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The risk of nuclear war between the US and Russia is objectively low at the moment. Higher than the time before the Russo-Georgian War, far lower than the Cold War. This may of course change in the following years.
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Jan 20, 2017 16:33
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axeil posted:China only has 4 ballistic missile submarines (the Type 094 or Jin class) which may or may not even be deployed. They carry 12 nuclear missiles each. The US has 18 Ohio-class submarines somewhere in the water right now, each which has 24 Trident II nuclear missiles. A couple of observations. 1. The USN has 14 Ohio SSBNs in total (4 of the original 18 have been converted to SSGNs). Not all of them are in the water right now. Also, all of them are capable of carrying up to 24 Trident D5s each, but they are not doing that. Each D5 is capable of carrying up to 14 warheads in a MIRV configuration (either W88 or the smaller yield W76), but they are not currently carrying as much. Right now, if all Ohios were out in the water and if all of them were permitted to carry the maximum amount of vehicles and weapons, each Ohio would carry 20 or 21 D5s, with each one having 4 MIRV warheads (for a total of 288 vehicles and 1152 deployed warheads). See the ratified - and in effect - New START. 2. China wants a credible SLBM deterrent, but they are not quite there yet. They are methodical in the way they are approaching this though, first fielding a prototype (092 Xia) and then going into production mode with 4 094s. It is currently thought that their earlier plans for a fleet of 8 Xia class SSBNs are scrapped, and that work is put in into bringing their next design into service, which has the capability of fielding up to 24 vehicles (096 Tang class). It is rumored that the sub will carry a modified version of the DF-41 ICBM, called JL-3. In that case, we are talking about a heavy SLBM in the R-39 Rif class (80 tonnes), capable of hitting the continental US from Chinese coastal waters. Much depends, however, on whether China shifts its overall nuclear posture from minimal deterrence to active pursuit of secure second strike capability. China has (correctly imo) identified that the best way forward is to field ICBMs in road mobile TELs, taking into advantage the vastness of the Chinese mainland for cover and concealment. This provides a credible minimal deterrence against a first strike (see DF-31 variants and DF-41 to replace the mainly silo based DF-5 and DF-4s), but China still does not have the numbers needed for a viable/secure second strike. This might change in the near (5 years) future. Dante80 fucked around with this message at 08:53 on Jan 21, 2017 |
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Jan 21, 2017 08:47
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This is true, and one of the main reasons for China spending some big bucks on developing a true blue water navy cap in the future (they do have some way to go still). Also, the choke-hold of the South/East China Sea theaters is one of the reasons for China bringing the ASuW IRBMs to the table in their first place, as well as developing bases on the SCS. Still though, this has not much to do with second strike SLBM cap. Ballistic submarines are designed to creep as close as possible to the mainland of the opponent undetected to launch a first strike that removes most of the reaction time for a massive retaliation or ABM measures. Depending on the number of fielded vehicles and warheads, a SSBN force in that scenario can work as a decapitation strike force (which prompted USSR to develop fail-deadly measures like the Dead Hand/Perimeter system), or as a massive first strike element against counterforce targets(*) to reduce or eliminate the opponents second strike cap. At the same time, they are fielded as a traditional and expensive first strike deterrent, with the mission of providing second strike capability. In that case, SSBNs can be fielded close to home and under the protective umbrella of the friendly air-force and navy forces. When used in that role SSBNs are "hardened" against SSN hunter attacks by the proximity and operations of those forces, and their mission is to provide the deterrent against a first strike on the mainland. In the Chinese example, to fulfill the second strike cap they need two things. 1. A delivery vehicle with enough range to target the mainland US from SCS or other coastal waters. 2. Enough actively fielded vehicles and warheads to provide a secure second strike cap. They are currently working on both, and this is consistent with Chinas' NFU policy after all. The question here is whether China truly wants to pursue a very expensive secure second strike cap or not. Their mobile TELs are much cheaper, and can also do that to a certain degree. Now. (*) Historically, SSBNs could only target countervalue targets (due to the innate CEP inaccuracy that early SLBMs had), but with the advances in electronics in the last decades it is possible to also use them now as a first and second strike counterforce element (in the latter scenario though, it is still more logical to go for the countervalue targets, as the deterrent becomes higher since most counterforce targets are already depleted from the first strike). Dante80 fucked around with this message at 10:13 on Jan 21, 2017 |
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Jan 21, 2017 09:48
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Fojar38 posted:My point is mostly that SLBM's are only useful insofar as they are mobile and invisible. China's submarines are neither and won't be anytime soon barring a massive leap in technology that we don't see any signs of occurring. While this means that they could theoretically launch from submarines near the Chinese coast, at that point you may as well just be using land-based systems. What I explained above is that your point is mostly irrelevant since China is not pursuing a first strike cap against the US. SSBNs need deep sea invisibility if they have to be used as first strike weapons. As a second strike element, they simply need hardening and vehicle range. As I stated above, China has a NFU policy, and has also developed TELs for their ICBMs, which makes the strategic importance of SLBMs as a deterrence force smaller. Which is the reason that many are contemplating China moving/keeping more resources to the land part of the triad, instead of paying the very big expense for a secure second strike cap via SLBMs.  Fojar38 posted:
Agreed, completely. Dante80 fucked around with this message at 12:41 on Jan 21, 2017 |
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Jan 21, 2017 12:34
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Policies/pledges can, and do change in a jiffy, especially if we are talking about war. The NFU pledge China has is predominantly a political/legitimization weapon in the proliferation arena. Actually, this more or less holds true for every country. All nuclear powers (including North Korea, which has a stated NFU btw too), describe in their nuclear cap as a strictly defensive measure.
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Jan 21, 2017 22:26
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Willie Tomg posted:More knowledgeable folk than me have pretty aptly demonstrated why first-striking the US mainland is a pretty bad idea for anyone, and how second-striking is not terribly credible from any forseeable party, but what if China uses some of their limited stock to erase two or three carrier battle groups throwing their heft around in waters they claim? That is a much more plausible and thornier deployment of those weapons than outclassed subs taking a shot at the west coast USA, IMO. Interestingly enough, China has explicitly described their DF-21d ASuW MRBM as a non nuclear weapon, with a conventional payload. They have done that for two distinct reasons. 1. Because they don't really need a nuclear warhead for it, especially since they have designed it for saturation attacks. The kinetic energy of its MaRVs is enough to - if not one-shot the Carrier - register a mission kill. 2. Because arming it with a nuclear warhead ties their hands diplomatically, since they cannot use it without major nuclear escalation. Thus, it cannot work as a viable deterrent for a conventional confrontation (like a USCG can). Sure, putting a nuclear warhead on it is trivial, but the Chinese are pretty adamant about using this as a conventional weapon. It both fits their policy/narrative and moves the escalation trigger over to the US (with all the consequences that this incurs diplomatically/ethically). The concept behind the weapon is pretty similar to what the Soviets were thinking when they designed and fielded the 65-76 650mm Carrier Killer torpedoes on their hunter subs..it was one of them exploding (they are pretty tricky to field due to the oxygen peroxide motor) that sank the Kursk btw. Dante80 fucked around with this message at 22:50 on Jan 21, 2017 |
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Jan 21, 2017 22:36
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Well..of course. But we will all be hosed anyway if that happens, so... The whole idea of weapons like these is to field them so that you never have to really use them.
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Jan 21, 2017 22:46
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Btw..for anyone interested, this is a pretty good starter article for one of the Cold Wars major Crises, the one in 1983. With Able Archer and RYAN. WarGames for real: How one 1983 exercise nearly triggered WWIII Pretty chilling stuff.
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Jan 21, 2017 23:00
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GreyjoyBastard posted:
My bad, its of course hydrogen peroxide. ---------- In regards to climate change, the mass immigration/refugee waves alone combined with the resulting economic sequences from rising sea levels, desertification etc would be enough to spark regional wars or to at least destabilize the world in a major sense. This is not sci-fi btw, neither is it something that will trigger in 200 years from now or happen very gradually. We are getting slightly off-topic though. Dante80 fucked around with this message at 05:55 on Jan 28, 2017 |
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Jan 28, 2017 05:49
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Regarding a revamp of the USA nuclear arsenal. Right now, the US strategic nuclear force consists of 3 major elements. 1. 431 LGM-30G ICBMs with W78 or W87 warheads. Those missiles are old, but have been thoroughly upgraded over the last five decades. By 2018, USA has to bring the number of active missiles down to 400 (with another 50 in reserve). 2. 230 UGM-133A SLBMs with W76 or W88 warheads. By far the most capable elements of the nuclear triad, those missiles are projected to be in service until the early 2040s at the earliest. They have exceptional MIRV capabilities and are poised to also arm the Columbia-class SSBNs that will start replacing the Ohio-class in a couple of decades. 3. 78 strategic bombers, including 58 aged but still capable B-52Hs. The global strike command currently can carry three different nuclear weapons. The B61 and B83 free-fall thermonuclear bombs, and the aged AGM-86 ALCM carrying the W80 nuclear warhead. Here are the programs currently running or under consideration. 1. The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program is set to replace the 60s vintage ICBMs in USAs inventory. Those Minuteman-class missiles have been the sole element of the land part of the triad since 2005 when all 114 LGM-118 Peacekeeper missiles were removed from service due to START II (and more importantly, low reliability and high maintenance problems). GBSD has just started, and we are expecting the program to be able to start replacing Minuteman III missiles in the very late 2020s. The projected cost is very difficult to ascertain at this point in time, it is possible though to balloon to more than $100Bn (including development costs). 2. The Columbia-class/SSBN-X program is set to replace the 14 Ohio-class SSBN fleet, starting from the early 30's. The first Ohio class submarine has to be decommissioned around the 2027-2029 time frame, and the schedules are rather tight after that for the rest of the fleet (about 1 ship each year). So, by the early thirties US has to provide a reliable replacement to keep the SSBN force at the current levels. The plan right now is for a total force of 12 SSBNs instead of 14. Also, each Columbia class SSBN carries 8 less missiles than the Ohio class (16 vs 24). So the projected ceiling for the second part of the triad is projected to be around 192 D5 missiles by the early 40s. The projected cost for the program is about $80Bn (including development costs). There is no current plan to replace the Trident II SLBM, which can stay in service without additional maintenance programs until roughly 2042. 3. The Northrop Grumman B-21 "Raider" under the LRS-B program is going to be the next nuclear weapon carrying strategic heavy bomber in US service. Initial operating capability is expected around 2030, although that is considered slightly optimistic. This is a pretty major program, with an expected cost of at least $80Bn for 100 aircraft (including development costs). Interestingly enough, in July 2016 the U.S. Air Force stated they would not release the estimated cost for the B-21 contract with Northrop Grumman. The Air Force argued releasing the cost would reveal too much information about the classified project to potential adversaries (lol). The Senate Armed Services Committee also voted to not publicly release the program's cost, restricting the information to congressional defense committees over the objections of a bipartisan group of legislators. 4. The Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile program is set to replace the around 530 aging AGM-86 ALCMs. After the removal from service of the newer but plagued with reliability and maintenance problems AGM-129 ACMs in 2012, most of the 30 year old AGM-86s were given a lease of life until the early 30s, via a SLEP program. This put considerable pressure on the LRSO program, since developing and producing the new cruise missiles would be very expensive, there were other similar weapons that could fill the role (like the AGM-158 JASSM-ER) and there were a lot of bigger priorities ahead of it. After a vote in last June though, the program is back on track. Which still does not make much sense for many people..in any case, the projected cost of the program is around $25Bn for 1000 missiles. ----------- If someone had to chose from the above, I think the most "pressing" program is GBSD. It is the only viable way for US to maintain the Triad. On the other hand, you could do a couple of things, partly taking a lesson from China and Russia. You could shelve silo-based ICBMs for a competent mobile road TEL ICBM like RS-24 Yars or DF-41. Silo based missiles are prime Counterforce target candidates, that in this day and age mostly work as pork incentives for local politicians. Also, you could choose to scrap the land part of the triad all-together, and address force size via more SSBNs. Modern SLBMs have the same range and ICBMs, and almost the same accuracy. Thoughts? Dante80 fucked around with this message at 08:08 on Jan 28, 2017 |
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Jan 28, 2017 07:56
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Ardennes posted:I don't think the US is well suited for TEL ICBM, one thing is you need a very strict control over the flow of information to make them viable. Not really. To be more precise, I find it far more difficult for a country to have a secure strategic air arm as well as a tactical nuclear force - like US had in the past, than a secure mobile (rail or road) ICBM network. I do agree that going ahead with a good SSBN element is the most pressing priority. Those Ohios cannot get a SLEP without a very heavy and expensive modernization program (which also involves re-fueling).
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Jan 28, 2017 12:38
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Ardennes posted:I am talking more about keeping track of launchers, which ultimately is going to be more difficult in a country that still has freedom of the speech/press (well..for a while) were you can post all the Instagram photos you want. There are ways to get around this but I think Russia/China have had advantage here (although Russia did have a problem in Donetsk, I think they have largely controlled the issue). Again, that is not really a big issue man. See where (and how) GLCM and Pershing II were fielded in Europe. And yes, there were telephones back then too, as well as freedom of speech/press. Also, its not like a good portion of USA is not restricted to civilians already. Case in point:  I think that the main reason that DoD is not going for something like this is simply due to the pressure from Dakota/Wyoming/Montana politicians. There is a LOT of pork involved in keeping the silos running imo. Ardennes posted:At a certain point it seems more feasible to simply have better/more modern SSBNs. A strategic air arm at this point seems like an inefficient use of resources. Agreed on both. Having said that, B-21 is a global reach penetration bomber that can be used in a conventional war rather well, coupled with smart weapons. No idea on what its capability would be against a competent AA force with L-band EW elements though. Dante80 fucked around with this message at 12:16 on Feb 5, 2017 |
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Feb 5, 2017 12:04
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If this were to happen, counter-force targets would be hit first by the initiator, with counter-value warfare mostly reserved for a second strike. In any case, it would not matter much what you did. The world would be hosed and we would at last have a pretty convincing answer to the Fermi Paradox.
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Feb 5, 2017 12:26
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Here is the abstract of a 2014 study on the matter, that uses current, precise weather models and also takes into account nuclear warhead miniaturization. Multidecadal global cooling and unprecedented ozone loss following a regional nuclear conflict quote:We present the first study of the global impacts of a regional nuclear war with an Earth system model including atmospheric chemistry, ocean dynamics, and interactive sea ice and land components. A limited, regional nuclear war between India and Pakistan in which each side detonates 50 15 kt weapons could produce about 5 Tg of black carbon (BC). This would self-loft to the stratosphere, where it would spread globally, producing a sudden drop in surface temperatures and intense heating of the stratosphere. Using the Community Earth System Model with the Whole Atmosphere Community Climate Model, we calculate an e-folding time of 8.7 years for stratospheric BC compared to 4–6.5 years for previous studies. Our calculations show that global ozone losses of 20%–50% over populated areas, levels unprecedented in human history, would accompany the coldest average surface temperatures in the last 1000 years. We calculate summer enhancements in UV indices of 30%–80% over midlatitudes, suggesting widespread damage to human health, agriculture, and terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems. Killing frosts would reduce growing seasons by 10–40 days per year for 5 years. Surface temperatures would be reduced for more than 25 years due to thermal inertia and albedo effects in the ocean and expanded sea ice. The combined cooling and enhanced UV would put significant pressures on global food supplies and could trigger a global nuclear famine. Knowledge of the impacts of 100 small nuclear weapons should motivate the elimination of more than 17,000 nuclear weapons that exist today. Its not good. Far better than ye olde Nuclear Winter scenarios (based on earlier climate models and very large, imprecise warheads hitting counter-value targets), but still not good at all. Moreover, have in mind that radiation knows no borders. Open a map of Ukraine/Belarus, and see what Chernobyl did to both due to the wind/rain. Quick example. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MU4_bJT8W3Y Dante80 fucked around with this message at 13:21 on Feb 5, 2017 |
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Feb 5, 2017 13:16
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welp Report: Trump Denounces Nuclear Arms Control Treaty to Putin http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2017/02/11/report-trump-putin-call/  President Donald Trump in his first phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin denounced a treaty that caps U.S. and Russian deployment of nuclear warheads, according to a report. Trump told Putin that the treaty, known as New START, was one of several bad deals negotiated by the Obama administration, according to a report by Reuters. Unnamed sources said that Trump did not know what the treaty was, and had paused to ask his aides in an aside what it was, according to the report. White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer told reporters on Thursday that Trump understood the topic, but had wanted an opinion from an aide. “It wasn’t like he didn’t know what was being said. He wanted an opinion on something,” Spicer said. The treaty requires Russia and the United States to lower the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550 or less by 2018. It also limits deployed land- and submarine-based missiles, and nuclear-capable bombers. In the phone call, Putin suggested extending New START, which is set to expire in 2021, the sources told Reuters. Trump had criticized the treaty during a 2016 presidential debate, saying Russia had “outsmarted” the U.S. with former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Critics view the agreement as one-sided, requiring deep cuts in the U.S. nuclear arsenal and abandoning missile defense in Europe. Trump had also tweeted, as president-elect, “The United States must greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding nukes.” Supporters of the treaty argue that the end of the treaty could lead to a new arms race. “New START has unquestionably made our country safer, an opinion widely shared by national security experts on both sides of the aisle,” Democratic Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (NH) said in a statement. A mutual agreement can extend the treaty’s provisions for another five years. The original agreement, known as START, was renewed in 2010 by then-President Obama, and went into effect in 2011, according to CNN. It aims to cut the number of nuclear weapons that the U.S. and Russia could deploy by about one-third. It would limit a maximum of 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarines and bombers, and a total of 1,500 warheads.
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Feb 12, 2017 14:18
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North Korea, best Korea. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-uJ5i1r2Xu0 btw...this looks like a solid fueled rocket. O_O Dante80 fucked around with this message at 21:35 on Feb 13, 2017 |
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Feb 13, 2017 21:13
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