Kiwi Ghost Chips posted:

Yes.

Justice Ginsburg posted:

...In the end, however, the Court is not so sure. In stark contrast to the Court's initial emphasis on this accommodation, it ultimately declines to decide whether the highlighted accommodation is even lawful. See ante, at 44 ("We do not decide today whether an approach of this choice complies with RFRA....").

Justice Ginsburg posted:

Any First Amendment Free Exercise Clause claim Hobby Lobby or Conestoga might assert is foreclosed by this Court’s decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990). In Smith,two members of the Native American Church were dismissed from their jobs and denied unemployment benefits because they ingested peyote at, and as an essential element of, a religious ceremony. Oregon law forbade the consumption of peyote, and this Court, relying on that prohibition, rejected the employees’ claim that the denial of unemployment benefits violated their free exercise rights. The First Amendment is not offended, Smith held, when “prohibiting the exercise of religion...is not the object of [governmental regulation] but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision."..."an individuals religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct the state is free to regulate". The ACA's contraceptive coverage requirement applies generally, it is "otherwise valid" it trains on women's well being, not on the exercise of religion, and any affect it has on religion is incidental.

Even if Smith did not control, the Free Exercise Clause would not require the exemption Hobby Lobby and Conestoga seek. Accommodations to religious beliefs or observances, the Court has clarified, must not significantly impinge on the interests of third parties.

The exemption sought by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga would override significant interests of the corporations' employees and covered dependents. It would deny legions of women who do not hold their employers' beliefs access to contraceptive coverage that the ACA would otherwise secure...

Little_wh0re posted:

It's interesting how RBG's dissent mirrors Scalias dissent in Windsor.

kelvron posted:

Was it in here that someone did the effort posts on insurance providers and treatments and how drug costs are impacted by purchasing agreements? I haven't been able to find it.

KernelSlanders posted:

Is she writing that just incase the RFRA gets amended? I don't understand why she's talking about the first amendment, much less Smith at all, since the privileges asserted here are RFRA privileges and the RFRA was passed specifically to overturn Smith.

Justice Ginsberg posted:

Lacking a tenable claim under the Free exercise Clause, Hobby Lobby and Conestoga rely on RFRA, a statute instructing that "[g]government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the the burden results from a rule of general applicability" unless the government shows that application of the burden is "the least restrictive means" to further a "compelling governmental interest. 2 U. S. C. §2000bb–1(a),(b)(2). In RFRA, Congress “adopt[ed] a statutory rule comparable to
the constitutional rule rejected in Smith.” Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U. S.
418, 424 (2006).

RFRA's purpose is specific and written into the statute itself. The Act was crafted to "restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner,... and Wisconsin v. Yoder...and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise is substantially burdened."...

The legislative history is correspondingly emphatic on RFRA's aim See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 103–111, p. 12 (1993) (hereinafter Senate Report) (RFRA’s purpose was “only to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith,” not to “unsettle other areas of the law.”)...Given the Acts moderate purpose, it is hardly surprising that RFRA's enactment in 1993 provoked little controversy...(RFRA was approved by a 97-to-3 vote in the Senate and a voice vote in the House of Representatives).

Despite these authoritative indications the Court sees RFRA as a bold initiative departing from rather than restoring pre-Smith jurisprudence. To support its conception of the RFRA as a measure detached from the this Court's decisions, one that sets a new course, the Court points first to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA, which altered the RFRA's definition of the term "exercise of religion." RFRA as originally enacted, defined that term to mean "the exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the Constitution." As Amended by RLUIPA, RFRA's definition now includes "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to a system of religious belief." That definitional change according to the Court, reflect "an obvious effort to effect a complete separation from First Amendment case law."

The Court's reading is not plausible. RLUIPA's alteration clarifies that courts should not question the centrality of a particular religious exercise. But the amendment in no way suggests that Congress meant to expand the class of entities qualified to mount religious accommodation claims, nor does it relieve the courts of the obligation to inquire whether a government action substantially burdens a religious exercise.

Next the Court highlights RFRA's requirement that the government, if its actions substantially burdens a person's religious observance, must demonstrate that it chose the least restrictive means for furthering a compelling interest. "[B]y imposing a least-restrictive-means test," the Court suggests, RFRA "went beyond what was required by our pre-Smith decisions."...But as RFRA's statements of purpose and legislative history make clear, Congress intended only to restore, not to scrap or alter, the balancing test as this court had applied pre-Smith...

With RFRA's restorative purpose in mind, I turn to the Acts application to the instant lawsuits. That task in view of the positions taken by the Court, requires consideration of several questions, each potentially dispositve of Hobby Lobby's and Conestoga's claims: Do for-profit corporations rank among "person[s]" who exercise...religion"? Assuming that they do ,does the contraceptive coverage requirement "substantially burden" their religious excercise? If so, is the requirement "in furtherance of a compelling government interest"? And last, does the requirement represent the least restrictive means for furthering that interest?

Misguided by its errant premise that the RFRA moved beyond the pre-Smith case law, the Court falters at each step of analysis.

kelvron posted:

Was it in here that someone did the effort posts on insurance providers and treatments and how drug costs are impacted by purchasing agreements? I haven't been able to find it.

Shimrra Jamaane posted:

So today could have been far worse. That's what I'm going to tell myself so I can sleep tonight.

Quantum Cat posted:

KernelSlanders posted:

Is she writing that just incase the RFRA gets amended? I don't understand why she's talking about the first amendment, much less Smith at all, since the privileges asserted here are RFRA privileges and the RFRA was passed specifically to overturn Smith.

Kugyou no Tenshi posted:

Is it just me, or does this read like Ginsburg had to seriously debate whether or not to write "YOU IDIOTS" on the plaza in gasoline and light it ablaze as the entirety of her dissent?

Kugyou no Tenshi posted:

Is it just me, or does this read like Ginsburg had to seriously debate whether or not to write "YOU IDIOTS" on the plaza in gasoline and light it ablaze as the entirety of her dissent?

Quantum Cat posted:

I'm only an interested layman when it comes con-law, but it really reads like that.

KernelSlanders posted:

Yes, it was in this thread. It was quite a ways back though. Probably around when cert was granted.

esquilax posted:

It was McAlister, during March. I don't think anything they wrote had any bearing on the actual legal case, though.

Kiwi Ghost Chips posted:

1 U.S. Code § 1 - Words denoting number, gender, and so forth

In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise—
…
the words “person” and “whoever” include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals;

KernelSlanders posted:

Is she writing that just incase the RFRA gets amended? I don't understand why she's talking about the first amendment, much less Smith at all, since the privileges asserted here are RFRA privileges and the RFRA was passed specifically to overturn Smith.

Kiwi Ghost Chips posted:

1 U.S. Code § 1 - Words denoting number, gender, and so forth

In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise—
…
the words “person” and “whoever” include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals;

evilweasel posted:

You're eliding over the key point.

Justice Ginsberg posted:

RFRA's compelling interest test, as noted, see supra, at 8, applies to government actions that "substantially burden a person's exercise of religion." 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1(a) (emphasis added). This reference, the Court submits, incorporates the definition of "person" found in the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. §1, which extends to "corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals." See ante, at 19-20. The Dictionary Act's definition, however, controls only where "context" does not "indicat[e] otherwise." §1. Here, context does so indicate...

TyroneGoldstein posted:

So it looks like Alito basically said that the home healthcare assistant program is staffed by people that don't quite qualify fully as public employees.

Looks like labor is safe, for now.

I can't help but think that opening opinion was really salty though. Like you could tell the guy was just looking for a reason to bring the hammer down.

I feel sorta bad for the home healthcare workers though, doesn't this basically say they don't have any of the normal shop protections because of the structure of their employement?

If anyone wants to read it: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/11-681_j426.pdf

Kugyou no Tenshi posted:

Is it just me, or does this read like Ginsburg had to seriously debate whether or not to write "YOU IDIOTS" on the plaza in gasoline and light it ablaze as the entirety of her dissent?

Evil Fluffy posted:

Why waste the gasoline on pavement when she could light Scalia and Roberts on fire instead?

Crows Turn Off posted:

How can SCOTUS even say that unions aren't constitutional? I mean, it's an assembly of people, isn't that guaranteed by the First Amendment? Wouldn't they just be saying that workers cannot assemble? And, isn't that just the free market working as intended, without government intervention (whereas SCOTUS ruling IS government intervention)?

Crows Turn Off posted:

How can SCOTUS even say that unions aren't constitutional? I mean, it's an assembly of people, isn't that guaranteed by the First Amendment? Wouldn't they just be saying that workers cannot assemble? And, isn't that just the free market working as intended, without government intervention (whereas SCOTUS ruling IS government intervention)?

Crows Turn Off posted:

How can SCOTUS even say that unions aren't constitutional? I mean, it's an assembly of people, isn't that guaranteed by the First Amendment? Wouldn't they just be saying that workers cannot assemble? And, isn't that just the free market working as intended, without government intervention (whereas SCOTUS ruling IS government intervention)?

Quantum Cat posted:

look Kiwi Ghost Chips, I know you're busy running a hypothetical halal meat-atorium in the U.S. politics thread, but maybe you should take a moment to actually read the opinion and dissent.

Crows Turn Off posted:

How can SCOTUS even say that unions aren't constitutional? I mean, it's an assembly of people, isn't that guaranteed by the First Amendment? Wouldn't they just be saying that workers cannot assemble? And, isn't that just the free market working as intended, without government intervention (whereas SCOTUS ruling IS government intervention)?

B B posted:

Welp:

B B posted:

Welp:

Crows Turn Off posted:

How can SCOTUS even say that unions aren't constitutional? I mean, it's an assembly of people, isn't that guaranteed by the First Amendment? Wouldn't they just be saying that workers cannot assemble? And, isn't that just the free market working as intended, without government intervention (whereas SCOTUS ruling IS government intervention)?

Kiwi Ghost Chips posted:

They didn't say anything like that.

evilweasel posted:

You're eliding over the key point.

Kiwi Ghost Chips posted:

Yes I know what she said. The context does not indicate a distinction, and that part of her dissent was willfully obtuse.

quote:

(a) Findings
The Congress finds that—
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution;
(2) laws “neutral” toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise;
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without compelling justification;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.
(b) Purposes
The purposes of this chapter are—
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.

Crows Turn Off posted:

How can SCOTUS even say that unions aren't constitutional? I mean, it's an assembly of people, isn't that guaranteed by the First Amendment? Wouldn't they just be saying that workers cannot assemble? And, isn't that just the free market working as intended, without government intervention (whereas SCOTUS ruling IS government intervention)?

Evil Fluffy posted:

Why waste the gasoline on pavement when she could light Scalia and Roberts on fire instead?

OAquinas posted:

Little known fact: Scalia is 80% asbestos. Wouldn't work.

Sand won't save you this time posted:

The compound also a stronger oxidizing agent than oxygen itself, which also puts it into rare territory. That means that it can potentially go on to “burn” things that you would normally consider already burnt to hell and gone, and a practical consequence of that is that it’ll start roaring reactions with things like bricks and asbestos tile. It’s been used in the semiconductor industry to clean oxides off of surfaces, at which activity it no doubt excels.

There’s a report from the early 1950s (in this PDF) of a one-ton spill of the stuff. It burned its way through a foot of concrete floor and chewed up another meter of sand and gravel beneath, completing a day that I'm sure no one involved ever forgot. That process, I should add, would necessarily have been accompanied by copious amounts of horribly toxic and corrosive by-products: it’s bad enough when your reagent ignites wet sand, but the clouds of hot hydrofluoric acid are your special door prize if you’re foolhardy enough to hang around and watch the fireworks.

evilweasel posted:

You're being willfully obtuse, not Ginsburg. First, that a for-profit corporation can have a religious belief is absurd. Second, the RFRA was passed in a specific context that is listed in its preamble, all of which you've willfully ignored because the history and context makes clear that what was being overturned was the rule that a law of general applicability was not a substantial burden on an individual's freedom of religion rights. It was not to make a new rule out of thin air and so your attempt to argue that the context of the words immediately surrounding it is all that one would look at is absurd.

Chris James 2 posted:

I like the idea of limiting justice terms, but think 24 years might be a bit long. Maybe 20 years. The possibility of seeing 5 Presidents elected in the span of a SCOTUS justice term seems fair and not excessive to me.