Ask Us About Military History: Remove Balls To Fire Blanks

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Arquinsiel: Jun 1, 2006; "There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families. And no government can do anything except through people, and people must look to themselves first."

God Bless Margaret Thatcher
God Bless England
RIP My Iron Lady

If you've seen the original cut version of the final scene you know exactly how seriously they were taking it. God-damned heartbreaking.

# ? Jan 30, 2014 16:33

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# ? May 16, 2024 18:41

SeanBeansShako: Nov 20, 2009; Now the Drums beat up again,
For all true Soldier Gentlemen.

Arquinsiel posted:

If you've seen the original cut version of the final scene you know exactly how seriously they were taking it. God-damned heartbreaking.

Is it in the making of in the DVD box set? I've seen it. I can understand why Tony Robinson is biting back at Gove bless him.

# ? Jan 30, 2014 16:51

Arquinsiel: Jun 1, 2006; "There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families. And no government can do anything except through people, and people must look to themselves first."

God Bless Margaret Thatcher
God Bless England
RIP My Iron Lady

SeanBeansShako posted:

Is it in the making of in the DVD box set? I've seen it. I can understand why Tony Robinson is biting back at Gove bless him.

I think they break it down in that, but it's not just directly shown. I found it on youtube somewhere years ago.

# ? Jan 30, 2014 17:02

Davincie: Jul 7, 2008

There was a version with some sort of scandinavian subtitles on youtube like a month ago.

# ? Jan 30, 2014 18:16

Rodrigo Diaz: Apr 16, 2007; Knights who are at the wars eat their bread in sorrow;
their ease is weariness and sweat;
they have one good day after many bad

For the curious, here's a little youtube video on gunbreaking a horse:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bhWCymdwlHE

# ? Jan 31, 2014 00:38

ArchangeI: Jul 15, 2010

Ghost of Mussolini posted:

In actual military history news (how often does that happen!) Ferguson continues to add to the pile of evidence that makes his naming to Harvard inexplicable.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/30/britain-first-world-war-biggest-error-niall-ferguson?CMP=EMCNEWEML6619I2

e: vvv yes Gove's article is just one big

A man who does not understand the difference between "entering the war" and "sending troops" shouldn't comment on military history. Especially someone who should understand the role the Royal Navy played in British strategy. I read that yesterday and was completely flabbergasted. Has that man ever even read a book on WWI?

# ? Jan 31, 2014 01:16

Slim Jim Pickens: Jan 16, 2012

ArchangeI posted:

A man who does not understand the difference between "entering the war" and "sending troops" shouldn't comment on military history. Especially someone who should understand the role the Royal Navy played in British strategy. I read that yesterday and was completely flabbergasted. Has that man ever even read a book on WWI?

Yeah, he wrote one.

I like that his main point is that if Britain didn't join in WWI, they would've kept the old empire? That's a solid, bias-free and inoffensive stance.

# ? Jan 31, 2014 01:40

HEY GUNS: Oct 11, 2012; FOPTIMUS PRIME

Slim Jim Pickens posted:

Yeah, he wrote one.

Oh my god.

# ? Jan 31, 2014 02:59

bewbies: Sep 23, 2003; Fun Shoe

Slim Jim Pickens posted:

I like that his main point is that if Britain didn't join in WWI, they would've kept the old empire?

It is? Where are you seeing this?

I mean, honestly, I'm not seeing what is so extraordinary and/or offensive about anything that guy says, at least based on the posted article.

# ? Jan 31, 2014 03:06

ArchangeI: Jul 15, 2010

bewbies posted:

It is? Where are you seeing this?

I mean, honestly, I'm not seeing what is so extraordinary and/or offensive about anything that guy says, at least based on the posted article.

"We should have waited until the Germans beat their main adversaries on land so they can pour their resources, and the ones they have captured, into their fleet. This will allow us to fight on our terms, just like we did against noted proponent of industrialized warfare Napoleon Bonaparte. Also we had no Army in 1914. None. Nada. We had to build one from scratch and send it to France in just a few weeks. We also had to send in the troops the moment we went to war instead of pursuing a blockade. Also all our colonies left because of THE DEBT."

I mean, you can argue that British decision making during WWI was flawed, and that it wasn't a noble effort by the otherwise pacifist Brits against the warlike Hun, but arguing that Britain should have stayed out of the war to improve their chances against Germany in a later war is insane. I can not come up with a scenario where a quick German victory against France means that the continental balance of power shifts to a more favorable arrangement for Britain. His main argument was that sending an army in France wasn't a good idea (debatable) and that Britain should have used its naval supremacy better (probably true). Except somehow that means that Britain should stayed out of the war entirely, instead of declaring war and blockading.

# ? Jan 31, 2014 03:37

Vincent Van Goatse: Nov 8, 2006; Enjoy every sandwich.; Smellrose

Slim Jim Pickens posted:

Yeah, he wrote one.

I like that his main point is that if Britain didn't join in WWI, they would've kept the old empire? That's a solid, bias-free and inoffensive stance.

It's also wrong in every important respect.

:siren:

WARNING: BIG WALL OF TEXT :siren:

I can't give a blow by blow Fisking of Ferguson's idiotic swill because my library is currently boxed up in my garage and I haven't actually read The Pity of War, but I'm familiar enough with the main thrust of it all that I can safely describe it as garbage.

OK, first of all he totally ignores the naval rivalry between Britain and Germany before the First World War. If a student turned in a paper to me on the origins of the First World War and omitted this, I would fail them immediately. German sailors drank regular toasts lustily hoping for Der Tag when the High Seas Fleet would sortie and defeat the British battle fleet in a reverse Trafalgar in the North Sea. The Kaiser was obsessed with sea power. Admiral Tirpitz was one of the key men who shaped German history as a whole in the two decades before August 1914. The German Army Command and the other hawks during the July Crisis went through quite a bit of trouble to give crucial mobilizing orders and such like when the Wilhelm and the fleet were on a cruise in Norwegian waters, because they thought Tirpitz and the Kaiser would want to hold off on military action out of fear of the superior strength of the Royal Navy (irony or ironies, the service which had done the most to damage Anglo-German relations had a better understanding of British feelings than anyone else).

Second of all, Ferguson pins the whole of the collapse of Anglo-German relations on Sir Edward Grey, the Liberal Foreign Secretary, claiming he led a cabal to bring Britain around into opposition to Germany because Reasons (and because he was from a political party that Ferguson hates). This is preposterous. When he first took over as Foreign Secretary, he was interested in better relations with Germany, or at least trying to find common ground. Want proof, here's an excerpt from a January 1906 letter from Grey to the Prime Minister, Henry Campbell-Bannerman, discussing British actions during the recent Algeciras Crisis:

Sir Edward Grey to Henry Campbell-Bannerman, 9 January 1906, Add MS 41218, f. 49-50, Campbell-Bannerman MSS, British Library posted:

In more than one part of the world I find ... that Germany is feeling after a coaling station in a port. Everywhere we block this. I am not an expert in naval strategy, but I doubt whether it is vy important ... to prevent Germany getting ports at a distance from her base; and the moment may come when timely admission, that it is not a cardinal object of British policy to prevent her having such a port, may have great pacific effect.

That sure sounds like a man doing all he can to poison the Anglo-German diplomatic well, doesn't it? Never mind that in the fallout from Wilhelm's congratulatory telegram to Paul Kruger after the Boers defeated the Jameson Raid had led to such a crisis between Germany and Britain that a "Flying Squadron" of warships had been assembled in case the balloon went up. Never mind that since at least 1903 the Admiralty had been drawing up potential operational plans for a war with the German Navy. Never mind that Tirpitz mentioned the Royal Navy by name in his own memoranda leading up to the devising of the German Navy Laws in 1898. Never mind all that, Sir Edward Grey is obviously the villain of the story. I mean, he had to be, he was a Liberal.

Third of all, Ferguson (I believe) interprets a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence in August 1911 (amidst another Moroccan Crisis, the Agadir Incident) as being the point where the sinister cabal of evil Liberal politicians decided they would throw in with France in a continental war and destroy the Empire in the process. Bull loving poo poo. I've read the minutes of that conference and nothing of the sort happened. Hell, here's my own description of events taken direct from my own loving Ph.D thesis. Footnotes are missing, sorry.

Me posted:

Agadir

In the spring of 1911, France had begun working to remove the last vestiges of independent Morocco by sending a military column to Fez. Germany, alarmed by this disruption of the status quo began diplomatic counter-manoeuvres but overplayed their hand by demanding excessive compensation for the loss of their (largely theoretical) commercial claims in Morocco in the form of French Congolese holdings and by impetuously sending the gunboat Panther to Agadir in defence of their position. It is worth noting that in both cases the impetus came from the German Foreign Ministry, as Tirpitz for all his faults knew better than to make such an obvious challenge to British maritime pride. Sir Edward Grey and the rest of the Foreign Office understood the German grievances but nonetheless regarded them with the suspicion of a conspiracy theorist. Helping them to this conclusion were the usual diplomatic rumours of the time, especially one of French provenance that the Germans were desirous of a great African territory that would ultimately threaten South Africa and Rhodesia.

The Admiralty, who were not privy to such rumours and in any case understood the reliance on seapower that such a move would entail, took a much more relaxed view of the entire crisis. Much 'to the consternation of Crowe and Nicolson', the Admiralty's initial reply to the Panthersprung was to note the fact that the crisis posed little threat to Britain's maritime interests. This response was, in retrospect, a very good example for those who wish to paint the Navy as a retrograde institution. It was entirely correct but politically na�ve�the diplomats and cabinet politicians wanted something more than a blithe assurance of safety, and the Admiralty would not stoop to give it.

Frustration was not limited to the Cabinet. From his flagship, Admiral [Sir Francis] Bridgeman [Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet i.e. the main battle fleet in British waters] complained to [Prince Louis of] Battenberg [Second Sea Lord at the Admiralty] in an unusually forceful manner at the end of September about recent events. Hearing garbled (and, in fact, inaccurate) reports of German warships operating in the Orkneys and Shetlands, Bridgeman sent first 'a Scout & some Destroyers' to the islands and then took his own flagship, the dreadnought Neptune, to Lerwick in response to rumours of German cruisers being seen in nearby waters. 'It's difficult to say what particular cruiser she was,' Bridgeman stated 'but I am led to believe she was one of those in charge of the Submarines & most possibly she was accompanied by them!' These reports convinced Bridgeman that 'Germany has laid her plans for attacking our fleet in these Northern ports with His Submarines, Destroyers and Mines�the instant they declare war!' Germany, he thought, would go to war using their flotillas as the tip of the spear. Their rumoured infiltration of the northern islands was disturbing enough, but 'what is so disconcerting to all of us Sailors in the Home Fleet' was that the Cabinet 'will permit no precautions being taken to prevent a surprise.' Bridgeman complained further that he �was forbidden to take the Fleet to Sea, or take the necessary precautions while laying in Harbour, exception having been taken to getting nets out at night!� What were the point of War Orders providing precautionary measures for 'Strained Relations' when those Orders 'were disregarded just as much as if they had not existed!' The experience had even soured him on the use of Scapa and Cromarty and the Firth as bases. 'Are we never to take precautions for fear of the press? If so, then I am no longer in favour of using these Northern Harbours for our Battleships! For if we are not to go to sea, and not defend ourselves, the fleet will be gone before we can fight an action!'

On August 23rd, 1911, in the context of the crisis a famous meeting occurred in London. Despite recent efforts to downplay its importance, there is still the impression of a bureaucratic coup d'�tat to the proceedings. The Army could hardly have prayed for better circumstances. The Navy's best advocates were either absent or hors d'combat. Also absent were Lewis Harcourt and Lords Morley and Crewe, who if not sympathetic to the Navy�s cause, were unlikely to favour the Army's 'continental commitment'; in any case they were furious regarding their enforced absence. The Navy�s case was thus left to [Reginald] McKenna [First Lord of the Admiralty (the civil head of the Admiralty)], [Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur] Wilson[, VC] [First Sea Lord (professional head of the Admiralty)], and [Admiral Sir Alexander] Bethell [Director of Naval Intelligence]. It is not an understatement that 'the meeting constituted a gathering of the entente faction'. The stage was set for what amounted to the Navy's Ides of March.

The subject of the meeting was officially described as 'Action to be Taken in the Event of Intervention in a European War'. Zara Steiner observed that this would be the only time that the Committee 'actually reviewed the over-all pattern of British strategy before 1914.' Wilson and McKenna began the meeting by denying that the Admiralty could provide men or ships to transport a major expedition across the Channel:

'The whole force at the disposal of the Admiralty would be absorbed in keeping the enemy within the North Sea. Ordinarily the Navy would furnish transport officers and protecting ships. These could not be furnished in these circumstances.'

Unfortunately, this argument was diluted when General [Sir Henry] Wilson [Director of Military Operations (the man in charge of British Army war planning and a strong advocate of sending the British Expeditionary Force to fight alongside France)] observed that in any case the Channel would likely 'be covered by the main operations' in the North Sea, and resultantly the risk to the troop transports would be 'very slight', especially since in the first few days of mobilization many of the Navy's warships activated from reserve would be 'traversing the Channel on the way to their stations.' When pressed for details on the opinion of Admiral Groome, the Admiralty Director of Transports, McKenna said the Admiralty had not sufficient men to mobilize the fleet and ferry the expeditionary force to France simultaneously. Bethell added that a previous report on transport availability had 'assumed the Fleet had already been mobilized.' [Prime Minister] Asquith grew increasingly impatient over the whole issue and finally ended the discussion, instructing McKenna to look into the matter of transportation because the Army's plan required simultaneous mobilization of the British forces alongside the French Army, making 'the question of time... all important.'

General Wilson was then able to commence his 'masterful, well-planned exposition'. Seven British divisions (six infantry, one cavalry) plus Army-level assets totalling some 160,000 men would cross the Channel and marshal at Maubeuge, where they would be available to assist the French forces defending against the main German thrust, which Wilson said would happen in 'the 90-mile gap between Verdun and Maubeuge.' Limitations of the local road network meant the Germans could employ at most forty divisions against a French defensive force of thirty-seven to thirty-nine. In these circumstances, General Wilson said it 'was quite likely that our six divisions might prove to be the deciding factor.' Doubts over whether Germany would violate Belgian neutrality only south of the Liege fortress were dismissed by Wilson when they were raised by Churchill and, later, General [Sir John] French [present as Inspector-General of the Forces]. When the question of a French defeat along the Meuse was raised, Wilson simply said the British forces would remain alongside the French left flank. This did not satisfy [Home Secretary Winston] Churchill, who 'did not like the idea of the British Army retiring into France away from its home country.' After a discussion of potential Russian contributions to a European war, and a suggestion by Churchill that Russia could be supported by a forcing of the Dardanelles which Grey felt would be 'an insuperable difficulty', the meeting adjourned for lunch.

The Admiralty spoke their case that afternoon. The First Sea Lord began by offering three related objections:

1. The effect on public morale if the entire regular Army went abroad.
2. The effect of such a deployment on the Navy�s defence of the British Isles.
3. The consequential loss of the ability for the Navy to carry out combined operations.

On the second point, Admiral Wilson emphasized that his statements were in no way a capitulation on the unending invasion argument. It was not 'a question of invasion by 70,000 men,' he said. 'The guarantee of the Navy against any number like that was absolute, but small raids might cause serious damage unless very promptly met.' The third objection allowed Admiral Wilson to segue into the Admiralty's own plans of war against Germany.

Wilson's strategy was consistent with his proposals during the previous Moroccan Crisis. Landing operations would be undertaken to seize Heligoland 'as soon as possible after the outbreak of war' using the Royal Marines for the assault, and afterwards other islands and points on the coasts on the German Bight would be taken by Army forces covered by the fleet. Wangeroog, Schillighorn, and B�s�m are named explicitly in the Minutes, the first to prevent its use as an inconvenience for the British destroyer flotillas on observation duties or as a German signal station, the second for its potential as an advanced base, and the last because of the threat it would pose to the Kiel Canal if in British hands. No mention is made of Borkum, presumably because Heligoland was designated as an essential target, making the former's capture redundant. Admiral Wilson's estimate was that these operations would 'probably require one division, perhaps more', especially if at a later phase of the war the British felt 'obliged to try and destroy or drive out the German Fleet at Wilhelmshaven', presumably if they had not previously sortied to attack the earlier British landing forces en masse. Anticipating arguments on the vulnerability of the transports to attack or the landing forces to counterattacks from the German shore, the First Sea Lord claimed that by 'having its transports close at hand' the British amphibious assets 'would be highly mobile, and could be landed and embarked again before superior forces could assembled to destroy [them].'

Summarizing the plan's objectives, Admiral Wilson launched into a barbed attack on his Army counterpart:

'If in this way we could retain the 10 German divisions of which General Wilson had spoken on the North Sea coast, we should make a material contribution to the Allied cause by keeping these men not only from the theatre of war elsewhere, but from normal productive labour, possibly in dockyards or kindred industries. That meant that we should intensify the economic strain upon Germany.'

This excerpt should remove any doubt that Admiral Wilson was supportive of economic warfare or that he was blind to the possibility of these landings being faced by German reserve units or even the Landstrumm, instead of first-line regiments pulled back from the Western Front. After all, why would a redeployment of active duty troops pose a danger to the availability of shipyard labour?

How McKenna took all this in is not recorded, although [naval historian] Nicholas Lambert suggests he 'listened in horror', which may be true as Battenberg would later write that neither McKenna nor [Minister of War R.B.] Haldane knew of this plan before Wilson presented it. In any case, the counterattack came quickly. When Churchill observed that the taking of Wilhelmshaven would involve 'regular siege operations', the First Sea Lord 'assented', and further observed he did not anticipate any difficulty in the Heligoland operation�despite previous N.I.D. [Naval Intelligence Department] studies of such an operation suggesting otherwise�since the Admiralty 'knew what guns were there, and those we could easily fight.' The only intelligence that the First Sea Lord was concerned with involved mortar batteries on Heligoland, presumably due to the danger of plunging fire. As for the other operations 'we could not foresee how much we could do; but the nature of the enemy coast, with its numerous creeks and islands providing shelter for the enemy's torpedo craft, would make its blockade very arduous' without 'regular troops to assist [the Navy] in their operations.' Field Marshal Sir William Nicholson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, noted that Admiral Wilson's comment on keeping transports close to hand was a departure from a statement he had previously written for a book on the invasion/conscription issue. The First Sea Lord retorted that 'the difference was that we should have command of the sea.' Furthermore, the guns of the fleet could protect the landing forces. This provoked Nicholson to sum up the Army's position on the matter:

'The truth was that this class of operation possibly had some value a century ago, when land communications were indifferent, but now, when they were excellent, they were doomed to failure. Wherever we threatened to land the Germans could concentrate superior force.'

Things only got worse for the Navy after this. Churchill's comment that landing operations would tie the fleet to the coast was met by Wilson observing that those ships 'would be tied to the coast by the necessity for blockading it.' Nicholson thought siege operations against Wilhelmshaven were out of the question given the Japanese experience at Port Arthur. When Wilson said a successful fleet battle in the North Sea might open the Prussian and Pomeranian coasts to attack by the Royal Navy, Haldane scoffed it would 'not cause the Germans a moment's anxiety, for they had always ridiculed the idea of fortifying Berlin despite its comparative proximity to the sea.' Churchill, meanwhile, thought entering the Baltic would 'incur great risks' to the fleet.

Churchill would later remark to Asquith that he had lost all confidence in Wilson and '[n]o man of real power cd have answered so foolishly.' The War Minister now had his opportunity and went on the offensive, informing the Prime Minister that 'the Admirals live in a world of their own. The Fisher Method, which Wilson seems to follow, that war plans should be locked up in the brain of the First Sea Lord, is out of date and impractical. Our problems of defence are far too numerous and complex to be treated in that way.' Furthermore, 'I have after mature consideration come to the conclusion that this is... the gravest problem which confronts the Government to-day and that unless it is tackled resolutely I cannot remain in office.'

In addition, Haldane took the opportunity to embarrass the Admiralty further on August 25th. He submitted the details of the latest revision of the Army's transport requirements with a demand for immediate comment, despite knowing he was on leave. After three weeks Haldane complained to the Prime Minister about the (predictable) lack of response, and Asquith swallowed the bait whole, writing to McKenna telling the First Lord to 'Please see to this, for though there is every reason to home that we are well out of the wood, all possible contingencies ought to be studied.' There seems little doubt Haldane had by now fixed his eyes on the First Lordship. He claimed the Board of Admiralty could not be counted upon to move with the times, complaining 'the doors of the Admiralty are closed to all new ideas and new developments.'

In the end, it seems unlikely that the Admiralty could have carried the day, even if Wilson had put forward what Sir William May might have described as a significantly more au fait presentation of his schemes of campaign against the German coast. At this distance, with the horrors of the Somme and Ypres and Passchendaele defining�for better or worse�public conceptions of the Great War, and the many successful amphibious operations seen during the Second World War and subsequent conflicts, it is tempting to see Wilson's proposals as a great 'what if'. This is, however, to put too much stock in hindsight. Whatever their chances of success, they were politically na�ve in the face of the Army delegates' emphasis on cooperation in an assumed Anglo-French coalition. An expeditionary force deployed to the Continent, even a body of only two corps, was a direct show of material assistance that a naval blockade could not be, no matter how many German divisions were kept pinned to the Waddenzee by British landings.

OK, so that's how the conference went down. It's important to note that at no point did the C.I.D. make a firm decision on committing the B.E.F. to the continent. In fact Asquith and his Cabinet wouldn't make a final decision until after the First World War had begun. However, the real significance of this conference is that the Admiralty presented what looked like a suicidal proposal (whether it was or not can be argued) while the Army's plan as presented had a professional polish and was expounded on expertly by General Wilson. The Navy in effect ceded their previous primacy in terms of war strategy. From this moment on the British Army had established that they would pursue a strategic policy completely separate from what the Royal Navy had planned. Anyone who says otherwise hasn't actually read the loving conference minutes at the National Archives in Kew. Which is a shame as there's only 14 or 15 pages of them to read.

There's a lot more, including how his fingering Sir Edward Grey as the villain is basically just filing the serial numbers off a similar condemnation of Winston Churchill for not negotiating peace with Hitler in late 1940, which would somehow magically have saved the empire because, essentially, Hitler would've killed off the Soviet Union and then Germany and Britain could've fended off the monster that destroyed the Empire: the United States.

So yeah, Niall Ferguson is a flatulent, pinheaded, morally bankrupt imbecile and HEGEL has a friend's sister who dated him (while he was married!) and ended up throwing his clothes [amongst other things] into the street from ~~her~~ his window.

Vincent Van Goatse fucked around with this message at 05:05 on Jan 31, 2014

# ? Jan 31, 2014 04:55

HEY GUNS: Oct 11, 2012; FOPTIMUS PRIME

ALL-PRO SEXMAN posted:

So yeah, Niall Ferguson is a flatulent, pinheaded, morally bankrupt imbecile and HEGEL has a friend who dated him (while he was married!) and ended up throwing his clothes into the street from her window.

That was her sister, but yes.

Edit: And it was all of his things, from his apartment window. She found out he was married.

HEY GUNS fucked around with this message at 05:03 on Jan 31, 2014

# ? Jan 31, 2014 04:58

Vincent Van Goatse: Nov 8, 2006; Enjoy every sandwich.; Smellrose

a travelling HEGEL posted:

That was her sister, but yes.

Edit: And it was all of his things, from his apartment window. She found out he was married.

I want to shake that lady's hand and buy her a drink.

# ? Jan 31, 2014 05:06

Dreylad: Jun 19, 2001

The War of the World is so loving dumb it's one of the only history books I've had to throw out because I couldn't give it away.

Dreylad fucked around with this message at 05:54 on Jan 31, 2014

# ? Jan 31, 2014 05:27

Smoking Crow: Feb 14, 2012; *laughs at u*

There is a Japanese history thread if you guys want to talk about things that have to do with samurais and ninjas and stuff!

http://forums.somethingawful.com/showthread.php?threadid=3605918

# ? Jan 31, 2014 05:52

Slim Jim Pickens: Jan 16, 2012

bewbies posted:

It is? Where are you seeing this?

I mean, honestly, I'm not seeing what is so extraordinary and/or offensive about anything that guy says, at least based on the posted article.

Ferguson seems genuinely wistful whenever he speaks of the empire and its offputting. I've read The Pity of War by him, and in one section covering the casualties sustained Commonwealth and colonial forces, he beams with patriarchal pride when he talks about how many Australians died in proportion to their population. It seems very inappropriate to take that attitude, when discussing thousands dead out of state obligation.

He also claimed that the Brits and Germans in the trenches hated the poo poo out of each other. He dismisses letters and accounts of mercy and humanity as freak occurrences that happened to get logged. But his proof that the trench war was a frenzy of bile and rage... is a bunch of letters and personal accounts.

According to his book, the highest proportional losses suffered by any state in WWI was by Serbia, with 24% of 17-45 year old men dead. Here's a thing from earlier in the thread? Or the last? It's about the problematic tactics of Austria-Hungary in the Serbian campaign.

https://archive.org/stream/howaustriahungar00reis#page/n0/mode/1up

# ? Jan 31, 2014 06:33

I'm Crap: Aug 15, 2001

Don't say "problematic" when you mean "criminal."

# ? Jan 31, 2014 14:52

Rodrigo Diaz: Apr 16, 2007; Knights who are at the wars eat their bread in sorrow;
their ease is weariness and sweat;
they have one good day after many bad

I'm Crap posted:

Don't say "problematic" when you mean "criminal."

Absolutely. "problematic tactics" is not the same as "repeated atrocities" or "frequent war crimes" if you want to moderate your tone a bit.

# ? Jan 31, 2014 15:07

Davincie: Jul 7, 2008

How is Ronald Asch's 'The Thirty Years War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europa 1618-48'. Please tell me it's good.

# ? Jan 31, 2014 15:50

SeanBeansShako: Nov 20, 2009; Now the Drums beat up again,
For all true Soldier Gentlemen.

Dreylad posted:

The War of the World is so loving dumb it's one of the only history books I've had to throw out because I couldn't give it away.

I heard it makes decent paper for the toilet.

# ? Jan 31, 2014 16:08

bewbies: Sep 23, 2003; Fun Shoe

ArchangeI posted:

"We should have waited until the Germans beat their main adversaries on land so they can pour their resources, and the ones they have captured, into their fleet. This will allow us to fight on our terms, just like we did against noted proponent of industrialized warfare Napoleon Bonaparte. Also we had no Army in 1914. None. Nada. We had to build one from scratch and send it to France in just a few weeks. We also had to send in the troops the moment we went to war instead of pursuing a blockade. Also all our colonies left because of THE DEBT."

I mean, you can argue that British decision making during WWI was flawed, and that it wasn't a noble effort by the otherwise pacifist Brits against the warlike Hun, but arguing that Britain should have stayed out of the war to improve their chances against Germany in a later war is insane. I can not come up with a scenario where a quick German victory against France means that the continental balance of power shifts to a more favorable arrangement for Britain. His main argument was that sending an army in France wasn't a good idea (debatable) and that Britain should have used its naval supremacy better (probably true). Except somehow that means that Britain should stayed out of the war entirely, instead of declaring war and blockading.

I suppose I simply disagree (and, in turn, agree with that guy). WWI was absolutely devastating to Britain, both economically and socially, and they really gained very little in exchange for that sacrifice. The easiest scenario wherein they'd wind up with a "favorable arrangement" that I can come up with is them behaving basically like the US did through the first half of the war: sell unholy amounts of war stuff to the participants, grow fat on the profits while expanding your industrial base continue expanding your fleet, work out a useful peace with the German Empire once the war is over.

edit - I should add that I've never heard of this guy nor anything else he's written, I'm commenting only on that linked interview.

# ? Jan 31, 2014 16:25

Kemper Boyd: Aug 6, 2007; no kings, no gods, no masters but a comfy chair and no socks

WW1 was really the moment when the citizens of all nations involved should have risen up and hanged their leaders. No one really gained anything from the whole ordeal.

# ? Jan 31, 2014 16:35

Arquinsiel: Jun 1, 2006; "There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families. And no government can do anything except through people, and people must look to themselves first."

God Bless Margaret Thatcher
God Bless England
RIP My Iron Lady

We did, and we did. Sort of....

Also America made out like bandits.

# ? Jan 31, 2014 16:41

Nenonen: Oct 22, 2009; Mulla on aina kolkyt donaa taskussa

Kemper Boyd posted:

WW1 was really the moment when the citizens of all nations involved should have risen up and hanged their leaders. No one really gained anything from the whole ordeal.

OUR monarch was deposed and executed as a consequence. I don't know if that really improved anything militarism-wise, though...

# ? Jan 31, 2014 16:46

Koesj: Aug 3, 2003

Arquinsiel posted:

Also America made out like bandits.

20th century.txt

# ? Jan 31, 2014 17:37

Raskolnikov38: Mar 3, 2007; We were somewhere around Manila when the drugs began to take hold

Kemper Boyd posted:

WW1 was really the moment when the citizens of all nations involved should have risen up and hanged their leaders. No one really gained anything from the whole ordeal.

Lenin? Is that you????

Also the French kinda tried their hand at it.

# ? Jan 31, 2014 18:00

Shimrra Jamaane: Aug 10, 2007; Obscure to all except those well-versed in Yuuzhan Vong lore.

Arquinsiel posted:

We did, and we did. Sort of....

Also America made out like bandits.

# ? Jan 31, 2014 18:11

Tevery Best: Oct 11, 2013; Hewlo Furriend

Were there really any seriously influential pacifist voices in the whole thing? From what I gather, as much as everyone hated being in the trenches, nobody really wanted to not wage the war and it enjoyed an overwhelming popular support throughout most of the involved nations (one big exception being Russia) until the later stages. Is this correct?

# ? Jan 31, 2014 19:22

gradenko_2000: Oct 5, 2010; HELL SERPENT; Lipstick Apathy

Britain did not want to enter the war and it took the violation of Belgian neutrality for them to do so.

The thread has had a conversation before on whether or not they still would have joined on the side of the Entente once France was on the verge of / past the point of defeat as a "balance of power" measure, but that's ultimately alt-history talk.

===

Airplane questions because I've been hooked on War Thunder for a straight week now:

1. Was the Bf-109 an example of Germany coming up with a good standard design and mass producing it, the way alt-history always wished they did with Panzer IVs, or was it a case of sticking around with a design for longer than they should have because the FW-190 took so long to develop?

2. Did the RAF perform markedly different during Case Yellow compared to the Battle of Britain? If so, was it just a case of inexperience or was there a particular other reason? I'm thinking maybe the different battlefield (e.g. no English Channel) had to have mattered. I'm wondering because IIRC it was a thing in The Gathering Storm and Churchill's War that the BEF and GQG kept begging for more fighters to be sent to the continent.

3. Armee de l'air: Boom-and-zoom or turn fighters?

# ? Jan 31, 2014 19:41

Arquinsiel: Jun 1, 2006; "There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families. And no government can do anything except through people, and people must look to themselves first."

God Bless Margaret Thatcher
God Bless England
RIP My Iron Lady

gradenko_2000 posted:

2. Did the RAF perform markedly different during Case Yellow compared to the Battle of Britain? If so, was it just a case of inexperience or was there a particular other reason? I'm thinking maybe the different battlefield (e.g. no English Channel) had to have mattered. I'm wondering because IIRC it was a thing in The Gathering Storm and Churchill's War that the BEF and GQG kept begging for more fighters to be sent to the continent.

When you come back from a sortie to find Panzers on your airfield it's probably gonna have a negative effect on performance.

# ? Jan 31, 2014 20:07

hump day bitches!: Apr 3, 2011

The Entire Universe posted:

Embarrassed to say the first place I heard this line was in Civ 5.

That said, I recently heard (on a Mil-Hist podcast) that the Wehrmacht was still heavily using horses when they kicked off WWII. Was this solely due to the preceding decades of sanctions, or was the ramp-up in technology from 39-45 even more mindblowing (i.e. combustion motors being unreliable for war transport -> jet goddamn engines and gas turbines) than I was already aware of?

Bringing this thing from two pages ago,but whatever.

Germany really wasn't an economic powerhouse in those times.It was a powerful country with leading technological sectors (chemical engineering for example) but had a incredible inefficient agricultural sector employing 9 million workers incapable of feeding the country,no petroleum and no raw materials.This prevented a concentration of capital and human resources needed to have a market the size required for huge Ford style factories.German automobile sector was really small and fragmented,with almost artisan shops making very small runs of cars for a very small segment of the population.In the 30's germans were kind of poor compared to english or french,something that fueled a bitter resentment (The master race has no indoor plumbing and only eats potatoes)

In peace time Hitler actually tried to set up a huge factory for cars,using whatever spare capital they could find (German economy was spending at a massive rate in weapons) but it was never enough and there wasn't a market for it.

Mentioning that not only there was a shortage of demand and capital,but also raw materials to sustain that industry.In 30's you have the massive rearmament programs of the Wehrmacht,Lufftwaffe and Kriegsmarine bleeding the country dry of any kind steel.The needs were so great that production of ammunition had to be stopped for periods of time to save steel for other projects.Aluminium was completely hoarded by the Luftwaffe,the same with high-performance alloys.

This obsession with gigantic ford style factories was a very nazi trait that in a 90% of the times backfired badly,they were obsessed with economies of scale (the more you produce,the cheaper it gets)but never achieved the concentration of manpower and capital required to put forward these projects .Very few of these new projects came online for the war.The only one I can remember was the BMW air engine factory but it was a small affair capable of producing a 1000 engines a month (I think) and the chemical plant close to Auschwitz (still working today)

quote:

1. Was the Bf-109 an example of Germany coming up with a good standard design and mass producing it, the way alt-history always wished they did with Panzer IVs, or was it a case of sticking around with a design for longer than they should have because the FW-190 took so long to develop?

A may be wrong ,but the problem was that the Bf-109 was that they were capable of producing a ton of planes thanks to the economies of scale and were a really refined designs with lot of experienced workers working on them,changing that infrastructure to produce a new airframe,rework the lines and wait for the workers to gain experience would have been a disaster with the increasing needs of airframes.

They needed numbers and only were capable of getting them producing an old plane.

hump day bitches! fucked around with this message at 20:46 on Jan 31, 2014

# ? Jan 31, 2014 20:38

bewbies: Sep 23, 2003; Fun Shoe

gradenko_2000 posted:

1. Was the Bf-109 an example of Germany coming up with a good standard design and mass producing it, the way alt-history always wished they did with Panzer IVs, or was it a case of sticking around with a design for longer than they should have because the FW-190 took so long to develop?

The 109 was a magnificent aircraft and a real piece of genius design (as were its engines, which were pretty critical to its success). It faced off against an extremely wide variation of tasks: in the west, intercepting bombers and fighting fast long range escort fighters at extreme altitudes, in the east fighting flying tanks and super-dogfighters at low level. Really, it did fairly well in both roles. The E variant was one of the best (maybe the best) air superiority fighters in the world in 1940, the K variants could hold their own simultaneously against P-51s and Yak-3s (two vastly different and very specialized designs) in 1945.

That being said it had some pretty big limitations, its poor range being the biggest. It was hard to fly and wasn't made for a mass of average pilots like the USAAF planes generally were, and it didn't have much of a multi-role capability. The 190 might be more of what you're thinking (a "jack of all trades" type of thing), but the 109 certainly had a role to play throughout the war.

quote:

2. Did the RAF perform markedly different during Case Yellow compared to the Battle of Britain? If so, was it just a case of inexperience or was there a particular other reason?

Dowding very controversially held back much of his fighter force for the upcoming battle he knew was coming, and rightfully so...had he sent more fighters to France, the UK very well might have lost control of the air over southern England during the Battle. That said, it is pretty difficult to assess their performance in France...they had some terrible equipment (Fairey Battle lol), outdated tactics, inexperienced personnel, and they were facing off against what was at that time the world's best air force. I'm not sure that anyone could have done "well" in that scenario (maybe the Japanese for alt-history sake).

# ? Jan 31, 2014 21:02

Slim Jim Pickens: Jan 16, 2012

Rodrigo Diaz posted:

Absolutely. "problematic tactics" is not the same as "repeated atrocities" or "frequent war crimes" if you want to moderate your tone a bit.

I'm not a Habsburg apologist. They are indeed war crimes.

# ? Jan 31, 2014 22:09

Rodrigo Diaz: Apr 16, 2007; Knights who are at the wars eat their bread in sorrow;
their ease is weariness and sweat;
they have one good day after many bad

Slim Jim Pickens posted:

I'm not a Habsburg apologist. They are indeed war crimes.

I never implied you were. I just said you should use appropriate terms for the subject, and suggested some alternatives.

If I thought you were writing apologia I would've told you to get the gently caress out.

# ? Jan 31, 2014 23:40

Frostwerks: Sep 24, 2007; by Lowtax

bewbies posted:

It faced off against an extremely wide variation of tasks: in the west, intercepting bombers and fighting fast long range escort fighters at extreme altitudes, in the east fighting flying tanks and super-dogfighters at low level.

What do you mean by flying tanks in this context? Surely not one of these? Seems like it'd be easy pickings for any fighter worth its salt.

# ? Feb 1, 2014 00:08

Ensign Expendable: Nov 11, 2008; Lager beer is proof that god loves us; Pillbug

Airborne tanks are not, in any way, prepared for air combat. I'm pretty sure he meant heavily armoured aircraft.

# ? Feb 1, 2014 00:10

AbleArcher: Oct 5, 2006

gradenko_2000 posted:

1. Was the Bf-109 an example of Germany coming up with a good standard design and mass producing it, the way alt-history always wished they did with Panzer IVs, or was it a case of sticking around with a design for longer than they should have because the FW-190 took so long to develop?

They did not mass produce it, at least while it might have mattered. German aircraft production was stagnant until well into 1943. Manufacture remained mostly in the hands of the pre-war aircraft industry which was inefficient and corrupt and tried to keep the big industrial works like Volkswagen and Opel out. A 50% increase in workers only saw production rise 15%. Metals lost in production of engines rose to over half a tonne per unit (twice that of British engines), some of it going into Willy Messerschmitt�s side line of making aluminium ladders and frameworks for grape growers, which he pursued while receiving furious letters from commanders losing pilots to frequent wing and undercarriage failures. The millions of francs worth of new American machine tools seized in France had been stockpiled and forgotten about. The 60+ sub variants of the 109s E,F,G models cost 20% of production capacity and chaos for field workshops. Massive resources were invested in the He 177, Me 210, Me 209(2) and Ju 288 for little return.

# ? Feb 1, 2014 00:16

SeanBeansShako: Nov 20, 2009; Now the Drums beat up again,
For all true Soldier Gentlemen.

Frostwerks posted:

What do you mean by flying tanks in this context? Surely not one of these? Seems like it'd be easy pickings for any fighter worth its salt.

I think he is talking about the IL-2 series of ground attack fighters.

# ? Feb 1, 2014 00:35

Mirificus: Oct 29, 2004; Kings need not raise their voices to be heard

Frostwerks posted:

What do you mean by flying tanks in this context? Surely not one of these? Seems like it'd be easy pickings for any fighter worth its salt.

I'm pretty sure bewbies was referring to the Il-2 Sturmovik as well as maybe the IL-10.

# ? Feb 1, 2014 00:35

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# ? May 16, 2024 18:41

Slavvy: Dec 11, 2012

bewbies posted:

The 109 was a magnificent aircraft and a real piece of genius design (as were its engines, which were pretty critical to its success). It faced off against an extremely wide variation of tasks: in the west, intercepting bombers and fighting fast long range escort fighters at extreme altitudes, in the east fighting flying tanks and super-dogfighters at low level. Really, it did fairly well in both roles. The E variant was one of the best (maybe the best) air superiority fighters in the world in 1940, the K variants could hold their own simultaneously against P-51s and Yak-3s (two vastly different and very specialized designs) in 1945.

That being said it had some pretty big limitations, its poor range being the biggest. It was hard to fly and wasn't made for a mass of average pilots like the USAAF planes generally were, and it didn't have much of a multi-role capability. The 190 might be more of what you're thinking (a "jack of all trades" type of thing), but the 109 certainly had a role to play throughout the war.

Dowding very controversially held back much of his fighter force for the upcoming battle he knew was coming, and rightfully so...had he sent more fighters to France, the UK very well might have lost control of the air over southern England during the Battle. That said, it is pretty difficult to assess their performance in France...they had some terrible equipment (Fairey Battle lol), outdated tactics, inexperienced personnel, and they were facing off against what was at that time the world's best air force. I'm not sure that anyone could have done "well" in that scenario (maybe the Japanese for alt-history sake).

Also the intake tract on a late-war 109 went something like supercharger -> intercooler -> 2nd supercharger -> methanol injection. Which is just :black101:

and I don't give a poo poo how obsolete it was by that point.

# ? Feb 1, 2014 02:57

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