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Hyrax Attack! posted:Were there any plans to use US carriers in the European theatre aside from convoy/submarine hunting? Or were they not needed because of the proximity of UK bases to the continent? Absolutely there were. The US Navy started World War 2 with half its carrier fleet in the Atlantic and regardless of the Pacific situation kept one fleet carrier in the Atlantic until 1944. Not just carriers too. The US Navy kept 2+ battleships in the Atlantic until 1944 for many of the same reasons. The reasons for are a litany of unrealized potentials: 1. First and foremost is to hunt German fleet units. This really was a concern right up until 1944 2. Invasion of the Azores islands 3. Operation Jupiter: Invasion of Norway 4. Operation Sledgehammer: Invasion of the Brest peninsula 5. Invasion of Vichy French Caribbean islands And the realized potentials: 1. Replace Royal Navy Home Fleet units to allow Britain to reinforce the Mediterranean or Indian Ocean (instead of USN units) 2. Deploy land-based air power across the Atlantic to crisis points faster than shipping planes by freighter 3. Operation Torch: Invasion of French North Africa
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Feb 10, 2022 00:50
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PittTheElder posted:What was the bathroom plan for tanks in an NBC environment? Can you even still empty yourself into a shell casing and then toss it out somehow? Just as you indicate, Robert Dick in his memoir, Cutthroats: The Adventures of a Sherman Tank Driver in the Pacific, has a great passage recollecting a moment on Okinawa when a crewman of his tank needed a casing to relieve himself. Their tank was buttoned up behind the line waiting to be called forward. Because they hadn’t gone into action yet, they were bereft of spent casings when his crewmate couldn’t wait anymore. To answer the need, the gunner cranked the turret off to the side and loosed a round. The fresh, hot casing was then used as the necessary and chucked out the disposal port. Regarding NBC conditions, I imagine it simplifies the NBC design to have tank rounds that fully combust the casing and thus require no complicated NBC-proof disposal port. However, it does make me all the more curious how tank crews relieve themselves in NBC environments. My personal design submission to the DoD has a portion of tank ammunition stowage devoted to special toilet rounds. The round itself is used as toilet, then loaded into the gun, and fired towards the enemy. This system piggybacks on the NBC-proof gun system to extricate sewage from the tank in the most offensive manner possible with maximum effect upon enemy morale. My proprietary toilet shell can also be used to shoot locally sourced bee hives, acid, etc. at the enemy.
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Feb 27, 2022 04:07
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The following 1939 quote from Rear Admiral Rowcliff responding to the General Board solicitation for comments on the cruiser building program provides some candid comments from the cruiser perspective of the impact that a 30kt battleship could have upon the necessary characteristics for the battle fleet.“Rear Admiral G. J. Rowcliff, Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force, to Chairman, General Board, Subject: Cruisers in General, 26 October 1939” posted:
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Mar 24, 2022 00:45
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Darcy C. Coyle, Censored Mail, (Francestown, NH: Marshall Jones, 1989), 57. posted:U.S.S. Ranger (At Sea)
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Apr 30, 2022 02:11
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Vahakyla posted:How did World War 2 era fleet carriers do water? Where did drinking water come from and how was it stored? How about showers? Prewar US carriers had tanks for approximately 80,000 gallons of potable water (exclusive of boiler feed water and reserves) and daily desalination capacity of approximately 80,000 gallons. The Essex class during WW2 had tanks for approximately 106,000 gallons of potable water (exclusive of boiler feed water and reserves) and daily desalination capacity of approximately 166,000 gallons. These equate to roughly 40 gallons per person of daily desalination capacity. However, as Cessna points out, this number depends on the good operation of the desalination system, and as MikeCrotch points out it also depends on any requirement of the system to backfill boiler feed and reserves. Circumstances can affect the capacity of the system and require water rationing. A common major impact to the system was the accumulation of many personnel above and beyond the design limits of the vessel. This most often occurred due to the addition of anti-aircraft guns and sensors to vessels. Urcinius fucked around with this message at 21:15 on Aug 1, 2022 |
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Aug 1, 2022 17:51
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Thanks for the question Vahakyla. It inspired me to look more closely at the characteristic cards for the WW2 US fleet carrier classes regarding supplies. This time I noticed that of all the classes, Ranger had significantly more fresh food stowage capacity relative to its personnel complement than any other US fleet carrier. It had double the stowage over the Enterprise and Essex classes. The most stark example being eggs. Enterprise had egg stowage for 26 days while Ranger had stowage for 80! This goes some way to explain why Ranger had a reputation for being a particularly well fed ship. Long had I assumed this reputation was based primarily on Ranger having better access to the continental United States than any other fleet carrier. However, this assumption was flawed if critically analyzed because prior to 1944 the vast majority of Ranger’s time was spent at sea, stationed in Bermuda, stationed in Placentia Bay, or on loan to the Home Fleet in Scapa Flow or Iceland. It’s only in 1945 that Ranger is stationed regularly at San Francisco or San Diego. For example, Ranger was capable of making a 36 day sortie to Africa with fresh food to spare whereas Enterprise would have been had to rely on dry provisions 3/4ths of the way home. It’s the combination of significantly greater capacity and greater relative access to the continental US that created the opportunity for Ranger to achieve a food reputation. To hazard a guess why Ranger had significantly greater fresh food stowage, I will postulate that the root cause of Ranger’s immense fresh food stowage was due to it being the first large US Navy vessel designed to have a cafeteria mess. It had what might have been considered excessive fresh food stowage because the US Navy did not yet have experience designing the mess stowage for a cafeteria system.
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Aug 1, 2022 21:12
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To illustrate the differences in fresh food stowage between US carrier classes more fully with combat operations: Ranger departed Norfolk on 3 October 1942 for Operation TORCH and returned to Norfolk on 24 November 1942. If Ranger had been fully provisioned prior to departure, it would have run out of fresh food just a few days short of returning to Norfolk when imminent arrival home would smooth over the lack of fresh food upon morale. In contrast, Enterprise departed Pearl Harbor on 15 July 1942 for Operation WATCHTOWER. By 10 August 1942 off Guadalcanal, Enterprise would have run out of any fresh food it had brought from Pearl Harbor. It was reliant on the supply situation in the South Pacific for any fresh food in the midst of Operation WATCHTOWER. This comparison does not account for the pitstops both took at advance bases on their way to the landings. Ranger stopped over in Bermuda and Enterprise stopped over at Tongatapu. However, I have no record of any significant provisioning of fresh food received at these advance bases. On the other side of the ledger, I don't have any records either of if they shared out any of their stores to the other vessels of their respective task forces. For the purposes of this comparison, I consider the two cancel each other out. Also, this comparison does not account for the option to ration fresh food, but rationing only mitigates and does not solve fresh food shortages. I may have used 1942 as an example, but the supply situation for fresh food was not fully solved at advance bases and underway replenishment until potentially 1945. Most vessels were incapable of supplying themselves for long upon reaching the front. Just shifting to an advance base at the front, the average fleet carrier could expend 1/3 of its fresh food. More than any other navy, the US Navy moved a mountain of logistics to the front, but even Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil is replete with statements that, although everyone was fed, the demand for fresh food exceeded supply in the Pacific.
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Aug 2, 2022 03:00
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Speak of the devil. Stumbled on these recommendations while reviewing action reports of Enterprise.USS Enterprise CV6, Action Report, Operations in Support of the Landings on Okinawa Phase II, 5-13 April 1945 posted:Part VI. Special Comments and Information, Battle Rations USS Enterprise CV6, Action Report, Operations in Support of the Landings on Okinawa Phase III, 3-16 May 1945 posted:Part VI. Special Comments and Information, C-4 Supply
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Aug 5, 2022 00:25
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1945 April 070925 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC (Nimitz Graybook) posted:I MAY BE CRAZY BUT I THINK THE JAPS HAVE QUIT THE WAR AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING.
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Apr 6, 2023 16:57
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The mention of the Navy assisting as a training opportunity reminded me of a bit from the Falklands War of fortuitous submarine sighting training.Marino Sciaroni. A Carrier At Risk: Argentine Aircraft Carrier and Anti-Submarine Operations Against the Royal Navy’s Attack Submarines During the 1982 South Atlantic War. Pg. 60-61 posted:The last hurdle that the aircraft carrier and its escorts would have to face would be to get past the threat posed by the superbly manned HMS Spartan, possibly the most dangerous of the steel sharks which was still stalking the fleet.
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Jun 23, 2023 00:06
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In the gifs, looks like Enterprise is in a developed turn and would thus be doing about 18kts around an 800yd circle.
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Jun 24, 2023 00:50
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The US Navy's monograph, Naval Aviation Combat Statistics—World War II (https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/research/histories/naval-aviation/aviation-monographs/nasc.pdf), not only has a lot of fascinating data and interpretations, but the data can even be reinterpreted - especially by comparing data across multiple tables. For fun, I tried to separate the "action sorties" of 1942 actions into the individual fleet carriers (CVs 2-8). The year 1942 is the only one in which this finite level of separation is easily possible as 1943 & beyond has a magnitude greater number of carriers (all types) and multi-carrier actions are the rule rather than the exception. Even then 1942 is inexact as I simply distributed actions sorties equally between all participating carriers in multi-carrier actions. Important details: - Definition of "Action Sortie" = "Number of planes taking off on a mission which eventuated in an attack on an enemy target or in aerial combat, or both. This basis of tabulation was the number of planes of one squadron taking off on the mission. If any of these planes had action, the entire squadron's planes on the mission were counted as action sorties, including abortive planes, planes which reached the target but did not attack, and planes which escorted or patrolled but did not engage in combat. Thus if 16 VF took off as escort, 2 returned early, 2 engaged in combat, and 4 strafed, all 16 were counted as action sorties. On the other hand, if 8 VF took off for escort, and none engaged in any sort of attack or combat, then none were counted as action sorties, even though they reached the target, and even though the escorted bombers attacked the target. Likewise, CAP planes missions, none of whose planes engaged in combat were not counted as action sorties." - Data is compiled from thousands of reports across the US Navy's direct participation in World War II. How reports were captured changed over the war. There are some errors from the data and general typographical errors in the monograph. I recommend engaging with the monograph's frontmatter on any concerns about the data. - In the case of multi-carrier actions, such as the Battle of Midway, I distributed action sorties between all participating carriers equally. Notably, I removed the Wasp from participation in the Battle of Eastern Solomons. The specificity of "Action Sortie" versus sortie dissuaded me from attempting to use war diaries and action reports to precisely identify individual carrier action sorties. - In the case of multi-day actions, such as the Battle of Coral Sea, I attempted to verify the number of Days by corroborating carrier war diaries. This resulted in shortening North Africa to 3 Days as the only action sorties on 11 November were by a few CVE strikes that mistakenly occurred after the ceasefire. - Quantity does not directly correlate to quality. The carriers (CVs 2-8) are ranked by quantity with no interpretation of quality. - Apologies for the table embedded as an image. 
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Jul 24, 2023 21:12
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Have a few more tables! - Apologies again for tables embedded as images Tons of Bombs Dropped and Enemy Aircraft Engaged & Destroyed for each Action  Tons of Bombs Dropped by each Carrier - Again, multi-carrier actions are distributed evenly between all participating carriers  Enemy Aircraft Destroyed by each Carrier - Again, multi-carrier actions are distributed evenly between all participating carriers  In the table in my prior post, average Action Sorties per carrier per day for both Raids and Battles matches one full effort of a carrier air group less reconnaissance & defensive patrols. As already pointed out by others, the average carrier battle did in fact usually involve just one major strike per carrier per day. Whichever side got the worst of the exchange usually retired. Ultimately unsurprising but good that the overall trend generally matches experience. However, Eastern Solomons is an odd Battle as the number of Actions Sorties per Carrier per Day at 89 far exceeds the average 59.9 - more than one full air group per day. The best I can figure looking at the data and rereading the battle, the US Navy had an unusually successful day with the carriers' CAP shooting down Japanese snoopers. This would inflate the total Action Sorties above the Action Sorties for just strikes, both own offensive strikes and defending against Japanese strikes. As there are only two Landings in 1942, I decided to compare them more directly. Technically, the choice of additional sources favors every carrier except Ranger. The CVE total sorties includes Non-Action Sorties for the entire operation and not just for the three days of action. The Enemy Aircraft Destroyed for the Guadalcanal Landing are from a 1943 US Navy wartime source that did not have access to Japanese records to verify claims against the true losses in Japanese planes. As Ranger was and still shows as such a strong outlier, I figured the variance was within acceptable bounds.  Of note is the difference in landing at the loci of opposing air power. The Torch Landing operation in Morocco landed at and near the airfields of the French Air Force and Navy. The majority of the French planes were destroyed in offensive air missions. Whereas, the Guadalcanal Landing operation landed away from the locus of Japanese airpower, Rabaul, but within Japanese attack range from Rabaul. Thus, the far greater number of Japanese planes engaged in the air. Otherwise, the two Landings are remarkably similar in stats for two very different operations. Easily noticeable is the one CV for Torch shouldering the vast majority of the offensive sorties and the CVEs shouldering the defensive sorties.
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Jul 25, 2023 16:48
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Cyrano4747 posted:You're good, pretty sure forums posts don't have to be 508 compliant.  I look forward to my posts being evidence in the ADA suit against SA for all this site’s fat stacks of  Probably should include a table putting 1942 in context of the total numbers across the US Navy’s direct participation. 
Urcinius fucked around with this message at 02:15 on Jul 26, 2023 |
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Jul 25, 2023 18:52
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Alright, finished breaking out all of Naval Aviation Combat Statistics—World War II (https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/research/histories/naval-aviation/aviation-monographs/nasc.pdf). Every year of direct participation of the US Navy in World War II has been distributed between all of the US Navy’s 30 fast carriers that participated in World War II. All the CVEs are still tabulated as a block. Again, it’s incredibly important to understand what an "Action Sortie" is to be able to understand what the data did and did not capture. The definition is specific to the Naval Aviation Combat Statistics dataset. Confusion will inhabit you should you engage with the table before comprehending what Naval Aviation Combat Statistics specifically excluded from its tabulation. Important details: - Definition of - Data is compiled from thousands of reports across the US Navy's direct participation in World War II. How reports were written changed over the war. There are some errors from the data as well as typographical errors in the monograph. I recommend engaging with the monograph's frontmatter on any concerns about the data. The monograph specifies the sources for all data and its own estimation of data variance. - In the case of multi-carrier actions, such as the Battle of Midway, I distributed Action Sorties between all participating carriers equally. Notably, I removed the Wasp from participation in the Battle of Eastern Solomons. The specificity of "Action Sortie" versus sortie dissuaded me from attempting to use war diaries and action reports to precisely identify individual carrier action sorties. - When multi-carrier actions involved both medium carriers (CVs) and small carriers (CVLs), I distributed the Action Sorties between the two types based on their proportion of the total for the whole month, as identified on Table 10 in Naval Aviation Combat Statistics. - No attempt was made to pro-rate the Action Sortie data of night carriers (CVN or CVLN). Night carriers received an equal share per their hull type (CV or CVL). - Quantity does not directly correlate to quality. The carriers are ranked by quantity with no added interpretation of quality. - Battle Stars were included in the table as a contemporary qualitative analysis of Actions. By adding in Battle Stars, an element of qualitative data was incorporated via the US Navy’s own choice of which actions merited separate Battle Stars. For example, the US Navy considered the Buin-Faisi-Tonolai Raid of 5 October 1942 as worthy of a separate Battle Star from the Guadalcanal Capture & Defense, August 1942 to February 1943. Even if that worthiness could be debated, this qualitative data is strictly contemporary US Navy.  Quantitative Titles Carrier of 1942 = Enterprise (CV-6), Yorktown-class Carrier of 1943 = Lexington (CV-16), Essex-class Carrier of 1944 = Bunker Hill (CV-17), Essex-class Carrier of 1945 = Yorktown (CV-10), Essex-class Carrier of WW2 = Essex (CV-9), Essex-class Participation Trophy = the entire Independence-class, for greater than average participation Personally, that nearly every carrier title went to an Essex-class carrier was no surprise to me which makes it poetic that Essex, itself, took the overall title. What did surprise me was Essex taking the overall title without ranking first in any individual year for any field. It just put in a close 2nd every year. Good on the United States for preserving two of the carriers-of-the-year plus Hornet which put up a very credible 4th overall. That Intrepid is 11th overall gives some small excuse for the integrity of the historic vessel being impinged by the housing on Intrepid’s flight deck for the space shuttle Enterprise. What did surprise me was for the Independence-class to on-average be more present in actions than any medium carrier. This they did despite on average more medium carriers being in commission than small carriers in every year. Just 22% of actions in 1944 had more small carriers than medium carriers. From the inception of the Fast Carrier Task Force, the Independence-class simply showed up more than anyone else despite suffering damage, losing one of their number, and requiring general overhaul too. Before we get too chummy with small carriers, I will still point out that the Independence-class suffered only one sunk and five instances of damage to the medium carrier’s 22 instances of damage over the same period. Medium carriers are obviously a larger and more desirable target. Generally speaking, equal distribution led to the most active participants reaping the largest share of distributed data. However, variability still resulted from the actions participated in. See for example how Lexington (CV-16) dropped more tons of bombs and destroyed more planes on fewer Action Sorties than Yorktown (CV-10) in 1943. This is why Lexington (CV-16) is carrier of the year for 1943 and not Yorktown (CV-10). My data table is available at this link: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1J_nXM6CGfqqMR3WEoShy31cDG8kcFs8C/edit?usp=sharing&ouid=104612421893671551563&rtpof=true&sd=true Urcinius fucked around with this message at 00:22 on Aug 7, 2023 |
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Aug 6, 2023 21:37
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Can I interest anyone in a game of guess the carrier? Below I’ve quoted a carrier’s War History written by its command staff over the course of World War 2. For this game, I’ve lightly edited out specific references. Some CV’s War History posted:It was around noon on February 13 that the Carrier X steamed past old Diamond Head at the southern tip of Oahu and slipped through the narrow channel guarding America’s first battleground of World War II. Even in those days, with the fight going our way, the arrival of a new fast carrier enroute to the fleet was a memorable and heartening occasion. To the men aboard, who for five months had sweated and strained toward the ultimate attainment of this end, it marked a final step in the long transition from construction to combat. Although the battle line was still thousands of miles to the west, the angry memory of December 7 and the industrious, warlike atmosphere of this vast Pacific naval base lent a grim seriousness to the traditional welcome at Ford Island.
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Aug 15, 2023 02:09
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Zorak of Michigan posted:Based purely on service dates, I'm guessing Boxer. A fine guess! But Boxer was still very much in the Atlantic during this period of the quoted war history.
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Aug 15, 2023 02:59
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OpenlyEvilJello posted:Looks like Shangri-La? Correct! For anyone curious, Shangri-La was proud of its 6,315 landings by 1 April 1945. The war history can be enjoyed on the National Archives catalog, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/77686527?objectPage=73 Shangri-La was replaced by Bon Homme Richard for April and May 1945 until Saratoga completed its repairs. Good job zeroing in quickly on the Essex-class!
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Aug 15, 2023 04:07
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Cessna posted:Was the general stupid? No, he'd inspected that barracks last week. This week it was A Co 1st Armored Assault Bn, last week it was K/3/5, the week before that it was some unit from Landing Support Bn. He knows it's the same barracks. And the general can testify that the unit or service is (capable of being) disciplined and tidy. I’ve posted before on the USS Ranger’s (CV-4) reputation for good food. In 1935, during appropriation hearings, the Navy shared ‘random’ menus from the Ranger to show how well it spends its Subsistence of Naval Personnel appropriations. I’ve reproduced the testified menus below for the thread’s review of how far $0.45 per man per day goes. Select Menus of 1935 February 25 posted:- Wednesday Breakfast = fresh fruit, assorted, cereal, fresh milk and sugar, pork & beans, catsup, bread, butter, and coffee
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Aug 29, 2023 18:31
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zoux posted:Do you have some of the other menus for comparison sake I wish! Sadly, the Navy didn't share any other 'random' menus at that hearing  I mostly spend my time in Records of Naval Operating Forces, Records of the Bureau of Construction & Repair, and the General Board. Might not have poked around the right L series files, but I'm skeptical that menus have been generally preserved. Here's hoping still!That reputation I spoke of is mostly documented by newspaper articles, memoirs, oral histories, and reflected records rather than comparative menus.
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Aug 29, 2023 19:01
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Myth of Hangar Equivalence I was reminded today to  Instead of holding this back until I craft more of an interpretative post for it that probably won't come, I’ll share with y’all a recent spreadsheet project as is. The short backstory is boy howdy do some people in the corners of the internet debate aircraft carrier measurements, particularly hangar measurements. I don’t think any of them will ever prove what they really want to prove, but I decided to run some numbers myself.Thought I might be able to even add something special by using the scan I have of a US Navy General Board study from 19 April 1939 showing the US Navy’s computation of the total effective aircraft operating area on each of its carriers that were in commission or building by that date. Indeed, I then fired up FreeCAD and took my own measurements of carriers with freely available scans of record plans. However, I quickly ran up against almost no carrier except US Navy carriers having record copy scans of their plans freely available online. The  Methodology: 1. US carriers had their dimensions as given by Norman Friedman, Royal Navy carriers had their dimensions as given by David Hobbs, and Japanese carriers had their dimensions as given by Mark Peattie. Any specific bias by these authors in inflating figures for their personal subject matter was hoped therefore to cancel out. a. Total Effective Area of a carrier was found by multiplying the extents as given by Friedman, Hobbs, or Peattie and then subtracting out elevators from the flight deck and subtracting out internal elevators from the hangar. b. Dividing a carrier’s Total Effective Area by its operating complement of aircraft gives the Total Effective Area per Plane. c. That basic efficiency number can then be compared to any other carrier to see which is more or less efficient than the other. This study compared every carrier against Langley because Langley’s effective area was entirely concentrated in its flight deck. 2. Aircraft operating complement is the largest total number of embarked & operated planes each carrier class achieved in its wartime career. Almost without exception, that number is from 1945 unless the full carrier class was sunk before then. Spares were specifically excluded as the study was meant to examine how efficiently each carrier class operated its total area rather than total potential stowage. a. The prewar Royal Navy carriers are included primarily to illustrate within the Royal Navy the difference between prewar and end-of-war operating practices. All the classes except Colossus and the armored carriers have limited air groups for their size due to the two factors of 1) striking below each plane fully into the hangar before landing the next and 2) using only the hangar to stow planes. b. None of Japan’s wartime construction were included for two reasons. First, information on such vessels are even spottier than the prewar carriers. For example, does anyone know what the width of each of Taiho’s hangars are? Second, aircraft production and pilot training were such an issue for Japan that after 1943 practically none of their carriers could be said to have operated with a full complement of planes. As this study very specifically does not use design figures, there’s no fair number to use. Even still direct comparisons between Japanese and other carriers is difficult because Japan’s operating practices never incorporated the deck park. 3. Frankly, maximizing the published numbers was intended to allow for the maximum total area any individual partisan could care to believe in. This is because a purpose of the study was to show that simply believing a particular carrier had more area does not necessarily translate into aircraft operating complement. Instead, aircraft operating complement being a known fix fact means identifying excess area tends to show as inefficiency. 4. I ran the numbers an extra two times comparing against the Yorktown because everyone wants to be Enterprise. I ran those numbers twice because I know some people don’t believe Enterprise truly operated 90 planes. Yes, this means I altered the study a second time to specifically ameliorate the concerns of people who are skeptical of the US Navy in particular. Places of Known Error: 1. All figures of area computed from Friedman, Hobbs, and Peattie are over estimated. They range from a -0.2% difference for Wasp to a +22% difference for Lexington. This averages an error of as much as 7,144ft2 which can be visualized as the area that 9 Avengers occupy. 2. All figures I computed in CAD range in over- or underestimating by ~3.4%. On average this is an error of as much as 2,702ft2 which can be visualized as the area that 3.5 Avengers occupy.  Ark Royal's flight deck with the broad dimensions overlaid as quoted from Hobbs. Inset is my own personal measurement of the flight deck area using FreeCAD. Disclaimer: I should emphasize that none of these carriers were truly awful carriers. Take Kaga for instance. Although it is the most inefficient user of massive space, its air group of 72 operable planes was a cornerstone of the Kido Butai. The only carriers arguably without a useful aircraft complement are Royal Navy carriers sunk before new operating practices could be implemented. Truly, the only absolute weirdo on the list is Furious whose survival through the entire war without any known increase to its air group is surprising. Much of its use during the war was as a training carrier, but it still saw occasional action through 1944 yet without any obvious change in operating practice. Generally, any carrier that could operate at least 20 planes was broadly useful because of how much aviation every fleet needed in WWII. None of this is slam-dunk evidence that a carrier was bad. At best this is a data point for measured criticism of certain classes. Everyone who dislikes the findings of this study is welcome to fully ignore this as being instigated by general grumpiness. Except for pointing out how problematic broad dimensions are as comparative figures, there’s nothing particularly rigorous about this study. I’d just appreciate it if someone would fix the Illustrious-class Wikipedia page. That thing reeks of insecurity. Half of the text paragraphs mention the US Navy or US Navy carriers in some fashion. I think it’s pretty obvious that’s why it is a “C” class article on Wikipedia’s “quality” scale. I think it would go a long way if that page stopped trying to ride the coattails of Enterprise and simply argued its own significance.   Case Studies: 1. Langley is a perfect reference point as it functionally had no hangar. While it had an elevator, that elevator did not directly service a hangar. Instead, planes struck down from the flight deck via the elevator then had to be craned off the elevator to be placed in the hold – a tedious process that prevented use as a regular feature of aircraft operations. It makes the perfect case study to evaluate if hangar space directly equals or exceeds the flight deck area for efficient operable space. 2. Wasp is another good bellwether. It has a larger hangar than Yorktown and nearly the same total area. However, it never achieved an aircraft operating complement of more than 72. This is a good indication that its first-generation deck edge elevator was not efficient. Further, it being less space efficient than Yorktown demonstrates that overall length in flight deck is superior to beam at the waist. 3. Lexington had the longest length flight deck until the Essex-class approximately matched it and the Midway-class exceeded it. The long flight deck was paired with the smallest hangar of any US Navy medium fleet carrier, yet it achieved in Saratoga an aircraft operating complement of 90 airplanes. It demonstrates that even in carriers massively larger than Langley that flight deck length is the first consideration in aircraft operating efficiency. 4. Implacable. I still don’t know why Implacable has an aircraft operating complement of 81 when Indomitable only has a complement of 57. It’s an unexplained outlier as the only other feature I know it has as an outlier is hangar height. The hangars of Implacable were very short at 14ft high, but I struggle to believe that a 2ft shorter height than Indomitable allows for such faster elevator operations as to allow for 24 more planes. Truly, I can only believe that Indomitable is shorted somehow. 5. Illustrious demonstrates the effect of elevator placement. Although in comparison to Wasp it has the same number of elevators and relatively close flight deck length, Wasp operates its space more efficiently than Illustrious having an aircraft operating complement of 72 to Illustrious's 54. The elevators of Illustrious are set at the ends of the hangar. This might appear to provide the advantage of allowing the largest unimpeded hangar space, but instead it is generally the least useful position for an elevator. The positioning was governed more to minimize the unarmored elevator’s opening into the armored hangar than for efficient use. 6. Kaga & Akagi are the only carriers with three hangars each. Those hangars are then served by three elevators on each carrier. Thus, they demonstrate maximum verticality in hangars. Their relatively low aircraft operating complement versus their total area demonstrates the difficulty of servicing planes from many hangars, especially with a ratio of just one elevator per hangar. 7. Ark Royal - if there is anything I was hoping to see out of this study was some insight into what Ark Royal's aircraft operating complement might have been were it not sunk long before it could have participated with the British Pacific Fleet. To my disappointment, it looks like Ark Royal's elevator arrangement might have been so tricky as to preclude it from operating a proportionally exciting complement in comparison to Illustrious, Indomitable, or Implacable.   The effect of crediting Yorktown with a smaller aircraft operating complement can be seen to do no favors for other nations' carriers. If Yorktown is less efficient, then that means Essex is comparatively more efficient as a carrier and then all US medium and large carriers become more efficient than all other nations' carriers. Whereas a more efficient Yorktown credits the Implacable as more efficient than Essex in operating its total area. This is your reminder to build your own significance rather than trying to tear down others with regards to historiography and historic preservation.  And here is the smaller comparison of the contemporary US Navy's far more precise measurements and my own measurements for the additional carriers I could find freely available scans of record plans. I'd particularly like a readable set of Colossus plans if anyone can point me to some.
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Aug 30, 2023 02:44
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Timmy Age 6 posted:I'm honestly a little surprised that the ships originally laid down as battlecruisers aren't appreciably in their own grouping as compared with the ships built from the hull up as carriers. Were the rebuilds really that comprehensive, or does it turn out that a battlecruiser hullform works pretty well for a carrier? I suppose that would also make sense - carriers also need to be able to move fairly fast to get airflow over the deck for takeoffs and landings. Before directly answering, I’m still going to emphasize that, just as the numbers don’t directly deem a carrier bad, the numbers don’t expressly deem a carrier good either. The numbers are an indication in how efficiently the carrier operates the area it has. A carrier that is capable of launching & recovering just one aircraft could look very good here if it did so with very little operating space. Now with that said, I’ll address your surprise that the converted battlecruisers are not inherently inefficient with their aircraft operating area. You are correct that the class usually makes a decent base for conversion to an effective carrier. Not only do they tend to be fast, but the desire to mount battleship scale weaponry on them generally forces that speed to be achieved with a great length-to-beam ratio without sacrificing the beam. The result is usually a vessel of great broad dimensions that can accept a large flight deck. How efficiently those broad dimensions then operate aircraft is still up to operating practices and design of aircraft handling features as with any other carrier. We can see how Lexington, Courageous, and Akagi generally run the gamut in those operating practices and aircraft handling features. To paint a picture of size, Lexington was the largest US Navy carrier by dimensions until Essex broadly matched it. Yet, every US Navy carrier was larger than all the old battleships. Ranger is approximately the dimensions of North Carolina (BB-55); North Carolina is particularly deeper in draft than Ranger and Ranger’s flight deck looms over North Carolina's navigating bridge. The speedy Iowas ultimately matched Essex in broad horizontal dimensions, and then Midway and every subsequent carrier dwarfed even Iowa. Incidentally, what made the art of constructing carriers a learned skill was the massive size yet comparatively light displacement of carriers. Still, the converted battlecruisers were mostly massive money, time, and tonnage sinks compared to their performance. Lexington & Saratoga took up nearly half of the United State's treaty allotment of carrier tonnage and cost over $40 million each. Subsequent purpose-built carriers would cost about half that. Their expense in tonnage and dollars cast a long shadow over the US Navy's building program. Then the US Navy had so few carriers that it struggled to find the opportunity to take Lexington and Saratoga out of service to modernize them circa 1940 - another major expense. Akagi and Kaga did similarly by taking up the majority of Japan's allotted treaty strength and later requiring massive rebuilds. I think Courageous-class was the only one to be reconstructed at fair cost and for okay treaty tonnage, but they benefited from Furious having forged the way. Even so, I was surprised as well by the relatively decent positions on the chart converted carriers and particularly of smaller converted carriers of Independence and Shoho. Indeed, many of the smaller carriers go to show that at the end of the day it’s not pure size but how you use it (ahem) when speaking only with regards to efficient use of space. Rocko Bonaparte posted:Hey Urcinius, I am going a bit OT since you said you did a bunch of test drawing in FreeCAD. I just wondered if you had it poo poo its pants at all on you. People like to turn off the lights, shine a flashlight under the chin, and tell horror stories about what that program will do while you use it. I may have had a peek of it when I tried to do some 3d print modeling, but it hasn't killed me in my sleep yet either. Yeah, for this study I worked strictly in 2D for measuring the plans of Langley, Essex, Independence, Saipan, Ark Royal, and Illustrious because Friedman's, Hobbs's, Peattie's, and the historical US Navy measurements are pure planar measurements. I'm not too worried about my estimates of hangar area with regards to ceiling height as my estimates were uniformly smaller than the historical US Navy measurements when I practiced on the vessels the US Navy measured for me. FreeCAD has been okay to me. Mostly it's only a bother because it works in metric and the US Navy & Royal Navy figures are in imperial. Had decent success with 3D printing some 1:350 model parts, but I specifically focused on simple parts. It's appreciably less capable than what I'm familiar with in AutoCAD, but for personal use the pricing is ridiculously better. Might still shell out someday for a better program because the clunkiness of FreeCAD generally discourages me from some of my hobby projects. MikeCrotch posted:If we're talking WWII planes you literally just have a bunch of guys shoving them around by hand. Always an excellent watch for understanding WWII flight deck operations. Also useful for demonstrating that although US Navy carriers had tractors, the primary method of recovering and spotting planes on deck was simply crewpersons.
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Aug 31, 2023 20:11
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Oh, for some visual enjoyment here is the US Navy exploring air groups for the Yorktown and Lexington classes. I'll let you guess the year based on the planes. 
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Aug 31, 2023 20:21
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DTurtle posted:Are those tiny cutout paper airplanes on a drawing of the carriers? And then lovingly photoed. Adorable, right?
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Aug 31, 2023 20:38
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Koramei posted:Is there not a plug-in or option that lets you do imperial? When I’ve had to use it there have been some seemingly basic functions in kind of rear end-backwards places, but something like changing the units would be a glaring thing for them to not have. Maybe? Probably. Appreciate the plugin reminder, particularly. Sadly, I’ve only had the time to use FreeCAD as it is. So far I’ve found the documentation ponderous to sift through and interpret. Fortunately, it is good enough presently to deliver the products I intend. And I get to make my teachers proud by practicing my unit conversions. I’m intensely curious of Blender, though, with your recommendation. Frankly, I just want a program (and quick guide) for performing Historic American Building Survey (HABS) documentation efficiently. If you or anyone has such a installation guide, I’d love it. Then I can perform some of my personal documentation projects quicker.
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Sep 2, 2023 01:55
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I've always been intrigued by how much the Japanese plan for their concurrent Midway and Aleutians operations looks like a prewar fleet exercise. The multitude of forces operating separately towards complex but interlinked objects specifically reminds me of US Navy Fleet Problems. Indeed, Fleet Problem XVI of 1935 involved a superior force from Hawaii attacking Midway while an inferior force stationed in Alaska attempted to defend Midway. Although the locations are nearly exact, the US Navy was obviously using US locations to roleplay attacking the Japanese Mandates and imagining Japan's defense of those islands. Still the planning, actions, and results look in many ways like what Yamamoto intended in his Midway plan. A major component of all fleet exercises was imagining and roleplaying the opposing force. One of the major themes often explored by the US Navy Fleet Problems was the difficulty of bringing to battle the inferior foe who, without a critical & vulnerable base threatened, often had little reason to engage the superior fleet. Naturally, the US Navy was exploring bringing the smaller Japanese fleet to battle or demonstrating the undesirable effect of dividing the US Fleet between multiple oceans. What would induce the enemy to action, and then in what ways might they act? Although I'm not familiar with the detail activity of Japanese Navy fleet exercises, I know they explored the reverse roles for most of the 20s and 30s. Unexpected Japanese success at the outset of the actual war and US global commitments in other theaters flipped the roles for the first six months of the war. Japan was struggling to bring an inferior US fleet to battle, and the US Navy was seeking to defend outlying bases and attrit the Japanese fleet. In many ways this isn't surprising in the context of 1941, but, regarding many of the prewar exercises, it means each navy had the opposite role than it had practiced before the war. Thus, if either navy fell back on prewar wargaming & exercise experience, they'd be basing their actual plans on the fake opposing force plans they had imagined. This could result in planning on an order of magnitude more unrealistic and complex than one's own prewar plans which usually had some basis in one's own goals and resources. If any of the above is true, it could explain Yamamoto's plan not merely as hubris or an issue specific to Japanese planning. It could be that the Midway plan was a mess because it was the Japanese Navy cosplaying as the US Navy. Were I a better scholar of the Japanese Navy, I would explore: 1. the prewar Japanese fleet exercises for similarities to the Midway plan, 2. Yamamoto's own roles and actions within those fleet exercises, and 3. Yamamoto's activity as naval attache in Washington to explore what opportunities he had to listen or investigate the US Fleet Problems and other exercises. Anyone can explore the records of the US Navy's Fleet Problems because the National Archives has digitized the series. https://catalog.archives.gov/id/176561618 The US Naval War College also published a free book on the US Navy Fleet Problems. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-historical-monographs/18/ An extra item to ponder, if the above has any merit, would be to look if any other operations in history with plans functionally based on OpFor planning experience - not own doctrine - went either incredibly well or equally as poorly as Midway. ---- This post feels as good as any to share my two favorite exceedingly false conspiracy theories about the Battle of Midway: 1. The chaos of rearming of the Kido Butai's second wave was a myth - in this conspiracy theory the Kido Butai's second wave had been armed with bombs to attack Midway at the same time as first wave had been on the morning of 4 June. The assumption is Nagumo et al were fully insubordinate to Yamamoto's instruction to retain half the Kido Butai's striking power in reserve in case of unexpected US carriers. The theory believes that they did not even wait for the first strike to report the necessity of a second strike before arming the reserve planes to attack Midway. The theory is meant to answer the question of why the Japanese were unable to rearm and launch their naval strike against the US carriers before the Japanese carriers were sunk. Any belief that the Japanese could launch a strike before being themselves sunk relies upon some amount of the second strike having been armed with torpedoes and remaining armed with torpedoes by the time the order was given to rearm the second strike to attack the US carriers. Entire chapters of Midway histories are focused on exploring when rearming orders were given, how many planes were rearmed, and even down to how many torpedo carts or tools were available to posit the status of the second strike at any given hour. However, this theory entirely sidesteps the issue as there is zero question that the entire second strike could be armed with torpedoes in time had they been all armed with bombs. This theory relies completely upon the belief that the first strike's radio message recommending a second strike was pro forma and that the timing of the rearming order was a complete fudging of the record to conceal when it was actually given. The theory utterly falls apart because some amount of the hundreds of Japanese officers and crew involved would have spoken and revealed that arming of both strikes' planes occurred at the same time that morning. 2. Yamamoto delayed the implementation of the new JN-25c codes specifically to allow the US to read Japanese coded messages - in this conspiracy theory Yamamoto deliberately allowed the opportunity for the US to discover and decode the Midway plan specifically to entice the US Navy to action. The theory is meant to answer the question of why Yamamoto expected the US Navy to rise to the obvious bait of Midway. As mentioned regarding prewar fleet exercises, a common problem was how to ensure that a battle would occur with an inferior foe at the superior fleet's choice of time and place. By providing the US Navy with an intelligence coup, the Americans might believe they had an incomparable opportunity to surprise the Japanese. This theory relies completely upon the belief that the senior operational leader of a navy can believe that "If I know that you know my plan, I have the supreme advantage." This especially falls apart because the only way to truly take advantage of such a situation is to have all key subordinates aware of and understanding their true role in the secret plan and not just their role in the overt plan. Then this theory again falls utterly apart because, like all conspiracies, someone would have spoken.
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Sep 20, 2023 23:41
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I’ll return to my shtick of posting tables. This day’s table is an expansion of a Vincent P O’Hara table in his Operation Torch (2016). He published a tabulation of damage events during the surface action of the Naval Battle of Casablanca. To this table I added in the concurrent air and sub actions of the battle. Included are some status lines to make some major events pop.  Air actions nearly doubled the table. Besides the battle being a fairly unique surface action, the immense size of my table makes it obvious why a more complete table wasn’t published. What even my table still doesn’t express is the details of the damage inflicted. Most notably, the air attacks wounded the French 2nd Light Squadron’s commander, wounded a division commander, killed a destroyer’s captain, and killed another destroyer’s executive officer. Strafing directly resulted in command devolving in one division of two destroyers to the executive officer of the second destroyer, Boulonnais. Although strafing never caused any severe structural damage, strafing caused critical casualties and chaos that prevented the French from performing decisively. Even with air and sub actions added, the Massachusetts is the most decisive participant. It disabled Jean Bart before the pitched battle. The lack of Jean Bart in action limited the available heavy gun support for the 2nd Light Squadron. Then the Massachusetts sank one French destroyer, the Fouguex. When Fouguex sank, it was not just the first significant hit upon the French squadron, but it can be seen as the point where what had been an indecisive skirmish turned against the French. At that point the battle had raged without a shell hit for 66 minutes. Massachusetts then had only one more hit but it knocked out the large destroyer, Milan. Granted, Massachusetts subsequent maneuvering away ultimately stretched the battle for another 104 minutes. Collectively, the US cruisers were critical to blocking and containing the French squadron. Although twice they left opportunities for the French squadron to attack the Fedala beachhead, the cruisers sank one destroyer, knocked out another, and drove the rest of the squadron back to the Casablanca roadstead. Their contributions are readily visible in the table. What the addition of the air actions provides is a greater clue as to why the French squadron did not push into the transport area off Fedala and wreak havoc before the full weight of US heavy surface units could interfere. Before any shells were fired, all four vessels in the 2nd Light Squadron’s two leading divisions had been strafed by F4F Wildcats. Just minutes before the action opened, the commanders, bridge, and signal crews were dead or wounded on the lead vessels. Although the physical damage to the vessels was mostly minor there were a few vital hits that damaged tiller control, damaged directors, and even started a fire in one store of ready ammunition. Then within 18 minutes of action opening, the Wildcats finished strafing all but one of the French vessels. Thereafter, three waves of SBD Dauntless divebombers delivered the only telling damage to L’Alcyon and knocked out the remaining three vessels of the French squadron. It is always correct to belabor that the Wildcats did not directly turn back the French squadron, as the pilots themselves claim. Augusta and the transports’ destroyers were the obstacles which turned back the French squadron. I believe the table shows that the Wildcats were simply the factor that dissuaded the 2nd Light Squadron from ganging up on Augusta and pushing their attack fully into the transport area off Fedala. Uniquely, the French submarine attacks are included despite all of them missing. They’ve were added to show when and how they could have affected the battle were their attacks more successful. Had all three attacks hit their targets Massachusetts, Brooklyn and Tuscaloosa could have been knocked out of the fight before several critical blows those ships dealt to the French squadron. Removing a battleship and two cruisers would have reduced the opposing US heavy forces to just two uncoordinated cruisers at a time when the French light cruiser was yet undamaged and supported by five destroyers. Incidentally, the Ranger Air Group also killed the captain of Le Tonnant before that submarine sortied from Casablanca harbor. The very same submarine attempted a torpedo attack on Ranger two days later, but the torpedoes missed. Who knows if those torpedoes would not have missed had Le Tonnant been commanded by its captain rather than its executive officer.
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Sep 22, 2023 16:44
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I feel called out for having a model of a US aircraft carrier and a painting of a rabbit as the first pieces of decor every guest sees when visiting my house.
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Sep 28, 2023 00:24
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Was exploring Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King's papers at the Library of Congress and came across an interesting monograph in his post-war files involved with the historians writing the history of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is undated & unattributed but appears to be in King's voice. It's a very interesting and candid read of his high level (i.e. only a few dozen pages) thoughts about the long, intense war. Thus, what stands out to him is most telling about which events struck lasting chords with him. In the midst of the monograph is a swipe about the relative cooperative spirit between the US Navy and Royal Navy. He specifically calls out two instances in 1942 where each navy requested a carrier of the other - Wasp in March and Illustrious in October. Right or wrong, the number of questions, delays, and ultimate selection of carrier by the Royal Navy in response to the US Navy request was less congenial than the US Navy's earlier response to the British request within two days (three days if we include the initial British confusion about which battleships King was offering). Recently, I found King's response to the questionnaire that the British Admiralty Delegation hit King with back with upon his 27 October 1942 request for Illustrious or other carriers to reinforce Halsey's Southwest Pacific forces. To this I added some of the contextual correspondence so y'all can see the conversation from origin to finish. Then I further added the correspondence for the March 1942 British request that netted them Wasp. Between the two you can see what drove King's post war comparison. To develop his point further, I drew up a table of all the requests for fleet carriers and responses I know of. The purpose of the table isn't to argue whether requests were appropriate, but to show why King felt as he did. There's one outlier in the table, the August transfer of Ranger to the Home Fleet. The reason it was transferred is known, the torpedoing of Indomitable in the Mediterranean, but the specific correspondence requesting and responding has not been found. As such I had to give it response of date of no earlier than the day before Ranger departed for Scapa Flow. Similarly, I specifically used the date Victorious arrived at Pearl as I don't know when the additional work at Pearl was completed before it steamed south in May. If anything, Ranger's 1943 transfer is a case study demonstrating that 1942 carrier requests were dealt with at the highest political level and in 1943 the requests were handled routinely at the naval headquarters level without as much issue. Saratoga of 1944 also shows the reverse instance of what King was hoping for in late 1942. Saratoga joined the Royal Navy's Eastern Fleet from the US Pacific Fleet within 35 days of being requested. King wanted Illustrious from the Eastern Fleet, as is, within about of month of his request being made - not Victorious from Home Fleet about a third of a year later. Again, whether or not each request involved the highest and best use of the few allied carriers, in this specific case of allied cooperation, King was quick & accommodating whereas the Royal Navy was bureaucratic & recalcitrant. An interesting inversion of their perceived relationship per historiography. Correspondence Regarding the Late 1942 Request for a British Carrier to Reinforce the South Pacific Notes: Regarding Official History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ernest Joseph King Papers, Library of Congress, DC posted:The deficiencies in the strength of our forces opposing the violent Japanese attacks in this most desperate and critical struggle of the war applied to all elements, but was particularly acute in the matter of aircraft. Especially desperate was the situation in regard to carriers and carrier aircraft. At one stage, our forces in the South Pacific (and in the entire Pacific, for that matter) were reduced to one damaged carrier, the ENTERPRISE (opposing at least five Japanese carriers). 1942 October 27 0251 – CINCPAC to COMINCH info COMSOPAC, Nimitz Gray Book vol. 2, Naval War College, RI posted:Most Secret. Halsey has requested reinforcement by 1 or more carriers of the British Eastern Fleet. In view urgent and immediate need for every possible increase particularly of carriers I recommend that this idea be explored to utmost. Admiral Charles M. Cook Papers, Hoover Institute, Stanford University, CA posted:United States Fleet Fleet Air Arm Papers, 1942-1943, Naval Records Society posted:106. Minute from First Sea Lord to Prime Minister 2 December 1942, Churchill to Roosevelt #217, Message Files, FDR Presidential Papers, National Archives, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/27579613 posted:1) Ever since we received a request for carrier reinforcement for your Pacific fleet we have been earnestly seeking to meet your wishes. We did not feel able to come to a decision about these very few vital units until we knew how our carriers had fared in the restricted and dangerous waters in which they had to operate for Torch. 4 December 1942, King to Leahy, , Message Files, FDR Presidential Papers, National Archives, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/27579611 posted:I enclose draft of a dispatch which I propose be sent by the President in answer to [Churchill]'s No. 217 of 2 December. 5 December 1942, Roosevelt to Churchill #226, Message Files, FDR Presidential Papers, National Archives, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/27579611 posted:Your despatch number 217 of December 2, 1942, has received serious consideration. Your offers of cooperation are deeply appreciated. Delivery Timeline of Victorious 1942 December 20 – Victorious departed Britain 1942 December 31 - Victorious arrived Norfolk 1943 January 31 – Victorious exited dry dock 1943 February 3 – Victorious departed Norfolk 1943 March 4 – Victorious arrived Pearl Harbor 1943 May 8 – Victorious departed Pearl Harbor 1943 May 17 – Victorious arrived Noumea Correspondence Regarding the Early 1942 Request for an American Carrier to Reinforce Force H 14 March 1942, Churchill to Roosevelt #44, Message Files, FDR Presidential Papers, National Archives, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/27579599 posted:We have decided to do Bonus (Operation Ironclad, Invasion of Madagascar), and as it is quite impossible to weaken our Eastern Fleet we shall have to use the whole of Force H now at Gibraltar. This will leave the Western exit of the Mediterranean uncovered, which is most undesirable. Would it be possible for you send say two battleships, an aircraft carrier, some cruisers and destroyers, from the Atlantic, to take the place of Force H temporarily? Force H would have to leave Gibraltar not later than March 30 and could hardly reach Gibraltar again before the end of June. We have not planned any operation for Force H inside the Mediterranean between April 1 and the end of June. It is most unlikely that French retaliation, if any, for Bonus would take the form of attacking United States ships by air. Moral effect of United States ships at Gibraltar would, in itself, be highly beneficial on both sides of the straits. Operation Bonus cannot go forward unless you are able to do this. On the other hand, there are the greatest dangers in leaving Bonus to become a Japanese base. We are not telling anyone about our plans and assaulting troops mingle easily with our March convoy to the east. A separate telegram will explain the meaning of Bonus. 16 March 1942, Roosevelt to Churchill #119, Message Files, FDR Presidential Papers, National Archives, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/27579597 posted:Prefer to meet request in your despatch number 44 regarding Ironclad as to temporary replacement of Force Hypo by sending detachment to join Home Fleet equivalent in strength to force detached therefrom to replace Force Hypo. Our ships now being made ready with view to early departure. 16 March 1942, Roosevelt to Churchill #120, Message Files, FDR Presidential Papers, National Archives, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/27579597 posted:1) Apropos my No. 119 this afternoon I feel that it would be more advisable if we reinforce your Home Fleet temporarily and you detach such ships as are necessary either to replace your H Force or to do the whole escorting job itself. We would send a force of two battleships, two cruisers, an aircraft carrier and a squadron of destroyers to take up their position at such bases like Scapa as are agreed upon between the Admiralty and the Navy. The difficulties of our operating in Gibraltar are very considerable and I should much prefer to reinforce your Home Fleet in a manner that would enable you to release the appropriate number of ships. 17 March 1942, Churchill to Roosevelt #48, Message Files, FDR Presidential Papers, National Archives, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/27579599 posted:1) Your numbers 119 and 120. If Tirpitz comes out only the fastest heavy ships are of any use. We must therefore keep two King George Fifths and Renown in north working with our only remaining fast aircraft carrier on this station. Tirpitz has gone north to strike at our joint munition convoys to Russia and action may easily arise. Texas class could not play any part in such fighting. They could not therefore release corresponding force to go to Gibraltar. 17 March 1942, Churchill to Roosevelt #50, Message Files, FDR Presidential Papers, National Archives, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/27579599 posted:1) Pound has just informed me that he has received a very nice message from King in which the latter says he will do all he can to keep the Japanese interested in the Pacific, whilst we are building up our strength in the Indian Ocean. 19 March 1942, Churchill to Roosevelt #52, Message Files, FDR Presidential Papers, National Archives, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/27579599 posted:1) We are deeply grateful for your sending a force in which is included one of your new battleships to join CINC Home Fleet. 18 March 1942 Roosevelt to Churchill #123, Message Files, FDR Presidential Papers, National Archives, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/27579597 posted:Your Number 48 and 50. We will send departing about March Twenty third detachment under command of Wilcox comprising one new battleship, two heavy cruisers, one carrier, five or six destroyers to report for temporary duty to Ghormley to be under operational orders of CINC Home Fleet. We will keep ready on this side similar detachment in position suited to head off enemy when he comes into open Atlantic. We feel that you can now include battleship in your replacement for Force Hypo and otherwise make it more nearly adequate. Delivery Timeline of Wasp and TF39 1942 March 26 – Wasp, Washington, Wichita, and Tuscaloosa departed Casco Bay 1942 April 3 – Wasp, Washington, Wichita, and Tuscaloosa arrived Scapa Flow Table of Interallied Requests for Fleet Carriers Comparing Date of Request, Response, and Delivery from Date of Original Request 
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Oct 4, 2023 22:10
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I will be gauche and respond to myself with Roskill's defense of the Royal Navy in the late 1942 episode:Roskill, Stephen W. 1954. The War at Sea 1939-1945, Volume II: The Period of Balance. London: H.M.S.O., available at Internet Archive posted:Pg. 227-230, Chapter 9: The Pacific and Indian Oceans Still, I will point out what King would wish me to: Roskill conveniently focuses on Wasp with regards to the logistical difficulties and forgets the request for Ranger to join the Eastern Fleet in the Indian Ocean in April 1942. A request in which the US Navy kindly used diplomatic language to deny the request instead of pointing out the same embarrassing issues. In that instance, King stole a march on the British request and denied it the day before the request was made. I'm sure he'd also point out that he asked for the much nearer Illustrious and not the Victorious that was half a world away. King would also argue that the consistent speediness of US Navy responses had no basis in Royal Navy communication or lack thereof. He offered South Dakota, Alabama, and Ranger for Operation Husky within three days of miscommunication being cleared up that the Royal Navy had been expecting the US Navy to provide a spare pair of battleships.* He would argue that it was a lack of appreciation not a lack of communication that was the basis of the Royal Navy's recalcitrance. * On 16 April 1943 it was discovered between the British and Americans that the British had assumed that their Operation Husky planning paper was adopted in full including the requirement for a pair of US battleships. The US position was that such explicit agreement had not been given. Indeed, Cooke pointed out that the US planners had stated plainly that no allocation for a covering force would be made by the US. Even so on 22 April 1943 King sent a memo to the Combined Chiefs of Staff stating that the US Navy would prefer to replace two British battleships in the Home Fleet with South Dakota and Alabama but could supply the Mediterranean force with its Task Force 22 (2 BB, 2 CA, 1 CV). King's preference bore out, but he cannot be said to have dithered in meeting the request. His naval staff wanted to belabor the issue of the Royal Navy having 13 capital ships and should be able to provide all necessary forces to contain the Italian fleet for the invasion of Sicily. Instead, per the idiom that King displayed for almost all requests he assented to, he answered positively and quickly in a message in which he merely pointed out that the situation appeared to him to not need US Navy assistance. I won't flatly disagree with however any of you come down in these fights between King and the Royal Navy over requests for major naval vessels. Frankly, I feel that the wisdom behind every carrier request between the two allied carrier navies was questionable for the entire war. Both navies refused to transfer carriers out of the Atlantic due to a lack of trust with the other, so none of the transfers that did occur amounted to anything significant. At best the transfers that did occur were opportunities for mutual observation and practice in joint maneuvers. This is the point that people belabor today - often without addressing the lack of significant effect that actually occurred in naval relations. Mostly this just gives me an opportunity to post another wacky treasure of the Admiral Cooke Papers. The US Navy was not unaware of the effort that it would take to prepare a Royal Navy fleet carrier for optimal operation with US forces. That had been explored the summer of 1942 when the idea was floated to take the Royal Navy fleet carriers and operate them directly in the US Navy in exchange for more escort carriers. 1942 July 16 - Memorandum, Subject: British CV’s posted:1. Using the U.S. system of aircraft stowage and control, the capacity of British CV’s in U.S. aircraft, based on space studies, is about as follows: 1942 August 3, Memorandum for Admiral King, Subject: Transfer of Two British Carriers to U.S. Navy posted:1. Recent reconnaissance at GDYNIA shows that the upperworks of the GNEISENAU are being removed. This may well indicate her prospective conversion to a carrier. If the GNEISENAU is converted to a carrier, and the GRAF ZEPPELIN is completed, the Germans will have available a very powerful striking force, composed of two carriers, SCHARNHORST, TIRPITZ, and supporting craft. 1942 August 3, Memorandum for Admiral Cooke posted:1. A conference was held between a representative of the Bureau of Ships, two from Bureau of Aeronautics, and three officers who have recently done duty in England, two of them having made wartime cruises in British carriers. A concensus of opinion of these officers brings out the following details: Before you get too shocked at the US Navy's gumption, you should read that the Royal Navy was considering asking for US carriers. Fleet Air Arm, 1942-1943, Naval Records Society posted:34. Minute from Director of Plans[1] to Vice Chief of Naval Staff[2] Honestly, if you read James P. Levy's "Race for the Decisive Weapon" in the Naval War College Review, it's not too surprising why both the US Navy and Royal Navy were eyeing each others carriers in 1942.
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Oct 5, 2023 02:02
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DTurtle posted:This was an extremely interesting read. It's interesting to see some of the incomplete information sharing (deliberate or not), miscommunication, etc. between two allies working so closely together. Just getting everything where it needs to be is already such a complicated thing to do. And then you actually have an enemy trying to stop you. Yeah! There’s some great scholarship on both points. Allies & Adversaries by Mark Stoler, editor of the Marshall Papers, explores, from the American perspective, the difficulties and obstacles to closer cooperation with Britain. It well demonstrates that the Allies did not win by succeeding in cooperation more than the Axis but instead failing significantly less than the Axis in cooperating. I’m forever indebted to Marcus Faulkner and his “A Question of Estimates” for arguing well that the lack of definite intelligence on Graf Zeppelin forced the British and US to treat it seriously at least until midway through 1943. Milan Vego has also published excellent articles in Naval War College Review concerning the major German Navy operations of World War II. The German fleet of World War II gets a bad reputation because it faced the entire Royal Navy and French Navy for a year in a war of Germany’s instigation with no guarantee of allies. It very specifically did not win that war or the larger war for Germany. The presumption then being that whatever benefits it provided could not be the highest and best opportunity cost. Furthermore the benefits it provided the Italians and Japanese are not appreciated because neither of them managed to win the war either. Bismarck in particular is seen as a sinecure of the Royal Navy dominance over the Germany fleet in a way that wasn’t assessed at the time. In historiography the loss of Bismarck is seen as wiping away the other successful raids of the 1940-41 winter. Yet everyone in the Royal Navy and US Navy were convinced that the winter of 1941-42 would have still more raids by the German heavy surface ships. This is why the fleet destroyers for the US battleships and carriers were not released to address Operation Drumbeat. Even when those raids didn’t happen, the expectation was there again for raids that following winter of 1943-43. Far from proving that heavy raiders could be caught with certainty, Bismarck proved that the Home Fleet at Scapa Flow or Iceland wasn’t enough to assure the interception of German heavy raiders. Instead, multiple task forces around the Atlantic were required to guarantee (as much as can ever be) catching a German heavy ship or task force. This is why containing the German fleet took 2-4x the number of like vessels. Adding naval aviation to the German fleet through Graf Zeppelin would have increased the difficulty by a magnitude. There’s an oft repeated claim that Germany should only have built uboats and never have built a fleet. Nothing of the war would have given the Allies better relief.* In short the Graf Zeppelin is a case study for the German fleet as a whole, the Allies allocated greater resources than the German fleet warranted for the effort the Germans applied. By hindsight we can thus rightfully question the appropriateness of Allied concern and resources so long as due regard is given to acknowledging that the Germans could have also acted differently. The Allies could have allocated less capital ships and carriers to contain the German fleet but by doing so the German fleet might have been more active up to and including finishing and sortieing the Graf Zeppelin. When you leave yourself weak or inadequately prepared because you don’t expect the enemy to act, you’re brave or foresighted. If they do punish your inadequacy, you’re foolhardy. *Short of no war at all or their enemies simply being too incompetent to even breathe. I’ll still vocalize that my arguing the German fleet wasn’t ‘bad’ does not mean I think it was ‘good’ let alone great. It simply is under appreciated for the limited value it did have.
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Oct 5, 2023 17:43
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Occurred to me that my tables could spit out a few more charts. Aside from showing the variety of World War II carriers, I haven’t figured out anything to say with them. Still, I figured y’all should be able to look at them. Tonnage (Standard) of WWII Carrier Classes  Operating Plane Complement of WWII Carrier Classes  Waterline Rectangular Area of WWII Carrier Classes  Overall Rectangular Rectangular Area of WWII Carrier Classes  Flight Deck Rectangular Area of WWII Carrier Classes  Flight Deck & Hangar Rectangular Area of WWII Carrier Classes 
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Oct 21, 2023 20:32
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Something that cracks me up in US Navy records straight through current US Navy journal and magazine articles is the continuous recognition that a carrier is a long-life vessel that needs to be designed as well as possible to age gracefully. What makes me laugh are statements that carriers need to be designed as much as 50% larger than contemporary requirements to account for growth in aircraft size, weight, and takeoff & landing runs. I have zero belief that a carrier designed to a larger size for future operations isn’t going to be immediately operated to its total capacity. For example, a carrier the size of 108 original planes with expectation of being only able to operate 72 in 10 years will be operating 108 upon commissioning not 72. Then the Navy will still complain when the air group eventually shrinks to 72. I love to imagine half the hangar boarded up with a sign that says, “Not to be opened until 2048.” The wisest writing on the subject I ever saw argued that if future airplanes, weapons, or whatever reduced the quantitative capacity of a carrier then the Navy needed to trust that the qualitative gain was equal or greater.
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Oct 21, 2023 22:00
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feedmegin posted:Surely the idea - with length especially in mind - is that if you lengthen your carrier then you can put more planes on it now and less, larger ones in the future, but if you don't, you go from putting the current number of planes on it now to zero (0) modern planes in the future because the carrier isn't big enough for them to take off. Nah. At least not for the US Navy. Their concern has been sheer numbers and capability when considering size and operating complement. (There’s a Navy doc quoted below for those who want to skip my explanation. It’s a good thought, but basically any prospective propeller plane* can take off from any carrier with at least a 600’ deck if not a 500’ deck. The key considerations for propeller planes performing a rolling takeoff are 1) wind over the deck and 2) loading condition. Both affect the necessary takeoff run. Generally any propeller plane can takeoff in 25kt wind over the deck unless in an extreme loading condition. When overloaded, 30-40kts wind over the deck becomes necessary to control the takeoff run to an acceptable length of the carrier’s deck. The Grumman TBF only needs about 440’ to takeoff in 25kt wind. That’s why carriers were able to launch planes even while swinging at anchor. Anything north of 600’ is capable of operating propeller planes and the greater length only affects the number of planes it can operate - not if. Hell, most of the carriers of WWII could launch a number of B-25s. That capability was not unique. Then the jet revolution changed everything. Now the consideration is the design of the catapult - length and capacity of the catapult. No jet aircraft can perform a rolling takeoff from any carrier without other limitations (short-or-vertical takeoff features or limited loading and a ski jump). Even the light but capable A-4 Scooter needs ~1800’-4000’ to takeoff in 25kt wind over the deck. This has largely standardized takeoff distance for carriers that use catapults. Now wind over the deck usually only affects loading condition using catapult launch. A lot of planes can be catapulted while the carrier swings at anchor if in light load conditions. This is why the Colossusclass could have a long and useful career into the 1990s operating the A-4 despite their 690’ long flight deck. Even still, takeoff distance, in general, is second to the space necessary for landing as the dominant limitation in deck space available to park planes out of the way of flight operations. The run out distance of an arrested landing is standard for a plane in a given load situation, but overall landing area is further governed by redundancy. Which wire does the plane catch? How many barriers need to be erected to ensure a run-away plane is caught before it plows into planes parked on deck? Angling the landing area outboard from the rest of the flight deck greatly assisted with controlling the need for extreme redundancy. A plane which misses the arresting wires on an angled deck will continue safely out over the water. Then just 4 arresting wires are necessary and no barriers are needed for regular operations at all. This has also fairly well standardized the required size of landing areas. Once you have your takeoff area and landing area sized, the remaining space is available for your air group. Basically, anything big enough to land one plane can operate one plane. The extra size is for the ability to operate 10, 25, 50, or 100 planes. The sizing debates were very much about numbers and defensive features - not about basic capability to even operate planes. Read the materials enough and you start picking up that “can’t operate” is simply a more forceful way of saying “can’t operate the number of planes that we believe is necessary.” If we wanted to design a carrier that operates just one nuclear bomber, we could probably do so on a flight deck of just 400’. * by prospective propeller plane I mean any of the propeller planes designed and operated until jet planes supplanted propeller planes. Continued propeller plane development would eventually have required the angled deck and catapults that jet planes needed. Here’s a historical paper by Admiral (then Lieutenant) James S. Russell that was passed around the Navy in 1940. Not only does he explain what I have already covered well, but he also tackles hangars too. I’ll try to reproduce his charts in the near future for y’all. A Statistical Analysis of the Growth of Carrier Based Airplanes and Discussion of Effect on Carrier Design and Operation, Prepared by the Carrier Desk, Bureau of Aeronautics (signed James S. Russell) posted:In studying the design of new aircraft carriers it is necessary to predict the size and weight of the landing and take-off performance of future carrier based airplanes.
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Oct 22, 2023 21:37
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I should acknowledge this whole page more and say that yes the need to operate multiple nuclear bombers off of a carrier using 1940s operating practices and technology required a largest carrier yet designed - the USS United States. The ‘debate’ over that carrier led to the Revolt of the Admirals when the United States was cancelled. Therefore, again, yes a debate involved basic capability. However that debate is specific to the few years between the advent of the nuclear bomb and before the development of the steam catapult and angled deck.
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Oct 22, 2023 21:47
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Thought about buying the 16 Micronaut models necessary to recreate Task Group 58.5 in Feb. 1945, but then I did the math. To accurately depict the cruising formation of that task group at proper scale would require a 12.5’ diameter space. Not the minor decor project I first considered. The only sufficiently clear space I have is my ceilings, but none of my rooms are even big enough. Garden project?
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Nov 27, 2023 02:08
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Ensign Expendable posted:Get several models in different scales and arrange them in a forced perspective diorama. Now there’s an idea! And if I botch the scale, I can claim it’s an interpretation of mistaken identification. Such as when destroyers are confused for cruisers.
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Nov 27, 2023 14:39
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FPyat posted:Do historical battlefield parks struggle with things like erosion and plant growth altering the landscape? Are there different approaches to how preservation should handle these changes? The National Park Service has a grant program specifically to address this issue. American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP) posted:Battlefield Restoration Grants support projects that restore “day-of-battle” conditions at nationally significant American Revolution, War of 1812, and Civil War battlefields and associated historic sites. The awards are made possible by the Land and Water Conservation Fund, which reinvests revenue from offshore oil and natural gas leasing to help strengthen conservation and recreation opportunities across the nation. These grants empower preservation partners to inspire wonder, understanding and empathy at the places that witnessed some of our nation’s most challenging events. In addition, the ABPP administers three other grants: Battlefield Land Acquisition, Preservation Planning, and Battlefield Interpretation grants. This financial assistance encourages and sustains community-driven stewardship of historic resources in Tribal, state, and local communities. I’ll also add to what others have already said and address your second question further. Battlefield preservation can find itself opposite wilderness conservation as it seeks to preserve a cultural landscape in spite of nature. It can also find itself opposite other forms of preservation when it seeks to preserve the battlefield over other history significant to the place. However, the standards, guidelines, and even regulations of the cultural preservation fields provide the framework for identifying what actions should occur amongst competing issues & perspectives. In the United States, you can find the majority of them through the National Park Service.
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Nov 27, 2023 15:19
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This is a surprisingly generous assessment with regards to Operation Drumbeat in a Royal Navy focused book.“British Naval Intelligence through the Twentieth Century" by Andrew Boyd posted:Successive OIC assessments, drawing on the final weeks of Dolphin coverage from mid December, revealed the U-boat redeployment to the western Atlantic, but the OIC underestimated its scale, ambition and duration.⁶ As the full scope of the Drumbeat campaign became evident, and losses mounted, it posed political, operational and intelligence challenges, which the British struggled to manage. The British were bearing the brunt of the losses, but they were taking place in waters under US Navy control. Inevitably, British naval leaders, with encouragement from Churchill, were inclined to blame the US Navy for not implementing a British-style OIC model for managing the U-boat threat, for failure to introduce convoying and ineffective aerial surveillance, partly reflecting poor cooperation with the US Army Air Forces, with no U-boat sunk by air attack off the American coast until 7 July. It was also easy to blame persistence of peacetime attitudes, such as continued peacetime lighting helpfully illuminating targets against the shoreline. However, the British underestimated the sheer size of the area the Americans had to defend, showed scant understanding of the resource constraints facing the US Navy in a two-ocean war, with major risks facing them in the Pacific, and conveniently ignored other demands facing the American naval forces in the Atlantic theatre, which were a high priority for both countries – above all, safe transport of American troops and equipment to Britain during this period, an objective achieved without loss. Most important of all, the British overlooked that they were neither contributing useful intelligence on Drumbeat, nor explaining why they could not do so.⁷ They would have had further cause for humility had they known that by March, the Germans enjoyed almost complete mastery of British Naval Cipher No 3 used for Anglo-American communications. This carried most traffic related to Atlantic convoying, and also shared OIC U-boat disposition signals. The compromise probably had limited impact on Drumbeat itself, with its focus on independent shipping, but it was an important influence on the renewed offensive against mid-Atlantic convoys from the middle of the year. With only occasional gaps, BDienst retained current readability of around 80 per cent of traffic on this net until May 1943.⁸ Has anyone noticed any other sea change in the historiography for Operation Drumbeat?
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Nov 30, 2023 21:39
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Does anybody have a good source for WW2 plane takeoff characteristics in 30kt wind in various load conditions? I’ve found data for 25kt wind, but the 30kt wind take off distances that I have found have been occasional mentions in correspondence. I’d love 30kt data for the F4F-4, FM-2, F6F-3 or -5, F4U, F8F-1, SBD-3, SB2C, TBF-1, F7F-1, and PBJ. For example, pencil notation on a BuAer routing slip pegs the F4F-4 as having a 210’ takeoff run in 30kt wind when loaded to 8000lbs. The aircraft characteristics card pegs it in 25kt wind as 278’ for 7975lbs and 390’ for 8762lbs.
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Mar 9, 2024 04:06
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