- Ardennes
- May 12, 2002
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In all likelihood, the reason there won't be a nuclear war is relatively simple, rich people have to live in the same world we do and they like the world they built for themselves and control. Nuclear war isn't in their interests, although nationalism and saber rattling might be.
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Jan 22, 2017 11:35
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May 14, 2024 14:57
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- Ardennes
- May 12, 2002
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But nationalism and saber rattling tends to create more opportunities for an absurd chain of events leading to a civilizational collapse scenario. It may still not be very likely, but the consequences are so dire we should be very concerned with anything that increases that likelyhood.
I heartily recommend Command and Control by Eric Schlosser to anyone interested in the mechanisms we have around preventing the accidental detonation of nuclear weapons. It covers the basic history from the first nuclear weapons up to the systems we have today as well as describes the near misses along the way.
If you do look at the historical record, its clear that the cause of a lot of those accidents (or why they might have resulted in triggering a nuclear war instead of just a messy accident) were directly or indirectly caused by the US being on a war footing with the USSR. Anything that puts us back closer to that situation is going to once again increase the chances of some stupid accident spinning things out of control.
It may increase the likelihood but there is a reason the Soviets always held back, everyone actually controlling the warheads themselves knew the result was certain destruction. The likelihood is higher than it was but it is still very minimal. I think the thing to fear is broader economic warfare that can could be extremely destructive while not as apocalyptic.
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Jan 22, 2017 12:20
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- Ardennes
- May 12, 2002
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Regarding a revamp of the USA nuclear arsenal.
Right now, the US strategic nuclear force consists of 3 major elements.
1. 431 LGM-30G ICBMs with W78 or W87 warheads. Those missiles are old, but have been thoroughly upgraded over the last five decades. By 2018, USA has to bring the number of active missiles down to 400 (with another 50 in reserve).
2. 230 UGM-133A SLBMs with W76 or W88 warheads. By far the most capable elements of the nuclear triad, those missiles are projected to be in service until the early 2040s at the earliest. They have exceptional MIRV capabilities and are poised to also arm the Columbia-class SSBNs that will start replacing the Ohio-class in a couple of decades.
3. 78 strategic bombers, including 58 aged but still capable B-52Hs. The global strike command currently can carry three different nuclear weapons. The B61 and B83 free-fall thermonuclear bombs, and the aged AGM-86 ALCM carrying the W80 nuclear warhead.
Here are the programs currently running or under consideration.
1. The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program is set to replace the 60s vintage ICBMs in USAs inventory. Those Minuteman-class missiles have been the sole element of the land part of the triad since 2005 when all 114 LGM-118 Peacekeeper missiles were removed from service due to START II (and more importantly, low reliability and high maintenance problems).
GBSD has just started, and we are expecting the program to be able to start replacing Minuteman III missiles in the very late 2020s. The projected cost is very difficult to ascertain at this point in time, it is possible though to balloon to more than $100Bn (including development costs).
2. The Columbia-class/SSBN-X program is set to replace the 14 Ohio-class SSBN fleet, starting from the early 30's. The first Ohio class submarine has to be decommissioned around the 2027-2029 time frame, and the schedules are rather tight after that for the rest of the fleet (about 1 ship each year). So, by the early thirties US has to provide a reliable replacement to keep the SSBN force at the current levels.
The plan right now is for a total force of 12 SSBNs instead of 14. Also, each Columbia class SSBN carries 8 less missiles than the Ohio class (16 vs 24). So the projected ceiling for the second part of the triad is projected to be around 192 D5 missiles by the early 40s. The projected cost for the program is about $80Bn (including development costs).
There is no current plan to replace the Trident II SLBM, which can stay in service without additional maintenance programs until roughly 2042.
3. The Northrop Grumman B-21 "Raider" under the LRS-B program is going to be the next nuclear weapon carrying strategic heavy bomber in US service. Initial operating capability is expected around 2030, although that is considered slightly optimistic. This is a pretty major program, with an expected cost of at least $80Bn for 100 aircraft (including development costs).
Interestingly enough, in July 2016 the U.S. Air Force stated they would not release the estimated cost for the B-21 contract with Northrop Grumman. The Air Force argued releasing the cost would reveal too much information about the classified project to potential adversaries (lol). The Senate Armed Services Committee also voted to not publicly release the program's cost, restricting the information to congressional defense committees over the objections of a bipartisan group of legislators.
4. The Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile program is set to replace the around 530 aging AGM-86 ALCMs. After the removal from service of the newer but plagued with reliability and maintenance problems AGM-129 ACMs in 2012, most of the 30 year old AGM-86s were given a lease of life until the early 30s, via a SLEP program.
This put considerable pressure on the LRSO program, since developing and producing the new cruise missiles would be very expensive, there were other similar weapons that could fill the role (like the AGM-158 JASSM-ER) and there were a lot of bigger priorities ahead of it. After a vote in last June though, the program is back on track. Which still does not make much sense for many people..in any case, the projected cost of the program is around $25Bn for 1000 missiles.
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If someone had to chose from the above, I think the most "pressing" program is GBSD. It is the only viable way for US to maintain the Triad.
On the other hand, you could do a couple of things, partly taking a lesson from China and Russia. You could shelve silo-based ICBMs for a competent mobile road TEL ICBM like RS-24 Yars or DF-41. Silo based missiles are prime Counterforce target candidates, that in this day and age mostly work as pork incentives for local politicians.
Also, you could choose to scrap the land part of the triad all-together, and address force size via more SSBNs. Modern SLBMs have the same range and ICBMs, and almost the same accuracy.
Thoughts?
In all likelihood, it seems more modern SSBN with a possible update to the GBSD seems to be the most prudent course. I don't think the US is well suited for TEL ICBM, one thing is you need a very strict control over the flow of information to make them viable.
The US has the naval and technological advantage to make SSBN's completely viable and GBSD back be a useful backup. I am not a big fan of another stealth bomber program and honestly it seems like a boondoogle especially since we may have to be working with contested airspaces.
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Jan 28, 2017 11:23
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- Ardennes
- May 12, 2002
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Not really. To be more precise, I find it far more difficult for a country to have a secure strategic air arm as well as a tactical nuclear force - like US had in the past, than a secure mobile (rail or road) ICBM network.
I do agree that going ahead with a good SSBN element is the most pressing priority. Those Ohios cannot get a SLEP without a very heavy and expensive modernization program (which also involves re-fueling).
I am talking more about keeping track of launchers, which ultimately is going to be more difficult in a country that still has freedom of the speech/press (well..for a while) were you can post all the Instagram photos you want. There are ways to get around this but I think Russia/China have had advantage here (although Russia did have a problem in Donetsk, I think they have largely controlled the issue).
At a certain point it seems more feasible to simply have better/more modern SSBNs. A strategic air arm at this point seems like an inefficient use of resources.
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Jan 28, 2017 13:51
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Jan 22, 2017 11:35
