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Heresiarch posted:now which one of them is the original consciousness, and which is just a copy that thinks it's the original? yes
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Sep 18, 2013 02:09
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consciousness is an illusion !!
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Sep 18, 2013 02:10
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space pusyy, the final frontier. these are the voyages of my dick. its 5 minute mission, to explore new orifices, to seek out stds and hot space babes,to bodly come where no man has come before
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Sep 18, 2013 02:13
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angry_keebler posted:if a transporter rebuilds your body out of atoms different from the ones in your body before beaming then it replaces all the atoms in a few seconds but in one to two weeks ~60-75% of the atoms in you today will be gone and in 10-15 years maybe all of the atoms in your body will be replaced so why would one bother you but not the other you're completely misunderstanding the objection here the problem isn't what atoms are used at the receiving end. that's irrelevant. the problem is that the original consciousness, that neurological machine which is the result of biological processes and which requires no soul or other weird crap, is literally destroyed in the process of copying it it is then re-created at the other end, using either the same atoms or a different set or whatever. the machine is recreated down to the last neurochemical and the last firing neuron. this new machine has all of the memories of the original, and as far as its concerned, it is the original because it remembers everything up to the point of the original's destruction. memories are, after all, a biological process which requires no soul or other weird crap the problem here is that it isn't the original. it's a copy. it has a freshly-created fully functional self-aware consciousness but the original is still dead think about what would happen if the original was not destroyed during the copying process. it would now be clear that the copy was a copy because the original was still around. the original would obviously still be self-aware. it would not somehow share a consciousness with the copy, there would not be one person looking out from behind two sets of eyes does the destruction of the original somehow change the nature of the copy? does the consciousness somehow jump to the copy, but only if the original is destroyed? how can the copy be the same self-aware machine, since the copy is exactly the same whether the original is destroyed or not? this is all based entirely on a mechanical, non-supernatural concept of human self-awareness and i don't understand why it's so hard for people to understand it i'm just going to assume you don't actually have an answer to the question, then
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Sep 18, 2013 02:27
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Heresiarch posted:so, theoretically, if the pattern is the important thing (which is what you said earlier), the transporter could then use the pattern twice with two different sets of raw materials and reassemble two people instead of just one if the patterns are identical then what does this matter? also, since they're being disassembled and reassembled, neither is the "original" in any useful sense anyway. but as we've established there's no useful definition of "original" for things made up of billions of components that are regularly changed/replaced in the normal course of life (or operation). tl;dr: fishmech edit: are you still you after 15 or so years? infernal machines fucked around with this message at 02:34 on Sep 18, 2013 |
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Sep 18, 2013 02:29
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Improbable Lobster posted:space pusyy, the final frontier. these are the voyages of my dick. its 5 minute mission, to explore new orifices, to seek out stds and hot space babes,to bodly come where no man has come before plz post a link to ur kickstarter, id like to invest
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Sep 18, 2013 02:30
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my friends i think this philosphical question is actually akin to the question regarding trhe meaning of life and cannot be answered by mortal man ...ne1 get a hold of Q ?
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Sep 18, 2013 02:30
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infernal machines posted:if the patterns are identical then what does this matter? also, since they're being disassembled and reassembled, neither is the "original" in any useful sense anyway. that was sort of my point, actually. if neither copy is the original, doesn't that mean the original is gone?
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Sep 18, 2013 02:38
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i've watched In Time about 5 times now and it's a shameful pleasure. i like the future challengers.
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Sep 18, 2013 02:41
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congrats on having a worse grasp on consciousness and mereology than my undergrads sci fi thread
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Sep 18, 2013 02:43
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infernal machines posted:are you still you after 15 or so years? we've already established that for the scope of this thought experiment, the actual atoms are not important, but their relationships and patterns are
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Sep 18, 2013 02:44
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Heresiarch posted:that was sort of my point, actually. if neither copy is the original, doesn't that mean the original is gone? Yes, but it also doesn't matter since the "original" can only be defined at the time it's disassembled, it's in constant flux anyway. How many consciousnesses can dance on the head of a transporter buffer? edit: Heresiarch posted:we've already established that for the scope of this thought experiment, the actual atoms are not important, but their relationships and patterns are And those are in flux too, up until the point they're recorded, after which the pattern may be static but when returned to a usable form it changes again. So whether or not multiple copies are made, or if the thing the pattern was taken from was destroyed, there's still nothing you can usefully define as original. infernal machines fucked around with this message at 02:50 on Sep 18, 2013 |
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Sep 18, 2013 02:44
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Heresiarch posted:that was sort of my point, actually. if neither copy is the original, doesn't that mean the original is gone? i contend the original is just as meaningless a collection of atoms and poo poo as the air around it. theres nothing more "original" than the clone than a lump of lead. all things are equally meaningless jumbles of particles
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Sep 18, 2013 02:45
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infernal machines posted:Yes, but it also doesn't matter since the "original" can only be defined at the time it's disassembled, it's in constant flux anyway. the point of disassembly is the only point that matters here
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Sep 18, 2013 02:48
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Improbable Lobster posted:space pusyy, the final frontier. these are the voyages of my dick. its 5 minute mission, to explore new orifices, to seek out stds and hot space babes,to bodly come where no man has come before i'd like to recommend sesley crusher gently caress machine as my favorite sci fi themed erotica of choice
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Sep 18, 2013 02:49
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Heresiarch posted:the point of disassembly is the only point that matters here hrrrmmmm yes temporal continuity has no salience for whatever we'd like to pack into consciousness
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Sep 18, 2013 02:50
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Breakfast All Day posted:hrrrmmmm yes temporal continuity has no salience for whatever we'd like to pack into consciousness i'm trying to restrict the scope of the argument here the fictional transporter copies the original as it was at a single point in time. the fact that consciousnesses are always in a state of flux isn't relevant to this particular thought experiment
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Sep 18, 2013 02:54
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Heresiarch posted:i'm trying to restrict the scope of the argument here the fictional transporter works in an undefined way as a plot device, the way it works seems fairly flexible depending on what they need for the plot. i don't know how you expect to have a philosophical debate about this. edit: if you want to bust out d&d style and define everything clearly so that all the mechanics of the transporter, consciousness, and "original" are fully explained, go nuts. otherwise we're discussing how many consciousnesses can dance on the head of a transporter buffer. infernal machines fucked around with this message at 03:04 on Sep 18, 2013 |
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Sep 18, 2013 02:56
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Heresiarch posted:the actual atoms are not important, but their relationships and patterns are whether the process takes 10 seconds or 10 months or 10 years or if the process occurs in your living room or if your body is being displaced 10 light years by some sort of technology the end result is the same so if your original "neurological machine" is preserved in one process it is also prserved by the other
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Sep 18, 2013 03:02
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angry_keebler posted:whether the process takes 10 seconds or 10 months or 10 years or if the process occurs in your living room or if your body is being displaced 10 light years by some sort of technology the end result is the same so if your original "neurological machine" is preserved in one process it is also prserved by the other and as long as the data is preserved perfectly there is no meaningful distinction between "original" and "copy". the data in the buffer is a recording of the state and location of every atomic and sub atomic particle in the transported subject (guess why this doesn't work). since the state of all of those elements is in constant flux the data in the buffer would have to be the "original", because the subject on either side (temporally) of the transportation will be different. infernal machines fucked around with this message at 03:14 on Sep 18, 2013 |
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Sep 18, 2013 03:06
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stop sperging about teleporters holy poo poo
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Sep 18, 2013 03:10
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infernal machines posted:and as long as the data is preserved perfectly there is no meaningful distinction between "orginal" and "copy". only to an outside observer 
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Sep 18, 2013 03:12
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theflyingexecutive posted:laser penis
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Sep 18, 2013 03:13
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nigga crab pollock posted:stop sperging about teleporters holy poo poo shut up you boring dullard Heresiarch posted:you're completely misunderstanding the objection here Your consciousness is destroyed and renewed at every moment. it is an emergent property of the machine. the difference between it and the original is no more profound than the difference between temporally separated states within the same machine.
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Sep 18, 2013 03:13
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Breakfast All Day posted:hrrrmmmm yes temporal continuity has no salience for whatever we'd like to pack into consciousness correct
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Sep 18, 2013 03:14
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syscall girl posted:only to an outside observer since there's two of you, you're both outside observers. deal with it. Amethyst posted:Your consciousness is destroyed and renewed at every moment. it is an emergent property of the machine. the difference between it and the original is no more profound than the difference between temporally separated states within the same machine. good lord, i just agreed with amethyst infernal machines fucked around with this message at 03:17 on Sep 18, 2013 |
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Sep 18, 2013 03:15
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Heresiarch posted:i'm trying to restrict the scope of the argument here of course it is. your entire argument rests on the notion that spatial and temporal flux are fundamentally different due to some platonically essential reason. there is no rational basis for this assumption
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Sep 18, 2013 03:15
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your body is a shifting blob of atoms when you're just chilling on the couch. you're like fusing and unfusing w/the air around you and couch all the time. there's no difference between this relationship and the one you have w/ the transporter idk. im not really smart enough to discuss these matters
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Sep 18, 2013 03:21
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if you like ideas like this I strongly recommend Permutation City by Greg Egan although it deals with consciousness digitization rather than teleportation
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Sep 18, 2013 03:23
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Heresiarch posted:i'm trying to restrict the scope of the argument here if you're talking about consciousness without temporal extension, you aren't talking about anything like the thing we feel compelled to impose on brain processes because of our strong intuitions of identity, which are characterized by (depending on who you ask) inherent intentionality, spatial locality and temporal extension also the teleportation problem itself is necessarily a temporally extended one (someone tried to construct a clone-type consciousness problem without temporal considerations, may have been kim or jacksom, don't remember, but anyway it was dumb and everyone said it was dumb because talking about consciousness without temporal extension is dumb) anyway there's no answer to this debate. if you're an eliminativist/(strong) reductionist/even epiphenom, the answer is various forms of "we can't know" with a few hardcore eliminativists saying "we don't know but whether it's hard epistemic (i.e., whether we'll ever be able to know whether we know, aka the KKK status) is undecided." for this whole class of TOMs there is an edge case empirical counterfactual, but not one that bears on knowledge. that is, we could build a transporter at some point, riker could go through and report "oh poo poo, i'm not who i was." obviously that isn't evidence, but since the whole notion of consciousness is built out of intuition pumps it would alter those arguments esp. eliminativist positions. anyway, in the absence of that unexpected result (any other result only serves to inform us in the same weak sense that uniformity of connexion informs inductive attributions), eliminativists have sympathies towards preservation of identity, whereas other reductionist and epi whackos are more evenly split with loss of identity (or vanishing qualia) or other outcomes (some Xphi guys have done surveys because they don't know what else to do besides bail water). property- and substance-dualists and other fringe good-old-days dudes tend to have dumb bespoke positions on tele identity to match their dumb bespoke positions on mind.
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Sep 18, 2013 03:30
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In the above mentioned book there is a really good chapter where two digitized people are having a conversation. they are stow aways, people who couldn't afford the exorbitant cost of digitization, and so they sneaked copies of themselves onto the system, along with some code which covertly executes their code periodically. they have a discussion on how many cpu cycles they need to sustain consciousness. about the limit to how slow they can set the scheduler to avoid getting caught. does a limit exist? could they continue to think at say, one cpu cycle per year? the "real" world would be moving at an unimaginably fast pace, while they have a discussion at less than a single word per century. their consciousness would, however, perceive continuously. read that book, it's good as hell
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Sep 18, 2013 03:31
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Breakfast All Day posted:if you're talking about consciousness without temporal extension, you aren't talking about anything like the thing we feel compelled to impose on brain processes because of our strong intuitions of identity, which are characterized by (depending on who you ask) inherent intentionality, spatial locality and temporal extension can you recommend some literature where I can learn to use terms like this, and find discussions on them?
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Sep 18, 2013 03:34
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Amethyst posted:can you recommend some literature where I can learn to use terms like this, and find discussions on them? chalmers has a good primer anthology on philosophy of mind. i was helping a friend choose a text for his course recently and it stuck out as having most of the stuff i'd choose as solid introduction. it has some big omissions (mostly in modern dualisms) just because of chalmers perspective but if you really peruse it all you'd be plenty literate to seek out other lit and fill those gaps yourself. also gently caress modern dualisms.
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Sep 18, 2013 03:45
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Breakfast All Day posted:chalmers has a good primer anthology on philosophy of mind. i was helping a friend choose a text for his course recently and it stuck out as having most of the stuff i'd choose as solid introduction. it has some big omissions (mostly in modern dualisms) just because of chalmers perspective but if you really peruse it all you'd be plenty literate to seek out other lit and fill those gaps yourself. also gently caress modern dualisms. cool, thanks
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Sep 18, 2013 03:48
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infernal machines posted:if you want to bust out d&d style and define everything clearly so that all the mechanics of the transporter, consciousness, and "original" are fully explained, go nuts. otherwise we're discussing how many consciousnesses can dance on the head of a transporter buffer. that's what i was trying to do, actually, reduce the thought experiment down to some basics independent of trektech, but i was doing it in a way where i was trying to get other people to answer questions so i could understand what they thought, and this obviously wasn't working because qwerty sort of zen koaned his way out of the argument at the same time that everybody started trying to poke holes in what they thought was my argument and it all turned to poo poo because i should have just been straightforward instead of trying to be clever and now bluestymie is posting anyway i just spent about an hour writing a big-rear end effortpost trying to explain the point i was trying to get to, while at the same time distract myself from this hosed-up depressive episode i'm in the middle of, and then i saw this after i hit preview: Breakfast All Day posted:if you're talking about consciousness without temporal extension, you aren't talking about anything like the thing we feel compelled to impose on brain processes because of our strong intuitions of identity, which are characterized by (depending on who you ask) inherent intentionality, spatial locality and temporal extension and i realized that i'm woefully unequipped for this level of conversation so i went and deleted everything i wrote and am instead going to do some reading short version: i feel that a perfect copy of me would not be me, regardless of if i was destroyed during the copying process, because if i wasn't destroyed i would be looking out of one set of eyes and the copy would be looking out of another set. i am aware that i feel this instinctively and i was hoping somebody could explain why they might disagree because obviously people do after seeing breakfast's post it's clear that there's a philosophical term for this feeling somewhere in the literature, and i need to go find it and read whatever the counter-arguments are instead of hoping some sf nerds can tell me anyway sorry
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Sep 18, 2013 04:11
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we're getting away from the important thing here: if we start from the point that barclay is "howlin' mad" murdoch, we can extrapolate that worf is b.a. baracus, then who must logically follow as templeton "faceman" peck and john "hannibal" smith?
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Sep 18, 2013 04:18
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oh man look what i started; i love these arguments anyway i just watched the movie "epic" which was pretty silly and not all that great overall. i think someone's favourite movies were avatar, a bug's life, and ferngully, so they tried to put them all into one
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Sep 18, 2013 04:30
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so, like, what if consciousness was a quantum-level effect arising out of vibrational asymmetries extending through a meta-level of reality, an n-dimensional string that coils around our current understanding of spacetime? that said consciousness essentially grows with the originating meat, so that it's not like there's a pre-life or eternal soul and everything arises through natural processes? and that the mathematical artifact called Consciousness can, once established, persist long enough without a physical anchor such that the original body can be destroyed and a new one created faster than it would take for the quantum effect itself to evaporate? and that, given everything in the new anchor is the same down to a quantum level, it would pick up on the same n-dimensional vibration that was crated by the prior anchor? so that there's continuity of consciousness even through short gaps in the continuity of the actual body? what then, huh?
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Sep 18, 2013 04:35
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http://forums.somethingawful.com/showthread.php?threadid=3517785&userid=0&perpage=40&pagenumber=4
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Sep 18, 2013 04:48
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duTrieux. posted:so, like, what if consciousness was a quantum-level effect arising out of vibrational asymmetries extending through a meta-level of reality, an n-dimensional string that coils around our current understanding of spacetime? that said consciousness essentially grows with the originating meat, so that it's not like there's a pre-life or eternal soul and everything arises through natural processes? and that the mathematical artifact called Consciousness can, once established, persist long enough without a physical anchor such that the original body can be destroyed and a new one created faster than it would take for the quantum effect itself to evaporate? and that, given everything in the new anchor is the same down to a quantum level, it would pick up on the same n-dimensional vibration that was crated by the prior anchor? so that there's continuity of consciousness even through short gaps in the continuity of the actual body? you could characterize literally any not-yet-fully-understood physical phenomenon with this exact explanation, no modifications necessary. and the persistence thing is pure speculation without basis even in string theory. returning to what just happens to be the intuitive, instinctual, Cartesian dualist idea with it is arbitrary.
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Sep 18, 2013 04:55
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