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Been reading about WW2 Operation Grief which is pretty amusing. Allegedly one of the German squads gave themselves up on their first word, "petrol". The gas station attendant's eyes simply bulged and the Germans floored it out of there in their jeep. Also Montgomery being detained.
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# ? Mar 24, 2015 16:44 |
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# ? May 28, 2024 15:08 |
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wide stance posted:Been reading about WW2 Operation Grief which is pretty amusing. Wasn't it Gen Bradley who was detained, because he told a sentry that Springfield was the capital of Illinois when the sentry insisted it was Chicago? I've also heard that one German was captured because his ID was forged too well. All GIs carried an ID card labeled "Not a Pass, For Indentification Only", and the Germans, being German, had spelled "identification" correctly.
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# ? Mar 24, 2015 16:55 |
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100 Years Ago General Limon von Sanders is formally appointed to take command of the army in charge of defending Gallipoli; meanwhile, Sir Ian Hamilton can quite clearly see that he may well be on a hiding to nothing here, but he entirely lacks the strength of character to do anything about it. At Chantilly, GQG lays plans for the Battle of Woevre (no, I hadn't heard of it either), and in the paper, for once there's an advert that I have no desire to poke fun at. darthbob88 posted:Wasn't it Gen Bradley who was detained, because he told a sentry that Springfield was the capital of Illinois when the sentry insisted it was Chicago? I've also heard that one German was captured because his ID was forged too well. All GIs carried an ID card labeled "Not a Pass, For Indentification Only", and the Germans, being German, had spelled "identification" correctly. I'm reminded at this point of a durable joke that I've spent weeks trying to find a place to slot in somewhere. It goes something like this. Some poor bastard has drawn sentry duty for his camp late at night, and he hears someone approaching. Sentry: Halt! Who goes there! Voice: Ceylon Planters' Rifles. Sentry: Pass, friend. Time passes, the sentry is long past just being bored, and someone else appears. Sentry: Halt! Who goes there? Voice: Auckland Mounted Rifles. Sentry: Pass, friend. More time passes. The sentry shivers and thinks longingly about a cup of tea. Finally... Sentry: Halt! Who goes there? Voice: What the gently caress has it got to do with you? Sentry: Pass, Australian.
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# ? Mar 24, 2015 19:32 |
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gradenko_2000 posted:I would say yes. The Japanese were pretty much completely exhausted by the end of the Russo-Japanese War, but the Russians were fighting at the rear end-end of a single rail-line and had to sue for peace themselves. The take-away was that determined offensive effort really could force decisive results in a war, without making the connection that the Japanese basically had to accept whatever they could get in the peace talks because they couldn't fight any longer and that things would have been vastly different if the nations in question had far better infrastructure, ergo Western Europe. This also had interesting consequences for the Japanese in terms of strategic and military lessons learned, which would end up costing Japan dearly in WW2. They took away from the Russo-Japanese War the idea that one or two decisive victories could force an enemy that on paper is far larger and economically superior to the bargaining table for a favorable peace, and went into WW2 with this fundamental strategic belief. It may even have been accurate in the case of the British and Dutch when the Japanese smashed their colonial holdings and sank their Pacific fleets - if they had stopped there, they might well have been able to force the British and Dutch to swallow the Japanese victories, especially given the shitstorm in Europe. Unfortunately, the Japanese also thought that all this applied to the United States. Again, it could possibly have been accurate if they stopped with the Philippines and other distant holdings. As it is, Japan turned into a pretty good case study in the strategic lessons from the last war being inapplicable to the next one.
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# ? Mar 24, 2015 20:40 |
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Cythereal posted:It may even have been accurate in the case of the British and Dutch when the Japanese smashed their colonial holdings and sank their Pacific fleets - if they had stopped there, they might well have been able to force the British and Dutch to swallow the Japanese victories, especially given the shitstorm in Europe. There is zero chance the British Empire would have just let the Japanese hang on to everything they took in the East, assuming the war against Hitler was won (if it was lost, of course, there wouldn't be an independent Britain to contest the matter anyway). As proved to be the case postwar, the Japanese attack was an existential threat to the whole idea of colonialism. Also, while Japan sunk a carrier and a couple of battleships, there was plenty more where they came from, again assuming peace in Europe. The Eastern theatre was relatively speaking a sideshow for Britain for most of the war, both because of Japan's threat to Britain compared to Hitler and because America both strongly wanted to and was able to take the lead.
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# ? Mar 24, 2015 21:54 |
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feedmegin posted:There is zero chance the British Empire would have just let the Japanese hang on to everything they took in the East, assuming the war against Hitler was won (if it was lost, of course, there wouldn't be an independent Britain to contest the matter anyway). As proved to be the case postwar, the Japanese attack was an existential threat to the whole idea of colonialism. That's not really my point. I think it's possible that, had Japan only attacked the British and Dutch colonial holdings, the Pacific War with the US might have been significantly delayed. Popular support in the US for war with Japan was lukewarm until Pearl Harbor, and although I agree with Yamamoto's assessment that war between the Japanese Empire and the US was inevitable I don't think it had to happen as early as it did and I'm not sure the British would have had the forces and will to do a lot about Japan in the absence of American hostility to Japan. Given that WW2 effectively ended the British Empire as it had been regardless, I don't think it's all that absurd that Britain might have sued for peace if the US wasn't involved in the war against Japan.
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# ? Mar 24, 2015 22:26 |
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Cythereal posted:That's not really my point. I think it's possible that, had Japan only attacked the British and Dutch colonial holdings, the Pacific War with the US might have been significantly delayed. Popular support in the US for war with Japan was lukewarm until Pearl Harbor, and although I agree with Yamamoto's assessment that war between the Japanese Empire and the US was inevitable I don't think it had to happen as early as it did and I'm not sure the British would have had the forces and will to do a lot about Japan in the absence of American hostility to Japan. Given that WW2 effectively ended the British Empire as it had been regardless, I don't think it's all that absurd that Britain might have sued for peace if the US wasn't involved in the war against Japan. They had the forces to deal with Europe or the Pacific and possibly both as long as they didn't happen at once. They were trying to avoid dealing with both at once, so I wouldn't be endlessly surprised if they'd just left the war going in the Pacific, leaving the Japanese with no end and a steadily declining merchant marine. Burma would likely have been more of a thing though.
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# ? Mar 24, 2015 23:04 |
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Cythereal posted:. Given that WW2 effectively ended the British Empire as it had been regardless, I don't think it's all that absurd that Britain might have sued for peace if the US wasn't involved in the war against Japan. It did signal the end of the British Empire, yes, but noone in Britain knew that at the time or for a decade thereafter. Like, Churchill was all about continuing the British Empire for ever more. 'I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire' as he said in 1942. Again,assuming Germany had been beaten or fought to a draw and a peace, there was no way the RN wasn't steaming east to rectify the situation. There's no way there'd be a lasting peace with Japan occupying a bunch of British colonies, and really absent an actual credible invasion of India or something I don't see why there would even be a temporary cessation of hostilities.
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# ? Mar 24, 2015 23:32 |
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While on paper British capital ship production would've edged out Japan by 1944, on the other hand I don't really see the British managing to steam their way to Okinawa without vastly heavier casualties in ships and men.
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# ? Mar 24, 2015 23:43 |
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feedmegin posted:It did signal the end of the British Empire, yes, but noone in Britain knew that at the time or for a decade thereafter. Like, Churchill was all about continuing the British Empire for ever more. 'I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire' as he said in 1942. Again,assuming Germany had been beaten or fought to a draw and a peace, there was no way the RN wasn't steaming east to rectify the situation. There's no way there'd be a lasting peace with Japan occupying a bunch of British colonies, and really absent an actual credible invasion of India or something I don't see why there would even be a temporary cessation of hostilities. Fair enough, I don't know much about the RN past WW1. Which I suppose only reinforces my original point that Japanese military leadership took to heart (the wrong? were there any right ones?) lessons from the Russo-Japanese War, creating a fundamentally flawed strategic vision for WW2, which was an entirely different kind of war from the RJW and against very different opponents. Actually, that makes me curious. Were there any useful lessons Japan could have taken away from the RJW for WW2, or were they fundamentally different wars with little to no meaningful (positive) lessons that could have been taken from the former and applied to the latter? Cythereal fucked around with this message at 23:47 on Mar 24, 2015 |
# ? Mar 24, 2015 23:44 |
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Raenir Salazar posted:While on paper British capital ship production would've edged out Japan by 1944, on the other hand I don't really see the British managing to steam their way to Okinawa without vastly heavier casualties in ships and men. Compared to Britain+the US as in real life? Obviously, and there might have been some sort of negotiated peace rather than a projected invasion of Japan. Not, however, til Japan had been kicked out of Singapore, Burma etc; too much face would have been lost otherwise.
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# ? Mar 24, 2015 23:45 |
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feedmegin posted:Compared to Britain+the US as in real life? Obviously, and there might have been some sort of negotiated peace rather than a projected invasion of Japan. Not, however, til Japan had been kicked out of Singapore, Burma etc; too much face would have been lost otherwise. On the other hand Japanese defense of those area's is significantly easier than having to defend Indonesia and Japan from the US island hopping; the Japanese can concentrate a lot of naval aviation to defend the straits and the approaches while the British would be forced to retake Burma first before they could do anything about that.
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# ? Mar 24, 2015 23:56 |
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Cythereal posted:Actually, that makes me curious. Were there any useful lessons Japan could have taken away from the RJW for WW2, or were they fundamentally different wars with little to no meaningful (positive) lessons that could have been taken from the former and applied to the latter? The Red Army in 1945 was a much more skilled, better equipped, and better motivated army than the Imperial Russian army. I doubt that any lessons would have been applicable.
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# ? Mar 25, 2015 01:10 |
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I had a question regarding the "abandonment" of Poland by France and England in 1940. A person was arguing that France and England were obligated to smash Germany in the West when they invaded Poland, and that their failure to do so was a breach of their treaty. (From Reddit: (I know, I'm sorry): https://np.reddit.com/r/europe/comments/2fjgyv/with_headquarters_in_poland_the_united_kingdom/cka0p6t?context=3) Is this person right that England and France really could have gone on the offensive and knocked out Germany early? If so, was it ever seriously considered? What was the England/France plan for beating Germany in 1940? Wait for an invasion of France, kill enough guys, let then sue for peace?
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# ? Mar 25, 2015 02:09 |
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Ensign Expendable posted:The Red Army in 1945 was a much more skilled, better equipped, and better motivated army than the Imperial Russian army. I doubt that any lessons would have been applicable. I think he means the broader WW2, since Japan wasn't exactly in good shape before August Storm.
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# ? Mar 25, 2015 02:19 |
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wdarkk posted:I think he means the broader WW2, since Japan wasn't exactly in good shape before August Storm. This is what I meant, yes. For example, it seems to be widely agreed upon that the RJW taught the IJN to worship the idea of one or two decisive battles fought with maximum speed and firepower as the way to bring the US to the bargaining table. I'm curious if anyone more knowledgeable about the conflicts thinks there actually are any useful lessons Japan could have learned from the RJW or if WW2 was a fundamentally and utterly different conflict where experiences from the previous war do not apply.
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# ? Mar 25, 2015 02:23 |
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Mojo Threepwood posted:I had a question regarding the "abandonment" of Poland by France and England in 1940. A person was arguing that France and England were obligated to smash Germany in the West when they invaded Poland, and that their failure to do so was a breach of their treaty. (From Reddit: (I know, I'm sorry): https://np.reddit.com/r/europe/comments/2fjgyv/with_headquarters_in_poland_the_united_kingdom/cka0p6t?context=3) They could have, but they had certain internal forces which meant they didn't. However, they also didn't give two shits about Poland or what happened to the Polish people. They didn't declare war because they honestly wanted to defend Poland, they were paranoid and cynical and looking for any reason to fight a resurgent Germany.
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# ? Mar 25, 2015 03:25 |
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Cythereal posted:Actually, that makes me curious. Were there any useful lessons Japan could have taken away from the RJW for WW2, or were they fundamentally different wars with little to no meaningful (positive) lessons that could have been taken from the former and applied to the latter? Troops at the end of a barely existent supply line are not very effective. Mojo Threepwood posted:Is this person right that England and France really could have gone on the offensive and knocked out Germany early? If so, was it ever seriously considered? What was the England/France plan for beating Germany in 1940? Wait for an invasion of France, kill enough guys, let then sue for peace? Yeah, that was their plan. An offensive into Germany in 1939 probably would have succeeded, but doing it in '38 would have been a much better idea had either of them had the political will to enter into a major war. PittTheElder fucked around with this message at 03:30 on Mar 25, 2015 |
# ? Mar 25, 2015 03:27 |
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If they gave a poo poo about Poland, they would have declared war on the USSR on 9/19/39. Fuckers.
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# ? Mar 25, 2015 03:27 |
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Mojo Threepwood posted:I had a question regarding the "abandonment" of Poland by France and England in 1940. A person was arguing that France and England were obligated to smash Germany in the West when they invaded Poland, and that their failure to do so was a breach of their treaty. (From Reddit: (I know, I'm sorry): https://np.reddit.com/r/europe/comments/2fjgyv/with_headquarters_in_poland_the_united_kingdom/cka0p6t?context=3) There was an exceedingly brief offensive undertaken by France into the Saarland in September 1939 that was called off for, well, reasons. Anybody in the thread well versed in the Phoney War? I have the toughest time wrapping my head around it.
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# ? Mar 25, 2015 03:44 |
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Cythereal posted:This is what I meant, yes. For example, it seems to be widely agreed upon that the RJW taught the IJN to worship the idea of one or two decisive battles fought with maximum speed and firepower as the way to bring the US to the bargaining table. I'm curious if anyone more knowledgeable about the conflicts thinks there actually are any useful lessons Japan could have learned from the RJW or if WW2 was a fundamentally and utterly different conflict where experiences from the previous war do not apply. Well, we've had this conversation before, but I kind of fall down on the side that it's less 'those slopes are prone to cult thinking and worship this idea because Confucius told them to'* and much more 'rational thinking leads to the conclusion that the only way for Japan to win will be through a decisive battle.' Like, they were never, ever going to win an attritional war. Once the USA got warmed up, yeah, not a thing that happens. The lesson of Tsushima was not 'we can march on Moscow' it was 'we can contest Pacific holdings because we're closer to it and we care more.' A big part of that would have been blasting up the US fleet as it was and then presenting their conquests as fait accompli. Let the American admirals try to argue with a population (which was showing all signs of declaring 'gently caress it' to the world in general) that, no, really, they needed to devote an ungodly amount of time energy and money to go sailing back out into the Pacific to save the ungrateful Filipinos who, let's be honest, were already revolting anyway**. I don't think it's a matter of them learning the wrong lesson. I think they felt boxed in (not, you know, being murderous imperialist dickbags would probably have been ideal, but looking at their old superpower get devoured alive kinda instilled this eat-or-be-eaten vibe) and looked at the line. They could play the long game and lose for sure, or go hard on the long toss and see how it played out. And then again, and again, and again, until inevitably caught up to them. It didn't go how they wanted but it was more rational than, like, 75% of what Hitler did. I think the bigger question is 'why did they me from before posted:Sure we would have been drawn in, but the question is, how willing would the USA have been to throw our young boys into some South East Asian jungle to prop up some dying European empire we feel vaguely obliged to help because they're part of a broader alliance against a looming power in Europe. Surely there must be some case where we could look at a war like that where, despite overwhelming material, industrial, technological, and manpower advantages, a lack of enthusiasm might sap the American will to fight. *Legit something said here like less than two month ago. ** Also had this on and off independence war going on too. the JJ fucked around with this message at 04:31 on Mar 25, 2015 |
# ? Mar 25, 2015 04:20 |
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Cythereal posted:This is what I meant, yes. For example, it seems to be widely agreed upon that the RJW taught the IJN to worship the idea of one or two decisive battles fought with maximum speed and firepower as the way to bring the US to the bargaining table. I'm curious if anyone more knowledgeable about the conflicts thinks there actually are any useful lessons Japan could have learned from the RJW or if WW2 was a fundamentally and utterly different conflict where experiences from the previous war do not apply. It's a little bit of both - technology was a huge factor, as was maneuverability and training (specifically gunnery training ) and a good lesson would have been that quality can trump quantity if the difference is big enough. However, that was a war of battleships whereas WWII was more about carriers. The technological edge was much greater in the RJW, and it was less the "decisive battle" that brought Russia to the bargaining table than it was a series of naval and land defeats resulting in major strategic disadvantages as well as a total collapse of political support for the war and the Tsar. A similar outcome probably wasn't possible for Japan in WWII since they were operating much farther from the home islands and their holdings on the Asian mainland. Maybe if they laid siege to Long Beach or Los Angeles while landing in Baja California and moving to occupy the region South of the Cascades and West of the Sierra Nevada in order to deny use of the ports as well as block reinforcements, resulting in a need for the Atlantic Fleet to steam down around South America... oh you get the point, that poo poo was nothing alike. Island versus continent in a war of attrition. FAUXTON fucked around with this message at 04:47 on Mar 25, 2015 |
# ? Mar 25, 2015 04:45 |
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I think that overall for Japan they started with fighting a war as their premise and looked back to the RJW for how they could win that war, so since it gave a facile answer they didn't go looking for ways to see how that could go wrong.
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# ? Mar 25, 2015 04:53 |
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Raenir Salazar posted:While on paper British capital ship production would've edged out Japan by 1944, on the other hand I don't really see the British managing to steam their way to Okinawa without vastly heavier casualties in ships and men. Britain wouldn't need to make it to Okinawa - if they could retake even Malaysia, bombers based there could effectively interdict most of the East Indies and the Japanese economy would eventually collapse without those strategic resources. It might not be enough to force the Japanese to actually surrender, but it'd make it very difficult for them to fight effectively or operate a modern industrial economy.
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# ? Mar 25, 2015 05:09 |
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xthetenth posted:I think that overall for Japan they started with fighting a war as their premise and looked back to the RJW for how they could win that war, so since it gave a facile answer they didn't go looking for ways to see how that could go wrong. But they won the war by strategically defeating the Russian navy through cutting off it's home port, driving Russian forces out of a good part of Manchuria, then forcing the surrender of the reinforcing Baltic Fleet after it sailed in from the Baltic Sea. It wasn't so much one decisive battle forcing negotiations so much as it was a thorough defeat of the Russian military across like 15 months of fighting. The defeat was so thorough that it catalyzed a revolution because (in addition to the pile of poo poo they were already pissed off about socially) nobody thought the government or military were competent because it just got its rear end handed to them by a comparatively tiny island nation with no goddamn bears (Ainu don't count). They didn't account for the existing social unrest and (assuming they drew the decisive battle doctrine from the RJW) the fact that they more or less thrashed the Russian military (less on land, more on water) before they sued for peace.
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# ? Mar 25, 2015 05:25 |
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FAUXTON posted:But they won the war by strategically defeating the Russian navy through cutting off it's home port, driving Russian forces out of a good part of Manchuria, then forcing the surrender of the reinforcing Baltic Fleet after it sailed in from the Baltic Sea. It wasn't so much one decisive battle forcing negotiations so much as it was a thorough defeat of the Russian military across like 15 months of fighting. The defeat was so thorough that it catalyzed a revolution because (in addition to the pile of poo poo they were already pissed off about socially) nobody thought the government or military were competent because it just got its rear end handed to them by a comparatively tiny island nation with no goddamn bears (Ainu don't count). ETA: VVVVV I think he means France wanted it, not Britain.
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# ? Mar 25, 2015 06:07 |
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cheerfullydrab posted:They didn't declare war because they honestly wanted to defend Poland, they were paranoid and cynical and looking for any reason to fight a resurgent Germany. This seems a bit strange to me, given that Chamberlain had been widely cheered when he boasted of peace in our time, and given that as far as I could tell aside from a few whackos like Churchill most people were perfectly happy to avoid The Great War 2: Electric Boogaloo as long as they thought it was possible. Could you elaborate? Edit: Also, paranoia about Hitler seems kinda justifiable given, y'know, Hitler. Tomn fucked around with this message at 06:12 on Mar 25, 2015 |
# ? Mar 25, 2015 06:08 |
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brozozo posted:Anybody in the thread well versed in the Phoney War? I have the toughest time wrapping my head around it. I'm not particularly well versed in the Phoney War, but the reason that the French and British made no real attempt to invade Germany is partly that they recognized that their armies weren't as well armed as Germany's was, but mostly because they had no intention of being the attacker this time around. The advance into the Netherlands was an attempt to secure a defensible line along the Rhine, blockade Germany, and force the Germans to attack right into the teeth of well entrenched Allied positions. The German leadership was pretty convinced that had France and Britain attacked while the Wehrmacht was busy in Poland, that would have been the end of the Third Reich, but the Franco-British command just didn't have the political will to do so. PittTheElder fucked around with this message at 06:36 on Mar 25, 2015 |
# ? Mar 25, 2015 06:28 |
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Arquinsiel posted:Irrelevant interjection: Japan totally has bears. poo poo, you're right.
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# ? Mar 25, 2015 07:13 |
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Tomn posted:Edit: Also, paranoia about Hitler seems kinda justifiable given, y'know, Hitler. How many people could guess that Erdogan or Putin or Assad or... whoever's Head of State of Indonesia or whatever would be be the next Hitler today? It's a grandiose claim, and no sane person would really suggest it. It was easy, at the time, to dismiss Mein Kampf as the same kind of nationalistic drivel that that Kazakh dictator put out a few years back; propaganda, signifying nothing. But once in a blue moon it's what the guy actually thinks.
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# ? Mar 25, 2015 08:49 |
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PittTheElder posted:I'm not particularly well versed in the Phoney War, but the reason that the French and British made no real attempt to invade Germany is partly that they recognized that their armies weren't as well armed as Germany's was, but mostly because they had no intention of being the attacker this time around. The advance into the Netherlands was an attempt to secure a defensible line along the Rhine, blockade Germany, and force the Germans to attack right into the teeth of well entrenched Allied positions. Let's remember also that everyone on the Allied side either viscerally remembers or has had it drilled into them exactly what happened the last time France declared war and then immediately tried to kick Germany's front door down; 30 days later, they were running for their lives across the Marne.
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# ? Mar 25, 2015 10:01 |
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I find it somewhat amazing that Hitler wasn't strung up from a streetlamp sometime on September 3rd 1939. I wonder if the Invasion of France didn't go so brilliantly how long a revolution would have taken. Let's say its six months into the campaign, the BEF is still on the continent and Paris hasn't fallen - what happens? It just seems like madness to launch another war against the same guys you just lost a million or so young men fighting. Ok there is 'stab in the back' and all the rest of it, but when 10% of the German population was killed or wounded surely below the surface there was a huge fear of a repeat. But on the other hand it does kinda feel like nationalism worldwide was at an all time high and life was cheap back then.
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# ? Mar 25, 2015 10:49 |
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gohuskies posted:Britain wouldn't need to make it to Okinawa - if they could retake even Malaysia, bombers based there could effectively interdict most of the East Indies and the Japanese economy would eventually collapse without those strategic resources. It might not be enough to force the Japanese to actually surrender, but it'd make it very difficult for them to fight effectively or operate a modern industrial economy. In conjunction with an aggressive submarine blockade, bombers might have been able to interfere with Japanese war production, but I'm skeptical if they alone could have "effectively interdicted[ed]" enough war material to force Japan out of the war by 1945-1946. For one, as you know, WWII strategic bombers could be very effective against large targets. Just ask the residents of Berlin and Dresden circa 1945. But hitting precision targets like refineries, oil fields, and ports often enough and with enough ordnance to meaningfully affect Japanese efforts would have been a tall order. Actually interdicting Japanese supply lines would have been even harder. Long-range bombers operating out of Malaysia would have been hard-pressed to deny Japan access to the resources in the region. At medium ranges, interedction might have been successful (the Battle of the Bismarck Sea is a good example of how this might have worked). But at longer ranges, I doubt the RAF could have done much. Masthead attacks in the longer-ranged four-engine bombers would have been a...dicey proposition (5th AF did with with B-17s, but only briefly). An Operation Starvation-style aerial mining campaign might have gleaned some results, but the task would have much greater than the USAAF faced during Starvation, since the RAF would have had much more sea to cover. Secondly, such a campaign would have consumed an enormous amount of POL, ordnance, spares, not to mention aircraft and aircrews. That means pulling resources away from Bomber Command's nighttime bombing of Germany and the occupied countries and throwing them into the relatively sideshow of the Pacific. I doubt Bomber Harris (or Churchill) would have approved. Bacarruda fucked around with this message at 11:42 on Mar 25, 2015 |
# ? Mar 25, 2015 11:24 |
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100 Years Ago Herbert Sulzbach is having rather a nice time of it. The Friendly Feldwebel, who I'm pretty sure has just arrived in the trenches that Sulzbach's guns are defending, is not. They call where he is now "The Devil's Hole", which I've carefully put right under the advert for "To-Day's Toilet Hints", snigger snigger. It's a seriously unhealthy place to be. And, Sir Ian Hamilton clashes with General Maxwell, in charge of Egypt and the Suez Canal.
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# ? Mar 25, 2015 11:26 |
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Japanese Explosive Ordnance: Army and Navy Ammunition Army Projectiles: Part 2 Type 99 (Rimless) 7.7mm Ammunition Continuing the tradition of the 6.5mm round, the 7.7mm cartridge has several different sizes based on what type of projectile is used. There are 5 listed variants: Ball round with CuNi jacket and lead core; Tracer round with CuNi jacket and lead core; A.P. round with CuNi jacket and Hard Steel core; Blank round with Paper or Wooden projectile. The rimless 7.7mm round was used in: Rifles: Type 99 rifle, Type 2 rifle, Type 4 rifle LMGs: Type 99 LMG, Type 97 LMG HMGs: Type 92 HMG, Type 1 HMG To differentiate the ammunition, color bands were used similar to the 6.5mm Arisaka round. Type | Band ----------------- Ball - Pink Tracer - Green A.P - Black Blank - Wood Blank - Paper (purple) Notes The heavy machine guns use feed strips of 30 rounds. When used in light machine guns and the rifle, this ammunition is packed in 5-round clips. In addition to the usual brass cartridge cases, ammunition with a steel case has been found. Type 92 (Semi-rimmed) 7.7mm Ammunition While the varied Type 92 rounds have different lengths in some cases, the interesting part is that it did not have a blank variant in wood or paper. That being said, there were still 5 variants, all using a CuNi jacket: Ball round with lead core; Tracer round with lead core; A.P. round with Hard Steel core; Incendiary round with W.P. and lead core; H.E. round with P.E.T.N. and lead core. The semi-rimmed rounds were used in the Type 89, used by the Army Air Force, and the Type 92 HMG used by the Army. To differentiate the ammunition, color bands were used similar to the 7.7mm Arisaka round. Type | Band ----------------- Ball - Pink Tracer - Green A.P - Black Incendiary - Magenta H.E. - Purple Notes The type 92 HMG uses feed strips of 30 rounds. When used for aircraft flexible machine guns, this ammunition is packed in 5-round clips in a manner corresponding to the packing of rimless, rifle ammunition; but the clip is of larger size to accommodate the larger bore of the semi-rimmed type. The P.E.T.N. in the H.E. round is set off by the heat of the impact. 7.92mm Aircraft Machine Gun Ammunition The manual mentions a few oddities here. It mentions that the 7.92mm round was used in 3 different guns: Bren type LMG, Type 98 flexible ACMG, and Type 100 flexible ACMG. The Bren's would've been captured examples produced by the Chinese chambered in 8x57mm IS (7.92x57mm Mauser) and the Type 100 twin-barrelled design. The Type 98 was a direct copy of the German MG-15. Only 4 different rounds were used: Ball round with Gilding metal jacket and lead core; A.P. round with CuNi jacket and Hard Steel core; Incendiary round with CuNi jacket and W.P. and lead core; H.E. round with CuNi jacket and P.E.T.N. and lead core. Another oddity is the Ball type round did not have a color marking. Type | Band ----------------- A.P - Black Incendiary - Magenta H.E. - White Notes The Bren type LMG uses a box-type magazine similar to the US BAR LMG. The type 98 and type 100 ACMGs use saddle-type magazines. 8mm Pistol Ammunition There were no special rounds for the 8mm ammunition apparently, but yet there are mentions of a tear gas round? In any case, the 8mm round was a Ball type, CuNi jacketed and had a Lead core. It was used in the Type 14 Nambu pistol, Hamada (Type 1 or Type 2) type pistol, Type 94 Nambu pistol, North China Type 19 pistol, Model 1927, Type 100 SMG, and several other guns. Interestingly, the TM mentions a "Solothurn" submachine gun and a "Bren Type" submachine gun. Notes The propelling case is rimless and made of brass. There is a tear-gas round, but specifications indicate that this is a relatively large missile and it is probably launched from the pistol somewhat in the manner of launching grenades from a rifle. 9mm Pistol Ammunition Like with the 8mm pistol cartridge, no variants seem to exist or at the very least recorded in the manual. As you may have guessed, the 9mm round was of Ball type with CuNi jacket and lead core. The manual states they were used in the Type 26 revolver (Webley type) and the Smith and Wesson pistol, although I have no clue what that latter is. It should also be noted that the 9mm pistol ammo should really be called 9mm Japanese Revolver. Notes The propelling case is rimless and made of brass. There is a tear-gas round similar to that mentioned for the 8mm pistol cartridge. Next time: 12.7mm Cannon (Really HMG round) and 20mm Cannon ammunition
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# ? Mar 25, 2015 12:28 |
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gohuskies posted:Britain wouldn't need to make it to Okinawa - if they could retake even Malaysia, bombers based there could effectively interdict most of the East Indies and the Japanese economy would eventually collapse without those strategic resources. It might not be enough to force the Japanese to actually surrender, but it'd make it very difficult for them to fight effectively or operate a modern industrial economy. But how do they retake Malaysia? I think its a given that the first major battlefleet that sails towards Malaysia without Burma secured is going to be eaten alive just as any British fleet trying to operate in the Baltic in 1940.
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# ? Mar 25, 2015 14:01 |
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29 Nov 1626 At some time in the night, a pair of Italian brothers hear a noise outside their dwelling place, and when the younger one gets up with the dog to see what's going on someone chucks a rock at his head. Turns out that soldiers are trying to steal their sheep. The soldiers Hans Vull and Christian Gottschalck, quartered with these brothers (corroborating a secondary source about warfare in the Netherlands which said that everyone is very careful to match the number of soldiers with the number of civilians in any single quartering), are interrogated about this. During the investigation, they mention that the soldier Hanns Geyer had gotten drunk in a nearby village and decided to crash with them. Gottschalck also says that he saw Geyer get up out of the bed during the night (there's only one bed for these five people), take the urine pot, "and because he was very thirsty, drink it again." When they interrogate Geyer, eventually someone asks him if he drinks piss. He hotly denies it. Turns out all three of them were in on the sheep theft and their company Fourier put them up to it. This makes sense because the Fourier combines the duties of a quartermaster and a sort of advance scout, finding quarters and directing the procurement of food. (I think this is also why these peoples' word for "bodyguard" is Fourierschutz--Fourier Protection.) He was replicating his official duties in an, um, unofficial manner and Geyer ended up getting hanged for it. These guys' lives are pretty entertaining but we should always remember that they're probably hovering at the brink of starvation most of the time--if this regiment is part of the Army of Milan I know they are pretty badly payed HEY GUNS fucked around with this message at 16:07 on Mar 25, 2015 |
# ? Mar 25, 2015 15:46 |
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Mojo Threepwood posted:I had a question regarding the "abandonment" of Poland by France and England in 1940. A person was arguing that France and England were obligated to smash Germany in the West when they invaded Poland, and that their failure to do so was a breach of their treaty. (From Reddit: (I know, I'm sorry): https://np.reddit.com/r/europe/comments/2fjgyv/with_headquarters_in_poland_the_united_kingdom/cka0p6t?context=3) This is going to be a big part of my dissertation, so I can cover some of it (just starting, so I don't really know anywhere near as much as I need to yet). Yes, Britain and France could have punched into German territory with ease - the forces the Germans left behind were pathetic. As for obligations, as far as I can tell this was a combination of wishful thinking/natural assumption on the part of the Polish, rather than any concrete promise, although hints were probably dropped and I may come across a firmer promise later. It was only natural for the Poles, fighting for their lives, to expect their ally to attack immediately, especially when it was so obvious that the Germans had committed so much to the east. But the Brits and French were determined to build up as part of a months- and years-long process, and saw their obligation to Poland as something that could be met when Germany was crushed, rather than something that had to happen immediately (after all, if Germany loses, Poland is free, whenever that happens). They were thinking of recovery and build-up, not offense: they imagined they still needed a lot of time to get ready, after the lead the Germans gained in the 30s, and even with 3/4s of the German army or whatever away, they couldn't shake that build-up-oriented mindset.
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# ? Mar 25, 2015 17:52 |
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Xotl posted:This is going to be a big part of my dissertation, so I can cover some of it (just starting, so I don't really know anywhere near as much as I need to yet). Related: imagine a war where the entirety of the BEF was annihilated somewhere south of Belgium, because even though they had made strong gains into Germany proper, they were harried and cut off as they retreated west towards the channel, instead of being evacuated at Dunkirk. Once the Wehrmacht turned its attentions west, the outcome in the short term would have been identical, it's just a matter of how bad the English and French losses would be.
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# ? Mar 25, 2015 18:38 |
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# ? May 28, 2024 15:08 |
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Xotl posted:This is going to be a big part of my dissertation, so I can cover some of it (just starting, so I don't really know anywhere near as much as I need to yet). I think you are underestimating/not accounting for the sheer absence of necessary material in the UK and French formations in 1939. e: the attitude in the BEF wasn't so much 'we need to build-up more to take on Germany' as it was 'the forces we have are not combat ready and lacking basic equipment' Alchenar fucked around with this message at 18:53 on Mar 25, 2015 |
# ? Mar 25, 2015 18:43 |