely have a shared history, but there was a rather obvious period of divergence, and after that divergence most of that history in myself was lost. I didn't really hold on to many (any?) of the important elements that determine identity of persons that she has, so I wouldn't say we were the same person, but we were once the same organism (back before I was a person at all), yes. It does seem flawed to me, because it seems very imprecise. quote:I've said before that shared history isn't enough for same-person-hood, that other attributes matter, and that if I developed some sort of extreme mental disorder I wouldn't be the same person. Are some attributes more important than the others? At least we agree that drastic changes to your thought process produce a different person. quote:I'm not really sure what you're trying to say here? I feel like we're back to not understanding each other's positions, though I'll try to answer as best I can. I am not the bottle of scotch for a fuckton of pretty obvious reasons, but if it lead to my concept I would certainly consider it part of my history of being? I probably wouldn't consider it part of my personal history though - I, as a past person, didn't exist when it happened and for a while afterwards. You pretty much got it, I think. I was asking that if your history was part of "you" how far back it went and what exactly included, I.E. did it only include people or also things. quote:Yes, of course. Although any such transition would probably result in them no longer being 2B either. Would it? Let me clarify/change the situation up a little and say that this loss of memory happens 30 years after duplication. So 2B still has 30 years of memories still, but none prior to his creation, thus losing his memetic connection to 2A. Are they now still the same person, or different people? Has losing memories of so long ago really changed 2B so drastically? quote:Okay, assuming by "same person" here we're referring to person 1. If I lost all my memories right now, I wouldn't be the same person. The person I am now would be dead. So yeah, if 2B (or 2A) loses all their memories, they would no longer be person. If 1 had a mindwipe instead of going through the teleporter, they would be super dead. There would be a person on the other side of the mindwipe, and they might have a bit of shared history with 1 due to the shared body, but definitely not the same person. Again, as with above, what about only a partial memory loss? How much memory needs to be lost before you are no longer you but a different person? quote:Okay, I'm with you... So adding another person's memories results in you no longer being you? Then why doesn't developing differing memories result in you no longer being you?
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Apr 11, 2016 19:58
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Control Volume posted:What if a teleporter gun replaces all of the atoms in your brain with different atoms of the same elements, are you dead? Can you get out of your obligations to meet the in-laws? Yes and no, respectively.
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Apr 11, 2016 20:37
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Control Volume posted:But you died, I thought your clone brain was supposed deal with that bullshit. This fuckign sucks Oh, he's going too now. Have fun explaining that to the in-laws.
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Apr 11, 2016 20:41
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GlyphGryph posted:I think me and Who What Now are having a good conversation even if it's mostly just him asking me questions. You're free to ask me questions back, you know. I'm totally down with typing up endless bullshit navel-gazing, I have nothing better to do at work! GlyphGryph posted:I'm not sure what the difficulty is here. Do you disagree with partial identity as a matter of principle, or is it specific to people for some reason? If you take a bit of my donut, what's left is most of my donut. You ate some of my donut. Do you disagree that the donut is "most" of my donut rather than all? If I mashed those remnants with some other baked goods into a larger donut, would you have a problem saying "part of my donut is now part of this new thing that really couldn't be described as my donut anymore"? You need to stop using inanimate objects for your analogies, dude. They are just so very awful at encompassing the subject matter in a meaningful manner. Specifically this one, because you've already agreed that at some point losing a certain amount of what makes you "you" makes you not "you" any more. But that donut is still that donut up until the last bite because there is no emergent property that arrises from it like consciousness does from a brain. Analogies using inanimate objects only make this conversation worse, harder to understand, especially if I try to run with it, so I'm not even going to run with it. But to reiterate my answer, it doesn't work because there's no emergent property to the donut like their is with brains and minds. quote:Reality can be pretty imprecise. Have you ever heard of "ring species"? Man, that poo poo is a pain for biologists. Imprecision is sort of an integral component of artificial boundaries and categorization. Even the edge of literal physical matter is imprecise, since atoms aren't perfect hard lines. "This is a fox" isn't wrong, no, but then going on and saying "and it's the same as all other foxes" would be. Just like saying "this is my clone" would be correct, but then saying "and he is also completely interchangeable with me in all ways" would be wrong. quote:Yes, although I imagine that would vary a lot by person and what they value. Like when determining when personhood begins, I imagine there's valid cases to be made for a range of places to draw the exact line. Ok, which are most important to you? quote:Yes, it's nice to have some common ground. Well that's why I was trying to nail down what parts of your history you believe are important and which aren't. quote:Even without the memory loss 2A and 2B would be different people. I could try to guess what you were asking, but I am not sure if what I think it would be is relevant - I don't think the answer differs whether the memory loss happens to 2A or 2B, which seems to be what you're thrusting at? Hopefully that answers whatever you were really asking, if it doesn't it at least allows you to rephrase the questions without "a"s or "b"s and just in terms of "person 1" and "person 2". I've always thought that they were Person 1 and Person 2 from the start. That's my point, that your clone is a wholly separate entity to you, and is not you. This goes back to the very beginning of the thread and my position that some people believe that if there is a copy made of your brain there is a 50/50 chance of you being either the copy of the original being wrong; there is a 0% chance of you being the copy because the copy isn't you, it's a new, wholly separate person that just so happens to share your memories and genetics. quote:I think memories are an important part of who I am, but not the only part. Also, different memories are more valuable than others. If I forget my favorite food, I'm probably fine. If I forget me wife and my child and my parents and my siblings? If I forget what I want and why I want it? At that point I think we're over the line. We're in a ring species situation though - there's no hard line here. But the answer still doesn't change whether the result happens to person 2A or 2B. The point of these questions is to determine when you can no longer say the original and the duplicate are the same person. Then, hopefully, to work our way back and show that the point where the became two separate individuals was the point of creation, and from that point on calling them both "you" is a mistake. quote:Eventually it might? Having of conflicting memories of the past seems like a lot more of a problem than having additional memories that are in turn built on those memories. It feels like you're asking "is it ever possible to be someone other than who you are right now?" I don't think I have an answer you'd find satisfying here, so let me turn it around and figure out what you think. I'd like to point out that this is exactly the same scenario I pointed out to you earlier. So I'm glad we've gotten back to it. To answer, the person post-wipe is indeed a new person, yes. If their bodies original memories resurface, the cease to be the post-wipe person and become a new person entirely, one that happens to have memories of both. And I say that this is a distinct, new individual because I believe that this "amalgamation" would act in a way that is significantly different than either the two constituent parts. You think this is wrong, why?
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Apr 11, 2016 21:07
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Ok, I'm going to go back on my own advice that I just gave and use an analogy I just thought up. Let's say the year is 2116, and through the magic of technology you are now really really old, but still sound of mind. You've been married to your spouse for 100+ years, and still love her as much as the day you were married. But tragedy strikes when one of you loses your wedding ring down the space-drain and your ring gets shot into the sun to be vaporized with all the other garbage. "But wait, Pop-pop! I'll just hop on down to the space-wizard and he'll use his space-magic to make a perfect duplicate of your ring. It'll be exactly the same, down to the last scuff and fleck of oxidization, except that it'll have been made by a space-wizard and come into existence six second ago!" Now, would you really believe that to be completely analogous to your original ring in all ways? Or would you recognize that, while it reminds you of your ring and certainly looks just like it, it's still just an imitation? Obviously because everyone here is a goon you'll all so that, no, dipshit, it's exactly the same and I'd feel nothing at the loss of my treasured memento of my marriage. But I have a feeling that in your heart-of-hearts you'd know that wouldn't be the case. Now why wouldn't this apply to a person, who also has a conscious and ever-changing mind?
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Apr 11, 2016 21:17
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Control Volume posted:What if I shove you into a teleporter and keep your old self alive and give it wedgies all day, you loving nerd I sit on you because I'm a colossal fatass. Now who's the bully, shrimp? 
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Apr 11, 2016 21:23
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Control Volume posted:Why don't you teleport that fat over to mars, butterball *high fives all my buds* You think that hurts my feelings? Pshaw! *bitterly fights back tears*
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Apr 11, 2016 21:27
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I also have no idea why you think I'm redefining terms or how you're getting so confused by what I consider to be very simple and straightforward questions, so yeah, let's start over when you feel the time.
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Apr 11, 2016 21:42
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crowoutofcontext posted:Because the brain is functional when the ring is sentimental, decorative. Right, and why do you assume the new brain will behave exactly like the old brain, especially considering it is experiencing and reacting to different things are the original?
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Apr 11, 2016 21:47
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