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No deal. We really can't pull this off without a tanker...
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Apr 17, 2020 11:29
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| # ¿ May 16, 2024 13:46 |
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power crystals posted:IIRC the USAF did some tests and found out the helicopters are unexpectedly effective vs jets due to their relative agility, and on top of that more modern helicopters' fire control systems were able to plot "jet will be here" and the gunner just has to fire a half-second burst at the right time to cause serious damage. I think the recommendation was to just avoid trying to go for short range kills on helicopters if you can because the odds are very much not in your favor. Hell just try doing it in DCS vs. an AI helicopter and you're probably in for a rude surprise. If you do it low and level enough it might even just decide to throw an ATGM at you instead which is extra funny. Oh boy, we're talking about J-CATCH! I wrote a thing about this a while back folks might be interested in. J-CATCH (Joint Countering Attack Helicopter) was 1978-1979 experiment run by the U.S. military to develop a counter to the Hind attack helicopters the Soviets were deploying in growing numbers. It took part in four phases. Phase 1: Simulator tests with airplane and helicopter pilots from the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force. The tests began in May 1978 at the Langley NASA Differential Maneuvering Simulator Phase 2: At Fort Rucker, Alabama, the home of Army Aviation, helicopters squared off against each other. The Blue Force of three U.S. Army AH-1S Cobras and two OH-58A Kiowas faced a Red Force of two CH-3Es and four UH-1N Hueys from the Air Force's 20th Special Operations Squadron. The big CH-3Es had been used as "Jolly Green" rescue helicopters in the Vietnam War; and their size and performance made them a suitable "Hind" emulator. To add further verisimilitude, the Air Force crews tried to get into the heads of their Soviet counterparts; Paul Kennard posted:The crews were given access to the latest classified information on the Hind’s capabilities and TTPs (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) and practiced flying the “Jolly” as a Hind before commencing Phase 2. Additionally, the “Mini-TAT” sighting/gun camera system from a Canadian UH-1 was installed to offer a reasonable facsimile of a turreted gun facility and to provide post flight analysis in the form of “gun tape." The spirit of the USAF Aggressor squadrons was adopted; the aircraft were repainted, red scarfs were created out of cleaning rags and the crews started painting their helmets to help “get inside the mind” of their Soviet equivalents The big helicopters proved to be surprisingly dangerous opponents. Every engagement was meticulously recorded with onboard gun cameras and poured over after a day's mission. After several days of flying (and occasionally losing). The Army pilots quickly realized that surprise, teamwork, and agility were their greatest assets in a fight against "Hinds." Phase III: In this two-week phase, the helicopters of Red Team faced the best the Air Force had to offer: F-4E Phantom II fighter-bombers, F-15A Eagle air superiority fighters, and A-10A Thunderbolt II and A-7 Corsair II attack aircraft. The helicopters did remarkably well. Phase Three is where the fighters came in. The Air Force chose F-4, A-7, A-10, and F-15 fighter aircraft to counter whatever the Army could muster in the exercise. The F-4 and F-15 were front line fighters with anti-air roles while the A-7 and A-10 had air-to-ground missions. For two weeks the fast-movers dueled the helicopters ... and lost. Badly. At one point" the helicopters racked up a 5-to-1 kill ratio in their favor! It quickly became clear that a slow-moving helicopter at treetop level wasn't easy meat for a jet. Quite the opposite! Army aviator Davis Tindall Jr., summarized the findings of J-CATCH's third phase (pages 21-23) several years after the fact Davis Tindall Jr. posted:The J-CATCH testing provided the most interesting insights concerning the capability of fighter aircraft to engage the attack helicopter. The Air Force aircrews found the helicopter to be extremely difficult to hit. They found out that the helicopter was virtually impossible to track. The best technique to achieve a kill was a slashing attack, a quick surprise attack. They discovered the helicopter was not a slow, vulnerable target. It could be a dangerous foe. The air crews' after-action reports found the helicopter to be as dangerous as a ground gun emplacement. The lackluster kill figures bore this out (aircraft kill ratio : helicopter kill ratio):
Tindall notes that the AIM-9L air-to-air missile fired at a 2500 meters range was the most effective weapon. The best solution for tactical fighters is a standoff/look down acquisition [using a radar that could pick the helicopter out from the ground clutter] and use of shoot down weapons such as the AIM-9 missile. However, even cutting-edge fighters would pay a heavy price trying to take down comparatively cheap attack helicopters. As Tindall says: The best exchange ratio of 1.7 to 1 achieved with today's weapons and tactics is not encouraging in light of air-to-air missile technology. How were helicopters racking up such an impressive kill count? Tindall explains what the Air Force helicopter crews did: Davis Tindall Jr. posted:The best tactic for the helicopter crews was to terrain mask, making acquisition difficult for the fixed wing pilots. The helicopters would work as a team of two or more aircraft to provide mutual support between each other and attempt to make an unobserved shot. In some cases, Air Force pilots weren't aware they'd been seen, much the less "shot down," until the post-mission debriefing, when they saw their fighters in the gun cameras of the helicopters. Once spotted, the helicopters were also hard to draw a bead on. Indeed, since the introduction of the helicopter, this had been a problem. Paul Kennard writes about a Luftwaffe experiment in 1944 that got similar results. Paul Kennard posted:[The trial] pitched a Me109 and FW190 against a Flettner 282 Kolibri (“Hummingbird”). Both fighters were equipped with gun cameras and told to spend 20 minutes trying to shoot down the helicopter. To the astonishment of many, not a single hit was recorded by either fighter. The fighter pilots encountered extreme difficulty in detecting a well-camouflaged slow-moving helicopter operating at low level. With no radar to guide them, the fleeting “spots” could not be turned into attacks due to the speed differential and the manoeuvrability of the helicopter One of the most worrying realizations was that J-CATCH hadn't even simulated weapons that might have tipped the odds further in the helicopters favor: missiles. Davis Tindall Jr. posted:[T]he opposing helicopters were not carrying air-to-air missiles such as the SA-7 or SA-9 in the conduct of the test. These missiles would have a range of 5600 meters and 7000 meters respectively. This additional weapon system would give the helicopters a tremendous advantage. If the helicopters crews acquired the fixed wing aircraft first, they could destroy the high performance aircraft well beyond the recommended engagement ranges of the fixed wing weapon systems. The possibility of the AT-6 Spiral antitank missile being fired at the fixed wing aircraft was not tested. The range of this missile is 5,000 meters and it will travel the distance in 11 seconds. An antitank weapon system with very high speed, such as the AT-6, provides an additional advantage to the helicopter. Phase IV of J-CATCH did end on a brighter note, one that suggested other attack helicopters might be the best counter to attack helicopters. Davis Tindall Jr. posted:In phase IV of the J-CATCH test the tactical fixed wing aircraft worked jointly with Army attack helicopter teams [AH-1 Cobras and OH-58 Kiowa scouts]. This effort was similar to a joint air-to-air attack team operation or what might be depicted. In a deep attack scenario for an attack helicopter battalion. This phase demonstrated that simultaneous operations by attack helicopters and tactical aircraft increased force effectiveness against enemy helicopters.
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Apr 28, 2020 14:04
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TheDemon posted:Dambusters Agreed. Dambusters is the best fit for the forces we have. We're great at wrecking old Soviet fighters and blowing up WarPac SAMs.
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Apr 28, 2020 14:08
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power crystals posted:Speaking of which, that's a great writeup, Bac. Though I do wonder how effective Sidewinders would actually be when the helicopters get to use flares given the helicopters' presumably minimal IR signature, but I suspect we're never going to know that one unless one of these fights actually happens and I'm fine with that not being the case. That's an interesting question! The Sidewinders used in the Gulf War had some issues trying to get a lock when helicopters were flying over hot desert sand. As far as I know, none of the Iraqi helos shot down in 1991 tried to use flares. One Strike Eagle crew dropped a 2000-pound laser-guided bomb on an Iraqi helicopter after they had a hard time getting a radar lock on the hovering helicopter (some accounts also say they couldn't get a Sidewinder lock). An A-10A shot down an Mi-8 Hip with his cannon after the pilot worried he couldn't get a good Sidewinder lock. Captain Robert Swain posted:“Things were happening fast; the helicopter moving quickly across my canopy, the altimeter unwinding and approaching 8,000 feet, and the potential threat all distracting me as I settled the gun cross out in front of the target. ... What about the AIM-9? No, the desert sand is probably hotter than the target-it’s a good gun shot." There was also an (apparently unofficial) guns kill on by another A-10A against another Mi-8. This pilot also had some issues getting a good tone from his Sidewinders. Captain Todd Sheehy posted:"I then decided that, since I was overhead the target, I would take a shot. I armed my gun, but also un-caged my AIM-9 heat seeking missile. I was fairly steep (65-70 degrees), and tried to lock up the helicopter twice, but the missile kept breaking lock because of the size of the target, distance away, and the surrounding terrain. Prior to pulling off the target I decided to also shoot the gun and put about 75 rounds out, but thought I had missed. I then extended away from the target and tried a second pass. I noticed that the helicopter was flying erratically, but I still managed to miss to the left with my first burst of 100 rounds, retook aim, and fired another 100 rounds and missed right. Knowing I was pressing the minimum altitude for the kill box, I put another 100 rounds down, and the helicopter jinked right into the last burst; the helicopter looked like it had been hit by a bomb.” Things might be a bit different now with IIR-guided Sidewinders and seekers with flare-rejection, but who knows?
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Apr 28, 2020 14:59
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The Hired Gooniverse draws one step closer to becoming reality. US says Russia sent jets to Libya 'mercenaries'
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May 27, 2020 01:14
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