GAINING WEIGHT... posted:

Jesus the Sun.

It died, so that we might live

markgreyam posted:

And when He returns (in about 4 billion years) then we'll all be returned to The Lord. By which I mean that the red giant that the sun becomes will consume us all.

I mean, Christianity subverted so much of the Druidic religion, and those drat hippie druids did a lot of nature worshiping that there were likely some overlap somewhere with solar worship.

The problem is that worshiping nature just didn’t suit the hubris of the time so it had to be adapted into the story of an actual person; the end result being that god made us “in his image”, because unfortunately the best that anyone could come up with for an all-powerful being was well, us, but all-powerful

I always find that the be the most humorous element of the most prevalent contemporary religions; that this was the best that they could come up with for the creator of the universe. Basically a human, but with universe creating powers. Design-by-committee at its finest. Hell at least the FSM is made of spaghetti.

All the rest of the stuff like christmas being the solstice and easter being the equinox was kept because it was more subversive to keep the existing dates and overwrite them with some human-related shenanigans but keep the symbolism. Also the effort thing.

Space Whale posted:

Let's kick this up a notch.

Boltzmann Brain!

and another: SOLIPSISM!

You're god falsely remembering creation that never happened but sprang into being a moment ago, and created me through your imagination.

WHOA

markgreyam posted:

But I keep remembering the most recent moment. That feels like a real redundancy somewhere, someone should look into that.

Maybe we're all Boltzmann Brains that got bored with floating through the ether and designed an environment through which we could experience something other than ... you know, floating through ether. Or in a virtual prison for those brains of us who committed crimes. I feel like as a floating brain I could have got up to some really bad poo poo.

Why would I bother to discuss solipsism with any of you?

Ernest Hemingway posted:

There is a possible world where a necessary supernatural being exists.

If it is possible that it is necessary for a supernatural being to exist, then it is necessary that this supernatural being exists.

It is necessary that this being (God) exists.

Post 9-11 User posted:

That all furries are not deathly allergic to peanuts or chlorine gas is a pretty solid proof that God does not exist.

I Am The Scum posted:

There is no possible world where an impossible supernatural being exists.

Ernest Hemingway posted:

There is a possible world where a necessary supernatural being exists.

quote:

If it is possible that it is necessary for a supernatural being to exist, then it is necessary that this supernatural being exists.

Ernest Hemingway posted:

Edit: It would be simpler for you to just say: "There is no possible world where a supernatural being exists". Which begs the question...

bitterandtwisted posted:

What do you base this on?

bitterandtwisted posted:

Why?

Ernest Hemingway posted:

God is an entirely perfect being. Necessary existence is a trait of an entirely perfect being.

quote:

Modal logic. It's pretty simple really - when describing something as necessary or possible (i.e. ascribing modal operators of N or P) - any string of Ns and/or Ps that precedes that thing is only equivalent to the last operator in the string, and vice versa.

So, saying that (G) is possible implies that (G) is necessarily possible. i.e. P(G)->NP(G).

Likewise, if it is possible for something to be necessary, it is necessary. i.e. PN(G)->N(G).

Saying that something is possibly possible, or necessarily necessary is just a long winded way of saying something is possible, or necessary: PP(G)->P(G), NN(G)->N(G)

...and just to drive the point home: NPPPNNP(G)-> P(G).

If you consider all possible worlds, and submit that God exists in at least one of these worlds PN(G), then it is implied that God must exist, since PN(G)->N(G).

If God exists in any possible world, then God must exist in all possible worlds.

bitterandtwisted posted:

That doesn't answer my question at all.

bitterandtwisted posted:

This is a load of waffle that would also prove the existence of magical penis unicorns. Plus, why do the bolded part?

Ernest Hemingway posted:

The logic is actually quite sound - you can't really reject the argument on the ground of its axioms (I didn't invent modal logic). And no, this argument can't be used to prove the existence of magical penis unicorns. Necessary existence is a trait that can only be possessed by God.

CommieGIR posted:

Okay, prove it outside of a metaphysical 'What if' argument.

Otherwise, while we cannot disprove/prove god, claiming that what ifs make him a reality is no more true.

Ernest Hemingway posted:

Could you clarify as to what exactly what your question is?


The logic is actually quite sound - you can't really reject the argument on the ground of its axioms (I didn't invent modal logic). And no, this argument can't be used to prove the existence of magical penis unicorns. Necessary existence is a trait that can only be possessed by God.

bitterandtwisted posted:

This is a load of waffle

Ernest Hemingway posted:

And so far I'm submitting that we CAN prove God. Which means that if you don't prove me wrong by Sunday you all have to go to church.

Ernest Hemingway posted:

Well, if the argument holds, I fail to see how the sort of argument it is (metaphysical, or otherwise) affects the strength of its conclusion.

Are you asking for an argument based on empirical evidence? I'm afraid I don't have one (no one does).

Ernest Hemingway posted:

Could you clarify as to what exactly what your question is?


The logic is actually quite sound - you can't really reject the argument on the ground of its axioms (I didn't invent modal logic). And no, this argument can't be used to prove the existence of magical penis unicorns. Necessary existence is a trait that can only be possessed by God.

quote:

As for the bolded part - in order to reject it, you would have to prove that it is impossible for God to exist.... which is much more philosophically dubious than submitting, at least, to the possibility of God's existence.

GAINING WEIGHT... posted:

The problem is that it begins by assuming the greatest thing must exist. Yes, the greatest thing would have the property of existence, but it's not necessarily true that there IS a "greatest thing". That's where the unicorns come into play: just because we can imagine it or describe it, does not mean it's there, even if the thing we imagine has the property of being there.

Like, my version of the best chocolate cake in the world would include the property of being in my kitchen right now, yet I am cakeless.

Ernest Hemingway posted:

Now, when we're talking about necessary/contingent existence the picture becomes difference. There is no possible world where 1+1 does not equal 2 and no possible world with a married bachelor in it. Likewise with God.

Ernest Hemingway posted:

You're thinking in terms of existence/non-existence and not in terms of necessary existence/contingent existence - your conception of the perfect cookie might include it's existence - but as Kant established, existence is not something that can be predicated onto something- i.e. regardless of what qualities A consists of, it either exists or it doesn't (You can have a real or imaginary A with qualities C,B,D - but you can't have an imaginary A that also exists ) this is why "The perfect (X) argument fails to address a more refined understanding of the ontological argument. When you imagine the perfect cookie existing, you don't imagine it necessarily existing - and you couldn't because cookies can't necessarily exist (i.e. there is at least one possible world where the cookie is not on the table).

Ernest Hemingway posted:

You're thinking in terms of existence/non-existence and not in terms of necessary existence/contingent existence - your conception of the perfect cookie might include it's existence - but as Kant established, existence is not something that can be predicated onto something- i.e. regardless of what qualities A consists of, it either exists or it doesn't (You can have a real or imaginary A with qualities C,B,D - but you can't have an imaginary A that also exists ) this is why "The perfect (X) argument fails to address a more refined understanding of the ontological argument. When you imagine the perfect cookie existing, you don't imagine it necessarily existing - and you couldn't because cookies can't necessarily exist (i.e. there is at least one possible world where the cookie is not on the table).

Now, when we're talking about necessary/contingent existence the picture becomes difference. There is no possible world where 1+1 does not equal 2 and no possible world with a married bachelor in it. Likewise with God.

CommieGIR posted:

This is called a god of the gaps argument, and its a logical fallacy. Sorry, that doesn't cut it.

Also: What the gently caress is that bolded part? That is just mind numbingly bad.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/God_of_the_gaps

CommieGIR posted:

The perfect cookie doesn't exist till someone actually creates it. It IS imaginary till its actually materialized. Likewise with God. Once again: Nobody is claiming god doesn't exist and they have the proof, they are claiming that there is insufficient evidence to accept that he does, as most of the natural things attributed to him have natural answers instead of supernatural ones.

You cannot try to use a materiel object that can be formed in reality with ease as proof that a metaphysical object exists.

GAINING WEIGHT... posted:

I think you have to prove that God has necessary existence.

Ernest Hemingway posted:

Ernest Hemingway posted:

So, what you'd be claiming is that although God is an entirely perfect being, necessary existence isn't a trait that an entirely perfect being would possess?

Ernest Hemingway posted:

So, in regards to the cookie: a potential thing is not an actual thing until it is actualized. I agree.

But I'm specifically claiming that God is not a contingent being, but a necessary being - so your point about the cookie does not apply to my characterization of God.

When people bring up "The perfect (x)" argument they're not grasping the semantics of the argument they're opposing. As a result of this, the argument gets characterized as implying that somehow conceiving of a perfect thing performatively establishes that thing's existence. This is silly. It's important to remember that it's not about 'perfection' but 'necessity' - so, since there is a possible world where you don't conceive of the perfect cake, the existence of that cake is contingent on that possible world not be the actual world (and furthermore, the cake wouldn't have come into existence until the point in time when you concieved it) - so the 'perfect cake' has contingent existence, which is fundamentally different from a thing (God) which has a necessary existence.

Thus, 'The perfect (x)' argument doesn't refute the ontological argument and people should stop using it.

jryan42988 posted:

How do you explain the beauty of the Grand Canyon if there's no such thing as God?

Ernest Hemingway posted:

CommieGIR posted:

By using the 'God is a necessary being you are making the watchmaker argument.

Still a very poor argument, and in no way ratifies or verifies the argument you are trying to present.

Once again, while none of us can verify/disqualify the existence of God, neither can you do so with god of the gaps and watchmaker arguments.

GAINING WEIGHT... posted:

No more than the perfect cake necessarily existing. You contend that the difference is, the cake doesn't exist as a concept until we conceive of it, but I submit that the same is true for God. We invented Him as an idea, and ascribed to Him the quality of "perfection", thus the argument came about that since he is perfect, he must exist, QED.

This is one of those fun tricks of logic, like Xeno's Paradox (you must go halfway before you can go the full way, must go a quarter of the way before half way, etc etc, thus you can never get anywhere). You use these definitions and seeming-truths to construct a conclusion that doesn't at all match up to reality. But in the end, it does not change the fact that we are the ones who dreamt Him up (prove we didn't), and just like the best cake, or the perfect girlfriend, or the ideal world, it doesn't exist just because it would exist if it were really perfect.

Dzhay posted:

Let me have a go: we have some property, "A". We use it to define a second property "B" as "a thing exhibits property B if it exhibits property A and necessarily exists.". Imagine the most B thing possible, by your argument it would exist, regardless of what A was, right?

But A could be anything, such as "being an orange cube on this desk in front of me, that I would definitely notice and not lie about on the internet".

There is no orange cube on my desk.

Ernest Hemingway posted:

Far from it, actually. The watchmaker argument speaks to the notion of causality and depends on the notion of necessary causality. My argument is not about causality and when I use the word necessary, I'm using it in a different sense - i.e. it is logically contradictory to deny a necessary something.

Ernest Hemingway posted:

Well, now you're characterizing God as a contingent entity as per a psychological approach (yes, we dreamnt God up and anthropomorphized him at some point), but you're not really addressing the issue of God as a necessary being so much as just asserting the opposite without argument. (To be fair I haven't provided an argument for God as a necessary being, it's just something I've stated).... if it helps, I'm trying to characterize the concept of God as a strictly logical concept which possesses 'necessary existence' as an essential property.

Ernest Hemingway posted:

So we have:
Property 1 = (A) = 'beingness' of an orange cube on your desk
Property 2 = (B) = another, unspecified property
A thing = x = an unspecified thin
Is necessary = N
Not = ~


and you state:

(IF) Nx and x(A) ->(THEN) x(B)
~A

Dzhay posted:

Actually B was specified, it was "Having property A and necessarily existing". (A&N in your terminology, I guess)

Dzhay posted:

Actually B was specified, it was "Having property A and necessarily existing". (A&N in your terminology, I guess)

Ernest Hemingway posted:

Oh, then it's simple - property A, unless it is a property that is an essential property of a necessary being, couldn't be attributed to a necessary being. So property A can't be just anything as "Having property A and necessarily existing" contradicts itself if property A is something that could possibly be otherwise (like an orange on your desk).

CommieGIR posted:

Still missing a key part: The proof that something is necessary implies you proving this 'necessity'

You have not done that yet. Nor have you shown how it is 'logically contradictory', in fact you've done your best to make it as illogical as possible.

CommieGIR posted:

Keep trying. Oh, and you did indeed make a Watchmaker implication. Remember where I said you made a god of the gaps argument? You just did it again.

CommieGIR posted:

God is not a logical concept.

Ernest Hemingway posted:

You're right, I haven't (and I'm not going to!). The argument, in most cases, would have to proceed from here.

The non-controversial claim I am making is that if God were proven to be a necessary being, then the fundamental characteristic of that proof would be showing that it is logically contradictory to deny God's existence.

Ernest Hemingway posted:

I think you've misunderstood me here. God, like any other concept, can be represented symbolically in logic formulations. I meant that that was how I was characterizing God in my arguments - to lead it into more of a logical analysis direction than a space-monkey-in-the-sky one.

Ernest Hemingway posted:

I'm sorry if I'm missing something obvious but I really do need you to explain how I'm doing this.