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Pacho posted:Roverhaus bracing a Rad Storm in the North American Exclusion Area #3, while on an emergency re-supply mission to a Reclamation Project team 
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Oct 27, 2020 04:39
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| # ¿ May 16, 2024 17:40 |
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Uh oh!
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Dec 17, 2020 05:07
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The following report was prepared by two specialists in the Far East Asian Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Extracts have been published below. The Chinese Political Situation Recent developments in the People's Republic of China have led to two conclusions. First: The "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" still retains a grip in the countryside and across multiple organs of state in the countryside, in provincial centers, and in work units in the cities. Second: the top leadership of the People's Republic is unstable, and composed of several ruling factions. It would be facile to assume that there are only two factions in Chinese politics today - as Western European news media used to speak of 'liberal' and 'conservative' factions and with inconsistent applications of both those terms. Chinese media, in publications such as the People's Daily, or the People's Liberation Army Daily tend to flatten out terms into either a kind of 'leftist' and 'rightist' understanding, and these terms were inconsistently applied, given the factional disputes between parties. It is best to understand the interplay of different factions, of the role of the People's Liberation Army, and the struggles for position between different leadership centers in the years since the death of Mao Zedong. Nominally, Hua Guofeng is chairman of the Communist Party of China and Wang Dongxing as chair of the Central Military Commission, but power is not embodied in these titles alone. There are other factions within ministries at the Premier level and below. Other figures, such as Deng Xiaoping or Chen Yun, may be making moves against him. Fundamentalists This category, broadly defined, includes some of the more extreme elements of the Cultural Revolution, believing that the challenges that China faces today can be overcome by sheer willpower and ideological purity. This group is potentially, but not necessarily, anti-urban, anti-bureaucratic, and 'anti-foreign' - read, anti-Soviet or anti-Japanese in recent years. In the material conditions that had produced them, they may superficially resemble anti-foreign elements in the feudal and semi-colonial period of Chinese history. They are the inheritors of Sun Yat-sen's statement of 'self-reliance' 自力更生, of the anti-missionary movement of the 1860s, the Boxer Rebellion of the 1890s, and again in the early stages Cultural Revolution of the 1960s. Many of the younger leaders of this group still continue to publish articles and agitate in their flavor of politics - this the ideologue Qi Benyu, and Wang Li, who has agitated for 'continuous revolution' and the 'proletarianization' of the People's Liberation Army. Nie Yuanzi, a former student leader in Beijing, still holds considerable informal power in the 'dual-track' of institutions that have been established by former rebel militia. Conservatives The second faction in Chinese politics still wishes to engage in the development of the productive forces - through industrialization and the import of advanced technology - but still maintaining the adapations of socialist governance to the agricultural-peasant model of Chinese life. In this way, it is a parallel to previous reforms of the "Chinese Learning as Substance, Western Learning for Application" 中體西用 school. They may wish to maintain the predominant position of the party in life. They wish to continue the pre-split course of foreign affairs and possibly a restoration of relations with the Soviet Union. These leaders may include the party Vice Chariman Chen Yun, the former secretary general of the Central Military Commission Yang Shangkun, and, a Beijing official and current Vice Premier Li Peng. Modernizers The third and likely smallest group, may yet be more tolerant of reforms, accepting foreign influences, and engaging contact with the rest of the outside world. Some may accept the need for a state bureaucracy, others may have advocated for a further devolution of power and establishment of local communes and granting more power to work units. Some have trumpeted the recent example of Xiaogang as a template for the rest of China, superseding the example of the place once held by Dazhai agricultural reforms, however that example has not been widely implemented. Potential leaders here may include Hu Yaobang, Secretary General of the CCP, and Zhao Ziyang, a Vice Chairman of the Party. Coalition Politics Incredibly, one of the most intriguing developments in Chinese politics is a tentative coalition developing between the Fundamentalists and the Modernizers. Hu Yaobang had been photographed making multiple visits to Red Guard factories and institutions, and recent public statements had indicated a possibility of the support of 'transfer of local control' and 'village and commune enterprises' as recurring phrases. This may potentially indicate a reform of enterprises and the agricultural system to the self-management of the Yugoslav or the Hungarian system. While some provinces, such as Anhui and Hunan, have experimented with these reforms, they cannot be said to have been implemented on a national scale. Conclusions While China and the Soviet Union were co-belligerents in the GRW, and contacts continue to exist in terms of work with technical expertise, in communicating the broad strokes of military strategy, and in more frequent civilian exchanges, elite politics remain a black box. Initiatives are proposed at the ministerial level or below, often presented as attempts at cooperation and potentially motivated by internal jockeying. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is at times either a flatterer, saying our diplomats and visiting representatives are 'old friends of China', or that we should take more responsibility or taking the initiative. Sources at a higher level are limited. The future trajectory of the CCP cannot be extrapolated in a single track. Any analysis of China is related to the art of studying leadership photographs, poring over public statements, and deciphering any changes in slogans or stated priorities in Five-Year Plans. Nevertheless, it can be said with certainty that the leadership of the People's Republic of China is in flux, and that the convulsions of the Cultural Revolution have not played themselves out. Kangxi fucked around with this message at 13:16 on Sep 16, 2021 |
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Sep 16, 2021 13:13
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This document is prepared for the Office of the Vice-Minister of International Affairs of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (通商産業省) of the Government of Japan, published March 1985. Over the past nine months, we have observed, through local reportage and state media sources, a new and dramatic shift in Chinese domestic production policy. Although no official announcements have been made at the highest level, we can assume a broader shift towards investment in energy production, biotechnology, automation, and the aerospace sector. Documents intended for internal circulation that have been obtained by both the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, corroborated with reporting based out of Taiwan, indicate a massive shift in policy directions and intentions, with the intent of placing China as a major player in science and technology over the coming decade. While the presence of both complex bureaucratic procedures coexists with (sometimes arbitrary) political intervention by top leadership, organizations face pressures both from competing organizations and political leadership. However, at times signals have been directed from top leadership, and lower levels of the bureaucracy demonstrate responsiveness before the details are fleshed out. This analyst would venture so far as to say that we may be seeing a 'rationalization' of the bureaucratic process, at attempt to bring order out of and centralize what may have been previous competing fiefdoms and dominions. [...] Our understanding of the economy was first passed down from economists of the 19th century - the concept of diminishing returns, or in Marxist terminology, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall in a capitalist economy. THe world of the 19th century was that of bulk production - iron, grains, dyes, ores, coal. Many sectors of the economy are still devoted in turns to bulk processing and so the paradigm of diminishing returns - where an expanding farm is forced to use less fertile land, or hiring more workers each increases output by less and less in a fixed process of inputs. Optimization is possible through streamlining, through the processes of scientific management, through 'efficiency'. But in the previous decades, and in particular with developments in high technology, economies move from the processes of resources through labor and capital to the integration of new technologies - in effect, with these technologies, we see increasing returns. In high technology, we have observed, and continue to observe, the prospect of increasing returns - of dealing with market instability, or of a sufficiently advanced agent or organization "lock in" a market - through dominating an industry, or controlling a sector in outer space development. Modern technology incorporates high up-front costs, which heavy investment in research and development preceding any further results, although unit costs fall as sales increase. Additionally, there are "network effects" - the more an organization or a country's industrial sector gains prevalence, the more likely it will become a standard or a hegemony - and even so, a hegemon may be overthrown should it fail to adapt to the next convulsion - the discovery of extraterrestrial life, for one. [...] In public appearances, top officials from the PRC have stressed the benefits of "indigenous innovation", but also to "catch up" in terms of not only production targets but also in scientific outputs. Recent visits by officials from the State Planning Commission, the State Commission for Science and Technology as well as the Chinese Academy of Sciences to various research parks, medical centers, and universities in the Soviet Union and Japan, only underscore a new interest in industrialization and scientific research. [...] Industrial policy has become like a multinational casino, where the player must choose the game as well as play them well. We imagine ourselves at MIIT, alongside Gosplan, and the expanded State Planning Commission of the People's Republic of China milling about in a great game. Some play at rocketry, others electronic communications, others multimedia. There are many tables. Pick one, says the croupier. How much to play? A trillion yen. What are the rules? We'll find out as the game goes along. What are the odds of success or penury? We can't say. Industrial policy, at this level, is not a game for the timid. Kangxi fucked around with this message at 00:23 on Jun 23, 2022 |
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Jun 23, 2022 00:18
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The following is a selection from a diplomatic cable published by the embassy of the USSR based in Beijing: After leadership reshuffle and conclusion of the recent Party Rectification Campaign, the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party may tentatively be summarized as follows: General Secretary of the Communist Party of China - Hu Yaobang Member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo - Chen Yun Member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo - Ye Jianying Member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo - Zhao Ziyang Member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo - Nie Rongzhen Member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo - Wan Li Member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo - Ye Jianying Member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo - Li Xiannian Other Members of the Politburo (in alphabetical order, list incomplete): Chen Muhua, Deng Xiaoping, Li Desheng, Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Xu Xiangqian, Wu Xueqian, Xi Zhongxun, Yang Shangkun, Yao Yilin President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences - Qian Xuesen Director of the State Science and Technology Commission - Song Jian Minister of Foreign Affairs - Qian Qichen Head of the People's Bank of China - Chen Muhua Head of the State Planning Commission - Yu Qiuli General Secretary of the Central Military Commission - Yang Shangkun Vice-Chairs of the Central Military Commission - Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang The more experienced observer of Chinese high politics will of course note the total absence of any figure even remotely near the top leadership of the "Red Guard" faction; one can safely assume that they have all been sidelined from the top levers of power in the past few months. The old system of Red Guards running parallel institutions and parallel ministries across the countryside seems to have been shuttered in the "Restore Order from Chaos" campaign of late 1985; and the names of Red Guard institutions have been quietly removed from maps and buildings. What remains is a coalition of reformers and party old-guard, of old marshals and younger reformers; and both appear united in their belief that the People's Republic of China must continue to modernize and take a more proactive role in global affairs. The awarding of the Administrative Headquarters arcology to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, in particular, may have served as an impetus for more immediate reforms and a more proactive foreign policy. A self-pitying nationalism may seek to blame Chinese issues on the outside world; a more strident and assertive nationalism implies that it may seek to achieve its own foreign policy goals. Kangxi fucked around with this message at 00:25 on Aug 6, 2022 |
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Aug 5, 2022 23:33
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From the bottom of page 11 of a Honolulu newspaper: Chinese Leadership Shakeup Continues BEIJING, People's Republic of China (Asahi Shimbun) - Marshal Ye Jianying, formerly a member of the standing committee of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, has announced his retirement from political life, citing advanced illness and a wish to spend time with his family. His replacement will be Deng Xiaoping, already a member of the Politburo. Deng, 82, former Minister of Finance, and member of the Central Military Commission, is a veteran of multiple military campaigns in both the Chinese Civil War and later campaigns. An expert at the University of Hawaii-Hilo cited him as the "consummate survivor", having survived waves of purges and been publicly rehabilitated twice. It is believed that Deng may be a compromise candidate between reformers, who value his ideological pragmatism; and party old-guard, who approve of his ties to the People's Liberation Army. It is uncertain how long the current balance of power will last in the Politburo, as the majority of the members in its standing committee, like Deng, are of advanced age.
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Aug 6, 2022 16:14
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local sichuanese man, 82, has one weird trick to survive purges, party rectification campaigns, and more what THEY don't want you to know
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Aug 7, 2022 03:53
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| # ¿ May 16, 2024 17:40 |
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Excellent post, Redeye
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Sep 12, 2023 02:26
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