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A Buttery Pastry posted:Perfect counterbalance to the Germans? Given that it took Russia actively waging a war of conquest before Germany started moving into the neutral/slightly anti-Russian camp, and that Germany is so dependent Russian gas, I think the balance might be skewed enough that Germany ends up falling over to the Russian side. This process could be strengthened by the fact that Germany has been extremely hesitant to act in a strategic manner, preferring to just focus on the economy. A Russia in the EU would mean they'd be able to offload that responsibility unto Russia, which certainly has no problem thinking in those terms, much like France has basically just let Germany define the economic ideology of the EU. A big problem for France is that the current economic orthodoxy of the EU was defined by the UMP regimes of Chirac and Sarkozy in collaboration with the Germans, so now Hollande is in he isn't just up against a stronger German economy, he's also against the established order of things. Hollande is not a particularly strong player, but his hand is also very weak. Make no mistake, the French moderate right is perfectly happy with the way the EU is set up at the moment.
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Mar 16, 2015 17:57
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Majorian posted:Keep in mind, though, we're talking about an ideal, hypothetical, alternate timeline in which we didn't drive the Russian voting public into the arms of nationalists. I would hope that in that situation, the dynamic between Germany and Russia would be different than it is today. Majorian posted:Also, it's hard for me to blame the Germans for focusing mainly on the economy when their military is still fairly limited. V. Illych L. posted:A big problem for France is that the current economic orthodoxy of the EU was defined by the UMP regimes of Chirac and Sarkozy in collaboration with the Germans, so now Hollande is in he isn't just up against a stronger German economy, he's also against the established order of things. Hollande is not a particularly strong player, but his hand is also very weak. Make no mistake, the French moderate right is perfectly happy with the way the EU is set up at the moment.
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Mar 16, 2015 18:16
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A Buttery Pastry posted:Does it matter why? As long as Russia has the gas that Germany needs, and German politicians get positions in Russian companies, it's going to be pro-Russian to some degree. Especially when the population as a whole is apparently slightly anti-American, which manifests itself as quite a lot of sympathy for Russia. A less nationalist Russia would also mean even less reason for Germany to question this relationship. I don't know about that though; if Russia were part of the EU, or had a better integrating agreement with them, I expect that the mechanisms put in place to keep Russia from playing games with their energy exports would allow the German government to take a more politically assertive position. Also, a less-aggressive Russia in general would probably mean that Germany would be less worried about pissing them off on any little thing. I think we're disappearing far too much up our own asses on this one, though. It's all very well to talk about what alternate history would have been better, if any, but I'd be interested to hear what you think the US, NATO, the EU, etc, could do now to improve stability and security in Eastern Europe. Is there anything that you think can be done that won't significantly damage our relations with Russia? And if so, would the costs that this would impose upon the West's global initiatives really be worth it? quote:Let's be realist about this, it's not a morality contest. There's nothing more realist than focusing on what a country can and can't do.
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Mar 16, 2015 18:25
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Majorian posted:Keep in mind, though, we're talking about an ideal, hypothetical, alternate timeline in which we didn't drive the Russian voting public into the arms of nationalists. I would hope that in that situation, the dynamic between Germany and Russia would be different than it is today. Putin as just as responsible for driving the Russian population towards the nationalists as any western/NATO counterpart- stating otherwise is a serious understatement of his competency. As for the Germans, I hate to bring up the chicken or the egg argument, but which came first: Did the Ukranian crisis prompt Germany to raise its defense budget for the first time in years, or was it the other way around?
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Mar 16, 2015 18:25
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Job Truniht posted:Putin as just as responsible for driving the Russian population towards the nationalists as any western/NATO counterpart- stating otherwise is a serious understatement of his competency. No question, but even so, there's a reason why the Russian public went from supporting Westernizers like Yeltsin, Kozyrev, Gaidar, etc., to Putin. That metamorphosis in public mentality didn't just happen on a dime and for no reason.
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Mar 16, 2015 18:27
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Majorian posted:There's nothing more realist than focusing on what a country can and can't do.
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Mar 16, 2015 18:28
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A Buttery Pastry posted:Blame sounds like morality to me! Well, again, I'm a constructivist (kind of), so morality does matter to me a BIT. It just acknowledges that a Russian's morality and mine might be different.  (but also, more importantly, I meant it as a turn of phrase)
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Mar 16, 2015 18:32
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Majorian posted:No question, but even so, there's a reason why the Russian public went from supporting Westernizers like Yeltsin, Kozyrev, Gaidar, etc., to Putin. That metamorphosis in public mentality didn't just happen on a dime and for no reason. Let's be frank for a second and say that nothing that took place during the post-Soviet reconstruction involved building a functional democracy- neither the West nor Yeltsin et al were interested in actually doing this. To reiterate this fact, what other political alternatives are there if we looked outside of United Russia? I think the correct answer would be the communists, which is something neither the West nor Putin want and still share as a belief today. In short, after the Soviet collapse, Russia was a country of autocrats and plutocrats from the get go whose nationalist beliefs just so happened to coincide with the views of whoever was in charge at the time.
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Mar 16, 2015 18:37
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Out of curiosity if China starts rattling sabers and threatening her neighbors does it also get to join the EU?
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Mar 16, 2015 18:38
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Job Truniht posted:Let's be frank for a second and say that nothing that took place during the post-Soviet reconstruction involved building a functional democracy- neither the West nor Yeltsin et al were interested in actually doing this. I don't think that's true at all, though. Everything I've read suggests that Yeltsin was a true believer in democracy and building a strong market-oriented economy - he was just a bit of an economic dunce, and thus relied too much on his free market-worshiping advisers. MeLKoR posted:Out of curiosity if China starts rattling sabers and threatening her neighbors does it also get to join the EU? Please don't do this.
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Mar 16, 2015 18:40
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Majorian posted:I don't think that's true at all, though. Everything I've read suggests that Yeltsin was a true believer in democracy and building a strong market-oriented economy - he was just a bit of an economic dunce, and thus relied too much on his free market-worshiping advisers. I find this extremely suspect given the fact that the people run Russia today were basically the same guys Yeltsin brought into his inner circle circa 1996-1997. I found a pretty good small article/summary for this thread on said topic. I'll go through them and find some highlights. STRATFOR posted:
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Mar 16, 2015 18:46
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MeLKoR posted:Out of curiosity if China starts rattling sabers and threatening her neighbors does it also get to join the EU? China has over a billion people and the second world's largest economy. They drat well know that if things go on they're set to be a dominant force by the end of the 21st century and have no need to pool their resources and sovereignty to survive as part of a larger bloc of nations. Big Fish v. Small Pond vis Large Pond v. Small Fish.
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Mar 16, 2015 18:47
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Job Truniht posted:I find this extremely suspect given the fact that the people run Russia today were basically the same guys Yeltsin brought into his inner circle circa 1996-1997. Wait, what? Putin purged quite a bit of the people that Yeltsin brought in, particularly the Oligarchs.
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Mar 16, 2015 18:49
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Majorian posted:Wait, what? Putin purged quite a bit of the people that Yeltsin brought in, particularly the Oligarchs. Let me rephrase: I'm saying that just because there are less oligarchs around now doesn't make Yeltsin's presidency any less oligarchal.
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Mar 16, 2015 18:50
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Job Truniht posted:Let me rephrase: I'm saying that just because there are less oligarchs around now doesn't make Yeltsin's presidency any less oligarchal. You said that quite a few of Yeltsin's appointees during the late 90's are the people who are running Russia right now, though. I'm not seeing it. Putin was only appointed acting PM under intense pressure, after Yeltsin's approval ratings had plummeted to low single digits. Who else from around that time is still running things in Russia? Certainly not Primakov or Chernomyrdrin.
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Mar 16, 2015 18:52
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Majorian posted:I don't think that's true at all, though. Everything I've read suggests that Yeltsin was a true believer in democracy and building a strong market-oriented economy - he was just a bit of an economic dunce, and thus relied too much on his free market-worshiping advisers. So have you read about that time when Yeltsin illegally dissolved that parliament and when the parliament wouldn't go quietly sent in tanks and artillery to shell them into submission?
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Mar 16, 2015 18:53
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Cerebral Bore posted:So have you read about that time when Yeltsin illegally dissolved that parliament and when the parliament wouldn't go quietly sent in tanks and artillery to shell them into submission? This strikes me as a bit of a mischaracterization of what actually happened... 
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Mar 16, 2015 18:55
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Majorian posted:This strikes me as a bit of a mischaracterization of what actually happened... It literally is what happened, mang. You don't get to be a true believer in democracy when your goto method for solving a constitutional crisis is illegally dissolving your parliament by force.
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Mar 16, 2015 19:02
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Cerebral Bore posted:It literally is what happened, mang. Yeah, but the way you're describing it is pretty out of context. You have to remember, Yeltsin himself came to power after the failed coup against Gorbachev in 1991. Although his dissolution of the Duma was not legal under the Constitution of 1978, the April 1993 referendum suggested that the majority of the public did want his economic policies to be implemented, which the legislature was refusing to do. That doesn't mean it wasn't illegal - it was - but it's still an important material factor in all of this. Also, saying that the reason why Yeltsin shelled the Duma because Rutskoi and Khasbulatov "would not go quietly" is a huge mischaracterization. They did quite a bit more than "refusing to go quietly." e: Also, there's a reason why the Russian public approved the 1993 Constitution. As bad as the neoliberal economic reforms turned out to be, I can't imagine the situation would have turned out much better if the Russian presidency had remained weak. Majorian fucked around with this message at 19:23 on Mar 16, 2015 |
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Mar 16, 2015 19:10
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Majorian posted:Yeah, but the way you're describing it is pretty out of context. You have to remember, Yeltsin himself came to power after the failed coup against Gorbachev in 1991. Although his dissolution of the Duma was not legal under the Constitution of 1978, the April 1993 referendum suggested that the majority of the public did want his economic policies to be implemented, which the legislature was refusing to do. That doesn't mean it wasn't illegal - it was - but it's still an important material factor in all of this. If you're a true believer in democracy you don't get to interpret a referendum going your way as carte blanche to unilaterally and illegally decide to dissolve your parliament either. Majorian posted:Also, saying that the reason why Yeltsin shelled the Duma because Rutskoi and Khasbulatov "would not go quietly" is a huge mischaracterization. They did quite a bit more than "refusing to go quietly." In the context of trying to counter an coup d'etat, I'd say that riots and street fighting are pretty much "not going quietly". Also do remember that the Constitutional Court had already ruled that Yeltsin could be impeached, that Parliament had deposed him as president and that the constitution had actually required him to be deposed by default due to his actions. At that point a true believer of democracy would kinda have to conclude that Yeltsin was no longer the legal president at all, but rather an usurper.
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Mar 16, 2015 19:22
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Majorian posted:Well, but they didn't have to be. My point is that we could have "bought low" in the 90's. But we kind of half-assed it, and unfortunately, we were pretty obvious about half-assing it. That obviously didn't endear us to them. And our interests do dovetail with theirs on a lot of issues. You think they aren't as concerned with Islamist terrorism as we are? Or that their government isn't apprehensive about the rise of China? (even if, as we've established in this thread, China doesn't seem like it's going to take an aggressive foreign policy anytime soon) Hambilderberglar fucked around with this message at 19:25 on Mar 16, 2015 |
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Mar 16, 2015 19:22
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Cerebral Bore posted:If you're a true believer in democracy you don't get to interpret a referendum going your way as carte blanche to unilaterally and illegally decide to dissolve your parliament either. All right, well, look, I probably oversold my case when I said that Yeltsin was a true believer. It's hard to say what went on in the man's heart. I don't agree with you that the 1993 crisis completely means that he wasn't ever a true believer, though. I think he was at the beginning of his presidency, but then met with some harsh realities when gridlock in the Duma kept him from instituting any of the reforms he supported. Hambilderberglar posted:Unfortunately Russia and the West seem to have a very fundamental disagreement on their views of what the European situation is supposed to look like My point, though, is that that fundamental disagreement did not have to happen. It did not seem to be the case throughout most of the 90's, for example. e: quote:with Russia viewing the addition of erstwile Warsaw Pact allies with great concern, to which the West replies that each country has a right to self determination. Is it really in our interest to base our foreign policy upon a hardline reading of this ideal, though? Especially when we've been fairly loosy-goosy with it throughout our history... It would have been much better if we had based our policies in the 90's upon our long-term interests, which included keeping the Russian public from embracing nationalism. Majorian fucked around with this message at 19:44 on Mar 16, 2015 |
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Mar 16, 2015 19:27
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Majorian posted:All right, well, look, I probably oversold my case when I said that Yeltsin was a true believer. It's hard to say what went on in the man's heart. I don't agree with you that the 1993 crisis completely means that he wasn't ever a true believer, though. I think he was at the beginning of his presidency, but then met with some harsh realities when gridlock in the Duma kept him from instituting any of the reforms he supported. Fair enough, I can agree to disagree on this one.
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Mar 16, 2015 19:29
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Cerebral Bore posted:Fair enough, I can agree to disagree on this one. Yeah, and I mean, I freely admit that I could be wrong in my judgment of him. I just think it's a big overstatement to say that nothing happened in the 90's that pushed Russia closer towards democracy; clearly there were things that had that effect. But the biggest problem, in my view, was that many of those reforms did not have the effect upon the Russian public that the West hoped they would.
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Mar 16, 2015 19:41
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Majorian posted:My point, though, is that that fundamental disagreement did not have to happen. It did not seem to be the case throughout most of the 90's, for example. Fact now is that in TYOOL 2015 every single former Warsaw Pact nation has acceded to NATO, with the overwhelming majority also being members of the EU. In my view it is not likely that this is going to be reversed any time soon. I believe that in order for that reversal to happen the US and Europe would have to collapse as security providers in their entirety because reneging on security and political commitments that have been made in the form of NATO and the EU would essentially mean those two structures would cease to exist in a meaningful way. I don't believe that the US or its EU allies are interested in having this happen as it would represent a fundamental challenge to the current order of the international system. Russia's behaviour at this point is counterproductive to its stated goal of retaining influence in the post-soviet space. By choosing to enforce its writ through use of proxies and military intervention it seems like it accomplishes short term goals but actively frustrates longer term goals, to the extent that its behaviour is worrying allies in Central Asia, where Russian influence was previously unchallenged. Moscow seems to feel that its security is reliant on pliable allies on its southern and western flanks. I personally don't see a win-win solution to this issue, as an ascendant China will (eventually, but likely not any time soon) challenge Russia's primacy in the Central Asian neighbourhood, and the EU/Atlantic Alliance's grip on Russia's western neighbourhood being practically absolute, I don't see Russia having very much to offer to countries in the region. Additionally, with the US gently prodding European allies to assume a greater share of the military burden, and with the Ukrainian crisis seemingly having contributed to an increasing awareness among Europeans (however little) that their current defensive posture is no longer adequate and the peace dividend honeymoon is over. How will Russia respond to the inevitable political and military consolidation that will take place? Is there room for an emerging European military identity that won't cause Moscow consternation? The US has come around to the emergence of an European third pole because it wants to be able to direct its attention elsewhere. How, if at all, can Moscow be persuaded that this new Europe doesn't necessarily strive to represent a threat to them?
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Mar 16, 2015 20:00
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Majorian posted:Yeah, and I mean, I freely admit that I could be wrong in my judgment of him. I just think it's a big overstatement to say that nothing happened in the 90's that pushed Russia closer towards democracy; clearly there were things that had that effect. But the biggest problem, in my view, was that many of those reforms did not have the effect upon the Russian public that the West hoped they would. I think you're making the simple mistake of associating democracy and neoliberalism. Nobody, not Summers or anyone of the advisors, were prepared to deal with a country or countries that were depending on a command economy until that point. Let me ask to address this problem of democracy in Russia back then, who was the opposition? I can guarantee you none of them were pro-democratic. Furthermore, what is the crisis in Crimea, if anything, other than a firm rejection of westernization or what was perceived as westernization going on in Russia? Job Truniht fucked around with this message at 20:05 on Mar 16, 2015 |
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Mar 16, 2015 20:03
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Hambilderberglar posted:Additionally, with the US gently prodding European allies to assume a greater share of the military burden, and with the Ukrainian crisis seemingly having contributed to an increasing awareness among Europeans (however little) that their current defensive posture is no longer adequate and the peace dividend honeymoon is over. How will Russia respond to the inevitable political and military consolidation that will take place? Is there room for an emerging European military identity that won't cause Moscow consternation? The US has come around to the emergence of an European third pole because it wants to be able to direct its attention elsewhere. How, if at all, can Moscow be persuaded that this new Europe doesn't necessarily strive to represent a threat to them? Russian politician responding to the idea of an EU army posted:"In the nuclear age extra armies do not provide any additional security. But they surely can play a provocative role," Klintsevich said, adding it was regrettable that such ideas had already met with some support. Not sure how you'd get around that either. Like, if the EU goes crazy and bulks out its military to near-US standards, and then tells the US to take a hike (to get around the NATO problem), would that really assuage Russia? An EU that isn't just a silent partner of the US would seem much more worrying to me as a neighbor than an EU where occasionally the smaller countries in the EU + the UK have a play date with the US in some Middle Eastern country while the country running the show is fine with just making money and buying Russian gas.
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Mar 16, 2015 20:25
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Hambilderberglar posted:But then we arrive at the discussion previously had as to why and when that disagreement started and I don't think it'll be productive to just rehash the argument whether it was NATO enlargement, the Iraq war or Euromaidan that brought us here. So let's try and write about something new. I agree 100%; the only reason why I bring it up is because I think addressing the cause of this rift in relations will be central to creating a new, more stable, more amenable understanding with Russia. With regard to NATO being unlikely to pull out of existing member states, I agree - I don't think it will ever happen, and now that that bridge has already been crossed, it would be a big mistake to backtrack on it. Those nations that are NATO and EU members should remain NATO and EU members. I doubt very many people in Russia see this as a feasible outcome under any circumstances, anyway. quote:Russia's behaviour at this point is counterproductive to its stated goal of retaining influence in the post-soviet space. Well, but is it? Once Yanukovych was overthrown, it seemed fairly likely that Ukraine would re-up its bid to join NATO. This conflict appears to have prevented that from happening. The rest of Eastern Europe will still have to do business with the Russians for the foreseeable future, if they don't want to freeze during the winter. I mean, I agree with you that the payoffs from this gamble are a mixed picture for Russia at best, but keep in mind, what you or I believe about the productivity or counterproductivity of Russian's actions aren't what matter. Russia's perceptions on the outcome of its actions are what matter. To this end, I agree with you 100% that the way that Russia perceives rearmament in Europe will be an important thing to manipulate as best we can. This is one area where rhetoric really matters. Hopefully it will be something that, at least in terms of PR, will have lots of focus on combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations outside of Europe, etc. If it takes on a vocally anti-Russian image, that would be a really bad thing for everybody involved. Same applies here: A Buttery Pastry posted:Not sure how you'd get around that either. Like, if the EU goes crazy and bulks out its military to near-US standards, and then tells the US to take a hike (to get around the NATO problem), would that really assuage Russia? What matters most here are the optics. Klintsevich is an rear end and a blowhard, but it's partially right: Russia doesn't have much to fear from a large conventional Western European army at present, because they have nuclear superiority over the EU. Things like more ABMs or more nukes (or the potential for both) concern them a lot more. e: Job Truniht posted:I think you're making the simple mistake of associating democracy and neoliberalism. I've been loose with my terminology in referring to both sets of reforms as simply "reforms," which is something I probably shouldn't do. But that said, I still don't think it's fair to say that there were no meaningful democratic reforms for Russia in the 90's. Even though the Russian Federation under Yeltsin was an imperfect democracy at best, it's a little out-there to suggest that it wasn't ultimately more democratic than the USSR had been. I think Crimea does, in some ways, represent a rejection of Western values, but I don't buy that that rejection is a final one that can't be turned around gradually. Majorian fucked around with this message at 20:44 on Mar 16, 2015 |
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Mar 16, 2015 20:27
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Majorian posted:Well, but is it? Once Yanukovych was overthrown, it seemed fairly likely that Ukraine would re-up its bid to join NATO. This conflict appears to have prevented that from happening. The rest of Eastern Europe will still have to do business with the Russians for the foreseeable future, if they don't want to freeze during the winter. I mean, I agree with you that the payoffs from this gamble are a mixed picture for Russia at best, but keep in mind, what you or I believe about the productivity or counterproductivity of Russian's actions aren't what matter. Russia's perceptions on the outcome of its actions are what matter. I'm looking at Serbia's relationship vis-a-vis Russia and "NATO" (excuse me for being lazy here) as a model of what that might look like. A significant portion will not be kindly predisposed towards Russia due to the fact that they got invaded by them and a chunk of their territory occupied, but I can also see a fairly substantial proportion of the population eventually coming around and the "historical brotherhood of slavs" rhetoric make a comeback. If I'm mischaracterising the Serbian position here I'm sure someone will be along to correct me momentarily. I'm not up to speed on what the current distribution is, but I think it's fairly notable that a country that was bombed and shot up by a lot of EU members is now considered to be at least somewhat seriously working towards becoming a member of that organisation. Although I think that Ukraine will continue on its Western course, if only because rapprochement with Russia is off the table and the coming time will probably see the West firmly establish a grip on Ukraine. Similarly, while Russia's primacy as energy supplier to Europe may remain unchallenged for the near future, the EU has policies in place that eventually will do exactly that. I'm speaking here of relatively un-sexy initiatives like mandating energy labels for housing stock and the development of the energy union through energy interconnectors as well as "reverse" flow mechanisms and proposals for greater transparency in pricing, so as to reduce the difference that EU states pay for fuels from Russia. All of these may not be putting a big dent in Gazprom's margins and turnover now, but combined, and left intact will over the long term seriously challenge Russia's primacy in energy supplies. The best part about all of this is that none of these things are perceived as being anti-Russian. Public opinion in the EU also seems supportive of the proposals on the face of it, in no small part due to energy costs rising. Hambilderberglar fucked around with this message at 21:47 on Mar 16, 2015 |
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Mar 16, 2015 21:42
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Hambilderberglar posted:Only for the time being. If Ukrainian NATO membership is as much of a foregone conclusion without Yanukovych in power as Russia perceives it to be they'll find a way to admit them regardless of whether this ends with a frozen conflict and occupation of Crimea and Donbass. I don't think that's necessarily true, though. I think Russia's presumption is that they can wait us out in Ukraine until we give up on admitting Kiev into NATO. That has traditionally been their strategy with "Western invasions," after all - draw Napoleon in, wear him down, force him to leave. Rinse and repeat for Hitler, rinse and repeat for the evil homofascists or whatever. At this point, as unfulfilling as it may seem, the best thing we might be able to do for Ukraine is to convince Russia that they've "beaten us" on this one. Repudiate the Bush Administration's position at the Bucharest Summit, say that the US will no longer support Ukraine's and Georgia's accession to NATO in the near-to-medium term future, and tie it to other things that they and we both want (arms control, etc). You bring up the rest of Ukraine outside of the Donbas being galvanized against Russia, but realistically, how is that a problem for Russia? Ukraine's not likely to be much of a military power anytime in the near future, and if NATO accession is off the table, then Russia's got what it wanted. Ukraine will still be beholden to their energy policy, and while a lot of European powers are trying to stop chasing the Russian petroleum dragon, that's at best a very, very long-term solution for Ukraine. It seems to me that the Russian government would gladly take a pissed off but weak, unaligned buffer state that is beholden to their energy interests on their border, versus a less-pissed-off state to their west that could have NATO missiles or ABMs on its soil. I also think that, as much as people there are becoming galvanized against Moscow, the Russian government's operating assumption has been that they hated them before this crisis began anyway.
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Mar 16, 2015 23:31
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Majorian posted:I don't think that's necessarily true, though. I think Russia's presumption is that they can wait us out in Ukraine until we give up on admitting Kiev into NATO. That has traditionally been their strategy with "Western invasions," after all - draw Napoleon in, wear him down, force him to leave. Rinse and repeat for Hitler, rinse and repeat for the evil homofascists or whatever. quote:At this point, as unfulfilling as it may seem, the best thing we might be able to do for Ukraine is to convince Russia that they've "beaten us" on this one. Repudiate the Bush Administration's position at the Bucharest Summit, say that the US will no longer support Ukraine's and Georgia's accession to NATO in the near-to-medium term future, and tie it to other things that they and we both want (arms control, etc). quote:You bring up the rest of Ukraine outside of the Donbas being galvanized against Russia, but realistically, how is that a problem for Russia? Ukraine's not likely to be much of a military power anytime in the near future, and if NATO accession is off the table, then Russia's got what it wanted. Ukraine will still be beholden to their energy policy, and while a lot of European powers are trying to stop chasing the Russian petroleum dragon, that's at best a very, very long-term solution for Ukraine. It seems to me that the Russian government would gladly take a pissed off but weak, unaligned buffer state that is beholden to their energy interests on their border, versus a less-pissed-off state to their west that could have NATO missiles or ABMs on its soil. I also think that, as much as people there are becoming galvanized against Moscow, the Russian government's operating assumption has been that they hated them before this crisis began anyway. As opposed to "Russia can cut us off any time and will play political football with our energy supplies, we need to shut them out"
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Mar 17, 2015 15:04
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Hambilderberglar posted:Optimistically I'd see Russia ejected from both, sanctions maintained and Ukraine in NATO. Just to put a finger in Putin's eye. Yeah, well, the problem here is that unfortunately, the story doesn't stop with us sticking Putin in the eye. Even if everybody in NATO agrees that Ukraine should be let in, it would take years for them to get their country in order to the point where they could accede. Between now and then, you can bet that Russia would just double down on messing up the country. And if that somehow didn't work and Ukraine acceded as a full member, the US would have to deal with Russia undermining its foreign policy efforts pretty much everywhere else in the world. That's not worth having Ukraine as a NATO member. quote:NATO is one thing, but I doubt you'll get the EU to make any commitments to not take Ukraine on as a member because it'd make us all look like a bunch of dicks after they overthrew their government and waved the EU flag. I agree, they have a lot more skin in the game. I'm still pretty convinced that Russia doesn't care as much about the EU, though. The EU doesn't plant missiles or ABMs in its member-states' territories. quote:Ukraine wasn't going to be a military threat to Russia even before Euromaidan, I'd argue that this has made Ukrainians *more* keenly aware of the need to fund their military, and they'll likely end up a greater threat to Russia than if they'd just left well enough alone. But again, I think Russia would rather have a moderately-powerful conventional Ukrainian army to their west, versus a less-powerful Ukrainian army that's backed by Western missiles and ABMs.
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Mar 17, 2015 17:07
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Majorian posted:Yeah, well, the problem here is that unfortunately, the story doesn't stop with us sticking Putin in the eye. Even if everybody in NATO agrees that Ukraine should be let in, it would take years for them to get their country in order to the point where they could accede. Between now and then, you can bet that Russia would just double down on messing up the country. And if that somehow didn't work and Ukraine acceded as a full member, the US would have to deal with Russia undermining its foreign policy efforts pretty much everywhere else in the world. That's not worth having Ukraine as a NATO member. quote:I agree, they have a lot more skin in the game. I'm still pretty convinced that Russia doesn't care as much about the EU, though. The EU doesn't plant missiles or ABMs in its member-states' territories. Especially the fact that Ukraine's military-industrial complex is now completely disconnected from Russia's will prove challenging. It might not be as easily and obviously seen that the EU's expansion into Eastern Europe is challenging Russia, and the way in which it does so is particularly unconducive to being reduced to single word issues or soundbytes that can play on Rossija 24 all fuckin day. "ABMs in former warsaw pact nations" is sexy and can be used to whip up tangible fear and nationalism. "European imports of hydrocarbons projected to drop as a result of energy efficiency initiatives", eh. quote:But again, I think Russia would rather have a moderately-powerful conventional Ukrainian army to their west, versus a less-powerful Ukrainian army that's backed by Western missiles and ABMs.
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Mar 17, 2015 17:37
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Hambilderberglar posted:I disagree with you on whether or not it is worth having Ukraine in NATO though. From my armchair in Europe I don't particularly care very much about China's military posture in the Pacific or Islamic terrorism, and even if I did, I wouldn't view Russia as the partner to go to to solve either of these issues. Feel free to call me dumb and/or shortsighted for believing this, because it really isn't based on much except for a gut feeling. No, I get that, I really do. But there are other things that I'm guessing you care about that the West would need Russia's help on - climate change, Western rapprochement with Iran, stuff like that. And even if you don't, bear in mind that these are all things that a lot of the rest of the world cares about, particularly the U.S. As an American, that's why I'm not particularly keen on having Ukraine join NATO, at the expense of turning Russia into a real adversary. (instead of just the frenemy we've had for the last few years) quote:No, but the EU forces Gazprom to divest of its transit infrastructure if it wants to continue selling hydrocarbons to us. Its un-sexy energy initiatives reduce the leverage Moscow has in this field, reduces the dependence the West has on Russia, and the political dimension reduces the concessions Russia can extract by way of opposing Russian bilateralization. The fact that a Western friendly government now sits in Kyiv again also challenges the primacy of Russian business interests. Given that the EaU was something that Putin appears to have invested quite a bit of political capital into, and that it is essentially dead on arrival due to the fact that Ukraine has taken their population and economy and told the Russians they can get buggered is I think a major source of consternation. And one that Putin and successive Russian governments are highly unlikely to reverse. I think it's a factor, but still, this issue doesn't hit the average Russian in the same visceral way that the potential of NATO creeping up to their borders and putting missiles and ABMs there does. You mentioned (facetiously) a Western version of the Mongol Yoke, but fears of that happening really are what drive the Russian public crazy (and into the arms of nationalists like Putin). quote:I think the state of Ukraine's army is far less important to him than the direction of the economic winds currently blowing there. If Ukraine continues on its westward path and European business interests get a foot in the door, it'll all be downhill for Russia from there. The Smart Thing for the West to do would be to make the most of this moment, buy low in Ukraine and turn it into an Eastern European Taiwan. The amount of good that supporting Taiwan has done for the U.S. is kind of debatable, though, when one considers how much of a sticking point it's been between us and Beijing. What good can letting Ukraine join the EU and/or NATO do for the US, France, Germany, etc? Would those benefits be offset by the wrench it would throw in the gears of relations with Russia? I definitely think they would be. I think that's really kind of the main question at the heart of how the West deals with this crisis: what do we get out of helping Ukraine? I know that sounds cold and mercenary, but hey, it's international politics. Majorian fucked around with this message at 17:53 on Mar 17, 2015 |
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Mar 17, 2015 17:51
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But Russia and U.S. are geopolitcal adversaries in a very real sense. Russia has very little influence in tehran and the U.S. will come to deal one way or another without russian say.
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Mar 17, 2015 18:19
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Greataval posted:But Russia and U.S. are geopolitcal adversaries in a very real sense. Russia has very little influence in tehran and the U.S. will come to deal one way or another without russian say. How are Russia and the US geopolitical adversaries, though? I'm curious to know why you think that. And Russia does have some influence in Tehran - remember, they had helped Iran with its nuclear energy program. I doubt they'll be able to scuttle the nuclear deal with the US, but that doesn't mean that they can't be an impediment to the rapprochement in the future.
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Mar 17, 2015 18:36
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Majorian posted:No, I get that, I really do. But there are other things that I'm guessing you care about that the West would need Russia's help on - climate change, Western rapprochement with Iran, stuff like that. And even if you don't, bear in mind that these are all things that a lot of the rest of the world cares about, particularly the U.S. As an American, that's why I'm not particularly keen on having Ukraine join NATO, at the expense of turning Russia into a real adversary. (instead of just the frenemy we've had for the last few years) As for Iran, I think it's a mistake to link the current state of relations between Iran and the West to Russia, nor do I think they have a productive part to play in changing it. I see hostility toward Iran coming primarily from Israel, whose dutiful acolytes in the US Government are putting pressure in turn on the EU. The solution is that both the EU and US should stop letting Israel decide their foreign policies by proxy, let Iran have a nuclear program and wash our hands of the whole business. I'm already scoping out the hottest Tehran party spots in anticipation of the detente. quote:I think it's a factor, but still, this issue doesn't hit the average Russian in the same visceral way that the potential of NATO creeping up to their borders and putting missiles and ABMs there does. You mentioned (facetiously) a Western version of the Mongol Yoke, but fears of that happening really are what drive the Russian public crazy (and into the arms of nationalists like Putin). quote:The amount of good that supporting Taiwan has done for the U.S. is kind of debatable, though, when one considers how much of a sticking point it's been between us and Beijing. What good can letting Ukraine join the EU and/or NATO do for the US, France, Germany, etc? Would those benefits be offset by the wrench it would throw in the gears of relations with Russia? I definitely think they would be. quote:I think that's really kind of the main question at the heart of how the West deals with this crisis: what do we get out of helping Ukraine? I know that sounds cold and mercenary, but hey, it's international politics. * 45 million consumers * a landmass the size of France rich in both farmland and natural resources * relatively highly educated but cheap workforce * potential hydrocarbon resources to be exploited in its territorial waters * cutting the Eurasian Union off at the knees * punched the Russian military industrial complex in the dick by cutting off a bunch of their suppliers * seizing effective control of a large chunk of the distribution system for hydrocarbons coming from Russia * severely curtailing Russian freedom of action in the black sea, essentially making only its Eastern shore of any use * the moral high ground as we come out looking like we're throwing those plucky, pro european ukrainians a life raft * being in a position to now starve the Russians out of Transnistria, and preventing them from reestablishing communication or control there in the future * further removing Russia from the Balkan region where it tries to stir poo poo using Serbia as a proxy. * enhancing the commercial position of EU firms and concerns in the region I'm sure I'm missing some. E: Majorian posted:How are Russia and the US geopolitical adversaries, though? I'm curious to know why you think that.
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Mar 17, 2015 18:37
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With regard to climate change, they dragged their feet on the issue for a while, but they made an about-face in 2009:quote:In 2009, the Russian government quietly reversed that position, adopting a new climate doctrine that seemed to accept human contribution to global warming. The same year, the country pledged to reduce its emissions by at least 15 percent from 1990. However, this pledge still doesn't require any action on Russia's part: By some estimates, the country's emissions remain more than 30 percent below 1990 highs. Though Russia has unveiled energy-efficiency goals, analysts call the country's climate policies "a black hole." Even with these cuts, though, they're still one of the top five CO2 emitters in the world (#4 in 2009), and they still burn peat, which is even more harmful to the environment than burning coal. So it would be great if the West got some Russian concessions on this issue. With regard to Iran, it's their neutrality that we would be buying. At this rate, if we continue to piss off the Kremlin, I can pretty much guarantee you that they'll do everything they can to spoil the West's rapprochement with Tehran. e: Here's a recent Business Insider article that does a good job of explaining the machinations as they stand. quote:I agree 100% with this, but I think it would be a mistake to assume that this is also true for policymakers and Gazprom shareholders. Tanks, after all, still run on fossil fuels, and they're not very fuel efficient at that. That's true, but I think one of the big mistakes people make in watching Russia is in assuming that, since it's an authoritarian country, the will of its leaders don't often reflect the will of the majority. Remember, the top objective for any Russian ruler is to be a Groznyi Tsar, someone who is strong enough to protect the narod from invaders and interlopers. If the Russian public feels afraid of NATO expansion, you can bet that their government will respond, regardless of whether or not individual leaders or groups of leaders have their own ulterior motives. quote:If I were a scheming homofascist Eurocrat I'd be thinking of the following bullet points: These are all salient points, but remember - it comes at the cost of making a very powerful enemy, one that could scuttle the reelection chances of leaders like Angela Merkel. To a lot of European leaders, when given the choice between having Ukraine as a friend and having Russia as a friend, it's hard not to see the advantages in the latter option, even if their government is really awful. quote:E: I know, right? To be fair, in the last few months of the 2012 campaign, I just kept hearing "LOVE ME" over and over again whenever he opened his mouth. Majorian fucked around with this message at 19:09 on Mar 17, 2015 |
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Mar 17, 2015 19:03
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Majorian posted:With regard to climate change, they dragged their feet on the issue for a while, but they made an about-face in 2009: quote:Even with these cuts, though, they're still one of the top five CO2 emitters in the world (#4 in 2009), and they still burn peat, which is even more harmful to the environment than burning coal. So it would be great if the West got some Russian concessions on this issue. quote:With regard to Iran, it's their neutrality that we would be buying. At this rate, if we continue to piss off the Kremlin, I can pretty much guarantee you that they'll do everything they can to spoil the West's rapprochement with Tehran. I admit that's a pretty huge "If" though, since it doesn't appear very likely that the current crop of bibilievers in the United States is going anywhere soon. Nonetheless you appear to be convinced that rapprochement with Iran is possible even absent such radical concessions from the West, so I guess my question becomes what climate do you view as being realistically achievable between the West and Iran that facilitates better relations? And what would Russia be able to offer Iran to frustrate any budding improvement in relations? It seems like the West is more interested in having bad relations with Iran than vice versa. quote:
quote:These are all salient points, but remember - it comes at the cost of making a very powerful enemy, one that could scuttle the reelection chances of leaders like Angela Merkel. To a lot of European leaders, when given the choice between having Ukraine as a friend and having Russia as a friend, it's hard not to see the advantages in the latter option, even if their government is really awful. I'd like to point out that there's also a number of downsides associated with being Russia's friend. It's politically unpalatable in a lot of EU nations to be a friend to Russia, especially the further East one goes and the threat perception is amplified. There's also the human rights dimension to think of, as well as the aforementioned concerns for European nations in not appearing like we've thrown Ukrainians to the wolves after they overthrew an oppressive government and waved "our" flag there. If there were any American flags being waved I'm sure that would have resonated with a large chunk of the electorate. As well as that there's the issue of underlying friction with Russia over frozen conflicts in other parts of Europe, chiefly in Georgia and Transnistria, but also Armenia. While the Armenian issue may be further from the beds of Europeans, Georgia is recent and Transnistria is very close to the EU's current borders, with nobody in the EU being happy that these frozen conflicts continue to be a thing. Raising these issues would already be antagonizing to Russia, so if that's going to be a thing why not just turn the dial up to 11 and get as much benefit out of antagonizing them as we possibly can.
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Mar 17, 2015 19:29
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Hambilderberglar posted:While that is certainly pleasing to hear from a feelgood for all mankind point of view, the quote you selected doesn't seem to make much effort to Russia's policies in an especially flattering light being that they call it a black hole. No, but my point is, I think that we can convince them to turn their policy into something other than a black hole. Peat only makes up around 8% of Russia's energy production, but at this point it's becoming as much of a liability for Russia as it is an asset - [url=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Russian_wildfires]peatland fires helped start the wildfires that covered Moscow, Nizhniy Novgorod, Voronezh, and a bunch of other places in smoke. So I think we could make them cut back on the peat growing/burning if we tied that issue to other agreements. With regard to what Russia could do to spoil relations between the US and Iran, I agree with you that Russia probably won't be able to scuttle the nuclear agreement that's on the table (if they even wanted to). But what concerns me is what happens if this agreement fails. Does Iran then turn to Russia once again to help them with their nuclear program? If so, does that cause decision-makers in the US and Israel do really stupid things, like trying to bomb their reactors? That would be really sucky. quote:I agree with that. The point I was hoping to get across was that while these concerns may not resonate with the narod, the bean counters, political technologists and relevant bureaucrats will certainly be concerned with them. Their problem then becomes how can they turn that into political capital or PR fodder. Because like you said, it is easy to be afraid of NATO expansions and ABMs stationed on the Urheimat of glorious slavic master race, but how do you drum these comparatively esoteric concerns into a mould that is digestible to Vasya Pupkin taking a squat with his bropniks? I bet they'd love nothing more than that, but even as a cynic I have a hard time finding a way to spin that into something with the same emotional charge as the Mongol Yoke. Well, that's why I think the thing we have to do is let them think that they've beaten us, by formally giving up on Ukrainian accession to NATO. This lets Putin publicly declare victory and claim to his people, "I've stopped the NATO invaders! Worship me!" I guarantee you, the Russian public will eat it up. quote:I'd like to point out that there's also a number of downsides associated with being Russia's friend. It's politically unpalatable in a lot of EU nations to be a friend to Russia, especially the further East one goes and the threat perception is amplified. There's also the human rights dimension to think of, as well as the aforementioned concerns for European nations in not appearing like we've thrown Ukrainians to the wolves after they overthrew an oppressive government and waved "our" flag there. If there were any American flags being waved I'm sure that would have resonated with a large chunk of the electorate. Well, but what's going to be more unpalatable to German or French voters - backtracking on their promises to Ukraine, or having their electricity bills go up? A lot of people here, yourself and myself included, care about what happens to the Ukrainian public, but I honestly don't think most Europeans (or Americans) give much of a poo poo. No, they're not the only countries in the EU, but this kind of backs up what people like Matlock, Dean, etc., were warning about in that 1995 paper I posted several pages back: a rift is growing between the interests of Old and New Europe on these issues. quote:As well as that there's the issue of underlying friction with Russia over frozen conflicts in other parts of Europe, chiefly in Georgia and Transnistria, but also Armenia. While the Armenian issue may be further from the beds of Europeans, Georgia is recent and Transnistria is very close to the EU's current borders, with nobody in the EU being happy that these frozen conflicts continue to be a thing. Raising these issues would already be antagonizing to Russia, so if that's going to be a thing why not just turn the dial up to 11 and get as much benefit out of antagonizing them as we possibly can. Eh, Georgia is an issue we're going to have to give up on before long too, though. We honestly have no clout in that region, and there's not much we can do that won't make that situation markedly worse. Transnistria's a stickier issue, but I have a feeling that Russia would at least back away from the hard line if we were to make it clear that Ukraine and Georgia won't be joining NATO anytime soon. Also, keep in mind, there isn't just one type of clash with Russia. It's not an all-or-nothing sort of thing, where if we take the hard line on Transnistria but concede on issues like Ukraine and Georgia, we're guaranteed to have another Cold War. But the less flexible we show ourselves to be on more issues, the more likely it will be that we'll have a longer, nastier standoff.
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Mar 17, 2015 19:57
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