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Tuxedo Catfish posted:If instances of consciousness separated by space are different from each other, why should we consider instances of consciousness separated by time to be the same? Same question I posed before. What would it mean for instances of consciousness separated by time to be different?
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Apr 11, 2016 15:32
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Peta posted:Uh, the whole point of quantum teleportation as far as I can tell is that, yes, quantum information is preserved in its transmission from one pile of atoms to another pile of atoms, but the first pile of atoms has to be destroyed in the process. EDIT: The term 'quantum information' can be disingenuous in these contexts as it's the 'everything' of an objects. It contains the information but also everything else. In some contexts, like a quantum computer, the term 'quantum information' makes sense as there you only care about the information part, but you can't just generalize that. The Belgian fucked around with this message at 15:39 on Apr 11, 2016 |
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Apr 11, 2016 15:32
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The Belgian posted:Then you don't fully get the quantum teleporter. Physically, an object is a wavefunction. The wavefunction gets moved. The original quantum state is destroyed. The original object isn't transferred. These are the rules of quantum teleportation. 
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Apr 11, 2016 15:37
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wateroverfire posted:The point of the thought experiment isn't to redesign teleportation to render the question moot. The purpose of changing the question is to figure out where the line lays for different people, and that is relevant to the philosophy at question.
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Apr 11, 2016 15:40
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Killer-of-Lawyers posted:The purpose of changing the question is to figure out where the line lays for different people, and that is relevant to the philosophy at question. The line is irrelevant, is the thing. That's about the implementation of the teleporter and the point is not "can we find a teleporter scenario in which you would use this thing", the point is to jumpstart conversation about identity.
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Apr 11, 2016 15:53
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wateroverfire posted:Same question I posed before. What would it mean for instances of consciousness separated by time to be different? It would mean that it's silly to worry about the "destruction" of your consciousness because it's not something that persists, it's something that's continually replaced or renewed as long as certain physical conditions are met. I don't possess the same consciousness that I possessed a moment ago, so why should I be concerned that it's not the same consciousness when I go through the teleporter? e: Like, I honestly don't really understand what you're asking, if that doesn't answer it. If I had the same consciousness as myself in the past, I would be experiencing the past and the present simultaneously, and that's not how I experience things. Tuxedo Catfish fucked around with this message at 16:08 on Apr 11, 2016 |
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Apr 11, 2016 16:03
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Consciousness shouldn't be the focus of the debate.
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Apr 11, 2016 16:07
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Tuxedo Catfish posted:It would mean that it's silly to worry about the "destruction" of your consciousness because it's not something that persists, it's something that's continually replaced or renewed as long as certain physical conditions are met. I don't possess the same consciousness that I possessed a moment ago, so why should I be concerned that it's not the same consciousness when I go through the teleporter? Who is the "you" that possesses the consciousness? It seems like THAT you is persisting and in that case, what work is being done by your concept of consciousness?
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Apr 11, 2016 16:09
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Is this where somebody gets all screechy and tells us to seek help for depression or did I jump ahead?
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Apr 11, 2016 16:10
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Tuxedo Catfish posted:e: Like, I honestly don't really understand what you're asking, if that doesn't answer it. If I had the same consciousness as myself in the past, I would be experiencing the past and the present simultaneously, and that's not how I experience things. Like...your conciousness is the thing doing the experiencing, which we both seem to take to be continuous and persisting if I'm not misunderstanding? edit: Like...that there is some you that is moving through time and experiencing things is implicit in your language about this. I'm saying that you is your consciousness. But we could use some other word if you want.
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Apr 11, 2016 16:17
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Is telling someone to go get teleported the new, politically correct way of telling people to kill themselves?
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Apr 11, 2016 16:20
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wateroverfire posted:Who is the "you" that possesses the consciousness? It seems like THAT you is persisting and in that case, what work is being done by your concept of consciousness? If it walks like a Tuxedo Catfish, and it talks like a Tuxedo Catfish, and it gets in abstract internet arguments about identity like a Tuxedo Catfish, it's a Tuxedo Catfish. So basically, any member of a class of bodies that sufficiently resemble each other to the extent that they can be recognized as me, are all me. If this applies to me at different ages -- when I was a radically different person than I am now -- then I see no sensible definition that would exclude virtually identical clones or copies. wateroverfire posted:It seems like THAT you is persisting and in that case, what work is being done by your concept of consciousness? Well, I experience qualia (not that I can ever prove this to you, of course, or even prove to myself that I experience qualia at any time other than the present instant) and saying I have consciousness is basically just affirming that. Tuxedo Catfish is a creature which has subjective experiences. Apart from that, it doesn't mean much. I guess it might have moral consequences if you hold that happiness is good because it's subjectively experienced as pleasant and suffering is bad because it's subjectively experienced as unpleasant, but I'm not sure that's actually necessary. A philosophical zombie would probably still argue that it deserves to exist.
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Apr 11, 2016 16:21
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Agents are GO! posted:Is this where somebody gets all screechy and tells us to seek help for depression or did I jump ahead? Pretty sure nobody making that sort of quip actually thinks you're depressed because you're OK with teleportation. The idea is more that you're doing a bad job of conceptualizing death and its ramifications. As far as I can tell, your camp says that, as long as an exact copy of you exists, there is nothing wrong with your death, aside from the possibility that people will mourn you. It happens that there is indeed an exact copy of you somewhere in the multiverse. In fact, there are infinitely many exact copies of you. This means that other people's grief is the only aspect or consequence of death that troubles you - otherwise, you're fine with dying here and now. My camp thinks that's hosed up and dumb as poo poo.
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Apr 11, 2016 16:22
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Tuxedo Catfish posted:If it walks like a Tuxedo Catfish, and it talks like a Tuxedo Catfish, and it gets in abstract internet arguments about identity like a Tuxedo Catfish, it's a Tuxedo Catfish. So basically, any member of a class of bodies that sufficiently resemble each other to the extent that they can be recognized as me, are all me. Man. This is just not true. You're an individual, not a category.
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Apr 11, 2016 16:25
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Is painless genocide morally reprehensible if the atomic/subatomic states of all the victims are all logged and used to produce exact replicas of the victims?
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Apr 11, 2016 16:32
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Peta posted:Man. This is just not true. You're an individual, not a category. It might be cool to be a persistent individual, but supposing you're right, how would I tell? Being a category offers a much more compelling explanation of how I subjectively experience my life, regardless of what I prefer. Peta posted:Is painless genocide morally reprehensible even if the atomic/subatomic states of all the victims are all logged and used to produce exact replicas of the victims? If that's how you define genocide, genocide happens spontaneously all day every day. That's either super-depressing, or it reduces the term to meaninglessness, so I'm not going to define genocide that way, because I can control my definitions. I can't control or change how consciousness works -- much as I define my "self" as the category, and not the infinity of individual sparks of consciousness.
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Apr 11, 2016 16:34
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Is the modern resistance to teleportation an intuitive boon, or an evolutionary weakness?
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Apr 11, 2016 16:35
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Should the inventor of "safe" human quantum tunneling be tried for crimes against humanity?
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Apr 11, 2016 16:39
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Tuxedo Catfish posted:If it walks like a Tuxedo Catfish, and it talks like a Tuxedo Catfish, and it gets in abstract internet arguments about identity like a Tuxedo Catfish, it's a Tuxedo Catfish. So basically, any member of a class of bodies that sufficiently resemble each other to the extent that they can be recognized as me, are all me. I'd agree with Peta that this isn't an adequate description of the entity Tuxedo Catfish. It's sufficient most of the time because in the world we live in, there's only ever one Tuxedo Catfish running around and he is you. But in a world where there were clones or doubles your definition of Tuxedo Catfish would fail to identify an individual and you'd need to get more specific. Like...if your clone were served a summons meant for you, he would be 100% justified in not showing up. If your clone decided to gently caress your wife you'd still be c.u.c.k.e.d. Your duplicate might be in the mold of Tuxedo Catfish but wouldn't be The Tuxedo Catfish and therefore you and your clone are different individuals and you'd need different descriptors, different concepts, for each discrete entity. Tuxedo Catfish posted:If this applies to me at different ages -- when I was a radically different person than I am now -- then I see no sensible definition that would exclude virtually identical clones or copies. Time keeps all those different yous, if we want to think of them that way, conveniently separate. But just like above, if you were bumping into you from a few minutes ago all the time you'd need to refine your concept of self.
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Apr 11, 2016 16:42
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Tuxedo Catfish posted:It might be cool to be a persistent individual, but supposing you're right, how would I tell? It's the simplest complete explanation for your experiences, your sense of self, etc. You can maintain a healthy skepticism if you want but the hyperbolic doubt you're adopting doesn't get you anywhere; it just muddies the waters with seemingly less parsimonious alternative explanations. quote:Being a category offers a much more compelling explanation of how I subjectively experience my life, regardless of what I prefer. You're not a category. I am sorry. quote:If that's how you define genocide, genocide happens spontaneously all day every day. That's either super-depressing, or it reduces the term to meaninglessness, so I'm not going to define genocide that way, because I can control my definitions. I can't control or change how consciousness works -- much as I define my "self" as the category, and not the infinity of individual sparks of consciousness. Genocide is the (attempted) systematic eradication of a particular group of people. This definition isn't really up for debate. Explain how this "happens spontaneously all day every day."
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Apr 11, 2016 16:42
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Girl teleports, tells boyfriend "my clone has no personal history with you." Is this the future of Generation γ breakups?
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Apr 11, 2016 16:44
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Peta posted:It's the simplest complete explanation for your experiences, your sense of self, etc. It isn't, though. I just got through saying that. If I were the same individual, I would experience the same things, and I don't. I can draw on a physical record that seems to have been shaped by past experiences of someone very like me, and the simplest complete explanation for that is just that -- they're a record of experiences of someone very like me, albeit ever so slightly different. Peta posted:Genocide is the (attempted) systematic eradication of a particular group of people. This definition isn't really up for debate. If that's how you define genocide, then it doesn't happen spontaneously every day. But if that's how you define genocide, then putting everyone through a teleporter isn't genocide, because no one is eradicated. This is a silly follow-up question because it smuggles in the assumption that we already agree on who/what a person is, but the whole problem is that we don't. Tuxedo Catfish fucked around with this message at 16:48 on Apr 11, 2016 |
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Apr 11, 2016 16:45
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wateroverfire posted:I'd agree with Peta that this isn't an adequate description of the entity Tuxedo Catfish. It's sufficient most of the time because in the world we live in, there's only ever one Tuxedo Catfish running around and he is you. But in a world where there were clones or doubles your definition of Tuxedo Catfish would fail to identify an individual and you'd need to get more specific. It's probably best we don't recklessly make lots of duplicates, then, because it would suck to have to divvy up your rights over and over.
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Apr 11, 2016 16:51
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Tuxedo Catfish posted:It isn't, though. I just got through saying that. If I were the same individual, I would experience the same things, and I don't. I can draw on a physical record that seems to have been shaped by past experiences of someone very like me, and the simplest complete explanation for that is just that -- they're a record of experiences of someone very like me, albeit ever so slightly different. Why are you assuming that an individual can't persist through minuscule incremental changes? quote:If that's how you define genocide, then it doesn't happen spontaneously every day. But if that's how you define genocide, then putting everyone through a teleporter isn't genocide, because no one is eradicated. There is nothing wrong with forcing a million people against their will to step into a teleporter? quote:This is a silly follow-up question because it smuggles in the assumption that we already agree on who/what a person is, but the whole problem is that we don't. Zz. The Armenian Genocide killed off about 1.2 million Armenians. Your stance, presumably aside from complaints about the repugnant ways in which the killings were carried out, is that it wouldn't have mattered if only the Ottomans had generated identical copies of the 1.2 million Armenians. Peta fucked around with this message at 16:55 on Apr 11, 2016 |
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Apr 11, 2016 16:51
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Peta posted:Why are you assuming that an individual can't persist through minuscule incremental changes? I have no reason to assume they can. Peta posted:There is nothing wrong with forcing a million people against their will to step into a teleporter? Well, if they think the teleporter is going to kill them it's probably intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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Apr 11, 2016 16:53
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Tuxedo Catfish posted:Well, if they think the teleporter is going to kill them it's probably intentional infliction of emotional distress. Oh, good. I was hoping when I launched off on start of this tangent that it'd end with you saying the real problem with getting killed is that it's really loving stressful.
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Apr 11, 2016 16:57
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Tuxedo Catfish posted:I have no reason to assume they can. Wait, of course you do. You exist and have existed for years.
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Apr 11, 2016 16:58
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Peta posted:Zz. The Armenian Genocide killed off about 1.2 million Armenians. Your stance, presumably aside from complaints about the repugnant ways in which the killings were carried out, is that it wouldn't have mattered if only the Ottomans had generated identical copies of the 1.2 million Armenians. Trying to bludgeon me with "but you're okay with killing people!" when I keep saying "teleportation doesn't kill you in any meaningful sense" isn't an argument.
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Apr 11, 2016 16:58
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Peta posted:Oh, good. I was hoping when I launched off on start of this tangent that it'd end with you saying the real problem with getting killed is that it's really loving stressful. Everything that is morally wrong is morally wrong because it causes pain, stress, or other negative experiences. wateroverfire posted:Wait, of course you do. You exist and have existed for years. If you're saying that someone with the characteristics of Tuxedo Catfish has existed for years, then sure, that seems likely. If you're saying "the consciousness that presently animates you has been there all along" then that's an extraordinary claim and I would like you to convince me, because even as the subjective consciousness that's supposedly been around all that time, I don't experience that -- I only remember it. Tuxedo Catfish fucked around with this message at 17:02 on Apr 11, 2016 |
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Apr 11, 2016 16:59
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Tuxedo Catfish posted:Trying to bludgeon me with "but you're okay with killing people!" when I keep saying "teleportation doesn't kill you in any meaningful sense" isn't an argument. I'm not sure where you got the idea that you can dress up death, killing, etc., with conditions like "in any meaningful sense." Death is a biological phenomenon.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:01
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Peta posted:I'm not sure where you got the idea that you can dress up death, killing, etc., with conditions like "in any meaningful sense." Death is a biological phenomenon. To expand, I'm pretty sure when push comes to shove no one will try to say death sucks primarily because someone's consciousness/personality isn't around anymore. It sucks because that animal is "biologically" (this adjective is redundant) dead. We just immediately jump from animal to human being, pet, or other member of our moral sphere.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:06
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Peta posted:I'm not sure where you got the idea that you can dress up death, killing, etc., with conditions like "in any meaningful sense." Death is a biological phenomenon. You could create a definition of killing which includes things that are morally wrong and which also includes destructive teleportation, but if my definitions are correct, destructive teleportation isn't morally wrong. So that definition of killing wouldn't mean anything to me; I'd prefer the definition which only includes things that are morally wrong. Attacking my morals rather than attacking my definitions (which I am entirely willing to debate, and debating those definitions is the purpose of this thread!) is premature.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:09
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Attacking your morals is meant to highlight the poverty, as I see it, of your definitions. Of course I don't actually think morality should determine metaphysics.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:10
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Tuxedo Catfish posted:If you're saying that someone with the characteristics of Tuxedo Catfish has existed for years, then sure, that seems likely. Why is that the extroardinary claim?
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Apr 11, 2016 17:13
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Peta posted:To expand, I'm pretty sure when push comes to shove no one will try to say death sucks primarily because someone's consciousness/personality isn't around anymore. It sucks because that animal is "biologically" (this adjective is redundant) dead. We just immediately jump from animal to human being, pet, or other member of our moral sphere. Death sucks because the experience leading up to it is (usually) painful and bad, and because the experience of people who cared about the person who died is painful and bad, and because the world is deprived of any positive contributions they might have made (which is really just restarting the second reason in a more complete way.) If none of those factors apply, then either you're not describing death, or you're describing a death which has (at minimum) no moral weight. wateroverfire posted:Why is that the extroardinary claim? Because you're saying that I'm the same consciousness as another consciousness despite there being no overlap of our experience. I would be in the best position to know, and I don't even know that! Tuxedo Catfish fucked around with this message at 17:16 on Apr 11, 2016 |
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Apr 11, 2016 17:13
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wateroverfire posted:The line is irrelevant, is the thing. That's about the implementation of the teleporter and the point is not "can we find a teleporter scenario in which you would use this thing", the point is to jumpstart conversation about identity. The line has everything to do with the conversation of identity. Simply put, where does the person feel identity continues, or where it is broken.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:13
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wateroverfire posted:Why is that the extroardinary claim? What is the essential component of consciousness that exists from birth or whenever you think it emerges and remains unchanged throughout one's life?
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Apr 11, 2016 17:16
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Tuxedo Catfish posted:That I'm the same consciousness as another consciousness despite there being no overlap of our experience. That's the claim you're making when you say your clones are you, though.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:17
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Tuxedo Catfish posted:Death sucks because the experience leading up to it is (usually) painful and bad, and because the experience of everyone around the person who dies is painful and bad, and because the world is deprived of any positive contributions they might have made (which is really just restarting the second reason in a more complete way.) I think an unthinkably vast number of people would join me in disagreeing with you; the worst thing about death is that it's a termination of existence for the subject. I don't fear the ugly precursors nearly as much as I fear nothingness.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:18
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Brainiac Five posted:What is the essential component of consciousness that exists from birth or whenever you think it emerges and remains unchanged throughout one's life? It really doesn't matter?
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Apr 11, 2016 17:18
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