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Godholio posted:Citing the Somethingawful forums in homework might not be a good idea.1 I'm a big fan of "Private Communication" myself. Private communication is badass as a source. On the above reenactor bit: I learned how to spearfish on a catwalk-- basically, where the salmon are running upstream (and sometimes the trout coming down) some tribes will build catwalks across the rivers and spear the fish as they jump up. One thing I definitely notices was that an overhand stab is a hell of a lot more accurate. I can't really figure out why, thinking about it, but there's something about the downward motion that made it easier for me, at any rate, to consistently hit the target. I notices this was true as well with bo practice. Obviously, in both those cases it's very different from using a pike or a war spear-- I was using a thin, light spear in the first instance, and a heavy but evenly-weighted bo in the second, but the difference seemed to be in hand-eye coordination, mostly. Something about the downward angle felt more natural. However, the overhand thrusts are, if you're not expert, really tiring. Just holding it up there, you do all these little micro-corrections. The guys who taught me laughed at me, and said that it reminded them of being kids and practicing this for the first time-- they could hold their spears up and cocked and it didn't tire them much at all. So I could propose an alternate interpretation for reenactors preferring an underhand thrust: They're very far from expert with the weapon, and it's a lot less tiring to do it that way. Even though I found it easier to hit, they may be aiming at targets big enough that they don't care so much or notice so much accuracy. If they never put the hours into doing it from above, they'd probably get tired very fast doing it, so they might try it, notice it tires them out really quickly, and decide not to do it. And if you don't practice it, specifically it, you'll never improve from that state. You may cite this as "Private Communication". Koramei posted:I may have read this in a really sketchy source, but most of the time the feudal Japanese armies would just sally out and meet the enemy on the field. The castles were there more to just impress the peasants and be administrative centres/ palaces. They were partially important, mostly to keep dynastic integrity, as in, if someone really wanted to kill off your whole clan, they'd have a tough time doing it. There were a few mountain fortresses and strategic ones, but mostly they were in towns and so it was rare when the local lord would think it advisable to not defend the entire town and region. Obdicut fucked around with this message at 21:41 on Nov 26, 2013 |
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Nov 26, 2013 21:36
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Obdicut posted:On the above reenactor bit: I learned how to spearfish on a catwalk-- basically, where the salmon are running upstream (and sometimes the trout coming down) some tribes will build catwalks across the rivers and spear the fish as they jump up. One thing I definitely notices was that an overhand stab is a hell of a lot more accurate. I can't really figure out why, thinking about it, but there's something about the downward motion that made it easier for me, at any rate, to consistently hit the target. I notices this was true as well with bo practice. Obviously, in both those cases it's very different from using a pike or a war spear-- I was using a thin, light spear in the first instance, and a heavy but evenly-weighted bo in the second, but the difference seemed to be in hand-eye coordination, mostly. Something about the downward angle felt more natural. However, the overhand thrusts are, if you're not expert, really tiring. Just holding it up there, you do all these little micro-corrections. The guys who taught me laughed at me, and said that it reminded them of being kids and practicing this for the first time-- they could hold their spears up and cocked and it didn't tire them much at all. That would be awesome to do. An overhand motion is more aligned with your visual field, making aiming easier. It seems like the musculature is probably more developed for that movement as well, although this can be overcome with training. Softball pitching vs baseball, for example. Edit: I definitely should've mentioned Corbett alongside Mahan.
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Nov 26, 2013 22:01
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Some comments about the general command of the british and french on WWI because these guys look like they had no idead what they were doing . Holy poo poo what a waste.
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Nov 26, 2013 23:37
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I've wondered about that myself. It seems like the trench warfare hell that WW1 became would be something that would get tactically or strategically overcome relatively quickly. Noone in WW1 seemed to show the usual technical and tactical cleverness that peppers human warfare throughout history, despite the most technically and academically developed nations in the world participating.
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Nov 26, 2013 23:42
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Lamadrid posted:Some comments about the general command of the british and french on WWI because these guys look like they had no idead what they were doing . They were at the heightof military knowledge of the time, and the Germans didn't do that much better when they did attack. Plus until tanks arrived there wasn't really much they could do. In trench warfare, the attacker is at a distinct disadvantage. But so long as the enemy sits on your own or allied soil, you can't just sit around and wait until he gets bored of it, so attacks had to be made.
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Nov 26, 2013 23:47
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WWI was a much more dynamic and varied conflict than people usually give it credit for, and key actors such as Douglas Haig are unjustly ridiculed as mentally deficient, rigid fossils despite their actual record... Nevertheless, it's difficult to write about this topic without a more specific starting point.
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Nov 26, 2013 23:47
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steinrokkan posted:WWI was a much more dynamic and varied conflict than people usually give it credit for, and key actors such as Douglas Haig are unjustly ridiculed as mentally deficient, rigid fossils despite their actual record... Nevertheless, it's difficult to write about this topic without a more specific starting point. Id be interested in an effort post about how "Butcher" Haig wasn't all that incompetent.
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Nov 26, 2013 23:54
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Starting point: a year of attempting to clog the enemy's machine guns with corpses has failed. Lets think of something new! ... ... ... ... ...more corpses! Unless I'm missing something? I realise that WW1 had theatres other than Europe which were more dynamic, and that artillery and air warfare advanced in leaps and bounds. Not to mention the naval war happening simultaneously. But that still seems retarded to me.
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Nov 26, 2013 23:57
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Well by what I see and read they look like they were unable to come up with a different set of rules for infantry attacks for example, having continous repetitions of the same mistakes and being callous to the loss of life. How this guys didn't get fragged is a mistery to me.
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Nov 27, 2013 00:05
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Lamadrid posted:Well by what I see and read they look like they were unable to come up with a different set of rules for infantry attacks for example, having continous repetitions of the same mistakes and being callous to the loss of life. Would you consider the leadership of the Red Army, from Stalin down, to be incompetent? Because the same could be said about them.
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Nov 27, 2013 00:15
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While there were better ways to conduct infantry assaults in World War I, it's important to understand that half the reason no one could make serious movements is that the rail network in Western Europe was extremely good which allowed for very quick reinforcements in any sector. By comparison, in Russia, for example, the railroads were nowhere near as good so when someone won a battle locally, they could actually make moves before reinforcements appeared to plug any gap.
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Nov 27, 2013 00:16
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Grand Prize Winner posted:Bah. GURPS 3e sourcebooks are cleary the best historical texts you can get. Japanese castles look indefensible to western eyes because they weren't designed to handle the threats western minds expect, at least until the 17th century. There was no real tradition of siege warfare at the beginning of the Sengoku Jidai, and most castles were wooden palisades which could either be burned out or taken by a large rush of infantry. Even so taking such castles was a serious challenge without large cannons or catapult, and fortifications were widespread, relying on inaccessible terrain for defense. The kind of massive sprawling fortresses which are today associated with Japan only developed towards the end of the 16th century, after the arrival of Arquebuses. These castles were not designed to resist cannonballs or large hurled stones, but massed musket volleys, fire, mines, and assault by large armies. As to their effectiveness, well, they were effective enough Tokugawa Ieyasu ordered all but one castle in each provence destroyed. They just represented too great a threat to centralized power. Which may also be the reason Japan didn't have a much of a castle building (or sieging) tradition prior to the 16th century.
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Nov 27, 2013 00:20
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ArchangeI posted:Would you consider the leadership of the Red Army, from Stalin down, to be incompetent? Because the same could be said about them. Well I could exclude the callousness to the loss of life because you cannot make a tortilla without cracking some eggs. But continuos repetition of the same mistakes seems like a fireable offence , at least try something different even in a limited basis. They look incapable of adapting quickly to the changing conditions , and I want to know if they are trapped in a certain organization without mechanisms to change , victims of technology or any other thing.
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Nov 27, 2013 00:23
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Panzeh posted:While there were better ways to conduct infantry assaults in World War I What would have been the best way to conduct infantry assaults?
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Nov 27, 2013 00:27
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Panzeh posted:While there were better ways to conduct infantry assaults in World War I, it's important to understand that half the reason no one could make serious movements is that the rail network in Western Europe was extremely good which allowed for very quick reinforcements in any sector. By comparison, in Russia, for example, the railroads were nowhere near as good so when someone won a battle locally, they could actually make moves before reinforcements appeared to plug any gap. Was there ever any attempt to sever the raillines by means of air attack or long range artillery?
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Nov 27, 2013 00:28
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I need to go to bed, so no long posts now, but Haig specifically - while suffering from certain negative characteristics - played an important role in thoroughly reforming the British system of logistics, and training, in reviewing new technologies, and in slowly but certainly increasing tactical flexibility of lower level command. Furthermore, there is a lot of research from the 50s and 60s conducted among his veterans, including common footsoldiers, that basically paints him in a much more positive light than the revisionary academic writing of the later 1960s. One of his big problems, though, was a tendency to draw ambitious plans without giving clear instructions to his subordinates; I think some historians basically called him "the armchair general" because he was more likely to give a posteriori criticism of an operation than positive instructions prior to the operation.
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Nov 27, 2013 00:31
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Actually, I'd recommend this article as a starting point; it's a relatively recent (1989), polemical piece by one of his best known advocates - and it's infinitely better written than anything I could come up with: http://www.westernfrontassociation.com/great-war-on-land/john-terraine-essays-on-leadership-and-war-1914-18/192-field-haig.html
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Nov 27, 2013 00:44
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Saint Celestine posted:Id be interested in an effort post about how "Butcher" Haig wasn't all that incompetent. Sure! I'm actually quite tired of the false narrative that all WWI generals were callous foolhardy blunderers so thank you for the opportunity. I think that most criticisms of Haig and his contemporaries (I will include literally every senior commander involved in WWI in this because none of them are really any different from any other in this regard) are twofold: first, that they bore the responsibility for the static nature of the war because they were too stupid to figure out a way to attack anything successfully, and second, that they were responsible for an extraordinary number of casualties that could be traced back to their incompetence. On address the nature of the fighting, particularly on the Western Front: this was a product of the weapons available at the time, not a lack of ingenuity, creativity, or intellect by the commanders. Without getting too wordy, I'll just assert that every major technological advance offered by the industrial revolution to that point favored the defender both tactically and strategically. Modern artillery was incredibly destructive, but was not agile in targeting and thus was best used in conjunction with established reference points (in other words, from a prepared position that you're defending). Fire support was not up to the task of effectively supporting offensive operations effectively until 1917 at the very earliest, and even the it is iffy. Direct fire support was also heavily defensive in nature: the best machine guns of the era were all heavies, and neither the equipment nor the squad-level tactics effectively utilized any sort of direct fire support. From a tactical, operational, and strategic perspective, mobility too favored the defender. Tactical mobility for motor vehicles was nearly nonexistent at the time: trucks required roads, there were no effective tracked vehicles until late in the war, and horses still provided the vast majority of the light land lift mobility that armies required. This meant that it was next to impossible to effectively sustain offensives, as supply mobility was limited to that which soldiers carried with them, and what moved along at the speed of the attack. They were, however, effectively able to support defensive operations: trucks had roads, trains had tracks in the rear, and this mean that moving men and materiel to support a defensive operation was not only possible, but actually quite easy. It wasn't until well after the war that motorized sustainment became practical, and that more than anything (including the development of effective armor) contributed to the re-establishment of offensive mobility. Finally, no one, and I mean NO ONE really understood exactly how difficult it was to reduce an opponent that was a fully mobilized modern industrial power. The ability to reinforce and resupply an industrial army was an order of magnitude greater than it had been a century before, and for some reason no one who watched the American Civil War really understood this. Point being, the attitude that it was simply a lack of competence or intelligence precluding victory was silly: it was ALWAYS going to take a long time and a lot of lives to win an industrial war, trenches or not. WWII eventually made this point abundantly clear to everyone. As to the second issues (casualties), is very easy and simplistic to point to WWI and say "lol", but in reality "Butcher Haig" was responsible for far fewer casualties, proportionally speaking, than some generals who we hold up today as pre-eminent: Zhukov, Giap, and, in particular, Robert E. Lee come to mind immediately, and there are many, many others you could name. These three examples really make Haig look quite reasonable in comparison; Haig never did ANYTHING to his Army like what Lee did at Wilderness/Spotslyvania or Gettysburg. That being said, of course the casualty numbers from WWI are ghastly, and this too was much more of a byproduct of the state of technology (as discussed above) rather than any particular failure on the part of the officers. I'm not trying to argue that Haig or any of his peers were transcendent geniuses, but we should probably remember a few things about them when we're making our historical assessments: no generation of officers in history faced a more different battlefield from the time they were junior officers to senior officers than that cohort, and no one outside of those who watched the ACW very closely had any clue that his was the case. Regarding Haig in particular, he is an interesting case. During the war he was quite highly regarded by his peers (Pershing in particular) as being both a strong leader and a capable strategic thinker. He inherited an army that was badly outdated and completely outclassed (particularly in the realm of sustainment/logistics) and in quite short order molded them into an effective fighting force. He was quick to adopt and try new technologies and tactics (moreso than most of his peers), and as a result the Brits generally speaking enjoyed superior equipment from 1916 on. He was also an effective politician, a necessity for a 5-star commander in an alliance as he was. He was very highly regarded in his day and was buried as a hero; it wasn't until Lloyd George and later the rather obnoxious counter-culture history writers of the mid-century landed on him that the "butcher" mythology began in earnest. bewbies fucked around with this message at 01:01 on Nov 27, 2013 |
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Nov 27, 2013 00:58
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Not that I'm trying to excuse WWI tactics or anything, but part of the problem was that the Entente's intelligence services were pretty bad and/or were lying: They kept telling commanders that their attacks had killed as many as or even twice as many Germans as had been lost and that Germany would run out of manpower in mere months, which lead figures like Joffre, French and Haig to believe that yeah, we're losing a lot of troops, but just a little more and the breakthrough will come any day now. The real ratio was often much worse, to the tune of 2:1 British and French losses vs German losses during Entente offensives. ArchangeI posted:Was there ever any attempt to sever the raillines by means of air attack or long range artillery? EDIT: bewbies posted:As to the second issues (casualties), is very easy and simplistic to point to WWI and say "lol", but in reality "Butcher Haig" was responsible for far fewer casualties, proportionally speaking, than some generals who we hold up today as pre-eminent: Zhukov, Giap, and, in particular, Robert E. Lee. gradenko_2000 fucked around with this message at 01:01 on Nov 27, 2013 |
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Nov 27, 2013 00:58
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Man total war sure is depressing.Put everybody on the field ,completely revamp the organization of your army and the best result you can hope is a few years of soul-crushing grinding of the enemy with millions dead and even more crippled.
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Nov 27, 2013 01:20
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gradenko_2000 posted:The description of the final Red Army assault on Berlin definitely made me go "Holy poo poo what a waste"
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Nov 27, 2013 01:56
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Arquinsiel posted:The rumoured reason for the Western Allied assault around to the south and into Austria to avoid it makes a lot of sense, assuming the figure thrown around of "one million casualties" was actually calculated pre-Soviet assault. No, Eisenhower and the rest of the Allied high command genuinely believed the Alpine Redoubt was A Thing. Also the moment it became clear that the Germans weren't just going to collapse in the West and allow the Allies through, there was very little enthusiasm for pushing past the boundaries of the agreed occupation zones.
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Nov 27, 2013 02:01
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Alchenar posted:No, Eisenhower and the rest of the Allied high command genuinely believed the Alpine Redoubt was A Thing. Speaking of book recommendations earlier, this is actually a fun read. Very clear and it's a primary source, so anyone seriously interested in the ETO should check it out. Also dirt cheap.
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Nov 27, 2013 02:09
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Having been to Berschtsgarden, the idea of the alpine fortress is goddamn hilarious to me. Yeah there are mountains but it's not Tora Bora, you could easily control the valleys while letting the Germans freeze and starve to death up in some cave.
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Nov 27, 2013 02:14
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Godholio posted:Mysticism probably isn't the right word, but the gist of it is "here are a series of catchy I think it would be more accurate to be described as a sequence/series of generalizations about the meaning of waging war effectively. Where Clauswitz I imagine goes into more scientific detail, Sun Tzu is more philosophical; as long as its understood more as a philosophy then saying its a bunch of catchy rules is missing the forest for the trees. Sun Tzu never I believe says "So and so will lose if he doesn't heed my advice" its more probabilistic, "So and so is far more likely to lose if he doesn't abide by these principles." He doesn't think you should always retreat if outnumbered 10:1 in an engagement but that you as a commander should keep your eyes open to all paths and carefully consider the known risks versus the known advantages before acting decisively. quote:I understand the importance of the book as a foundation and I found it interesting in that sense; I'm just saying that at this point, in this society, it didn't tell me anything I haven't already heard (because everyone and their uncle quotes the Art of War). I think its important to read the book along with the history context in which it was written, because people can parrot the sayings all they want but isn't that just hearsay without context? It should be studied directly so that you can critically consider it and apply it to other writings. Sun Tzu is to war what Machiavelli is to politics, both authors hated their subject matter which I think makes them especially important when considered with more modern writings. Modern writings that I highly suspect lack the same level of contempt.
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Nov 27, 2013 02:21
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Raenir Salazar posted:Sun Tzu is to war what Machiavelli is to politics, both authors hated their subject matter which I think makes them especially important when considered with more modern writings. Modern writings that I highly suspect lack the same level of contempt.
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Nov 27, 2013 02:27
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Raenir Salazar posted:I think its important to read the book along with the history context in which it was written, because people can parrot the sayings all they want but isn't that just hearsay without context? It should be studied directly so that you can critically consider it and apply it to other writings. The lesson here is not to use clumsy metaphor in your posts when sleep deprived.  Sorry for not being more clear.edit: Hell if I remember correctly I read On War before the Art of War. Cumshot in the Dark fucked around with this message at 03:50 on Nov 27, 2013 |
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Nov 27, 2013 03:30
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 Mid-teens here too, I think it says a lot to the books credit that you can grasp its fundamental concepts as a teenager; its way more approachable when your young and is in a better position to influence your thinking.
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Nov 27, 2013 04:30
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AATREK CURES KIDS posted:What would have been the best way to conduct infantry assaults? Stormtroopers/arditi spearhead the attack, supported by coordinated artillery fire (HE, shrapnel and/or gas). They neutralize strongpoints and break through the weakest portion of the line. Following infantry mop up any remaining pockets of resistance and exploit the breakthrough. Tanks are also handy for punching holes in enemy lines and expanding breakouts. It's a lot more complicated than that, but that's the gist.
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Nov 27, 2013 07:50
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Bacarruda posted:Stormtroopers/arditi spearhead the attack, supported by coordinated artillery fire (HE, shrapnel and/or gas). They neutralize strongpoints and break through the weakest portion of the line. Following infantry mop up any remaining pockets of resistance and exploit the breakthrough. Tanks are also handy for punching holes in enemy lines and expanding breakouts. It starts to fall apart once the enemy counterbarrage breaks the phone line connecting you and your artillery batteries with your assault troops, making runners the only viable option for coordination - meanwhile the defender has mostly intact underground phone lines and can coordinate his actions with zero delays.
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Nov 27, 2013 09:00
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Why didn't the trench war of WWI turn into a very nasty underground war?
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Nov 27, 2013 09:11
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Nenonen posted:It starts to fall apart once the enemy counterbarrage breaks the phone line connecting you and your artillery batteries with your assault troops, making runners the only viable option for coordination - meanwhile the defender has mostly intact underground phone lines and can coordinate his actions with zero delays. How far away was wireless battlefield radio technology?
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Nov 27, 2013 09:11
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Bacarruda posted:Stormtroopers/arditi spearhead the attack, supported by coordinated artillery fire (HE, shrapnel and/or gas). They neutralize strongpoints and break through the weakest portion of the line. Following infantry mop up any remaining pockets of resistance and exploit the breakthrough. Tanks are also handy for punching holes in enemy lines and expanding breakouts. I think you're trying to describe the infiltration tactics (there are a few inaccuracies but I get your point). The issue is, even if you can gain localized superiority over a relatively small battlespace (say, a division-sized area), no army in the world in 1914-18 could successfully sustain such an attack long enough or deep enough to successfully exploit it. As soon as you got more than a few dozen kms away from your main supply trains and fire support, armies simply couldn't move the tonnage necessary quickly enough. Artillery movement was hideously slow and general supplies moved even slower: by the time you were within a few kms of the front most of it had to be literally carried by hand. It was at this point that your opponent, having commenced counter-fire missions and having used trains and trucks on the road to move a couple of reserve divisions up to meet your offensive begins his counterattack, and you're then beaten back with even heavier losses than your opponent. So it went, at least, for the Stosstruppen and their ilk on the Western Front. The Russians did do this quite successfully during the Brusilov offensive but much of that success can be attributed to the horrendous strategic mobility of the A-H army, who lacked the rail and motor networks of the bigger armies. In any case, the single most important thing that enhanced mobility on the battlefield (and let to the even-bloodier mobile warfare of WWII) was cross-country motorized logistical support.
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Nov 27, 2013 09:15
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VanSandman posted:Why didn't the trench war of WWI turn into a very nasty underground war? It did, in areas especially suitable for mining operations. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Hill_60_(Western_Front) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Vimy_Ridge
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Nov 27, 2013 09:16
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Grand Prize Winner posted:So what's the deal with Japanese castles? They look relatively indefensible to my Western eyes (relatively low stone escarpments under what appear to be wooden ceilings and paper walls). But presumably they worked else the daimyo wouldn't have kept building the drat things. quote:Well, the main reason the Japanese can’t build stone castles like you find everywhere else is that Japan is so earthquake-prone, moreso than pretty much anywhere else in Eurasia, except for parts of Indonesia. Even small, regular earthquakes would mean that a stone castle would need constant, expensive maintenence, and even then it would steadily lose stability. And a large earthquake would turn a European-style castle into a giant deathtrap. But the Japanese design of a wooden superstructure built on a steeply sloping earth mound (ideally stone-faced) is defensible and about as close to earthquake-proof as you can get in a building of this size and without modern construction techniques. HEY GUNS fucked around with this message at 10:30 on Nov 27, 2013 |
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Nov 27, 2013 10:26
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bewbies posted:I think you're trying to describe the infiltration tactics (there are a few inaccuracies but I get your point). Pretty much. Hutier tactics are really intriguing, but I won't pretend to be an expert on them. bewbies posted:In any case, the single most important thing that enhanced mobility on the battlefield (and let to the even-bloodier mobile warfare of WWII) was cross-country motorized logistical support. One of the things that I find so striking about WWII was how un-motorized parts of it were. The Wehrmacht was using horse-drawn wagons alongside Kubelwagens and Opel Blitzes. Mules are used by the US Army in the Italian campaign.
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Nov 27, 2013 10:59
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Hypothetical question: if I recall correctly, by the end of WWII, Hitler's lackeys tried to persuade him to abandon Berlin and set up a defence elsewhere. Some of them, mostly those connected to Doenitz, suggested going north, where they would be protected by ditches, rivers and whatever else there is in Schleswig-Holstein and northern Germany in general. Others recommended holing up in the Alps. Which of the three places (Berlin, north, Alps) would actually make the most sense as the site of his last stand (from a military point of view, symbolically he obviously had to die in Berlin)?
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Nov 27, 2013 11:05
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From the military point of view? The one that was closest to American POW camps, and at the same time furthest away from the Soviets. At that point the rational thing to do would be to find the most favourable way to surrender, not to fight a delaying war without a win-scenario.
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Nov 27, 2013 11:19
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Slavvy posted:Starting point: a year of attempting to clog the enemy's machine guns with corpses has failed. Lets think of something new! Generally infantry attacks in WWI are mischaracterized. For example, the slaughter at the Somme was essentially due to overestimating the effectiveness of the initial artillery bombardment.
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Nov 27, 2013 11:19
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Bacarruda posted:Pretty much. Hutier tactics are really intriguing, but I won't pretend to be an expert on them. Let's read In Stahlgewittern once more. It can't get more colorful than Ernst Jünger taking LSD at 75: http://www.welt.de/kultur/literarischewelt/article118106538/Ernst-Juengers-LSD-Trips-mit-Schnittchen-und-Mozart.html Power Khan fucked around with this message at 11:28 on Nov 27, 2013 |
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Nov 27, 2013 11:22
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