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Zachack posted:That's not what uncanny valley means, as the person wandering around presumably would be indistinguishable from the original rather than very close but just off enough to cause unease. There are echoes of the uncanny valley in the idea that you can look at a replica of your dead sister and find yourself disturbed by the knowledge that sh'es only a replica rather than the original. quote:The whole argument against sister cloning comes across as a fetishism of authenticity or religious fervor. If the only way to tell the difference is to be told which is the original then authenticity loses all meaning to the observer. Ah yes. It is OK to be tricked, because you do not know you are being tricked while you are being tricked.
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Apr 7, 2016 17:56
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Peta posted:Oh no, I'm aiming for the opposite. They'd wake up in identical rooms, be exposed to identical stimuli, etc. Better yet, they're both suspended in sleep until Oh dear me makes his choice. While I agree with Who What Now when he talks about the technical significance of even infinitesimal differences post-replication, my point is more about "authenticity" (I'm not sure if that word captures either the concept or the tone that I'm striving for). Okay but we still have this issue where you think this concept of 'authenticity' is inherently significant. For half of the thread, object identity is a set of information about the configuration of the object's constituent parts - not something carried by or specific to those constituent parts themselves.
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Apr 7, 2016 18:24
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Just quantum it, problem solved.
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Apr 7, 2016 18:27
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Who What Now posted:The majority of the first half of this post (which I assume is at least partially directed towards me) is largely just a difference in definition. And the short response to this is that I don't think the definition of "me" that you laid out is the least bit useful for this type of discussion. And, actually, calling it "me" or "I" or "you" is confusing, so let's just settle on "self" for a useful shorthand, yes? 
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Apr 7, 2016 18:51
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If you don't understand, you just need to say so and I'll gladly use smaller words for you.
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Apr 7, 2016 19:15
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Who What Now posted:If you don't understand, you just need to say so and I'll gladly use smaller words for you. It's perfectly clear that you're rigging things from the start by defining things so they'll do what you want them to.
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Apr 7, 2016 19:24
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Lt. Danger posted:Okay but we still have this issue where you think this concept of 'authenticity' is inherently significant. For half of the thread, object identity is a set of information about the configuration of the object's constituent parts - not something carried by or specific to those constituent parts themselves. I think "authenticity" is a decent shorthand for the idea that people either endure or perdure through time. I think perdurantism in particular is potentially a dagger blow to those who think originals and replicas are totally interchangeable.
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Apr 7, 2016 19:25
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The Belgian posted:It's perfectly clear that you're rigging things from the start by defining things so they'll do what you want them to. You should present alternative definitions.
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Apr 7, 2016 19:29
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Peta posted:There are echoes of the uncanny valley in the idea that you can look at a replica of your dead sister and find yourself disturbed by the knowledge that sh'es only a replica rather than the original. quote:Ah yes. It is OK to be tricked, because you do not know you are being tricked while you are being tricked. In the clone scenario it's simple to envision a method where knowledge of which is the original is destroyed, so I'm not even sure how that becomes a trick outside of attempting negative framing. Both then become clones and originals.
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Apr 7, 2016 19:34
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Lt. Danger posted:To be clear, I was saying "which is original and which is the copy" would be irrelevant to Oh dear me, since the sister-entities are both the same set of thoughts/memories/opinions and therefore, as far as I think Oh dear me is concerned, the same person. But they aren't the same set of thoughts because their space-time world-lines diverge.
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Apr 7, 2016 19:36
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Peta posted:I mean, I was trying to tease out the confession of a preference for authenticity, all other things being equal, were he forced to make a choice. Yes, we know, but the whole point is that I haven't got such a preference. You seem to find that either inconceivable or horrifying, but for me the horrifying thing would be rejecting my sister because she was composed of molecules I hadn't seen before. The argument would go better if we could quash our incredulous horror and accept that we do, genuinely, disagree. wateroverfire posted:Does that seem like a fair starting point? To be honest it seems like a terrible muddling of concepts: I could easily agree with half of each statement.
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Apr 7, 2016 19:39
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SHISHKABOB posted:But they aren't the same set of thoughts because their space-time world-lines diverge. As far as I am concerned 2+2=4 is the same thought, whenever and wherever it is had.
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Apr 7, 2016 20:04
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Oh dear me posted:As far as I am concerned 2+2=4 is the same thought, whenever and wherever it is had. Yeah but that's not how it works, and also not quite what I meant. If you have two states that are initially identical, but then expose them to different conditions, then they will not be the same anymore.
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Apr 7, 2016 20:06
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SHISHKABOB posted:If you have two states that are initially identical, but then expose them to different conditions, then they will not be the same anymore. Of course: no one disputes this. But what of it?
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Apr 7, 2016 20:09
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Oh dear me posted:Of course: no one disputes this. But what of it? It means they're not the same thoughts, so they aren't the same person.
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Apr 7, 2016 20:11
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SHISHKABOB posted:It means they're not the same thoughts, so they aren't the same person. I will be having different thoughts in two minutes time. Yet I will be the same person.
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Apr 7, 2016 20:17
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Oh dear me posted:I will be having different thoughts in two minutes time. Yet I will be the same person. Yes but not because you had those two thoughts.
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Apr 7, 2016 20:21
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Oh dear me posted:I will be having different thoughts in two minutes time. Yet I will be the same person. You can't have two of the same person. I'm not saying which is which because I don't know, but they are distinguishable.
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Apr 7, 2016 20:22
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Peta posted:Yes but not because you had those two thoughts. Of course not. Sorry, I don't understand what you are trying to say here.
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Apr 7, 2016 20:23
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Oh dear me posted:Of course not. Sorry, I don't understand what you are trying to say here. I was just nitpicking a specific point.
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Apr 7, 2016 20:27
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SHISHKABOB posted:You can't have two of the same person. I'm not saying which is which because I don't know, but they are distinguishable. That's just an assertion about a word. I suspect we wouldn't want to call two different bodies the same person, because it would be inconvenient; we'd want some way to distinguish them, in order to interact. But if we decided to call them the same person but in two natures, or some such thing, that would be entirely legitimate - as it would in the transportation case if we chose to call the clone the same person as the original. These word choices obviously reflect our opinions on whether anything of importance would have been lost, but they cannot change them.
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Apr 7, 2016 20:30
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Oh dear me posted:That's just an assertion about a word. I suspect we wouldn't want to call two different bodies the same person, because it would be inconvenient; we'd want some way to distinguish them, in order to interact. But if we decided to call them the same person but in two natures, or some such thing, that would be entirely legitimate - as it would in the transportation case if we chose to call the clone the same person as the original. These word choices obviously reflect our opinions on whether anything of importance would have been lost, but they cannot change them. I guess there's not much to the uniqueness of "self" beyond the perspective of that "self".
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Apr 7, 2016 20:41
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guys.... this will have you scratching your heads for a long time......... what if you are vaporized.... and AFTER that your clone is made
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Apr 7, 2016 22:52
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What if you weren't cloned at all, but just thought you were..............
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Apr 7, 2016 22:53
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Here's another one A doctor man officially tells you that your sister underwent the teleportation process. you know in your heart of hearts now, that this isnt your sister at all, but a gross amalgamation of atoms that superficially resembles her, and you murder her to rid the world of the abomination. But here's the twist, the doctor man was actually the secret antagonist, and wanted you to murder your sister, and actually, YOU were the clone. How about that.
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Apr 7, 2016 22:55
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What are the ethical ramifications of using teleportation technology to vaporize a baby and reconstruct it to avoid having to do an invasive caesarean section?
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Apr 7, 2016 22:56
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Peta posted:You're devaluing numerical identity and interpersonal history and insisting that your sister is replaceable. Not caught up with the thread yet, but: your notion of "numerical identity" doesn't seem to be real. As in, it's not a thing that physics as we understand it keeps track of.
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Apr 7, 2016 23:05
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Also people need to be clearer about whether they're talking about a (destructive) teleporter or a cloning machine.
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Apr 7, 2016 23:18
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GlyphGryph posted:What? This seems like you want it to follow from your previous argument but I'm not in any way understanding the supposed connection,. I'm saying that my accomplishments only have value to me if I can experience them. It's my awareness of my existence that I value, not just existence itself. I don't care at all if a clone that's indistinguishable from "me" goes on to accomplish great things, except in the very limited sense of it being a slightly better outcome than me simply being dead. And just to be extra clear, I'm not making an argument of "me"ness. A perfect clone would have just as much of a right to my life as I do, and I don't think "who came first?" is even a meaningful question if we're talking about absolutely perfect clones. The issue is entirely down to consciousness/self-awareness, and the fact that I'm not at all interested in having mine terminated.
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Apr 7, 2016 23:29
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Can the arguments against teleportation also be used to support abortion? I think so
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Apr 7, 2016 23:34
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Who/what is "me"? What is the nature of the self? What is it?
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Apr 7, 2016 23:37
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Shbobdb posted:Who/what is "me"? Nobody knows for sure, and the only people who care about it are philosophy people, and they're pretty useless in general.
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Apr 7, 2016 23:41
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*thinks real hard about phuilosophy* Actually, your idiot opinion is the wrong one, and bad, and my idiot opinion is correc.t
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Apr 7, 2016 23:51
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Control Volume posted:*thinks real hard about phuilosophy* Actually, your idiot opinion is the wrong one, and bad, and my idiot opinion is correc.t All right, we get it: You're a funny guy. Now that we know this, you don't have to post anymore 
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Apr 7, 2016 23:54
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Peta posted:All right, we get it: You're a funny guy. Now that we know this, you don't have to post anymore If you think about it, does Star Trek implicitly endorse murder?
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Apr 7, 2016 23:59
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Control Volume posted:If you think about it, does Star Trek implicitly endorse murder? Actually, I wanted you to keep posting all along. Don't stop ...
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Apr 8, 2016 00:04
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Shbobdb posted:Who/what is "me"? I think that pondering these questions can lead to a greater sense of connection with the world. Like I wanna say enlightenment basically. Thinking about those things and their relationship with the world, other people, and stuff, is good for you. Especially if you talk about it with people.
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Apr 8, 2016 00:12
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Peta posted:Actually, I wanted you to keep posting all along. Don't stop ... What if the memory banks of the modern cyberbrain go down to a hardware failure, and you are forced to use a backup, but then the memory banks are restored and the memories uploaded into your consciousness, are you still you, or a cyber clone, or both?
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Apr 8, 2016 00:14
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Dzhay posted:Not caught up with the thread yet, but: your notion of "numerical identity" doesn't seem to be real. As in, it's not a thing that physics as we understand it keeps track of. If you care about actual physics, you can just invoke the no-cloning and no-teleportation theorems to render the question void and be done with things.
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Apr 8, 2016 00:24
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Control Volume posted:What if the memory banks of the modern cyberbrain go down to a hardware failure, and you are forced to use a backup, but then the memory banks are restored and the memories uploaded into your consciousness, are you still you, or a cyber clone, or both? This is actually an extremely neat one that is somewhat less nightmarish than "what if sleeping causes the same discontinuity?". I'm not sure I have a decent answer, but it's a darn interesting question. What I personally care about is continuity of experience, which theoretically lends itself to some very weird scenarios that involve mindclones that aren't me until they're hooked back up to my meathead, whereupon they are me.
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Apr 8, 2016 00:25
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