- Azza Bamboo
- Apr 7, 2018
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THUNDERDOME LOSER 2021
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Tonty posted:
The context of this speech —originally a reflection on the 20 years since 9/11— has dramatically changed as a result of the events of the past 20 days. I will not repeat what I have said about the fact and manner of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. I will focus instead on the policy issues raised by it.
The Taliban are part of the global movement of radical Islam. The movement contains many different groups, but they share the same basic ideology. In simple terms: this holds that there is only one true faith, only one true view of that faith, and that society, politics, and culture, should be governed only by that view. Radical Islam believes not only in islamism —the turning of the religion into a political doctrine— but in the justification of struggle (if necessary, armed struggle) to achieve it.
Other islamists agree with the ends, but eschew violence, but the ideology itself is in inevitable conflict with open, modern, culturally tolerant societies. Nearly everything about 9/11 and its aftermath, particularly now, is mired in controversy. What cannot be seriously disputed, however, is that since 9/11 (though, thankfully, there’s been no further terrorist attack of that scale) radical Islam has not declined in force.
What is disputed is why. Is radical Islam a coherent ideology which represents a first order threat to our security? Or are we facing (despite some common themes) a series of disconnected security challenges —each of which require handling on its own terms based on local circumstances? Is islamism a problem, or only its manifestation in violent extremism? Is it akin —as I say— to revolutionary communism, and must be countered by a combination of security and ideological measures over the long term? Or is that to overstate it, overestimate it, and thus perversely —as some would argue by the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq— to elevate its appeal rather than diminish its appeal. This is a fundamental strategic question, and it needs a clear answer. In my view, islamism —both the ideology and the violence— is a first order security threat, and unchecked it will come to us (even if centered far from us) as 9/11 demonstrated.
The analysis published recently by Dr. El-Badawy from my Institute shows how the roots of islamism stretch back over many decades, grew in strength long before 9/11, and it examines the links between the ideology and the violence. This is supplemented by the excellent analysis of the ulema-state concept by Ahmet Kuru, and by the annual report we publish of jihadist groups, which shows that this is a global challenge, and one that is getting worse.
The ideology, whether Shia (promulgated by the islamic republic of Iran) or Sunni (promoted by groups on a spectrum from the muslim brotherhood, through to al qaeda, isis, boko haram and many others) has been the principal cause of destabilisation, across the middle east and beyond, and today in Africa. Like revolutionary communism, it operates in many different arenas and dimensions, and like it, its defeat will come ultimately through confronting both the violent and the ideology, by a combination of hard and soft power.
Now if —if!— this is a correct analysis, then (especially after the fall of Afghanistan) the leading powers must unite to develop an agreed strategy and, even if initial discussions center around western nations, China and Russia also have an interest in countering this ideology, and our best allies are to be found in the many muslim countries (including in the middle east) desperate to retake their religion from extremism. We need also to assess our vulnerability: Covid-19 has taught us about deadly pathogens. Bio-terror possibilities may seem like the realm of science fiction, but we would be wise now to prepare for their potential use by non-state actors. On the other hand, if this analysis is rejected, the alternative is (in effect) to say this is a second order problem where we are directly threatened, we directly retaliate through counter terrorism measures (drone strikes, surveillance, special forces) but otherwise we leave alone.
But, if this is where policy is heading, we have to understand it to its limitations. We need to work out what we mean by not “remaking” countries from which terrorist threats can arise. I understand it means that we do not do what we tried to do in Afghanistan. Though, one thing should be understood: our remaking didn’t fail because the people didn’t want the country remade. For sure we could have remade better, but Afghans did not choose the Taliban takeover. The last opinion poll in 2019 showed the Taliban with 4% support among the Afghan people. They conquered the country by violence, not persuasion.
The barrier to nation building is usually not the people, but poor institutional capacity and governance (including corruption) over many years, and (most of all) the challenge of trying to build while internal elements combined with external support are trying to destroy. But counter terrorism on its own won’t remove an entrenched threat. We could seek a middle course. For example, in the Sahel we could adopt a strategy of assisting countries with security but also supporting the government’s own attempts to develop their nations, because poverty and underdevelopment undoubtedly facilitate the extremists. In a way, this is what we did in Afghanistan post-2014 when NATO’s mission went to Train, Advise and Assist, but even here this will likely encompass more than conventional counterterrorism: We need some boots on the ground. Naturally, our preference is for the boots to be local, but that will not always be possible. Western societies and their political leaders have become quite understandably deeply averse to casualties amongst our armed forces. This is not a problem for the armed forces themselves, that are brave and extraordinary people, but it is now an overwhelming political constraint to any commitment to western boots on the ground except for special forces. Yet the problem this gives rise to is obvious: if the enemy we’re fighting knows that the more casualties they inflict the more our political will erodes, then the incentive structure is plain.
There is an additional challenge for Europe and NATO. It is clear now, if it wasn’t before, that America has decided that (for the foreseeable future) it has a very limited appetite for military engagement. After Kosovo I initiated European defence with France. I did this precisely because I realised that, without the United States’ (and, indeed, president Clinton’s) commitment, we could never have resolved the crisis. And today the Balkans, relative to its history, can aspire to a peaceful future, hopefully within Europe. Yet the crisis was on Europe’s doorstep, not America’s. It’s Europe that faces the immediate challenge from the destabilisation of the Sahel. Europe is already facing the fallout from Libya, Syria and elsewhere in the middle east. And, for these purposes, Britain is part of Europe, like it or not.
So, how do Europe and NATO develop the capability to act when America is unwilling? Answering these questions —at least, confronting them— would also reinvigorate western policymakers' capacity to think strategically. For me, one of the most alarming developments of recent times has been that the sense that the west has lost its capacity to formulate strategy: that its short term political imperatives have simply squeezed the space for long term thinking. It is this sense more than anything else, in my judgment, which gives our allies anxiety, and our opponents a belief that our time is over. Finally, one of the most depressing things I’ve heard regularly articulated over the past weeks, is the idea that we are foolish in believing that western notions of liberal democracy and freedom are exportable, or will ever take root in the somewhat decadent terrain of western society. Now, maybe my generation of leaders were naive in thinking countries could be remade, or maybe remaking needed to last longer, but we should never forget —as we see the women of Afghanistan in the media, culture and civic society now flee in fear of their lives— that our values are still those which free people choose. Recovering confidence in those values, and in their universal application, is a necessary part of ensuring we stand up for them and are prepared to defend them.
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Sep 1, 2021 13:55
