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So over the course of a lifetime you're constantly replacing your cells, right? So this is just a fast version of that, discarding them entirely for new atoms all at once. So I don't think there's anything especially important about the Carbon atom at a specific place in my brain at this moment because if it had a serial number there's every reason to expect it will be replaced with a new carbon atom in a year or ten. So I wouldn't place much value on the physical "me" of me. If I lose an arm and get a cybernetic replacement I'm still me although obvious also Robocop. Would I do it? I'd put the weight on that being the pain my old body was put through. If it was disassembled painlessly, it would be fine if it was proven safe. The issue with "killing" the old me? I, in current possession of the old body, sign a directive to have them disassemble me. Assuming it's matured enough for the lawyers to pick apart the legality of that, I don't think it's a particularly thorny issue. Ideally it would be an action I would do myself so that there isn't the psychological burden of being a "hangman" placed on someone else. Even if I don't think it's a big deal I wouldn't presume that would be shared with someone else and it's less thorny morally if I "kill" myself rather than ask someone else to do it for me. About the order of events, I'd much rather the old me still exist for some measurable period of time after the new me is created. If something went wrong, I'd like there to be an opportunity to recover either version of "me" they can. The soul issue? I think this more than anything would solve the question of the presence of a soul. You could do almost any test with placebo and control tests and run the gamut of personality tests. I'd worry about the lack of soul when there's some evidence it does not appear after teleportation. What would happen if there was an accident and the process of disassembling my old body didn't occur, leaving two of me? I would hope they'd put a framework in place to give the new me a proper identity and live out his accidental life in confusing peace. I mean, that seems like the obvious solution. He can keep the name but one of us will need a new social security number and place of employment but hopefully the teleportation company that made the mistake will provide support for that in an out of court settlement. It's going to be an awful situation for all involved but it's making the best of an industrial accident so patience and understanding will be needed. We'll diverge psychologically from the first moment so we're distinct individuals with common memories. You'd rather hope these types of accidents are rare but with this kind of teleportation I'd insist they create a legal framework for all of the potential results that show up when you're perfecting a Prestige machine. I had read a Robert J Sawyer novel called Mindscan which framed a lot of these issues and the big takeaway is "talk to a lawyer first". Anyway, I remember liking the book quite a lot so give it a read if you haven't. GlyphGryph posted:Interesting. Would you consider the MiB style "erase the last 10 minutes" mind wipers to effectively be murder, for killing the individual you were and replacing it with someone from the past? The MIB question is interesting but is actually back to a form of mind control because it isn't just the wiping away of memories but the fabrication of entirely new ones. And those can induce brand new behaviors outside of the norm so that is essentially a violent destruction of the old self. When you think about it, Edgar's wife's feelings for her husband are really buried under the jokey replacement feelings J creates for her. She'll never grieve for the loss of her husband and be driven by an artificial sense of purpose that isn't supported by her own internal drives. She's going to carve out a new life without knowing why or what she's looking for, just a vague sense that she's "moving on". I love the movie but it's one of those ones you can TV Tropes into horror really easily.
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Apr 5, 2016 21:01
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Isn't the dynamic nature of consciousness messing with that reasoning? The "you" from 8am is different from the "you" of 8:30 because someone cut you off in traffic and made you hate humanity. With that given, which you may well disagree with but bear with me, the you who stands still for a minute is similarly changed and unchanged. And the you that is disintegrated and reintegrated a foot away is also changed and unchanged. And if the machine duplicates you both versions are "you", changed and unchanged. But unlike a self same object out person comparing themselves to their past selves, their diverging experiences make them "change" differently. But they both have continuity of consciousness and their unique experiences make them different people immediately.
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Apr 6, 2016 01:24
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