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Raenir Salazar posted:What's the possibility of that, instead of Shock Therapy, Russia had a more gradual and more successful process of economic reform/growth that results in Russia being economically attractive enough for the Eastern European states to actually see valid market incentives to not drift too far from Russia? I see this as being impossible, since Russia would still remain pretty lovely economically for a while while the process happens. Meanwhile you have France, the UK, the Scandinavian countries, etc all sitting right there with robust economies. The newly unchained eastern countries would seek out ties with the west earlier and much more strongly than with Russia, absent some manner of economic miracle like Russia being able to rocket back to 1970s production levels within a year after the end of the Soviet Union. The outcome would, however, probably not be as much of an aggressive Russia that actively scares away the other countries to pile on the West's economic advantage though.
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Mar 12, 2015 19:26
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Nintendo Kid posted:I see this as being impossible, since Russia would still remain pretty lovely economically for a while while the process happens. Meanwhile you have France, the UK, the Scandinavian countries, etc all sitting right there with robust economies. The newly unchained eastern countries would seek out ties with the west earlier and much more strongly than with Russia, absent some manner of economic miracle like Russia being able to rocket back to 1970s production levels within a year after the end of the Soviet Union.  That doesn't seem to be the case. If the GDP of Russia stayed at the nominal Soviet level and kept growing (like the China or NEP model) then you'd have reached the 2008 level in 1992 to 1994. Early enough to be able to offer serious economic incentives to Ukraine which has had its own disastrous economic issues.
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Mar 12, 2015 19:35
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Raenir Salazar posted:
That's Soviet Union GDP, not Russian SFSR GDP, significant parts of which relied on the fact that stuff from the rest of the USSR didn't have any international borders to contend with. To say nothing of favorable economic agreements with independent Eastern Bloc nations. The massive disruption of everything entailed by the collapse necessitates at least some period of downturn. Unless what you're actually proposing is "Soviet Union never breaks up" and "none of the Eastern Bloc hates the Soviet Union" which both require WAY more than "not having shock therapy" to take place.
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Mar 12, 2015 19:46
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Nintendo Kid posted:That's Soviet Union GDP, not Russian SFSR GDP, significant parts of which relied on the fact that stuff from the rest of the USSR didn't have any international borders to contend with. To say nothing of favorable economic agreements with independent Eastern Bloc nations. The massive disruption of everything entailed by the collapse necessitates at least some period of downturn. If you check what I wrote I actually implied the scenario where Russian GDP remains at its nominal USSR levels, so Russian GDP stays at the level and rate of growth it had in 1988-1991, and then continues to grow as the effects of a gradual economic reform kick in, further accelerating economic growth but now without the disruptions. I exclude Eastern Europe and the remainder of the FSU since they didn't have as much as a bad time as Russia, meaning that in the mid 90's Eastern Europe/the Inner FSU are in desperate straights yet Russia is doing Okay and is actually in a position to provide economic incentives.
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Mar 12, 2015 20:19
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Nintendo Kid posted:I see this as being impossible, since Russia would still remain pretty lovely economically for a while while the process happens. True, but also still (presumably) have an intact social safety net, less of an easy environment for Oligarchs to exploit, etc. Even if economic growth had remained sluggish, I doubt Russia's fortunes would have played so directly into nationalist hands as they actually did. The non-Russian Eastern European countries would probably have integrated into Europe quickly, but then again, Russia probably would have had a better chance at integrating as well. Plus, the other EE states would still have had to keep a lot of economic ties with Russia anyway - Russia was still the country running the energy racket in the region, after all. So I think overall one probably would have seen a very different outcome had Russia transitioned to a market economy in a more phased, deliberate manner. Less angry Russians thinking that the West is trying to keep Russia weak means less angry Russians trying to keep the West out of Eastern Europe.
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Mar 12, 2015 20:23
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Raenir Salazar posted:If you check what I wrote I actually implied the scenario where Russian GDP remains at its nominal USSR levels, so Russian GDP stays at the level and rate of growth it had in 1988-1991, and then continues to grow as the effects of a gradual economic reform kick in, further accelerating economic growth but now without the disruptions. I exclude Eastern Europe and the remainder of the FSU since they didn't have as much as a bad time as Russia, meaning that in the mid 90's Eastern Europe/the Inner FSU are in desperate straights yet Russia is doing Okay and is actually in a position to provide economic incentives. This is impossible as the Russian GDP within the Soviet Union relied on the interrelated ties within the Soviet Union proper and with the favorable economic deals with "fellow" Communist eatern bloc states. All of these still vanish if shock therapy doesn't happen, unless, again, the Soviet Union doesn't shatter and the Eastern Bloc doesn't toss out the Communists.
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Mar 12, 2015 20:32
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Nintendo Kid posted:This is impossible as the Russian GDP within the Soviet Union relied on the interrelated ties within the Soviet Union proper and with the favorable economic deals with "fellow" Communist eatern bloc states. All of these still vanish if shock therapy doesn't happen, unless, again, the Soviet Union doesn't shatter and the Eastern Bloc doesn't toss out the Communists. I'm with Majorian here; the safety net would have remained, the economic transition would have been less of a shock and so on.
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Mar 12, 2015 21:18
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Majorian posted:True, but also still (presumably) have an intact social safety net, less of an easy environment for Oligarchs to exploit, etc. Even if economic growth had remained sluggish, I doubt Russia's fortunes would have played so directly into nationalist hands as they actually did. The non-Russian Eastern European countries would probably have integrated into Europe quickly, but then again, Russia probably would have had a better chance at integrating as well. Plus, the other EE states would still have had to keep a lot of economic ties with Russia anyway - Russia was still the country running the energy racket in the region, after all. I would think a stronger Russian economy would have made integration even less likely than before because it wasn't needed, it is more probably likely thought there would have been peaceful coexistence. That said, much of the former Soviet Union (not all) took cues over shock therapy, and if Russia had pulled back then much of the rest of the former Soviet Union would have as well. That said, it would have been tricky simply for the fact a lot of Soviet industry was obsolete or required significant subsidies to function so it would have to be taken apart piecemeal and obsolete industries needed to be either retooled or replaced. One issue is that the former Soviet Union had a lot of "company towns" that were tied to specific factories/mines (and in this sense it isn't really different than anywhere else with a rust belt). If anything it might have helped if the US/EU had simply given them major Marshall-type aid to retool that was tied to arms control and force reduction and they didn't sent guys like Larry Summers over there. Ardennes fucked around with this message at 23:03 on Mar 12, 2015 |
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Mar 12, 2015 22:40
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Ardennes posted:I would think a stronger Russian economy would have made integration even less likely than before because it wasn't needed, it is more probably likely thought there would have been peaceful coexistence. Possibly, but keep in mind, Russia not becoming more economically integrated with Europe wasn't from lack of trying on Russia's part. Yeltsin, et al., wanted more integration very deeply; Western Europe was more lukewarm on the idea: quote:After a one-day summit longer on symbolism than substance, President Boris Yeltsin declared a vision Thursday of a new Europe, united with Russia, that would be a "dominant force" in the world. It's pretty heartbreaking to look back on this time and think of how open to the West a lot of Russia still was, and how much people like Yeltsin wanted to join the rest of the developed world. I really wish we and they had both taken better advantage of the opportunity.
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Mar 12, 2015 23:23
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Raenir Salazar posted:I'm with Majorian here; the safety net would have remained, the economic transition would have been less of a shock and so on. Less of a shock yes. No shock or only a mild one? Absolutely not. While most other ex-Communist countries out there didn't suffer nearly as much, none of them were part of a disintegrated former union, a core that relied on extracting the excess production of much of the rest of that union to supply their own normal economy.
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Mar 13, 2015 02:41
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Nintendo Kid posted:Less of a shock yes. No shock or only a mild one? Absolutely not. I think you might be overestimating how devoid of sources of wealth Russia was when the clock struck 1992, though. The collapse of the Soviet economy had much less to do with losing its former satellite states, and more to do with an already-decrepit industrial base that was way behind on producing modern technology. They still had plenty of resources - they just hadn't been turning them into anything sellable since the early 70's. This was the sort of thing that a lot of government investment in infrastructure and modernization of the industrial base, coupled with a much more phased approach to privatization, could have helped at least partially ameliorate. But of course, Russia was strapped for cash in the early 90's, and the only lending sources were demanding that they cut government spending and rapidly privatize the whole shitshow.
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Mar 13, 2015 05:12
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Majorian posted:I think you might be overestimating how devoid of sources of wealth Russia was when the clock struck 1992, though. The collapse of the Soviet economy had much less to do with losing its former satellite states, and more to do with an already-decrepit industrial base that was way behind on producing modern technology. They still had plenty of resources - they just hadn't been turning them into anything sellable since the early 70's. This was the sort of thing that a lot of government investment in infrastructure and modernization of the industrial base, coupled with a much more phased approach to privatization, could have helped at least partially ameliorate. But of course, Russia was strapped for cash in the early 90's, and the only lending sources were demanding that they cut government spending and rapidly privatize the whole shitshow. It's the combination of the decrepit industrial base and the sudden disruption of reasonably comfortable supply lines that allowed said base to keep trucking along. China as a whole would probably be a lot poorer today if the Dengization had had to take place amidst a significant chunk of the population breaking off too.
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Mar 13, 2015 06:04
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Nintendo Kid posted:It's the combination of the decrepit industrial base and the sudden disruption of reasonably comfortable supply lines that allowed said base to keep trucking along. It didn't help, certainly, but even if those states had for whatever reason remained part of Russia, Shock Therapy still would have been the punch to the balls that made the whole preexisting economic tailspin turn into a swan dive. China, if anything, is an example of why the alternative (Deng Xiaoping's gradualist reforms) is a much better way to go about transitioning to a market economy. Majorian fucked around with this message at 08:20 on Mar 13, 2015 |
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Mar 13, 2015 08:18
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Majorian posted:It's pretty heartbreaking to look back on this time and think of how open to the West a lot of Russia still was, and how much people like Yeltsin wanted to join the rest of the developed world. I really wish we and they had both taken better advantage of the opportunity.
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Mar 13, 2015 15:08
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Hambilderberglar posted:I don't think it's so surprising that France and Germany, both of which have a complicated relationship with Russia, would have its leaders take a lukewarm tone on the prospect of any partnership with Russia. Why exactly would you expect any European country to feel a particular warmth to Russia to the extent that they'd want to hitch their wagon to theirs? Hilariously, Germany has been lukewarm on the alternate too: Confronting Russia is difficult due to their natural gas and coal ties.
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Mar 13, 2015 15:09
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CommieGIR posted:Hilariously, Germany has been lukewarm on the alternate too: Confronting Russia is difficult due to their natural gas and coal ties.
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Mar 13, 2015 15:22
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CommieGIR posted:Hilariously, Germany has been lukewarm on the alternate too: Confronting Russia is difficult due to their natural gas and coal ties.
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Mar 13, 2015 17:08
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Hambilderberglar posted:I don't think it's so surprising that France and Germany, both of which have a complicated relationship with Russia, would have its leaders take a lukewarm tone on the prospect of any partnership with Russia. Why exactly would you expect any European country to feel a particular warmth to Russia to the extent that they'd want to hitch their wagon to theirs? Oh, I don't blame them either - I just think it was a mistake to be as close-minded to the idea as they were. There's a lot of ground between saying yes immediately, and half-assing it like they did. CommieGIR posted:Hilariously, Germany has been lukewarm on the alternate too: Confronting Russia is difficult due to their natural gas and coal ties. Even without the energy issue, I guarantee you that Germany would not be super-keen on taking a hard line towards Russia. Nobody wants to go to war with Russia over Ukraine.
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Mar 13, 2015 18:41
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Majorian posted:Even without the energy issue, I guarantee you that Germany would not be super-keen on taking a hard line towards Russia. Nobody wants to go to war with Russia over Ukraine. They were having difficulty even backing sanctions.
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Mar 13, 2015 18:52
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Majorian posted:Oh, I don't blame them either - I just think it was a mistake to be as close-minded to the idea as they were. There's a lot of ground between saying yes immediately, and half-assing it like they did. I don't see the upside to committing to any sort of relationship with Russia beyond what was stated there. Solid and non-binding sounds just fine to my European ears. Although I'm still left wondering what "ties that bind Europe to Russia" looks like.
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Mar 13, 2015 19:02
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Majorian posted:Oh, I don't blame them either - I just think it was a mistake to be as close-minded to the idea as they were. There's a lot of ground between saying yes immediately, and half-assing it like they did. Well i'm real proud of Germany for being so pacifistic when pacifism will possibly hurt Europe. Seriously Germany fucks Europe twice destroying the economies of itself, France and the UK and then decides war is bad just as Russia becomes militarily aggressive? gently caress off. gently caress you Germany you pieces of poo poo.
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Mar 13, 2015 19:33
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Can't think of any reason here why Germany might be pacifist to the point of irrationality. Nope, can't think of any reason at all.
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Mar 13, 2015 19:35
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Hambilderberglar posted:What do they have to benefit from not half-assing? Or rather, what did they? Well, for starters they probably wouldn't have had to deal with Russia playing games with their energy bills. It also would have helped prevent such an "us vs. them" mentality in Russia. quote:I don't see the upside to committing to any sort of relationship with Russia beyond what was stated there. Solid and non-binding sounds just fine to my European ears. Binding agreements would have helped Yeltsin fend off criticisms from nationalists, who were claiming that the US and Europe would back out on their commitments. Regarde Aduck posted:Well i'm real proud of Germany for being so pacifistic when pacifism will possibly hurt Europe. Their concern is that if they intervene in the wrong way, it will hurt Europe considerably more. I think a lot of you are overestimating how much the rest of the world cares about Ukraine.
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Mar 13, 2015 21:58
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Fojar38 posted:Can't think of any reason here why Germany might be pacifist to the point of irrationality. Nope, can't think of any reason at all. They're just giving Russia some lebensraum.
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Mar 13, 2015 22:03
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Majorian posted:Well, for starters they probably wouldn't have had to deal with Russia playing games with their energy bills. It also would have helped prevent such an "us vs. them" mentality in Russia. quote:Binding agreements would have helped Yeltsin fend off criticisms from nationalists, who were claiming that the US and Europe would back out on their commitments.
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Mar 13, 2015 22:11
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Hambilderberglar posted:[citation needed]. Which part? I'm guessing the us vs. them mentality, and I'm not sure how that needs a citation. A big part of the us vs. them mentality arose because Russians genuinely thought that the West was actively trying to undermine their economy. (if it's the former, that's an easier answer: the EU would have almost certainly included mechanisms that prevented Russia from screwing with the energy supply of other EU members) quote:Russia's position as the most important energy supplier isn't to Europe's benefit in the short or long term. It gives the Russian government undue influence which I sincerely doubt they wouldn't wield in this scenario. It's not like the US doesn't pressure governments of even allied nations on positions they have issues with. Why would Russia not use the levers it has at its disposal in this reality? If they had been economically, politically, and strategically integrated with the EU, I don't really see why they would want to use those levers. But even if they did want to while part of the EU, I'd imagine that they wouldn't want to lose their EU membership. quote:What binding agreements were on the table that Kohl and Chirac declined to sign? If none were on the table, what binding agreements would you have liked Kohl and Chirac to have signed? None were on the table, but I think a binding commitment with a timetable for Russian EU accession would have been a really good, forward-thinking idea.
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Mar 13, 2015 22:19
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Majorian posted:Which part? I'm guessing the us vs. them mentality, and I'm not sure how that needs a citation. A big part of the us vs. them mentality arose because Russians genuinely thought that the West was actively trying to undermine their economy. (if it's the former, that's an easier answer: the EU would have almost certainly included mechanisms that prevented Russia from screwing with the energy supply of other EU members) quote:If they had been economically, politically, and strategically integrated with the EU, I don't really see why they would want to use those levers. But even if they did want to while part of the EU, I'd imagine that they wouldn't want to lose their EU membership. quote:None were on the table, but I think a binding commitment with a timetable for Russian EU accession would have been a really good, forward-thinking idea. I'm also still unclear on what sort of benefit this brings to the EU? I don't see the existing "great powers" of Europe welcoming a country whose size and population would mean it would command a larger share of MEPs than even Germany (I somehow doubt they'd agree to have their influence diluted to accommodate the power balance). Not even mentioning that the state of its economy would have stretched solidarity mechanisms to their breaking point. From the perspective of Kohl and Chirac all I see is a colossal money pit that would have fundamentally altered the nature of the EU. Not an especially appealing prospect. That's not even getting into the eventual accession of Russia to Schengen and the Eurozone. The Polish Plumber is already the nightmare of Euroskeptics, and the Federalists would see their dream of a Federal Europe evaporate in front of their eyes.
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Mar 13, 2015 22:39
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While I agree that NATO expansion into Eastern Europe in the 90s was counter-provocative, we've made that bed and now have to sleep in it. While not directly tied to NATO I am worried with the US apparent lack of regard for the Budapest Memorandum; in which Ukraine signed away their nuclear weapons in exchange for protection from foreign threats. If this state of affairs continues and I see no reason why it wont: US credibility can only be further damaged. Providing training and access to heavy defensive systems seems like a small price to pay in exchange for the surrendering of strategic arms.
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Mar 13, 2015 22:40
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Hambilderberglar posted:But in your previous post you stated there's a lot of ground between saying yes immediately and half assing it like they did. This sounds a lot like Europe hitching its wagon to Russia and I don't think you have demonstrated why there would be a compelling reason for the EU and its member states to do so? I mean, I think I've kind of said it pretty clearly at this point: they would have gotten a better assurance that Russia would not turn aggressive anytime soon, more favorable trade conditions for the EU, mechanisms that prevented Russia from playing games with their energy policy, etc. quote:I don't want to sound like I'm talking down to you but that seems to ignore a large number of realities that made this idea unpalatable then and unpalatable now. Kohl and Chirac wouldn't have had the ability to promise this even unofficially, and making it palatable to their citizens is not something I see as possible now or then. I understand those realities, but the thing that I wish the EU leaders had understood (and I don't buy that Chirac, Kohl, et al., couldn't have convinced their fellow EU leaders to support a timetable for Russian accession, by the way) is that the risks of taking gradual but concrete steps towards letting Russia into the EU were eclipsed by the risks of the path that they ended up taking. Risks that are unfolding in front of our eyes as we speak. Thunder Moose posted:While I agree that NATO expansion into Eastern Europe in the 90s was counter-provocative, we've made that bed and now have to sleep in it. While not directly tied to NATO I am worried with the US apparent lack of regard for the Budapest Memorandum; in which Ukraine signed away their nuclear weapons in exchange for protection from foreign threats. Yeah, but unfortunately, that particular memorandum is completely in tatters right now anyway. It was a big mistake for the Bush Administration to get involved as much as they did during the Orange Revolution, and it was a big mistake that US politicians got involved in the overthrow of Yanukovych. I don't think those really count as "violations" of the memorandum, and they certainly pale in comparison to Russia's invasion of the country, but I think it's safe to say that all confidence in that agreement is gone from all sides. Majorian fucked around with this message at 22:53 on Mar 13, 2015 |
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Mar 13, 2015 22:50
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Thunder Moose posted:While not directly tied to NATO I am worried with the US apparent lack of regard for the Budapest Memorandum; in which Ukraine signed away their nuclear weapons in exchange for protection from foreign threats. I do seem to remember we unnecessarily invaded some place a bit south of there a while back. I'm pretty sure the foreign threat to Ukraine was someone else though.
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Mar 13, 2015 23:10
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Majorian posted:I mean, I think I've kind of said it pretty clearly at this point: they would have gotten a better assurance that Russia would not turn aggressive anytime soon, more favorable trade conditions for the EU, mechanisms that prevented Russia from playing games with their energy policy, etc. quote:I understand those realities, but the thing that I wish the EU leaders had understood (and I don't buy that Chirac, Kohl, et al., couldn't have convinced their fellow EU leaders to support a timetable for Russian accession, by the way) is that the risks of taking gradual but concrete steps towards letting Russia into the EU were eclipsed by the risks of the path that they ended up taking. Risks that are unfolding in front of our eyes as we speak.
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Mar 13, 2015 23:28
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What does it mean to "hitch its wagon", wouldn't any sort of agreement along the lines Yeltsin and the Soviet era Westernizers envisions be along the lines of an EU +1? Where the RF joins in something like an economic association; that seems very beneficial to Europe in the short term, the only way I can see it as bad as when Russia economically recovers and by then the EU becomes economically more intertwined and dependent on Russia;, so it seems very FYGM to not do so. The most powerful economic country in any economic union is just naturally bound to gain a larger degree of influence, but at least it isn't them playing sovereignty games and brickmanship.
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Mar 13, 2015 23:32
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Raenir Salazar posted:What does it mean to "hitch its wagon", wouldn't any sort of agreement along the lines Yeltsin and the Soviet era Westernizers envisions be along the lines of an EU +1? Where the RF joins in something like an economic association; that seems very beneficial to Europe in the short term, the only way I can see it as bad as when Russia economically recovers and by then the EU becomes economically more intertwined and dependent on Russia;, so it seems very FYGM to not do so. The most powerful economic country in any economic union is just naturally bound to gain a larger degree of influence, but at least it isn't them playing sovereignty games and brickmanship.
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Mar 13, 2015 23:51
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Hambilderberglar posted:And as for the second part of your post, you're now running into a state of affairs that is unpalatable to the United States. They have no interest in seeing European knowhow flowing into the Russian economy or seeing its European allies be more sympathetic towards their point of view. Now this definitely seems the sort of geopolitical FYGM that very strongly implies to me that the current situation is a crisis of the West's making.
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Mar 14, 2015 00:43
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How is Russia even planning on maintaining services in Crimea when the only route to the territory for them is by sea? I know the current Russian line is that they will not take anymore Ukrainian territory but doing so would be the most direct way to solving that problem.
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Mar 14, 2015 02:25
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Thunder Moose posted:How is Russia even planning on maintaining services in Crimea when the only route to the territory for them is by sea? I know the current Russian line is that they will not take anymore Ukrainian territory but doing so would be the most direct way to solving that problem. They maintain services to Kaliningrad Oblast where the only access is at least 300 miles by land through unfriendly territory, or supply by sea from over 650 miles away In comparison Crimea sea travel requires a whole lot less distance.
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Mar 14, 2015 04:18
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Hambilderberglar posted:Yes, but at the cost of what sounds to me like Europe hitching its wagon to Russia, with enormous political and financial implications. What could have been offered short of EU membership that would partially or fully achieve what you just mentioned? Keep in mind, in my ideal scenario, Russia wouldn't have economically imploded since Shock Therapy wouldn't have happened. So Europe hitching its wagon to Russia probably wouldn't have been as big of a financial risk as it would have turned out to be in our timeline, where Shock Therapy did occur. I'm sure there could have been other in-between solutions, alternatively. Whatever the risks may have been to the Western world, I guarantee you, they wouldn't have been any bigger than the risks they did end up taking with their short-sighted course of action. I can't think of too many ways that they could have done any worse in dealing with a post-Cold War Russia. quote:I don't agree with that assessment at all. With how contentious the issue of accession ended up being for countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, with Kohl's Germany and Chirac's france being major sources of that criticism themselves. Yeah, but Bulgaria and Romania weren't huge countries with huge nuclear arsenals and large (albeit ailing) economies. Russia was, even at that nadir in their fortunes - and that made it all the more vital to get it to play nicely with the rest of the world. The mistake that Chirac, Kohl, Clinton, Talbot, and the whole crew made was in failing to see that by only going part-way with integrating Russia, they created even greater risks for their interests.
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Mar 14, 2015 05:38
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Majorian posted:Keep in mind, in my ideal scenario, Russia wouldn't have economically imploded since Shock Therapy wouldn't have happened. So Europe hitching its wagon to Russia probably wouldn't have been as big of a financial risk as it would have turned out to be in our timeline, where Shock Therapy did occur. I'm sure there could have been other in-between solutions, alternatively. Whatever the risks may have been to the Western world, I guarantee you, they wouldn't have been any bigger than the risks they did end up taking with their short-sighted course of action. I can't think of too many ways that they could have done any worse in dealing with a post-Cold War Russia. quote:Yeah, but Bulgaria and Romania weren't huge countries with huge nuclear arsenals and large (albeit ailing) economies. Russia was, even at that nadir in their fortunes - and that made it all the more vital to get it to play nicely with the rest of the world. The mistake that Chirac, Kohl, Clinton, Talbot, and the whole crew made was in failing to see that by only going part-way with integrating Russia, they created even greater risks for their interests.
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Mar 14, 2015 11:56
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One thing is that Russia would simply dominate the EU politically by virtue of its population. Germany has 80 million people while Russia has 142-144 million, they would be a giant if not overwhelming bloc in the EU parliament. In addition, likely eventually economically dominate the union if growth greatly expanded with market access. I mean it would be a great thing for Russia, but Europe has a whole would very possibly be under its shadow more than it is under Germany's right now. I get there might be this sort of Scifi-type dream that once you start integrating countries into larger superstructures you smooth out everything over time but to be honest, I don't think EU-integration would have "ended history." It might have led to more peaceful but very different political and economic structures that may actually be as much of a problem. Ardennes fucked around with this message at 12:33 on Mar 14, 2015 |
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Mar 14, 2015 12:20
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Hambilderberglar posted:You've basically listed the reasons why EU membership was never, ever, ever going to be on the table then *or* now. What part of that is supposed to be an attractive prospect for membership? Bulgaria and Romania together accounted for not even a third of the population of Russia and we have seen the opprobrium their application generated. EU leaders would have shat a collective gold brick at the prospect of being financially responsible for Russia. Hypothetical risks or not, there's no way you could have time travelled back to 1998 and convinced anyone this would have been a good idea with the information available at the time. On top of the direct economic effects on the EU budget, there is also the political effect of Russia joining the EU. Would Russia be as eager to get rid of the corruption within itself, when it (unlike Romania) would be far more able to set the tone in the EU? Might it not instead hinder this process in its immediate neighborhood, not necessarily through any ill intentions, but simply through doing business as usual? Especially if Russia joining the EU meant less EU support for the rest of Eastern Europe. Russia might simply be too big a bite for the EU to process, even more so if it accompanied the rest of Eastern Europe. The alternative of stringing Russia along until Russians realize that Europe won't ever let them in probably wouldn't be ideal either. Finally there is of course the issue that the EU has a history of doing poo poo in the dumbest way possible, preferring to just make a treaty stating that bad poo poo isn't allowed, and pretending this means it won't. I can just imagine a Eurocrisis, except with Russia standing in for Greece.
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Mar 14, 2015 13:09
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