Register a SA Forums Account here!
JOINING THE SA FORUMS WILL REMOVE THIS BIG AD, THE ANNOYING UNDERLINED ADS, AND STUPID INTERSTITIAL ADS!!!

You can: log in, read the tech support FAQ, or request your lost password. This dumb message (and those ads) will appear on every screen until you register! Get rid of this crap by registering your own SA Forums Account and joining roughly 150,000 Goons, for the one-time price of $9.95! We charge money because it costs us money per month for bills, and since we don't believe in showing ads to our users, we try to make the money back through forum registrations.
 
  • Post
  • Reply
Ardennes
May 12, 2002
I would say a direct comparison between productive in Western Europe and Eastern Europe during the 1950s is ahistorical and not academically useful for very obvious reasons.

Adbot
ADBOT LOVES YOU

Ardennes
May 12, 2002

axeil posted:


edit: re-reading they also only use data from 78, 79 and 80 so this doesn't even have anything to do with the 1950s. It says it in four different places and is in the header of the tables

Posting paper itself isn’t an argument. The issue is simply that Eastern European economies in many ways were simply not comparable to Western ones simply because of a vast gap in technology and investment. It isn’t an apples to apples comparison from the get go.

Also, entire conclusion comes down to real GDP per worker which honestly doesn’t really matter very much beyond coming to the general conclusion that Eastern European economies were less competitive but it doesn’t give a clear reason why central planning was responsible. At best you could say that full employment would lead to a loss of productivity but there is the the easy counter argument to make that unemployment itself is as if not more inefficient. That said, I don’t see that argument in there.

Anyway, there were various experiments with more market ordinated economies (Kosygin/Kadar) in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The general conclusion was that it often didn’t make much of a difference with equal levels of investment. Supply issues were more often than not due to simply a lack of capital not due to the inefficiencies of planning itself. In particular, during the late 1980s there was acute shortages as investment dropped.

Ardennes
May 12, 2002

Oakland Martini posted:

The paper axeil posted is pretty analogous to development accounting, wherein a country's unobserved productivity* is imputed based on its observed output and capital stock. The standard formula is absurdly simple: A = y/(k^alpha), where A is productivity, y is output per capita, k is capital per capita, and the parameter alpha governs the rate at which the marginal product of capital diminishes.**

The idea is simply to determine how much output a country gets from its factors of production. If you have two countries with the same level of capital per capita, the country with greater output is more productive. The point of this post is that these kinds of measurement frameworks are explicitly designed to determine whether "supply issues" are due to "lack of capital" or "inefficiencies."

Why some countries have less capital than others is left totally unanswered, but the overwhelming conclusion of the incredibly large body of research on development accounting is that differences in capital across countries are really just not that important in determining differences in income per capita; productivity differences are responsible for the vast majority of income differences.

My perspective on this stuff is that there's not much point trying to empirically compare command economies to market economies. GDP, total factor productivity, and related concepts really only make sense in the context of the latter, and measurement issues in the former are too severe.

*I like the term "productivity" a lot better than "efficiency." The latter has a normative connotation in many contexts.
**Certainly, countries do differ in their alphas. Doug Gollin has some incredibly thorough work on measuring variation in alphas across countries and analyzing the implications for development accounting.

I am talking about less about continuous capital available to the worker but the total capital available for investment since the Second World War as well as related issues like technological access and the damage of the war itself (which was easily still left decades later). They were simply two very different sets of countries under different historical circumstances and that is why more a direct comparison between productivity per worker is less than useful in my opinion unless you simply wanted to find that outcome.

It is more about the parameters of the study and the usefulness of the conclusion than anything else. But as you said "measurement issues" are indeed too limiting to get to much out of it. Also, the authors admit they really don't (or can't) know enough about a basket of goods to get a firm idea of price parity.

-------------------

As for Marxism, I think many arguments made by Marx in Kapital are interesting and should be dissected in parts. I actually don't agree with everything Marx has said and there aspects of Kapital that are heavily debatable in my opinion. But I think the biggest issue in any discussion is simply definitions (which in Marxian sense are often different than in liberal economics) and also the parts of the argument in Kapital itself.

Also, communism in Marxist terminology is a rather vague end state and the policies implemented by various Communist Parties after his death often have very little to do with that concept versus more pragmatic concerns. For example, Stalinist-style central planning wasn't part of Das Kapital was developed from the decisions of the Central Committee of the Kp(b) and had its own development during the late 1920s.

Ardennes
May 12, 2002
Honestly, I don't see the real distinction between military/civilian production beyond the particular emphasis needed by a government at that point. The Soviets had high degrees of military spending that arguably were a drag on consumer goods...but that wasn't because of central planning but because the Soviets were desperate to compete with a competitor with vastly larger economy and superior technology (although some fields like aerospace the Soviets were competitive in).

A significant issue remains that people are still mixing Soviet history, concepts like a command economy, and Marxism all together when they are in fact separate things with some overlap: not all command economies were the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union was not always a command economy, and much of the Soviet Union was doing was very tangential to Marx's theories.

(Also, I would say stuff like East Germany producing too many chandeliers could easily happen (and it does) in a free-market economy all the time. If anything it is arguably easier to fix in a command economy.)

  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4
  • 5
  • Post
  • Reply