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Tias posted:How far will the artillery shoot? Pasteur Ridge seems to make sense, but we shouldn't limber them up there if they can't fire far enough. Yeah, we also don't know their actual objectives. It's quite possible that they'll be defensively minded, but for all we know they might end up having quite asymmetrical objectives to ours. It might just be that they'll be shooting to capture places like Faibleimpot or Bouclecourt, which would drastically shift the overall dynamic of the battle. The only thing that seems vaguely certain is that they'll probably also be wanting to capture Saint Croissant, because rail lines are important.
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Feb 10, 2017 13:41
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look out for Breakfast Ridge and the rise around Clemenceau, if i were the french i'd want that high ground
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Feb 10, 2017 14:08
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Both plans seem sound enough, but as some others have mentioned I'm a bit leery about the fact that they make some hard assumptions both regarding from where the French will be deploying, and what objectives they will pursue. If they are aggressively inclined they could possibly get guns onto that north-western hill, which could be a thorn in our flank. Just something to be prepared for in my opinion, I'm never willing to underestimate the hubris of Frenchmen.
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Feb 10, 2017 14:24
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If at all possible I'd please like to keep my division at the western position it has in the chatroom's map just out of inertia, I've spent a bit of time staring at that part of the map now and doing it all over for the other side is kinda ugh. I've set my div orders up (in the chat room's plan the divisions are swapped, so I'm where Steinrokkan has 19th in his map) such that my brigade scheduled for the easternmost position enters first followed by the others in their intended order in the westward-stretching line and I've definitely had the thought in the back of my mind that if there is heavy fighting in the center we can just reroute the brigades intended for the West due South to hold the line or exploit a breakthrough, so maybe this is an acceptable compromise? Or I put my flank in Bois de Gooneville and use a bde of infantry plus arty on Missionary plus the long distance the French presumably have to walk to secure my against envelopment, which is basically what Steinrokkan is suggesting with division roles flipped. Dunno how risky this is wrt envelopment, it sorta rests on how mobile the French are. aphid_licker fucked around with this message at 16:50 on Feb 10, 2017 |
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Feb 10, 2017 16:18
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I think the main thing is that we advance in as compact a shape as possible til we reach Croissant, and only then begin to fan out, if deemed necessary, or continue in one direction. That way we can easily pivot to face any challenge. If the French make a substantial push along the Western edge of the map to defeat the screen units left there, it will weaken their ability to defend our objective, and will hopefully just move them to a position where they will be surrounded from east, north and south (upon storming the positions they vacated) - if fighting at Clemenceau reaches conclusion fast enough that elements of one division can quickly move to reinforce the erstwhile screen. E: I'm only talking about the scenario I'm proposing, to avoid confusion. steinrokkan fucked around with this message at 17:44 on Feb 10, 2017 |
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Feb 10, 2017 17:37
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Trin, it seems that the combat rules do not give any penalty to companies moving into the range of stationary defenders - both will fire with the same "initiative" based entirely on their side and no other factors, is that right?
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Feb 10, 2017 17:52
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FYI: I've been doing a few quick playtests of my various house rules, and I'm going to need to revamp the rules about when brigade commanders can give new orders because there's still too much scope for interrupting the flow of the game; file it under "things that work fine in person but not in an internet game". Fortunately, you guys aren't really thinking of brigade-level operations yet. I'll be quick. Sorry.steinrokkan posted:Trin, it seems that the combat rules do not give any penalty to companies moving into the range of stationary defenders - both will fire with the same "initiative" based entirely on their side and no other factors, is that right? Not so; let's look at how the Firing Phase works again. quote:Artillery Let's take the example situation from the OP of the observer thread, and say that the Germans have won initiative and, on Attack stance, advance south; the French, on Defend stance, sit and wait for them.  The Movement Phase goes off, the Germans move through the wood, everyone's in sight and firing range of each other. The Firing Phase begins. There's no artillery to fire. The German MGs have moved and are disallowed from firing. The French MGs fire. Next up are Stationary Infantry. The Germans have no Stationary Infantry, and none of the French Infantry has moved; so even though the French lost initiative, their Infantry will all fire first; we then go on to Moving Infantry and the Germans return fire. It doesn't work like the Movement Phase, in which all of Team A's forces move and then all of Team B's move; you resolve each category for both teams before moving down the list.
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Feb 10, 2017 18:15
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Oh, thanks, that makes a lot of sense.
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Feb 10, 2017 18:26
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From Roll 20, expected lines of sight to passive targets from various points on the map. https://imgur.com/a/rJ8oe Horrible compression courtesy of Imgur.
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Feb 10, 2017 23:35
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Revised brigade ordering rules are up; basically, Brigades can only make a Change of Orders when a Runner from a higher HQ gets to them, and I'm asking for a list of Auto-Response settings in your brigade orders so I can answer questions like "do you want to break off yet?" (which will be occurring multiple times a turn every turn once battle is properly joined) without interrupting the game; if I'm going to interrupt the game, I want it to be because someone has to make a strategically important decision, not because I need to know where you want to dig your latrines. edit: here is the German default Battle Order, if you want to improve on this feel free. The image includes my 4/8/12/16 range bullseye; all units are within 8" of HQ and the mortar is far enough back to fire over the infantry's heads 
Trin Tragula fucked around with this message at 00:43 on Feb 11, 2017 |
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Feb 10, 2017 23:47
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 I've added a column to the roster for us to link orders posts. Hopefully that is an easy way to track auto-response stuff. https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1INxQ8FIG2UdpFbkeeluhARW_6p7jluTnTxDaG4httAc/edit?usp=sharing glynnenstein fucked around with this message at 00:06 on Feb 11, 2017 |
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Feb 10, 2017 23:54
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Also we or specifically the company commander needs to decided when and where we want our spotter plane to appear. Need to decide this and order before the battle begins.
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Feb 11, 2017 00:34
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Okay. You've already seen Steinrokkan's proposed plan, here's mine, as well as some thoughts on stuff that's been popping up so far from me and the others. Bear in mind first and foremost that this is Corps deployment plan. I choose not to interfere with where brigades go or where your HQs go or where your cavalry goes outside of the broadest strokes. The map may seem busy at first and that's probably because I chose to stuff too many things onto it. But - to my mind, at least - it is more or less intelligible once you understand what do given symbols and colours mean. CYAN represents positions and movements of 43rd Division. BLUE represents positions and movements of 19th Division. RED represents potential positions and movements of the enemy. PURPLE represents artillery park sites (to be actually whether or not they're really feasible for what we want to do). YELLOW represents objectives. WHITE letters are labels I will use to discuss potential situations and contingencies in a later part of this post. Phase 1 FULL ARROWS AND LINES represent Phase 1 deployments. This stage is actually the one that we are so far 99% sure will happen roughly as depicted, as everyone agrees on it. The objective of Phase 1 is to secure Gooneville (hereafter OBJG). To make traffic bearable and manoeuvres swift, we approach along two roads, one per division. 19th should exercise more caution while on the march, as in this phase it will be closer to the enemy - what this specifically entails is left to its commander. Our entire Corps converges onto Gooneville and secures it with artillery support from Pasteur Ridge (purple box). This must be done quickly, but fortunately there is little reason to expect enemy to be there in force (see Appendix A: Assumptions), and in fact there is a chance there will be no enemy there at all. In any case, there is little subtlety here: take the town with the bulk of our force while dispersing some units (cavalry, jaegers) to recon as far and as fast as possible. The 19th should feel the responsibility to take the lead in this phase, should any such disputes arise; the 43rd will need to conserve its forces. Phase 2 DASHED ARROWS AND LINES represent Phase 2 deployments and positions. In this phase, 19th Division spreads out to secure Gooneville, hold our eastern flank, and try to maintain control of the situation to its south. If everything goes well, they won't have to move far from this phase line. The 43rd Division, meanwhile, pivots around the westernmost edge of 19th Division's line, securing La Sanglant Femme and moving into Brioche and Gooneville Woods to serve as jump-off positions for Phase 3. There should be little need to rush things at this stage. Our deployments will be hard to conceal from the enemy on the bulk of our line. It is up to the division commander how far exactly he wants to advance at this stage, but keeping as many men as possible in cover is important. Phase 3 DOTTED ARROWS AND LINES represent Phase 3 deployments and positions. At this stage, 43rd Division, supported by the bulk of our artillery (including the guns of 19th Division if possible), advances across the road and into Dejeuner Ridge, expecting heavy resistance of a significant part of the enemy force. This is the critical phase of the plan and the one where the most things can go wrong. If we succeed here, we've pretty much won. Dejeuner is a powerful position and getting some guns onto it would deny Quatrepourts (hereafter OBJQ) to the French, allowing us to seize it at our leisure. * * * The DOTTED AND DASHED ARROWS AND LINES represent hypotheticals, assumptions and contingencies. I shall go over them in order. A: The enemy may attempt to move units from the southernmost ridge (referred to in German staff documents as Roadblock Ridge) to bolster the defences of Dejeuner Ridge or outright attempt to roll up the flank of the attacking force. In such a case, it is the 19th Division's responsibility to react appropriately in order to deny that movement to the enemy. B: The enemy may, either during Phase 2 or Phase 3 (far less likely at Phase 1, see Appendix A) attempt a move along the western edge of the AO to flank our forces or deny us La Sanglant Femme or other valuable positions. This should be absolutely dealt with before advancing towards Dejeuner. The good news here is that if the enemy attempts that movement after we've begun our advance, they will have lost any decent timing; they would rush into our prepared offensive while denied the defensive benefits of their formidable position. C: The enemy may at any point attempt a probing or flanking movement towards Baguende. This would be a threat to the flank of 19th Division. However, with proper recon it should be impossible for the enemy to surprise us in this way and it is up to the division commander to decide on appropriate precautions and response if necessary. D: The enemy may try to attack 19th Division's positions at a variety of times and for a variety of reasons. The division commander must be on his guard and ready to respond to such developments. Securing Bois de Baguette may prove a good early warning and defensive position both (as well as potentially induce the enemy to expect an attack there), but be costly in lives; yet again, this is the division commander's decision to make. * * * PURPLE DOUBLE DOTTED AND DASHED BOXES represent potential artillery park deployments, but from what I hear are already obsolete due to a lack of range for the most part. Still, artillery at least temporarily kept in Gooneville Woods and at Bois de Haut may be a good insurance policy. * * * Compared to steinrokkan's plan, I think this has several advantages. One, we strike directly at the one position that gives us near-immediate control of the objective. This, on one hand, means we will not spend men attacking auxiliary positions with strong natural defences; it also lets us save time we would otherwise have to dedicate to a potentially protracted fight over Roadblock Ridge. This time savings can be "cashed in" as the time we spend setting up our artillery park, reconnoitering enemy deployments, and taking up jump-off positions before the main push. All these factors should help ensure we do not go into the battle piecemeal or without necessary fire support. Furthermore, while his plan suggests putting more forces to bear against the first likely point of resistance, it does commit us to fighting the entirety of the enemy force over the course of the battle. My plan only has us in combat against the specific forces that bar our progress along the crucial position we need to take either way. The risk, however, is that most of 43rd Division's main movement will be done in the open. We are going to be desperate for effective artillery or else this may well turn into Pickett's Charge Redux. Questions? Appendix A: The Assumptions I Am Making So Far Obviously the plan above makes a ton of assumptions - just like any plan we will put forward; this is inevitable: the only way to make a plan without any assumptions is to make no plans at all. Below I have outlined those I find the most important and - spoken or unspoken - prevalent throughout my thinking and the thinking of the rest of our side. 1. The enemy will come in from the SW corner of the map. This assumption stems from what we do know: scouts report the enemy is to the south of us. Starting them out in the SE corner would mean a real possibility that we can push to our objectives without ever seriously seeing them contested. Starting on Roadblock Ridge would keep them off the road in the early turns, which could represent a significant handicap. Starting on any non-southern map edge would mean Trin lied to us, which, while it would add "realism", is inconceivable. Having the enemy start in the SW corner is likely because it puts them right smack on our objective and it is the worst case scenario, which is why I choose to operate on it. Better situations, while possible, can be reacted to if they happen. The worst case scenario has to be planned for from the start. Now, there are two caveats here. The enemy may start on the road south of Graisse, which would let them get to Gooneville way ahead of us. That is possible, but it will just mean that the fight to take Gooneville will be that much fiercer, and we're already preparing for it. They may also start with some or all of their forces already deployed on the map - in which case they would probably naturally gravitate towards the main two ridge positions or push towards Gooneville (if they do not start with at least a token force in it already), so the plan should mutatis mutandis still be able to proceed. I'd gamble that this is less likely, as it's 1914 and thus the only good opportunity for a real meeting engagement of the whole war. 2. The enemy objectives are roughly opposite to ours. We expect the enemy have been given a set of objectives that will put them in conflict with us by having them push on to OBJG and defend OBJQ. But potentially they may have their objectives limited to bleeding us out, their real objective may be to turn our flank, or perhaps their objective is to attack us and secure, say, Bouclecourt or Nainville. I feel like my plan, which does pay some attention to flank security, prevents any of those hypotheticals from blowing up in our face. But should the enemy act on them, our plans will have to be adapted, rather than scrapped outright. 3. The enemy is not appreciably stronger than we are. We expect to be the attacking side in this scenario or to play it out as a meeting engagement between two forces at near-parity. This is certainly what it sounds like based on the time period and the orders we have gotten from the HQ. The enemy could be weaker than we are, as they would be counterbalanced by being on the defence in favourable terrain (if so, it is more likely they would have worse troop quality than that they would only have a single division; in the latter case their manoeuvre options would be extremely limited and thus unfun). They may also be at our strength, if they intend to meet us in a campaign of manoeuvre. However, there is at least a theoretical possibility that we are about to walk into the Marne and HQ orders are just bluster supposed to lull us into the false sense of security before we are hit by a force of three divisions or greater. But that's setup speculation and we should not let us drive our decision-making until we suddenly notice there are far more Frenchmen on the map than there should be. 4. The enemy will be somewhat reactive, rather than proactive. As a consequence of the above, we expect the enemy to let us come to them. While not unreasonable, we must appreciate that there are a number of positions (particularly on the western side of the map) that the enemy should be able to reach before we do, and they may go for it to throw a massive spanner in our works (or die out of position. Both may happen.). This is the one preconception I feel can and should be avoided, and why I stress scouting and flank security so much. In fact, having the 19th be something of a holding/reserve force is also, I feel, partially motivated by my distrust of this assumption. * * * So, there you have it. We have two competing plans and I need to hear from you on which one you feel is more feasible and what potential obstacles you see to either.
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Feb 11, 2017 00:41
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I like this; however, I suspect that the most likely enemy ambition is indeed to control OBJG given it's evident value as a crossroads and that they may maneuver more aggressively than the plan predicts. Obviously the plan accounts for this to some degree, but I think we ought to expect it. In any case our reconnaissance will have to determine the enemy's deployment. My gut feeling is to be particularly concerned about a more eastward initial disposition of enemy forces and thus the danger of note C, in conjunction with the likelihood of a forward thrust in an attempt to seize the town. I look forward to our victory regardless!
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Feb 11, 2017 01:15
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quote:1. Make your way to Quatreprouts as quickly as possible and hold it against enemy attack. [Battle End 1] Kinda wondering about objective 3. Could that mean that we need to secure a road beyond those we enter on? The goals are listed in descending order of importance as per the briefing so if we metagame this 1 and 4 is they get destroyed and we get destroyed, respectively. 2 is we hold the center of the map. Since achieving 3 is less high on the list than 2 I'd expect 3 to be more easily achievable than 2. Maybe have troops remaining on the ridges around our deployment zone contesting the road/rail exits in the east and north. That kinda puts most of our goals on our side of the map so maybe we are really about to bumble into a superior force. There's no goal set for us to take between St Croissants and Quatreprouts so I feel the scenario expects us to end the game in our half of the map. This is all reading tea leaves ofc.
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Feb 11, 2017 06:27
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Any feedback? My brigadiers, do you have a way you would prefer to be used so that I have something to disregard?
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Feb 11, 2017 12:03
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Another matter: the spotter plane. There are two ways we can deploy it: 1) as soon as the morning mist breaks we send it over the southern ridges to try and find out what the enemy's general deployments are. 2) we send it an hour or so before the rough estimate of when we may begin the main push in order to lean the enemy's specific deployments in the area we are about to attack. Any opinions? 2) seems more useful, but also calling for more delicate timing, while 1) has the added benefit of immediately verifying a bunch of our assumptions at a point where it is definitely early enough to change our plans.
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Feb 11, 2017 12:09
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steinrokkan posted:Any feedback? We seem basically agreed that we want to attack St Croissant with overwhelming force asap. I think I now prefer the option with the second stage assault going towards Clemenceau led by the Nainville road division. It seems like it minimizes walking distances. And that Clemenceau ground is good to threaten the objective and possible reinforcements. Spotting plane I'd go for the first option. aphid_licker fucked around with this message at 15:01 on Feb 11, 2017 |
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Feb 11, 2017 14:39
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Tevery Best posted:Another matter: the spotter plane. I'm somewhat leaning towards the former option. We'll be dealing with a lot of inertia in this format, and I'm worried that if we pull it late we won't really be in a position to meaningfully capitalise on whatever intel we'd get from it. One way or the other, it'll be a fairly direct and unsubtle push up the western ridge. Meanwhile if we call it in early, it could be very valuable in case the entente actually do come in from an easterly position. If nothing else, it should give us a general idea of their intended Schwerpunkt early on, which should be very helpful for the 19th when deciding on their defensive position.
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Feb 11, 2017 14:40
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Tevery Best posted:Another matter: the spotter plane. 1) knowing where the greatest enemy concentration is is more important than hoping for specific, potentially totally misleading, information, especially if it gives us extra time to issue commands.
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Feb 11, 2017 14:57
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aphid_licker posted:I think I now prefer the option with the second stage assault going towards Clemenceau led by the Nainville road division. It seems like it minimizes walking distances. And that Clemenceau ground is good to threaten the objective and possible reinforcements. Walking distances are only relevant as far as they cost us time (as far as I know this game does not simulate fatigue), and we will spend a lot more time fighting for Clemenceau than walking to Dejeuner. Clemenceau is also not good for directly threatening the objective. The sightlines from there are partially obscured by woods and a town (and should we choose to advance from there we will have to fight through the woods and the town, BTW) and Q or even most positions on Dejeuner are out of artillery range from there. The only thing it seems to be really good for is denying movement north of Conjunction Junction, and by the time we've taken Clemenceau, the French are not going to be moving there. Remember the road south of Conjunction is partially covered by the woods and town and partially out of artillery range unless we position as far to the SW of Roadblock Ridge as we can, and it is not guaranteed (or even in my opinion likely) that any French reinforcements would come in from that road rather than the two roads in the SW corner.
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Feb 11, 2017 15:01
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Tevery Best posted:Another matter: the spotter plane. I too vote for option 1, being caught out by an unexpected general deployment seems a larger danger, especially given how little we know about the foe's strength and objectives.
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Feb 11, 2017 15:23
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The point of attacking at Clemenceau would not be because of its strategic position for defenders, but to make the second stage attack as decisive as possible, cleaning up a flank of the North-South vector of approach to the final objective, and also allowing us a two-pronged assault at the Breakfast Ridge should it be heavily invested b the enemy. All in all, it should allow us to make use of the most of our assets in the offensive at all times. A straight up maneuver to Breakfast and an assault through there, while the other division waits at Croissant, would be arguably much faster in the best case scenario, but could end up much more vulnerable and potentially delayed as we would scramble for reinforcements.
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Feb 11, 2017 15:24
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Tevery Best posted:Walking distances are only relevant as far as they cost us time (as far as I know this game does not simulate fatigue), and we will spend a lot more time fighting for Clemenceau than walking to Dejeuner. Time is important. Troops that are marching somewhere out of sight rather than attacking are effectively neutralized while they do so. All the time we are doing this movement we will definitely be getting pounded in the center by all those other troops that have noone to fight because our counterparts to them are out of sight somewhere. We can be in Bois de Baguette getting eyes on Clemenceau at the same time we arrive at St Croissant. Anything on Breakfast will have to redeploy (temporarily being a non-factor) or stay and be a non-factor if we use this route. aphid_licker fucked around with this message at 15:36 on Feb 11, 2017 |
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Feb 11, 2017 15:33
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aphid_licker posted:Time is important. Troops that are marching somewhere out of sight rather than attacking are effectively neutralized while they do so. All the time we are doing this movement we will definitely be getting pounded in the center by all those other troops that have noone to fight because our counterparts to them are out of sight somewhere. We can be in Bois de Baguette getting eyes on Clemenceau at the same time we arrive at St Croissant. Fighting just for the purpose of fighting is in the end simply wasting our men far more permanently than temporarily neutralizing them by a long march. The French are unlikely to have enough strength to attack 19th Division's line with overwhelming force while at the same time maintaining any sort of coherent defence at Dejeuner - and if they do, then any offensive plans go straight to the dustbin either way. If we choose this route, anything on Breakfast will not necessarily have to redeploy. They will be faced with a choice of either being a factor now or being a factor later, because we cannot secure Q with French guns on Dejeuner, period. This only works the other way: forces that stay on Roadblock while we have Dejeuner will be a non-factor because we will not at any point have to concern ourselves with them.
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Feb 11, 2017 15:48
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I would argue to the contrary - trying to fight to reach a location with as little fighting as possible is going to entrap us, especially when it makes our lines longer, and gives the enemy displaced by our attacks a defended place to retreat, reform and pick a point to break our overextended positions. The French will also certainly receive reinforcements, just as we are liable to.
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Feb 11, 2017 16:16
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Tevery Best posted:Fighting just for the purpose of fighting is in the end simply wasting our men far more permanently than temporarily neutralizing them by a long march. The French are unlikely to have enough strength to attack 19th Division's line with overwhelming force while at the same time maintaining any sort of coherent defence at Dejeuner - and if they do, then any offensive plans go straight to the dustbin either way. I'd say that we are not fighting for the sake of fighting, we are making use of our best chance at gaining local superiority, which minimizes our losses and maximizes theirs, and are attempting to make efficient use of terrain by relying on the distance they have to travel to reach our right wing instead of committing units that would not do any shooting for turns upon turns. I agree with Steinrokkan's line of argument in the post above and would strongly prefer the strike south over the strike west. That said, since we seem to be going in circles a bit, I will 100% cheerfully roleplay a sour Zu Befehl, Ew. Exzellenz and execute the orders that end up being put into writing by Corps command to the best of my ability, no matter what they are. aphid_licker fucked around with this message at 18:21 on Feb 11, 2017 |
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Feb 11, 2017 18:18
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steinrokkan posted:I would argue to the contrary - trying to fight to reach a location with as little fighting as possible is going to entrap us, especially when it makes our lines longer, and gives the enemy displaced by our attacks a defended place to retreat, reform and pick a point to break our overextended positions. The French will also certainly receive reinforcements, just as we are liable to. They're going to have that anyway, unless you assume that they won't retreat onto Dejeuner Ridge should we drive them from Roadblock Heights. Furthermore, your plan would require us to clear Tigre Bois, which will take time and manpower that can't be used to advance on our actual objective. Additionally, we have no way of knowing how many troops the French have in Tigre Bois without either sweeping the entire forest, provoking every unit hidden there into firing and thus revealing our position, or accounting for the entirety of the French forces based on TOE of their observed largest formation elsewhere. I would much rather render that position irrelevant by not attacking it in the first place.
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Feb 11, 2017 23:54
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It is irrelevant in a vacuum, where we assume that the French are just going to stand there and do nothing. In any scenario where the crux of the game moves to fighting over Croissant (which would be a natural point of interest for both sides), it is FAR more relevant than Breakfast, and moving troops away from it would mean weakening our one must-have strategic position on the map, the capturing and maintaining of which is absolutely non-negotiable. Also the French being pushed away from Roadblock won't find an easy spot from which to retaliate, if they move to the west, they will end up as part of a pocket surrounded by our entire corps, and consequently reduced; moving to the east will separate the french force into two parts, and allow us to destroy them in detail. Retreating South to the bottom of the map would just delay their inevitable decision of pivoting to one of the sides on the west-east axis. Meanwhile attacking at Breakfast creates a long German line facing a continuous French sector in which all French forces can move freely and without much of a threat. In the worst case scenario of near all French troops sitting at Roadblock and dodging us to the east, we still win compared to attacking at Breakfast, because we end up with a stronger position at Croissant, possession of Breakfast, a much larger territorial gain in general, AND hopefully a bunch of dead Frenchies. For these reasons I maintain that Roadblock is important both for succeeding in our objectives, and managing the enemy force. As for Tiger Woods, I concede that it is an issue, but based on what I understand about rules, -woods are only useful for troops stationed at the very edge of them - if they for some reason end up with plenty of troops placed inside of the woods, it would be great for us, as they would have to move them forward to the edge of the forest to make them eligible for attacks, which would negate all their defensive bonuses, and also probably force them to actually charge out of the forest into the open. -we can determine if they have men there based on whether we see troops elsewhere. a brigade stationed in the woods can be countered with a similar force of our own skirting the woods and waiting for the French to make a move, and hopefully, if rules work as intended, the standoff would end up with an advantage to our side, as we won't be under pressure to break out -therefore I consider it to be a manageable obstacle steinrokkan fucked around with this message at 00:36 on Feb 12, 2017 |
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Feb 12, 2017 00:28
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An aeroplane flies over Corps HQ; the observer throws 1,000 leaflets over the side, and the plane vanishes in a puff of garlic. A French-speaking ADC tells you that the leaflets were printed on the orders of a "General de Corps Mon Pere". (I will carry messages between threads on the same terms as last time; they must be strictly silly in intent, and they must be specifically approved by the Corps Commander.)
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Feb 12, 2017 00:40
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aphid_licker posted:That said, since we seem to be going in circles a bit, I will 100% cheerfully roleplay a sour Zu Befehl, Ew. Exzellenz and execute the orders that end up being put into writing by Corps command to the best of my ability, no matter what they are.
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Feb 12, 2017 01:10
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I have started to pen a reply. How's that sound to you guys this is importantquote:Hello? Yes, hello? Is this the French field telephone? How splendid! Would you kindly get me the corps commander? Yes? (again: not for sending just yet, this is an early draft)
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Feb 12, 2017 01:21
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Trin, a question of vital importance: in the event that we secure the entirety of the railroad between Croissants and the northern map edge, would it be possible for our hypothetical reinforcements (both the army-level reserve that we can request in the battle and the ones that show up to win the game if we let Corps Command know we've taken Quatrepouts) to use the railroad and arrive in Croissants rather than having to march in from a map edge? And if the answer is "no", would it change if we could ensure there was no enemy artillery in firing range of that stretch of railroad? Or no enemy artillery and no enemy MGs? Or just no enemy forces in general? EDIT: I think we should tell the French that it was thoughtful of them to put pickelhaubes on their wives before sharing their candid photographs, but when compared to the stories our grandfathers told us about their grandmothers it's clear that the quality of French women has steeply declined, and we should hope for a commensurate decrease in their hourly rates. The Sandman fucked around with this message at 01:33 on Feb 12, 2017 |
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Feb 12, 2017 01:22
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The railway has no in-game mechanical use. Trains would not have been run anywhere remotely close to where there might possibly perhaps maybe be fighting.
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Feb 12, 2017 01:40
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HEY GAIL posted:all the scenarios i can think of end up in the same place: the 77th attacking french positions uphill. Ve haff set aside a bucket of Iron Crosses for the glorious dead and selected survivors *rattles bucket* e: in terms of a reply to the other thread just send a pic of the French football jersey e: sad, low-energy effort  Bad OPSEC ofc if you think that there is any chance whatsoever that they don't realize that that is our objective. e: 
aphid_licker fucked around with this message at 14:46 on Feb 12, 2017 |
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Feb 12, 2017 13:20
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When we deploy, can deployment orders contain some sort of sequence of commands, like Germans had drilled for IRL? Like instead of just saying deploy in march order, move along the road, make an order like "deploy, follow road, at this crossroad re-deploy into battle formation, then charge in this direction, unless you see enemy elsewhere"? (If yes, I understand that changing these drilled orders would require communication between brigades and divisional HQs, so that's not an issue)
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Feb 12, 2017 13:42
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A lot of contradictory posts, what corps and brigade( if any) will my Jägers attach to? I'd like to get my orders written out.
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Feb 12, 2017 17:33
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We banged something out in the chatroom. Tev should be writing the corps orders, part of those is assigning the Jägers to a division. Then I and Steinrokkan write division orders, telling you and the brigades where to go. The Jägers are handled like a minibrigade as I understand, you are on the same org level as a brigadier.
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Feb 12, 2017 18:02
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All right, meine Herren! Here is the current deployment plan: We expect the enemy can come from the south in force and attempt an attack on OBJG (Gooneville). Therefore, the Corps shall first focus on securing that vital position and establishing a line around it in order to regroup and present a cohesive force before our further moves south. Whether or not we will follow Case Scrambled Eggs or Case Clemency is to be seen. The 19th Division will secure St. Croissant in cooperation with 43rd Division and then ensure the safety of the eastern prong of our advance. Specific width of the deployment is at division commander's discretion. The 43rd Division will secure St. Croissant in cooperation with 19th Division and then take positions in Gooneville Woods and towards the Anschluss Knob road. Specific size of the deployment is at division commander's discretion. Both Division Commanders should safeguard our flanks by deploying cavalry in scouting role. I stress the importance of this. At least part of the artillery should be deployed on Pasteur Ridge to aid in potential operations against Gooneville. quote:III Corps - Generalleutnant Tevery Best The spotter plane will be sent to recon just west of WC Farm at 0800, exact deployment will be posted later. Tevery Best fucked around with this message at 22:19 on Feb 12, 2017 |
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Feb 12, 2017 20:31
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e: nvm, it is me, I'm the idiot
aphid_licker fucked around with this message at 21:08 on Feb 12, 2017 |
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Feb 12, 2017 20:41
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