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Maarek posted:After 9/11 we should have rebuilt the World Trade Center to look exactly like it did on 9/10, we should have tried the 'enemy combatants' in Federal court, and we should have taken Bin Laden alive and dragged his rear end into court clean shaven and in an orange jumpsuit just like a common criminal. If we had done those things we could have pretended we are still a nation that believes in the rule of law and one that isn't afraid of terrorists. It would have been a nice step toward reestablishing ourselves as a great nation instead of just a strong one. FlamingLiberal posted:No, you see, Clinton is at fault because he treated terrorism like a criminal issue, and therefore FAAARRTTTT The next Clinton, if she gets in office, will certainly right that wrong. I wonder which terrorist bitch she'll kill first. Monica Lewinsky or Gennifer Flowers.
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# ? Dec 13, 2014 19:03 |
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# ? May 20, 2024 02:19 |
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patentmagus posted:The next Clinton, if she gets in office, will certainly right that wrong. I wonder which terrorist bitch she'll kill first. Monica Lewinsky or Gennifer Flowers. Deb Fischer.
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# ? Dec 13, 2014 21:08 |
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patentmagus posted:The next Clinton, if she gets in office, will certainly right that wrong. I wonder which terrorist bitch she'll kill first. Monica Lewinsky or Gennifer Flowers. Sarah Palin.
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# ? Dec 13, 2014 21:12 |
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Maarek posted:After 9/11 we should have rebuilt the World Trade Center to look exactly like it did on 9/10, we should have tried the 'enemy combatants' in Federal court, and we should have taken Bin Laden alive and dragged his rear end into court clean shaven and in an orange jumpsuit just like a common criminal. If we had done those things we could have pretended we are still a nation that believes in the rule of law and one that isn't afraid of terrorists. And we execute Osama by Destination Defenstration from the top of the towers. And 24 is a Seinfeldian comedy about bumbling terrorists who aren't taken seriously and never get anything done.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 02:17 |
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Is there actually a Supreme Court case pending related to this, or is it just Scalia harming the authority of the Court again?
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 03:37 |
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Discendo Vox posted:Is there actually a Supreme Court case pending related to this, or is it just Scalia harming the authority of the Court again? Who would even have standing to bring such a case?
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 03:45 |
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Trabisnikof posted:Who would even have standing to bring such a case? If it were unconstitutional, a tortured detainee could theoretically bring a bivens claim. But that's like having lupus. it's never lupus.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 03:53 |
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ActusRhesus posted:If it were unconstitutional, a tortured detainee could theoretically bring a bivens claim. It was that one time.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 04:23 |
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Discendo Vox posted:It was that one time. yeah...that one time just to give everyone hope that it could happen again. Seems that since Bivens the court's done everything in its power to make bivens an anomaly...which sucks.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 12:50 |
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I had personally hoped for one last season in which every case turned out to involve lupus.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 15:17 |
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Discendo Vox posted:I had personally hoped for one last season in which every case turned out to involve lupus. A good friend of mine has lupus, I was out with her and her husband, and she mentioned having lupus (prior to that I was unaware of her lupus) Me: HOLY poo poo IT IS LUPUS!!!!! Her husband laughed. She had never seen House and was just confused.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 15:45 |
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Heien v. North Carolina: Objectively reasonable mistakes about what the law criminalizes does not render unconstitutional what is an otherwise reasonable seizure under that nonexistent law (but which the LEO reasonably believed to exist). In other words, a LEO's objectively reasonable mistake of law doesn't violate the Fourth Amendment. Roberts writes for 8; Kagan joins but concurs separately, with Ginsburg joining her concurrence; Sotomayor dissents alone.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 16:29 |
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So what is objectively reasonable?
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 16:37 |
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Green Crayons posted:Heien v. North Carolina: Objectively reasonable mistakes about what the law criminalizes does not render unconstitutional what is an otherwise reasonable seizure under that nonexistent law (but which the LEO reasonably believed to exist). Sotomayowns.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 16:43 |
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Agreed, Warszawa. Definitely my favorite Justice.Rygar201 posted:So what is objectively reasonable? Who knows! Whatever a court says is objectively reasonable. In this case, SCOTUS said that the LEO's mistaken belief that the law required both taillights to work, when the law only required one taillight to work, was objectively reasonable because no controlling state appellate court decision had addressed the issue, and the language of the statute at least supported the LEO's mistaken belief. Also, SCOTUS mentions that the lower state appellate courts in this case held that such a mistaken belief was reasonable - and while I think this was basically SCOTUS just trying to say "hey look these other courts agreed with our conclusion, so we're not wrong!", and not really a factor in the analysis, I'm sure litigants will argue it to be part of the analysis. So, from this brief rumination, courts will probably determine whether such a mistake was reasonable by looking at: (1) whether there was controlling law on point; (2) whether there was a legal basis that at least supported the LEO's mistaken belief; and (3) whether a lower tribunal already opined on whether the mistake was reasonable or not. All in all, it sounds like a pretty low standard - almost as if it's indistinguishable from the very forgiving qualified immunity standard which protects LEOs from liability for having violated a constitutional right! - but SCOTUS assures us that this is a stringent standard indeed, and totally not the same thing as the QI standard.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 16:47 |
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The Warszawa posted:Sotomayowns. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xIFJLMyUwrg
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 17:22 |
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The Warszawa posted:Sotomayowns. Wise Latina Justice still Best Justice, Justice of mi corazon.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 17:24 |
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So question, the ruling itself says:quote:Held: Because Darisse’s mistake of law was reasonable, there was rea- sonable suspicion justifying the stop under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 4–13. Would this be limited to "reasonable suspicion" type stuff which is already bullshit (traffic stops)? According to the ruling the guy consented to a search of his vehicle.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 17:24 |
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The Warszawa posted:Sotomayowns. I'm convinced Warszawa actually is Ginsberg at this point. That makes Ginsberg, Huntsman, and Rahm all posting in this forum. Anybody else want to come out of the closet?
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 17:33 |
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hobbesmaster posted:So question, the ruling itself says: I think the facts of this case: (1) that the reasonable mistake was "I thought both your taillights had to work"; and (2) the guy consented to the vehicle search means this case will have little to no precedent value.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 17:34 |
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ActusRhesus posted:I think the facts of this case: (1) that the reasonable mistake was "I thought both your taillights had to work"; and (2) the guy consented to the vehicle search means this case will have little to no precedent value. We know that most people consent to searches, even when they are guilty as hell and shouldn't. The precedent is, cops can pull people over for anything now and have an above average chance of having the driver consent to a search.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 17:37 |
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Pohl posted:The precedent is, cops can pull people over for anything now This was already true though?
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 17:40 |
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Pohl posted:We know that most people consent to searches, even when they are guilty as hell and shouldn't. The precedent is, cops can pull people over for anything now and have an above average chance of having the driver consent to a search. That isn't so much a precedent of this case as a precedent of police interaction in the U.S. - I do disagree with AR about the precedential value of this case being tied to the consent search, insofar as we consider the search to be an extension of the seizure (which was predicated on a mistake of law). I haven't gone through the case, but I wonder if it's a Catch-22 where if the the search is close enough to the seizure (the stop) to make the evidence obtained from the search improperly gained, then it's close enough for the consent to cleanse the impropriety. On the whole, I'm very skeptical of the influence of Supreme Court jurisprudence on on-the-ground officer conduct, though, and I'm not sure our consent jurisprudence regarding interaction with law enforcement approximates anything close to reality.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 17:44 |
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Pohl posted:We know that most people consent to searches, even when they are guilty as hell and shouldn't. The precedent is, cops can pull people over for anything now and have an above average chance of having the driver consent to a search. I don't think the holding goes that far. A cop interpreting a statute requiring "a working stoplight" to mean "your brake lights both have to work" isn't unreasonable. I would think both brake lights have to work too. Really, I don't see this case as being expanded very much past the facts of this particular case.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 17:45 |
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consent searches should be per se unconstitutional
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 17:46 |
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ActusRhesus posted:I don't think the holding goes that far. It is funny that Sotomayor, who I believe to be the only sitting Justice with prosecutor experience, seems to be much less credulous about the reasonableness of police conduct.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 17:47 |
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WhiskeyJuvenile posted:consent searches should be per se unconstitutional I don't necessarily disagree. It's not all that hard to get a warrant (if there is actually probable cause). Most areas have on-call judges 24/7.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 17:48 |
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I think warrantless searches have been made obsolete by technology.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 17:50 |
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"searches should be both subjectively and objectively reasonable" and unlawful searches are objectively unreasonable and boom, one sentence disposition of this dumb case and another reason why I'll never be a justice
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 17:51 |
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The framing of the decision sounds way worse than the actual case. When I saw the headline I was imagining being in court and hearing: "Your honor, I did not know that having a rear window Calvin-Peeing-On-Things sticker was not illegal".WhiskeyJuvenile posted:unlawful searches are objectively unreasonable I never gone to none of them high falutin' law schools but this sounds like a pretty good policy to me.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 17:51 |
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The Warszawa posted:It is funny that Sotomayor, who I believe to be the only sitting Justice with prosecutor experience, seems to be much less credulous about the reasonableness of police conduct. oh it had pretext stop written all over it...but the law as it exists allows you to pull people over for "other reasons." If both tail lights had been out, there'd be no question it was a fair stop...so I don't think it's unreasonable to assume one light out is also a moving violation. Which gets us into Whisky Juvenile's point about whether, given the prevalence of pretext stops, consent searches should be valid at all. My vote is for "Detain and get a warrant...if there is actually probable cause, and if there is no probable cause, then move along." The Warszawa posted:I think warrantless searches have been made obsolete by technology. Pretty much. I see no reason to not get warrants. If for no other reason than my selfish desire not to have to waste time and energy defending poo poo after the fact. Have probable cause? Get warrant.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 17:53 |
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Green Crayons posted:Who knows! Whatever a court says is objectively reasonable.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 17:54 |
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ActusRhesus posted:oh it had pretext stop written all over it...but the law as it exists allows you to pull people over for "other reasons." If both tail lights had been out, there'd be no question it was a fair stop...so I don't think it's unreasonable to assume one light out is also a moving violation. Yeah, see I actually believe this on its face was not a pretext stop (though the grammarian in me thinks that the law is perfectly clear about the sufficiency of one light), but I think Sotomayor's jurisprudence is willing to bar reasonable mistakes to guard as much as possible against pretext stops, and that's a fascinating voice on the Court that we haven't really seen since Marshall. Everyone should also read Justice Marshall's dissent in Los Angeles v. Lyons.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 17:56 |
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twodot posted:While this isn't wrong, the difference between objectively reasonable and subjectively, is that subjectively reasonable is talking about actor's beliefs "I believed it was reasonable to believe that the law required two tail lights", and objectively is talking about the person doing the analysis "We believe your belief that the law required two tail lights was reasonable". This. Generally the standard in mistake of fact reviews is subjectively held and objectively reasonable. As in "you actually believed that to be true, and a reasonable person could have made the same mistake."
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 17:56 |
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The Warszawa posted:Yeah, see I actually believe this on its face was not a pretext stop (though the grammarian in me thinks that the law is perfectly clear about the sufficiency of one light), but I think Sotomayor's jurisprudence is willing to bar reasonable mistakes to guard as much as possible against pretext stops, and that's a fascinating voice on the Court that we haven't really seen since Marshall. Hmm...I'd have to read the actual briefs...but the court's describing it as a "suspicious vehicle" left me with the impression they had a hunch shenanigans were afoot and were just waiting for them to do something wrong so they could pull them over. Could be wrong on that.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 17:58 |
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hobbesmaster posted:This was already true though? The difference is that they'd at least have to provide a legally defensible reason (a comically easy bar to clear) for a stop, whereas this one wasn't even that. I'm surprised at how few cops take the opportunity to stop someone because they switched lanes while turning, people do that poo poo all the time like being a fat gently caress extends to driving habits and they need to take a wide turn for their wide rear end. Nowadays where I live they just throw up a "NO RIGHT TURN" sign to flash while the opposing traffic has a left turn arrow. gently caress correcting the behavior, just enable these lardasses to waste everyone's time.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 17:59 |
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Reading Kagan's concurrence it looks like the Court goes pretty far out of its way to say that this case applies only to the objective standard, and the officer's personal belief is more or less irrelevant (so you couldn't say the officer was poorly trained, for example). So this case really only applies to statutes that are "genuinely ambiguous," which in the context of traffic laws is probably going to be a very slim number.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 18:04 |
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AndNowMax posted:Reading Kagan's concurrence it looks like the Court goes pretty far out of its way to say that this case applies only to the objective standard, and the officer's personal belief is more or less irrelevant (so you couldn't say the officer was poorly trained, for example). So this case really only applies to statutes that are "genuinely ambiguous," which in the context of traffic laws is probably going to be a very slim number. My interpretation is that this is the big takeaway, and is why the opinion presents the standard as stringent.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 18:40 |
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AndNowMax posted:Reading Kagan's concurrence it looks like the Court goes pretty far out of its way to say that this case applies only to the objective standard, and the officer's personal belief is more or less irrelevant (so you couldn't say the officer was poorly trained, for example). So this case really only applies to statutes that are "genuinely ambiguous," which in the context of traffic laws is probably going to be a very slim number. Roberts' opinion doesn't say anything about a statute having to be "genuinely ambiguous," at least as far as what I see. So that isn't a requirement, it's just what Kagan thinks is a requirement based off of her understanding of the majority opinion. But then again, Roberts didn't feel the need to amend his majority to include that phrase "genuinely ambiguous," so there's probably a reason for that. At any rate, Roberts writes that an incorrect understanding of the law needs only to be "reasonable." So there doesn't need to be any ambiguity in an existing statute, an attorney just needs to come up with an after the fact, "reasonable" - but ultimately incorrect - justification of how the law could be understood to justify the LEO's actions. Once again, what is an objectively "reasonable" misunderstanding of the law? As far as the SCOTUS tells us in this case, I return to: quote:So, from this brief rumination, courts will probably determine whether such a mistake was reasonable by looking at: (1) whether there was controlling law on point; (2) whether there was a legal basis that at least supported the LEO's mistaken belief; and (3) whether a lower tribunal already opined on whether the mistake was reasonable or not.
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 21:47 |
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# ? May 20, 2024 02:19 |
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Wow, that reads like "throw everything against the wall and see what sticks when the defense moves to suppress."
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# ? Dec 15, 2014 21:50 |