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hailthefish posted:Which takes us back to the topic of questions like 'why the gently caress is the surface fleet being left to rot with the exception of the completely pointless and ridiculously expensive LCS' and 'why is just about everything that flies and has a human pilot getting cut or generally ignored except for the F35'.  means Congress goes  when dealing with questions of 
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Sep 13, 2014 04:23
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Godholio posted:Here's part of my problem with this: what happens every time we have cuts like this? Korea. As one example.
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Sep 13, 2014 04:25
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Godholio posted:Here's part of my problem with this: what happens every time we have cuts like this? It's followed by a BRAC session that eliminates the excess equipment, facilities, and real estate. The Army has four basic training bases. Cut the Army back by a quarter, and what do you think will happen? Sill probably loses the BCT mission, consolidated to the other three. Even if that doesn't happen, how much excess capability do you think these bases have to plus up in case of a major theater opening up? Oh, and during WWII there were over 100 mobilization and training camps. The initial plus-up of 30,000 soldiers required a massive construction project at dozens of bases. Basic poo poo like housing, kitchens, etc. You know, the stuff we're going to have to build next time we go through this? After finding space for it, of course, and probably requiring Congressional approval. Oh, and throwing up a two story wooden barracks in a couple of weeks isn't going to fly this time around. You guys really aren't thinking this poo poo through beyond the first loving level. If money were no object, I'd be all for having a poo poo load of facilities on hand, ultra qualified personnel, extra employment and school opportunities for young people, and all the other benefits of a huge military. But money is a problem. WWIII remains unlikely. So keep the assets most likely to keep it unlikely. That means intel, airlift/sealift, cyber/space, deep precision strike, deterrence weapons both offensive and defensive, SF get prioritized. I'm not pretending that building 100k maneuver troops is trivial. But cuts are here, period. No amount of wishing we could just cut nothing while growing other programs and replacing or refitting equipment will prevent that. Is your argument simply that we should not cut funding at all, and actually increase it drastically to boot?
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Sep 13, 2014 04:26
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Godholio posted:Here's part of my problem with this: what happens every time we have cuts like this? It's followed by a BRAC session that eliminates the excess equipment, facilities, and real estate. The Army has four basic training bases. Cut the Army back by a quarter, and what do you think will happen? Sill probably loses the BCT mission, consolidated to the other three. Even if that doesn't happen, how much excess capability do you think these bases have to plus up in case of a major theater opening up? Oh, and during WWII there were over 100 mobilization and training camps. The initial plus-up of 30,000 soldiers required a massive construction project at dozens of bases. Basic poo poo like housing, kitchens, etc. You know, the stuff we're going to have to build next time we go through this? After finding space for it, of course, and probably requiring Congressional approval. Oh, and throwing up a two story wooden barracks in a couple of weeks isn't going to fly this time around. You guys really aren't thinking this poo poo through beyond the first loving level. KBR will build it for a cool 5 billion, the land upon which they build, and an open 20-year upkeep contract. They'll do such a lovely job the American public will demand we throw another few billion at a different Halliburton subsidiary in order for the public to believe the problem has been addressed and solved.
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Sep 13, 2014 04:34
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mlmp08 posted:Bewbies isn't wrong about the relative speed of growing forces. Sure, nine weeks doesn't give you a great infantry soldier. But in comparison, a Patriot engagement controller soldier goes through about 7 months of IET before even getting to a line unit, and then you can count on 3-6 months of serious training to have a prayer of passing the bare minimum certification to deploy. Then once they deploy, they typically get obliterated by in country evaluations for a couple weeks before they are trusted to actually man the system alone. Patriot crewman don't win or lose wars
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Sep 13, 2014 05:13
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Leif. posted:Because infantry operations amount to "walking around with a rifle" and clearly don't involve any higher-order thinking, complex maneuvering, combat lifesaving, calls for fire, etc. I'm not suggesting that light infantry or any other maneuver thing is easy, just that it is relatively easy to grow. The other major factor is that maneuver stuff is more sensitive to terrain and every other environmental factor than any other job in the military, and since we have a tendency to fight each new war on completely new and different places, a lot of the training that maneuver forces go through is not terribly relevant. The stuff that I did in BCT/ROTC/OBC/ranger was basically fighting the Vietnam war, L-shaped ambushes and stuff. By the time I got to Afghanistan, practically none of it was relevant. We had to learn to fight that environment on the fly, and I'm pretty confident in saying that any relatively in-shape servicemember from any branch and any MOS, given a couple of weeks of training on how to shoot and how to code a radio, would have done just as well as we did. This differs pretty strongly from most all of the more technically demanding military jobs; flying is flying, Patriot is Patriot, cyber is cyber; the only major variant for each is the opponent. OIF really drove this point home for me. The army was able to take guys from transportation and admin MOSs who'd gotten a couple of weeks of field time in basic training and qualified on an aging rifle once or twice a year, put them through a 3 or 4 week long predeployment trainup, and push out guys who were not all that less competent than career infantrymen. Same can be said for RC guys; an old boss of mine loved to talk good on a crew of NG mechanics who were shoved in as the dismounts for his Bradley battery. I'm not sure what the bare minimum time is to convert a maintenance warrant from the Mississippi national guard into a competent Apache or F-16 pilot but I am betting it is longer than a month. In any case, the opportunity cost for maintaining large maneuver formations is going to be pretty severe and it is unfortunate from my view that there is so little real discussion to be had about it since so many GOs are maneuver types. To use my own "BLOODY LESSON" hyperbole, it'll really suck when we have a dozen extremely well trained and exquisitely equipped BCTs floating somewhere in the ocean 6 weeks after hostilities kick off while every airfield, seaport, headquarters and assembly area in the theater are blown to hell because the army and navy both ran out of interceptors on hour 3 of the war.
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Sep 13, 2014 05:24
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216A posted:Patriot crewman don't win or lose wars No MOS wins or loses wars alone, but your comment didn't even address my point. Over 50% of air defenders of all AD MOS are either deployed or forward based right now. ADA is one of three groups in the army still growing during the drawdown, alongside SF and cyber. The Air Force, Navy, and Army take deterrence and protection of C2, force generation, and sortie generation sites very seriously, not to mention the geopolitical impact. Especially so, given how virtually every less capable nation has realized how much easier it is to have cruise missiles and ballistic missiles than to maintain a survivable, competent manned air force. People keep conflating training time with a personal insult to grunts, it seems. If it took a day to train an air defender, I'd call for them to get cut. Hell, the long game of army air defense upgrades will almost certainly lead to severe cuts in ADA manning requirements as they remote control of all ADA systems into one shelter with bare bones crews at the actual tactical sites to keep the equipment up and running. The ultimate goal is that IAMD puts a control cell together with id, surveillance, weapon control, and engagement control all run centrally across multiple weapon systems instead of requiring controllers at every echelon of every system.
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Sep 13, 2014 05:29
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bewbies posted:The army was able to take guys from transportation and admin MOSs who'd gotten a couple of weeks of field time in basic training and qualified on an aging rifle once or twice a year, put them through a 3 or 4 week long predeployment trainup, and push out guys who were not all that less competent than career infantrymen. HahahahahAHHA no. I was in a National Guard unit that did about three months predeployment training in a unit that was a collection of, basically, whoever was sitting around. The core of it was my detachment (Cav scouts, infantry snipers, and mortars) with bits of our Headquarters company (a lot of infantry guys, for whatever reason) and whoever else they could scrounge in order to paste together a new company to loan to another battalion. We had a lot of cooks, commo guys, and a bunch of other non-combat MOSes. These were some of the stupidest motherfuckers I'd ever had the misfortune to serve with. One sergeant was thrown out of a radio class because he was literally too stupid to use a radio. Could not figure out how to use the handset to save his life. A loving telephone-shaped object with a loving cord coming out of the bottom and he'd hold it upside down every loving time. They gave a 249 to a cook who hadn't seen one since basic training and gave him no instruction on it. Literally had no idea how to load it, take it apart, anything. He came to me for help, thank God. These guys who never, ever checked headspace and timing on their M2s because they had heard somewhere "three clicks is enough" or some bullshit. I had to hop into one of their vehicles during training for a live fire event and I, for whatever reason, decided to check the headspace before we started to roll. NO GO went all the way in. It was a loving shitshow and I remain amazed everybody came home in one piece.
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Sep 13, 2014 05:42
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People untrained on a SAW couldn't figure it out without help? Now imagine trying to shoehorn people into aviation, cyber, radars, etc on the fly. We definitely need to maintain combat experienced maneuver leaders. But you can train an 11b to be at least survivable and moderately effective faster than many other jobs. Also that is an anecdote about lovely leadership more than anything else. mlmp08 fucked around with this message at 06:00 on Sep 13, 2014 |
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Sep 13, 2014 05:55
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bewbies posted:OIF really drove this point home for me. The army was able to take guys from transportation and admin MOSs who'd gotten a couple of weeks of field time in basic training and qualified on an aging rifle once or twice a year, put them through a 3 or 4 week long predeployment trainup, and push out guys who were not all that less competent than career infantrymen. Same can be said for RC guys; an old boss of mine loved to talk good on a crew of NG mechanics who were shoved in as the dismounts for his Bradley battery. I'm not sure what the bare minimum time is to convert a maintenance warrant from the Mississippi national guard into a competent Apache or F-16 pilot but I am betting it is longer than a month. A few years back, I heard a story from a captain who'd just come back from Iraq. He'd gotten stuck leading a base security detail that consisted of a bunch of random MOSes, including the divisional band... Apparently, got them get them up to speed pretty quickly and their deployment went pretty smoothly. Musicians are (relatively) smart and pretty teachable, I guess. So if WWIII ever comes around, we should draft all the high school marching bands first. Let them trade their tubas for an M16.
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Sep 13, 2014 06:21
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mlmp08 posted:Also that is an anecdote about lovely leadership more than anything else. Oh, I've got stories.
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Sep 13, 2014 06:30
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mlmp08 posted:People untrained on a SAW couldn't figure it out without help? Ask me about the time 108th ADA, who my infantry platoon was defending, thought that we had been overrun so they set up a secondary defensive perimeter and lit us up with our own .50's. Now imagine said ADAer being tasked to land navigate through a hostile environment to conduct an effective L-shaped ambush against the regular line infantry forces of an opposing 1st world power.
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Sep 13, 2014 06:33
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mlmp08 posted:If money were no object, I'd be all for having a poo poo load of facilities on hand, ultra qualified personnel, extra employment and school opportunities for young people, and all the other benefits of a huge military. But money is a problem. WWIII remains unlikely. So keep the assets most likely to keep it unlikely. That means intel, airlift/sealift, cyber/space, deep precision strike, deterrence weapons both offensive and defensive, SF get prioritized. No, just that you're operating under a false premise. Cuts are absolutely necessary. However doing it the smart way is basically off the table because of Congressional district pandering. Acquisitions desperately needs an overhaul. Dependents need to be charged a small copay to convince the dependapotomi that just because you CAN go to the doctor and waste time & money every time one of your kids has a hangnail doesn't mean you should. We need to reabsorb a bunch of poo poo that's been privatized because it often costs more money, and we need career paths that lead to permanent or at least primary staff positions. We're wasting obscene amounts of training and talent by forcing everyone to check every box to make rank. Get specialists in there, alongside the odd fighter pilot to provide technical and operational expertise. If you really want to get deep into budget cuts then the formula is simple: the United States will no longer be the guarantor of anyone's safety beyond the ABC (Australia/Britain/Canada). NATO member nations will have to pony up or face the potential consequences. We've never been able to scale up rapidly. The best we've been able to do is to hit a training rate of about 4x the standing rate after a full year. In the meantime, we either stayed out of the war or lost a lot of blood. This is not the risk, this is the PRICE. It has happened almost every single time in history. If we as Americans are ok with that, so be it. We're not. But it'll happen anyway. Edit: Two examples of ridiculous privatization. When I graduated high school a buddy got a job as a civilian doing PMEL. He had to take a 6 week electronics course and started work upon completion. He started out making over 50k a year. His job used to be done by a junior enlisted dude, like E-3 or so. The other example is former AF officers training foreign military personnel at US facilities. I missed this by less than 2 months, sadly. Boeing held a contract to train foreign AEW controllers and were paying $145,000 for a 1-year contract. Aside from language challenges and the lack of extraneous bullshit, this was exactly the same job we were doing as O-3s. Godholio fucked around with this message at 07:10 on Sep 13, 2014 |
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Sep 13, 2014 07:05
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Haha you think the money hole is going to labor? Let me tell you about
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Sep 13, 2014 08:53
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Payroll is the biggest expense for most organizations and that includes the US government, the military, and probably Boeing as well. Part of the reason government employees aren't paid as well as private sector ones is because of the benefits mentioned previously. Health benefits are expensive. Dependent health benefits are even more expensive. Retiree health benefits are the most expensive of all.
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Sep 13, 2014 08:58
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Mortabis posted:Payroll is the biggest expense for most organizations and that includes the US government, the military, and probably Boeing as well. That isn't even close to being true. 
Acebuckeye13 fucked around with this message at 13:28 on Sep 13, 2014 |
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Sep 13, 2014 13:25
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Acebuckeye13 posted:That isn't even close to being true.
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Sep 13, 2014 13:41
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Leif. posted:Ask me about the time 108th ADA, who my infantry platoon was defending, thought that we had been overrun so they set up a secondary defensive perimeter and lit us up with our own .50's. You are comparing apples and oranges. ADA troops aren't crummy infantry due to an innate deficiency. It is because they trained for a different job. My argument is that, if you had to, given competent NCO and officer infantry leadership to retrain technical MOS soldiers, you can convert one to infantry faster than you could convert a GT qualified infantry soldier into a competent engagement controller on a patriot system or convert a soldier to being a pilot or doing cyberwarfare. Speaking of dumb military stories, you've apparently seen a patriot site and how noisy, bright, obvious one is, even at night. A cav unit doing their final training event before deploying somehow got horribly lost and drove a company of Abrams through an 11X patriot battalion at Bliss, nearly running over soldiers and destroying a bunch of our fiber optic cables. They didn't realize that they were surrounded by people and equipment until the patriot unit started shining every white light they could find at the tanks to blind the drivers. We've had more than a few very smart soldiers, NCOs, and officers transfer into the branch from maneuver. Yes, they laugh at our mandatory infantry crap that all soldiers do being half rear end, and they mock our field time amenities, power, climate control, etc. But not a one has then gone into the van to control the system and not had a moment where they realized that they were either going to have to spend a shitload of time learning the system or just resign themselves to being good at leadership, but ignorant of the weapon system. And in comparison with other even more technical or experience based forces, you can build air defenders quickly.
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Sep 13, 2014 14:49
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Acebuckeye13 posted:That isn't even close to being true. That's never stopped Mortabis before.
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Sep 13, 2014 15:30
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hailthefish posted:Which takes us back to the topic of questions like 'why the gently caress is the surface fleet being left to rot with the exception of the completely pointless and ridiculously expensive LCS' and 'why is just about everything that flies and has a human pilot getting cut or generally ignored except for the F35'. I've been pondering this in depth for a couple of days. If you want to understand LCS, I strongly encourage you to read this white paper by DepSecDef Bob Work. Work comes from a different school of thought than most of our "acquisition professionals", and espouses thought more closely aligned with the Center for A New American Security than more traditional think-tanks. Read the whole thing - he doesn't tie it all together until close to the end. While the LCS surface warfare package remains woefully underpowered due to the abrupt cancellation of the Army's NLOS missile, the other packages offer unique advantages. The ASW package offers unique abilities against diesel-electric submarines in the littorals. Not only can it deploy vital variable-depth sonar, it's incredible acceleration and top speed give it the potential to evade even the incredibly dangerous Type 53-65 wake homing torpedo, against which we have only the most experimental of countermeasures. The Mine Warfare package is capitalizing on UUV technology and is looking like it'll be significantly more capable than the retiring mine countermeasure ships. Detractors of the surface warfare package have cited that it has no stand-off capability and that the Mk. 110 57mm gun can't fire accurately at flank speed. Right now, it's looking like the addition of the Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile (a Norwegian design hand manufactured by elves) will be feasible, and that'll solve a lot of the firepower problems. In fact, the SUW module is proving so vesitigal that Kongsberg NSM may be mountable on all LCSs. As for the gun, LCS was never designed to fire at at flank speed because it doesn't have to, it was designed to use NLOS and the 30mm guns to fend off swarm boat attacks at speed. The results of the Small Surface Combatant study are being interpreted. Rumor has it that the findings will be released soon, but there haven't been any leaks - the team is under strict NDA. Telling, perhaps, is that the head of the team is a leading Marine Corps University thinker. While I hesitate to predict, I'm guessing that their findings will recommend a modestly modified LCS that'll include Sea RAM and a set of Mk. 41 VLS, in order to fit ESSM, Kongsberg NSM and potentially either Harpoon or the new Perseus ASCM.
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Sep 13, 2014 16:16
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Smiling Jack posted:That's never stopped Mortabis before. 
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Sep 13, 2014 16:49
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Default Settings posted:Add about $150 billion that go to the Department of Veterans Affairs to that chart. Yeah, exactly. I should have said "personnel" as that is more precise.
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Sep 13, 2014 18:17
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Godholio posted:Right now, the Marines recruit about 40,000 new idiots every year. Between 1940 and 1945, they recruited over half a million. So...they went from what would now be around 200,000 people recruited to 500,000 total during WW2, or barely over double the current rate? Or am I missing what you're saying in some fashion?
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Sep 13, 2014 18:21
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mlmp08 posted:That is what sold the public on the war, not the Iraqis shooting down a grand total of one predator IIRC. They were acting in self defense!
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Sep 13, 2014 23:28
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ulmont posted:So...they went from what would now be around 200,000 people recruited to 500,000 total during WW2, or barely over double the current rate? Or am I missing what you're saying in some fashion? Yeah, you're missing the part I forgot to include in that post. In 1939 the entire Marine Corps was under 20,000 men. It's not the total manpower number that matters, but the increase. I can't find monthly or even annual recruitment rates for the 30s and 40s, so it's not exact. But we can assume that annually they'd have to recruit about 20% of that total (based on how it's done now...if anything it would have been lower back then). So 4,000 recruits per year. That had to increase by an order of magnitude (and actually even more than that, since it would've ramped up rather than jumping immediately to the 80,000/yr the half-million Marines average out to. So yeah, I'm sure the two current training bases could scale up to double the number of recruits right now. But that's not really the issue, since the WWII increase was from 40k to 500k...more than 10x the size. Can Parris Island and San Diego handle that? Obviously not. And you can safely assume the Army is going to end up much larger than the Marine Corps. The Army was able to double in size in...wait for it...about three years. And that was WITH all the real estate available, and with construction standards that allowed for a camp to basically go from forest to operational in something like four months. You can't fix the loving HVAC in an existing building that fast thanks to contracting laws. By design, the current military does not have the excess capacity necessary to rapidly expand. It's that loving simple. We sold it all via BRAC. And guess what...we have another BRAC round coming up in 2017.
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Sep 13, 2014 23:53
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I'd like to think that if we faced a crisis on the level of world war 2 again, we'd throw half the rules out the window and make poo poo happen fast, but... Who knows how much pain we'd endure before we figured it out?
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Sep 14, 2014 00:04
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How did celestial navigation work in the 1950's cruise missiles (e.g. the Snark). I can barely imagine programming such a navigation system with today's computers.
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Sep 14, 2014 00:12
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mlmp08 posted:I'd like to think that if we faced a crisis on the level of world war 2 again, we'd throw half the rules out the window and make poo poo happen fast, but... Who knows how much pain we'd endure before we figured it out? I'm pretty sure that was the point I originally was chasing.
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Sep 14, 2014 00:13
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Groda posted:How did celestial navigation work in the 1950's cruise missiles (e.g. the Snark). I can barely imagine programming such a navigation system with today's computers.  The calculations for cel nav have been understood for centuries. With a book of tables, it's possible to do cel nav calculations on paper in tens of minutes. Automating the process is not that technically challenging.
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Sep 14, 2014 00:26
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mlmp08 posted:I'd like to think that if we faced a crisis on the level of world war 2 again, we'd throw half the rules out the window and make poo poo happen fast, but... Who knows how much pain we'd endure before we figured it out? If we faced a WW2-level crisis again, the ground infantry recruitment rate would be irrelevent, seeing as how that's when the Air Force and all those lovely long-range assets they hold would get their literal 15 minutes of fame. Shine bright like a
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Sep 14, 2014 00:26
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Fucknag posted:If we faced a WW2-level crisis again, the ground infantry recruitment rate would be irrelevent, seeing as how that's when the Air Force and all those lovely long-range assets they hold would get their literal 15 minutes of fame. 
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Sep 14, 2014 00:36
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Dead Reckoning posted:Automating the process is not that technically challenging. Yeah, this is the part I don't get.
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Sep 14, 2014 01:17
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All I have to contribute is this: Curtis LeMay fixed cars as a hobby. From a larger series from Life 1960 on "what people do in their spare time now that prosperity has spread to all levels of socitey."
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Sep 14, 2014 01:31
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The fact that LeMay didn't have a Ford Nucleon is proof that there is no god.
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Sep 14, 2014 01:47
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Red Crown posted:I've been pondering this in depth for a couple of days. If you want to understand LCS, I strongly encourage you to read this white paper by DepSecDef Bob Work. Work comes from a different school of thought than most of our "acquisition professionals", and espouses thought more closely aligned with the Center for A New American Security than more traditional think-tanks. Read the whole thing - he doesn't tie it all together until close to the end. Everything you mention falls under future planned capacity, except for the propulsion performance, which has been essentially neutered after blue water testing. Things like the ASW sonar, the Mine Warfare package, improved surface strike etc (and the bodies to operate them) are Mission Modules which will be hull-specific, meaning a given hull will have only one of these and there's little sign it'll be the right one at the right place/time, unlike a common frigate or other grey hull where (short of BMD defense) the capacities tend to be common across the type. The big thing, though, is that as Work lays out, the LCS was meant to be the new bottom rung of an expanded surface fleet with a lot more ships filling a lot more of the heavier roles. The older ships are all going away and their replacements never materialized. Work's statement that the ship works well as a theater-based vessel that can self-deploy, a big PC boat, is rendered invalid when the Navy is forced to use it as a blue-water boat with open op-areas far, far larger than the Persian Gulf. This throws LCS into roles it was not designed for and frankly can never be changed to handle; even a slightly bigger, heavier version with more punch still won't be sufficient. The thing to remember is LCS came out at a point when it was essentially impossible to get new funding for anything not headed to THE SANDBOX. LCS was tailored for Persian Gulf threats - swarms of Zodiacs, minefields, Iranian diesel subs - and an op environment with friendly-dominated skies and nearby reinforcements. In the end, it doesn't really matter if LCS can be the perfect ship for that; you don't need 55 hulls for that role, and those 55 hulls are useless practically everywhere else. The only reason we keep buying them is that it's the cheapest possible way to hide the drop in combat ship numbers.
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Sep 14, 2014 02:00
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LCS + Burke (with LRASM/MMT) is a potent mixture.
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Sep 14, 2014 02:08
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Baloogan posted:LCS + Burke (with LRASM/MMT) is a potent mixture. Sure, if you have a Burke in range, and the LCS isn't broken. 'X + Burke' is a potent mixture, but when solving for X there are almost always going to be better and/or cheaper answers than LCS. More wordily, LCS + Burke gets into the currently popular idea of a mothership / weapons magazine with remote sensor / targeting vessels to function in A2AD environments, the former expensive but heavily defended, the latter cheaper and more expendable. In the (not all that) long term the latter will be unmanned vehicles; the political cost of losing an LCS won't be diminished compared to any other warship, despite its lower hull cost and crew count. This brings up the futureproofing (or lack thereof) of even Flight III Burkes and how we need one or two new clean-sheet surface hull classes in the not-too-distant future that as far as I can tell aren't even on the drawing board.
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Sep 14, 2014 02:17
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Godholio posted:The fact that LeMay didn't have a Ford Nucleon is proof that there is no god. No but he owned an Allard J2, which is a car that had roughly the same personality he did.
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Sep 14, 2014 02:42
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MrChips posted:No but he owned an Allard J2, which is a car that had roughly the same personality he did. Groda posted:Yeah, this is the part I don't get.
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Sep 14, 2014 03:13
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Dead Reckoning posted:Like you think the math is too hard or what? I'm not totally up on my cel, but I think most systems use a crude DR track to figure where to point the camera, then update the DR track based on the cel fix. If they have an almanac and tables in memory, the math is no more complex than arithmetic. The machine vision aspect seems non-trivial.
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Sep 14, 2014 04:58
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