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Come to the Milhist Thread! We have: -Tank Destroyers -Artillery Bears -People who desperately want to stop posting about tank destroyers and artillery bears
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Dec 6, 2020 20:33
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Alchenar posted:To be fair that's a running joke from the one time that guy tried to claim they were a success, despite the vehicles all being provisional designs of necessity and cost, and the US abandoning tank destroyer doctrine immediately after the war. In fairness US self-propelled* TDs actually did fairly well and the M18 stands out in particular in punching well above its weight, but that success mainly came from training and low-level unit tactics rather than the actual doctrine. *e: edit to emphasize the self-propelled TDs, as the towed guns were hot garbage that mainly served to get their crews killed
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Dec 6, 2020 20:51
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Ensign Expendable posted:Towed anti-tank guns used by all nations quickly hit the point where a gun that could knock out any enemy tank was simply too heavy to push around the battlefield by hand. The solution to this was either to keep lighter guns that were still okay against most tanks (ZIS-3, 6-pounder) or go hog wild and hope there are enough tractors available to bail you out when you have to relocate (Pak 43). This led to some strange solutions after the war, like the Soviet gun with a motorcycle engine that could drive on its own, albeit very slowly and not very far. While this is obviously all true, US towed guns stand out as being especially bad. For those who don't know: US TD doctrine was created as a reaction to the fall of France. Specially trained and equipped TD units (Both towed and self-propelled) would be held in reserve to react to armored breakthroughs, using high strategic and tactical mobility to position themselves in key defensive positions to defeat enemy armor. As a strategic doctrine, this failed for more then a few reasons. By the time the US was in Europe, the Germans weren't exactly conducting armored offensives, and it didn't make sense to hold back perfectly good guns and tanks to wait for an offensive that would never come. So the TD units were sent out onto the battlefield, with differing results. The self-propelled guns (Mainly the M10, M18, and M36) generally perfomed well. While these vehicles were all flawed to varrying degrees (the lack of a roof stands out in particular), they were reliable, packed decent guns, and the M18 in particular had excellent tactical mobility that the well-trained crews were able to make the most of. By contrast, the towed guns were a disaster. These units were equipped with M5 3 inch guns, the same weapon found on the M10. The AT performance of this weapon was good in 1942-43 but barely adequate for 1944 - and this was made worse by the sheer physical bulk of the gun, originally designed in 1918, and exacerbated by the also-overly large gun carriage it was mounted to (originally designed for the M2 Howitzer). This meant that by late 1944, the towed TD units were equipped with a gun that was massive, barely mobile, and had relatively weak AT performance - so that when the TD doctrine was finally put to the test at the Battle of the Bulge, the towed gun units were mostly slaughtered (while the SPGs performed admirably). After the Bulge, pretty much all the towed guns were converted to self-propelled units, for obvious reasons. Outside of the specialized TD units, US AT guns generally lagged about a generation behind everyone else. While the Germans were using the 75mm PaK 40 and the Brits were using the 76mm 17 pounder, the standard US AT gun was still the 57mm M1, adapted from the British 6 pounder. And even up to December 1944, the US was *still* using the completely obsolete 37mm M3. Granted, this all didn't matter a whole hell of a lot. The US had enough Shermans, artillery, tank destroyers, and bazookas that infantry units were rarely lacking for anti-tank protection, and outside of the Bulge German armor offensives were fairly rare on the Western front. So the US could afford to have a nonsensical doctrine and bad AT guns, because we were doing well enough in other areas that outside of a handful of engagements it didn't really matter (though obviously it sucked a whole hell of a lot of the guys who were in those engagements)
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Dec 6, 2020 22:13
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Whatever happened to that spreadsheet of book recommendations someone put together?
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Dec 8, 2020 14:23
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Nebakenezzer posted:So ships that could keep up with the fleet but were fast/small enough to waste trash mobs of PT boats? Sort of, and the role gradually evolved over the years. Drach has a few good videos on the subject: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RiVmLk6JzNg https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0rlLlsYQ6lQ
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Dec 8, 2020 19:59
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PeterCat posted:Could you give a little background on this guy? Good and well-researched long-form videos dunking on bad opinions espoused by right-wingers typically, though he also posts his own *terrible* opinions on Twitter e: also haven't watched the video myself so can't comment on it as of yet Acebuckeye13 fucked around with this message at 19:42 on Dec 12, 2020 |
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Dec 12, 2020 19:35
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KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:it clearly cannot be that good as they replaced after 2400 units That's not really the best argument, plenty of good equipment had limited production runs - just look at the Jumbo Sherman, which was limited to only 254 tanks.
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Dec 15, 2020 15:19
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Cessna posted:Allied doctrine was was to drop, often at night, then form up, then go for objectives. (Think D-Day.) Worth noting that D-Day itself was such a disaster for the airborne troops it ended the night drops. Paratroopers ended up scattered over so wide of an area that for many it became functionally impossible to rally, and commanders were forced to make ad-hoc units out of whoever was in the immediate area at the time. While the overall operation was obviously a success, the challenges and risks imposed by dropping at night were made so abundantly clear that both Market Garden and Varsity, the two last big Allied Airborne operations of the war, were conducted during broad daylight—And of course, Market Garden would have its own cavalcade of issues. KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:are you seriously trying to argue that a tank production run is at all analogous to a rifle production run in terms of scale or magnitude? It was a singular example off the top of my head, relax. And if you want an example of an infantry firearm that was good but only had a short production run, how about the M2 SMG? A very solid weapon that was clearly superior to the M1 Thompson it was supposed to replace, but production difficulties delayed introduction to the point that it ended up getting cancelled completely after it was superseded by the cheaper and more easily produced M3. Good videos on the subject by Forgotten Weapons: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=08_mAlLrbTI https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nynxl9bgy9Q
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Dec 15, 2020 17:57
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Cessna posted:Oh, absolutely. And, as stated, Crete (which used the German doctrine) was an absolute poo poo-show as well. I don't think there's a really good way to drop a big unit with parachutes in WWII; you just do it if the reward outweighs the losses. I think it was doable (Operation Varsity was certainly a success), but it required a LOT of specialized training, equipment, and planning to be successful—and by the time all those pieces had been developed and were put into place, the war was effectively over.
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Dec 15, 2020 18:24
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Yvonmukluk posted:So I finally got around to reading Last Stand of The Tin Can Sailors (it owns, BTW), and how on earth has it not been made into a movie or miniseries yet? I've thought about this on and off for a long time, and I think it comes down to the simple fact it'd be a hard film to write and even harder to film. Not impossible, but difficult enough that it would deter all but the most dedicated screenwriter, and (to date) all directors and production companies.
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Dec 23, 2020 01:25
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FMguru posted:Also, there's no real demonstrated market demand for WWII naval movies. MIDWAY and GREYHOUND didn't exactly do gangbuster business. Did anybody see Greyhound? I wanted to watch it, but I don't have Apple plus or whatever it is that would let me actually see it.
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Dec 23, 2020 07:11
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Chamale posted:I stood too close to a cannon when I was 12; a 16-pounder firing a quarter charge. I wanted to see it up close so I snuck under the safety rope at the last moment. Now my friends have to tap me on the shoulder before speaking to me. IIRC they were trying to make and sell an SBR (Short Barreled Rifle, i.e. a rifle with a barrel length under 16") without having to comply with US firearms laws (Which require a $200 tax stamp and background checks to purchase an SBR). InRange TV (Ian from Forgotten Weapons and his buddy Karl) had a video dunking on it a while back: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1hkiVc0n_Yg
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Dec 24, 2020 04:56
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White Coke posted:Didn't the British have a sabot round they used during WWII that had some problems? What were they and how were they corrected? The British APDS rounds suffered from the "DS" not "D"-ing properly—or to put it more plainly, the sabot would fail to separate from the penetrator in a uniform manner, which would cause the round to wobble and lose accuracy, particularly at distance. This section of this video goes into it somewhat: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DaE0VJ7IaFU&t=1494s
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Dec 24, 2020 07:06
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PittTheElder posted:I don't know if it's based on any exact studies by the General Staff, but it's rooted in the fact that Russia was rapidly modernizing it's infrastructure and industry using French capital (provided largely in order to help them serve as a counterweight to Germany), and Russia's far larger population. Yeah that was pretty much it. Worth noting that the Russian Imperial Census of 1897 recorded the Empire's population as over 125 million, which would have doubtlessly increased significantly by 1916. By comparison, the 1900 German Census listed 54 million, which increased to a hair under 65 million by 1910. So while Russia was still horrifically backwards, the prospect of a modernizing Russia that was more capable of utilizing its vast population was deeply concerning to German military planners.
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Dec 27, 2020 06:24
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I vaguely recall hearing about the 1916 year mark as well, and yeah, it was a pre-war projection that by that year Russia's population and modernization would create an unbeatable juggernaut that Germany would be unable to meaningfully resist. As it stood of course the projections were completely wrong, but that was mainly due to Imperial Russia's infrastructure and leadership being so decrepit that no amount of numbers would have been able to overcome the vastly better trained, organized, and led German forces.
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Dec 27, 2020 06:58
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Alright, found some sources to refresh my memory. So to answer the original question:White Coke posted:A fact that seems to pop up a lot is that the Germans thought that the Russians were going to be unbeatable by 1916, and therefore they needed to go to war as soon as possible while they still had the advantage. Where does this fact come from, and is there any truth to it? The Germans were particularly concerned with the question of mobilization. The Russian Empire had a huge population, but it was a massive country with numerous enemies and a fairly underdeveloped transportation infrastructure. Because of this, for several years German war plans counted on a key window of opportunity where they would be able to mobilize their forces and strike into Russia before Russia was able to fully mobilize its forces to defend itself or attack into Germany. However, that window was constantly shrinking, in large part due to Russian reforms post-1906 that prioritized expanding railroad infrastructure to allow for more rapid mobilization—and critically, this also affected Germany's war plans in the west, as any war against Russia would also mean war against France. By the time World War I actually kicked off, the German plan was to mobilize quickly, knock France out of the war, and then reshuffle their forces east to meet the Russians before they could fully mobilize—but, as I said, these predictions came to naught as while they failed to knock France out of the war, the fears of the "Russian Steamroller" simply never materialized.
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Dec 27, 2020 07:17
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Solaris 2.0 posted:So I was browsing the COLD WAR/AIRPOWER thread and they had a good discussion regarding The Falklands war. Specifically, the British actually came pretty close to losing? Like if the Argentinians had knocked out a few more support ships, or even a carrier - it would have been over. The US likely wouldn't have let Britain lose the war. Though the US was ostensibly neutral, had Britain lost a carrier the US was prepared to give them an older US ship to replace it.
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Dec 30, 2020 17:10
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PittTheElder posted:Were any non-British warships lost to catastrophic magazine detonations in the WW1 to say, present day time frame? Arizona is probably the most obvious example. also this ship https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hJcDVbH5q3k
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Dec 30, 2020 20:49
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The allied conclusion was (After it began to be recognized what was actually happening at the camps, which took a while) that the fastest way to end the holocaust was to end the war, and diverting resources to bombing rail lines leading to the camps (Which could be repaired relatively easily) or the camps themselves (Which would undoubtedly kill a tremendous number of prisoners from near-misses and be of limited utility in actually shutting down the camps) would ultimately be counter-productive. It's impossible to say whether this was the right conclusion, but it's justifiable. For comparison as to what an attempt to use strategic or tactical bombing to liberate the camps could have looked like, there is Operation Jericho, which used Mosquito bombers flying at low altitude to destroy the walls of a prison holding French Resistance members scheduled to be executed. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_GI2AxVJbLg As it stood the result of the operation was... mixed. The bombing portion went as successfully as anyone could hope for, with the walls and the guard's barracks being destroyed. But 102 prisoners (Out of the 832) were also killed by the bombs, only 258 managed to escape, and most of those who did escape were recaptured or killed not long after. And these were relatively healthy French Resistance members in their home country, located close enough to Britain that Mosquitos with fighter escort could be sent in at low-level for maximum precision. As glorious as the image is of B-17s blasting down the gates of Auschwitz... any real attack on the camps would have only been marginally effective at best, would not have caused any real dent in Germany's ability to conduct mass killings, and likely would have killed more prisoners than they saved.
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Jan 1, 2021 05:46
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Tias posted:I guess that explains why Romania, Finland and others were actually furnished with German tanks and planes - they had the right enemy? Doing some brief research looking it up on wikipedia Germany did send some tanks to Italy, but comically low amounts. The Panzer IV for instance was apparently their most-exported tank, and Italy managed to get a whopping twelve out just under 300 that were sent out to Germany's allies.
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Jan 18, 2021 07:51
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brains posted:really interesting, and it seems like the main argument against it by the Germans was that shotguns were too efficient. the irony of protesting such a weapon was not lost on the people of the times: Funnily enough, according to the guy at C&Rsenal, while Germany absolutely did protest against the American use of shotguns... the Americans didn't actually use that many shotguns, mainly because at the time they used paper cartridges that were very, very easily ruined in the wet, muddy environment of actual trench fighting. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6ofO8MaIp4&t=733s Longer, more detailed video here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oROttbSkayU
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Jan 18, 2021 08:06
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Solaris 2.0 posted:I take it modern MBTs are better protected, or can you immobilize an Abrams if you hit it with a Molotov in just the right spot? I could be wrong but IIRC for the Abrams specifically it uses a gas turbine engine that runs at a hotter temperature than a molotov does, so probably not.
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Jan 20, 2021 20:01
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I would certainly be interested in seeing it, and I'm sure a lot of other people would as well.
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Feb 1, 2021 22:41
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Mystic Mongol posted:If I can! More positive reactions would certainly help me convince him, What I'd tell him is pretty simple—almost of my direct relatives who were in the war either died before I was born or not long after. The closest I ever came to learning about their experiences was when I went to one of the last of my grandfather's ship's reunions, where I was able to talk to his old shipmates and learn more about what it was like to serve, and more importantly what he was like. We're fortunate enough to live in a world now where moments can be captured in time to be shared for posterity. I'll never hear from my grandfather what it was like to be on a destroyer escort in the Atlantic convoys, my great-grandfather on being in Tokyo Bay for Japan's surrender, or my great-uncle about being a gunner on a PBY. But hearing from others about what their experiences were like can help fill in the gaps, and it's now more important than ever to record these experiences before they pass from living memory.
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Feb 2, 2021 02:34
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Hint Hint. If anyone wants to be encouraging without filling this thread with posts about a project that might not happen, feel free to send a Private Message, as I'm gonna print all of the responses out and show them to him.
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bewbies posted:It also wasn't really necessary or even militarily smart to try and hold the Mississippi I'd argue this is absolutely incorrect. The Mississippi was the single most important trade route on the entire North American continent, and control of the river had a massive impact on both the Confederate and Union economies. It wasn't for nothing that New Orleans was the third largest port in the United States and by far the largest city in the Confederacy (Population 170K in 1860, compared to only 40K in Richmond), and losing it so early in the war was an unfathomable blow.
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Feb 4, 2021 01:44
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Kaiser Schnitzel posted:Yeah it occurred to me that Vicksburg was this huge disaster for the confederacy, but really only because New Orleans and Memphis had fallen a year earlier. Holding those two much more economically, industrially and geographically important cities would mean nobody would have ever heard of Vicksburg. The Union navy could certainly blockade the heck out of the Mississippi as far as international trade went, but for internal trade and movement holding the Mississippi from Memphis to New Orleans would have been huge for the South. Keep in mind too that the Union benefited massively from the Mississippi being opened up—not only could troops and supplies be freely transported with gunboat support almost anywhere along the river and its tributaries (Which include the Illinois, Ohio, and Tennessee rivers), but it also meant that raw materials and supplies from the midwest could be more easily transported back east. Shipping things by boat is vastly more efficient than any other form of transport, and even today the Mississippi carries a full 60% of US grain shipments. It really cannot be overemphasized just how important taking the river was.
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Feb 4, 2021 02:39
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bewbies posted:I'm not arguing that it had no value, just that holding it was militarily impossible and thus a huge waste of resources. It might not have been possible politically, but ceding the river and everything west of it would've been a very smart move strategically. Once again you're ignoring the value of closing off the river to the Union. You're literally proposing that best move militarily would have been to improve the enemy logistic network and give up your largest city! Also the Mississippi does have a major west-running tributary, which was the focus of several campaigns between Union and Confederate forces in the far west. If you did a typo and meant east-running, then the river was still extremely important to hold thanks to the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which was the only major east-west railroad in the Confederacy and the major focus of the campaign that lead to the Battle of Shiloh. These networks were some of the biggest trade links in the entire Confederacy, and severing them so early in the war did incalculable damage to the Confederate cause.
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Feb 4, 2021 03:12
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bewbies posted:Once again, I said that holding the river was a military impossibility, not that doing so would've been a nice thing for the CSA. It should have been clear to all at an early stage that any position that Union gunboats could dominate was not tenable. Obviously, in doing so you concede the river's utility to the enemy, but that's probably a better outcome than losing multiple major battles and tens of thousands of irreplaceable soldiers in order to try and keep it! New Orleans was the third largest port in the country, but was functionally useless to the Union so long as the Confederacy controlled at least some part of the river. The longer Vicksburg stands, the longer the Union has to rely on railroads and lesser-developed or navigable waterways to transport food, finished goods, raw materials, and manpower from the Midwest to the East or for export (or vice-versa). The cascading effects are probably incalculable, but they were well understood at the time—which was why the Union spent so much effort and manpower to capture Vicksburg, which involved some insanely risky maneuvers from Grant to succeed. Acebuckeye13 fucked around with this message at 03:52 on Feb 4, 2021 |
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Feb 4, 2021 03:49
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HookedOnChthonics posted:also what combination of '420' and '69' make the most sense for gun measurements, asking for a friend 420mm caliber naval rifle with a barrel length of 69 feet
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Feb 5, 2021 06:26
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Ugly In The Morning posted:So I found the slides from my grandfather’s USO show in Korea. Is there a good way to turn those into images I can post here and archive? There's specific scanners you can buy for old slides, this article seems to have a good list of different options.
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Feb 7, 2021 02:42
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Ensign Expendable posted:PPSh = Pulverize Prussia Shockingly DP: Deutschland? Pathetic! PTRS: Push To Rhine Soon T-34: Teutonic 3radication 4evice  checks out
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Feb 10, 2021 18:11
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It's probably worth noting that while setting a tank on fire is a good way to make it irrecoverable due to wrecking the armor and internal components, the primary value of setting an enemy tank on fire is that it's the one sure-fire way to ensure it's knocked out. Even if you see the crew bail out, they can always get back in—but a tank that's on fire is guaranteed to be out of the fight. IIRC this lead to many crews in World War II being trained specifically to keep hitting an enemy tank until they could see flames, at which point they'd move to the next target.
Acebuckeye13 fucked around with this message at 06:51 on Feb 14, 2021 |
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Feb 14, 2021 06:49
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fat bossy gerbil posted:How did the Stug-III fare against tanks in a head on confrontation? I know they made tons of them and generally used them in an ambush or support capacity but if they were face to face with a t-34 or Sherman were they up to the task? The StuG III was actually better than contemporary Panzers in some areas. To quote from Zaloga's M10 vs. StuG III: quote:The antitank performance of the StuG III with the long L/48 gun was reinforced by the crews’ excellent artillery training and better fire-control sights. A report by the Heer’s Waffenamt in September 1943 reported that “the kill rates of assault gun batteries are frequently higher than those of Panzer units even though both are equipped with the same main gun.” Indeed a report to Hitler in August 1943 after the Kursk battles indicated that “the reports from the front submitted to the Führer highlight the exceptional value of the assault gun which in several cases under the prevailing combat conditions proved superior to the Panzer IV.” quote:The StuG III offered excellent antitank accuracy due to better sighting equipment than comparable Panzers. The vehicle commander operated a Scherenfahrlafetten SF 14Z scissors telescope offering 10× magnification, which was superior in resolution to the binoculars available to Panzer commanders. The Selbstfahrlafetten Zielfernrohr Sfl ZF 1a gunner’s sight on the StuG III provided 5× magnification, while that on most Panzers was 2.5×. tl;dr is that the mix of crew training and sighting equipment on the StuG made them very effective tank hunters. The lack of gun traverse was an issue, but this was in some ways cancelled out by the tank's low silhouette, which nearly two feet lower than the Panzer IV.
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Feb 21, 2021 02:11
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Hannibal Rex posted:I would also assume a big part of stug vs panzer effectiveness was also due to defensive rather than offensive use? I don't think that really factored into it—even though Germany was strategically falling back from 42 onward, the StuG III was still used in plenty of counter-attacks, and in the quote I posted above it was compared favorably to the Panzers even at Kursk. Its success really came from the fact that it managed to combine good armor and armaments with training and tools that allowed the crew to make the best use of their vehicle. There's a reason it was the single most produced German tank* of the war. *Assuming your personal definition qualifies it as a tank
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Feb 21, 2021 03:41
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Taerkar posted:Akin to how a lot of the success of the US TD units being training focused on fighting other armored vehicles. Exactly, or how the gun stabilizer on the Sherman was disabled by many crews, who found it unreliable or unhelpful... except for those in the 3rd Armored Division and 753rd Tank Battalion, who were trained in its use and reported a high level of effectiveness with it.  
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Feb 22, 2021 02:19
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So here's a question I've had rolling around my head for a while. Way back in undergrad, I had a class on the history of the US Army. For the most part I enjoyed the class and the professor, but during the section on World War II he made some very classic, very dumb comparisons between US tanks and German tanks, and then stated that the reason why the US Army had bad tanks was because they were all designed by government, while the reason we had good airplanes was because they were designed by the free market  Aside from this being, well, wrong (Which I clearly knew even at the time), it did get me wondering why it was that US tanks were government-designed while aircraft designs all came from private firms. Looking it up, it seems that most every other major power other than Japan (And, obviously, the USSR) contracted out AFV design to various private companies—see, for instance, Vauxhall designing the Churchill, Renault designing the R35, Krupp designing the Panzer IV, etc. And even in the USSR, tank design was contracted out to multiple different state-run firms, which were often in competition with each other. So why was it that the US, which quite obviously had no dearth of manufacturing firms and expertise, ended up designing most of its World War II-era AFVs directly through the Ordnance Department? While there were exceptions (Such as the Buick-designed M18 tank destroyer and the hilariously poor Marmon-Herrington CTLS), the M5 half-track, M3/M5 Light tank, M3/M4 Medium tanks, T26 heavy tank, and many more vehicles were all designed directly by the US Army Ordnance department. I've got my own thoughts on why this might be, but I'm wondering if anyone here has their own knowledge or conjecture on why the US ended up with this arrangement.
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Feb 24, 2021 19:04
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Fangz posted:I mean you can re-write that as "the vast majority of tanks that fought in WWII were the product of a nationalised tank design..." But you can't, because that's clearly not what happened (Unless you're putting every Sherman and T-34 in a bucket and weighing it against the rest of the world, which isn't useful or helpful at all). The Panther tank had its genesis via the VK 20 and VK 30 requests for proposals, which featured designs from MAN, Daimler-Benz, and Krupp. Ferdinand Porsche designed a proposal for the Tiger and infamously started building it before it turned out that Henschel's design had actually won (These tanks were later converted into the Ferdinand/Elefant tank destroyers). The British Cromwell tank started with design proposals from Vauxhall, Nuffield Mechanizations and Aero, and a joint Leyland/Birmingham Railway Carriage & Wagon proposal (Which was ultimately chosen). The Char B1 was a joint collaboration between Renault and Schneider-Creusot. Even in the USSR, the KV was chosen as the victor of a design competition between multiple state-owned factory design teams. So with all that in mind, my question really is, "In contrast with most other major powers, why did the US rely on a centralized design bureau to develop most of its AFVs during World War II?" That is what I want to know.
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Feb 24, 2021 21:37
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Fangz posted:Why not?  you're somehow both completely misunderstanding what I'm talking about, and are also completely wrong.
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Feb 25, 2021 02:16
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Raenir Salazar posted:Before WW1 IIRC wasn't the German High Command kinda scared of Russia? That could play into a reluctance to switch gears to a defencive war in the West while smashing Imperial Russia first because they were far less confident of victory. This sort of came up earlier in the thread, so I'll just quote myself from earlier: Acebuckeye13 posted:Yeah that was pretty much it. Worth noting that the Russian Imperial Census of 1897 recorded the Empire's population as over 125 million, which would have doubtlessly increased significantly by 1916. By comparison, the 1900 German Census listed 54 million, which increased to a hair under 65 million by 1910. So while Russia was still horrifically backwards, the prospect of a modernizing Russia that was more capable of utilizing its vast population was deeply concerning to German military planners. Acebuckeye13 posted:I vaguely recall hearing about the 1916 year mark as well, and yeah, it was a pre-war projection that by that year Russia's population and modernization would create an unbeatable juggernaut that Germany would be unable to meaningfully resist. As it stood of course the projections were completely wrong, but that was mainly due to Imperial Russia's infrastructure and leadership being so decrepit that no amount of numbers would have been able to overcome the vastly better trained, organized, and led German forces. Acebuckeye13 posted:Alright, found some sources to refresh my memory. So to answer the original question:
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Feb 26, 2021 01:21
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KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:the gun is long tho Which IIRC was actually a problem in Normandy, as it made it hard to swing the gun around in the bocage without smacking it into poo poo.
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Mar 2, 2021 04:41
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