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Tuxedo Catfish posted:Because you're saying that I'm the same consciousness as another consciousness despite there being no overlap of our experience. I would be in the best position to know, and I don't even know that! I'm saying you're being a doofus and, though I can't stop you if you're set on living with existential doubt, you are not a seperate consciousness from you five minutes ago except in wordplay.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:20
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wateroverfire posted:It really doesn't matter? But then people are not the same consciousness through all of their lives.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:21
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Tuxedo Catfish posted:If it walks like a Tuxedo Catfish, and it talks like a Tuxedo Catfish, and it gets in abstract internet arguments about identity like a Tuxedo Catfish, it's a Tuxedo Catfish. So basically, any member of a class of bodies that sufficiently resemble each other to the extent that they can be recognized as me, are all me. So where does this stop? When are you no longer you? If we clone you and the clone goes off to live a vastly differently life than you over the course of 50 years are they still you or they their own distinct person? If they are still "you", do you also consider identical twins to be only one person?
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Apr 11, 2016 17:22
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Brainiac Five posted:But then people are not the same consciousness through all of their lives. Sure they are. Can you ask yourself "Am I the same consciousness?" throughout your life at various points? Sure - that means you're the same consciousness caught in some dumb existential doubt and you need to find some real problems to ground yourself.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:26
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Who What Now posted:So where does this stop? When are you no longer you? If we clone you and the clone goes off to live a vastly differently life than you over the course of 50 years are they still you or they their own distinct person? If they are still "you", do you also consider identical twins to be only one person? That's a great question that, as a society, we've never really had cause to consider. I define "person" in the admittedly bizarre way that I do because it seems like the only way to unite my understanding of consciousness with conventional notions of personhood. When in doubt, I would probably defer to people's self-identification. That even goes for the teleporter question, by the way, because there's no way for me to know for certain that my subjective experience, upon which I base my understanding of consciousness, is true for everyone. I wouldn't force anyone else through the teleporter because I can't be sure they don't work differently than I do (although it seems improbable.) wateroverfire posted:Sure they are. Again, the clone could do this, and would come to the same conclusion. But for the clone, according to you, the doubt wouldn't be dumb at all.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:29
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wateroverfire posted:Sure they are. Without something that is unchanging, the consciousness becomes different and eventually becomes a different person. For example, it is quite possible you'll stop being a smug dickhead at some point in the future. But if the only thing that matters is continuity of consciousness, and this is not interrupted by losing consciousness, then teleportation killing you is suddenly very sticky.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:29
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Peta posted:Consciousness shouldn't be the focus of the debate. Yet you feel numericality should be and have still made no attempt to defend it's relevance. Peta posted:Man. This is just not true. You're an individual, not a category. You're a dynamic conglomerate that is different in substantial if subtle ways from the dynamic conglomerate you were yesterday. Kit Walker posted:You sound like a fundamentally damaged person. A popular accusation from those who seem to have a terrible fear of stuff they feel matters but can't explain or demonstrate why when they encounter people who don't think it matters at all. Just to be clear, this reads like someone calling me insane when I suggest that no, they should not run back into the burning house to retrieve their troll doll collection. Clearly they have a value paradigm that puts lots of importance on some really stupid poo poo, but it's going a bit far to claim that "I" am the one that's mentally damaged in this scenario. Meanwhile, from what I can tell, if I put you in a situation where you could teleport out or stay where you were and have a 50% chance of getting burned to death (and a 100% chance of severe injury), you'd still choose to stay in the burning building because of how much you value "continuity". So try to take second to see it from my point of view, where you are someone who would literally choose death over losing something that is from my perspective completely worthless, on par with a troll doll collection, and you respond by calling me fundamentally damaged. I'm certainly not going to call you broken for having some pretty silly sentimental attachment to something, but you're not going to convince me to join you in the burning building to rescue those trolls with the sort of arguments you've made so far. Kit Walker posted:Except you did experience something. A permanent blackout. Your clone, on the other hand, has felt nothing other than perhaps a split second of disorientation. But your molecules have been ripped apart, which would certainly constitute death. That there is another you in your place does nothing to change that. You can not, by definition, experience a permanent blackout. Anyways, this thread has finally gotten far enough that I want to share a comic: It's not the best artwork, or even writing, but it's certainly relevant. I at least found it quite interesting when I first stumbled across it. The Machine GlyphGryph fucked around with this message at 17:32 on Apr 11, 2016 |
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Apr 11, 2016 17:29
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Who What Now posted:So where does this stop? When are you no longer you? If we clone you and the clone goes off to live a vastly differently life than you over the course of 50 years are they still you or they their own distinct person? If they are still "you", do you also consider identical twins to be only one person? The never stop being me (or him). They pretty much immediately stop being each other. We've tread this ground over and over again, it has been explained multiple times. What is it about this explanation that so fundamentally clashes with your understanding of the universe that you can't accept it as a valid way to see the situation, since you clearly can't?
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Apr 11, 2016 17:32
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Peta posted:To expand, I'm pretty sure when push comes to shove no one will try to say death sucks primarily because someone's consciousness/personality isn't around anymore. It sucks because that animal is "biologically" (this adjective is redundant) dead. We just immediately jump from animal to human being, pet, or other member of our moral sphere. I'll say death sucks primarily because the consciousness isn't around anymore.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:33
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GlyphGryph posted:
I clicked random and got this one, which is also relevant: http://existentialcomics.com/comic/64
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Apr 11, 2016 17:35
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GlyphGryph posted:The never stop being me (or him). They pretty much immediately stop being each other. We've tread this ground over and over again, it has been explained multiple times. And the explanations continue to be unsatisfactory. If the two instances are not one-another how can you then turn around and say that they are the same person? It's a direct and total contradiction that you need to resolve in order to have a claim of consistency. quote:What is it about this explanation that so fundamentally clashes with your understanding of the universe that you can't accept it as a valid way to see the situation, since you clearly can't? See the part about it being contradictory and inconsistent.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:35
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GlyphGryph posted:Yet you feel numericality should be and have still made no attempt to defend it's relevance. It's just another way of thinking about biological identity, i.e., the fact that you're a single unique organism. quote:You're a dynamic conglomerate that is different in substantial if subtle ways from the dynamic conglomerate you were yesterday. Whoa. Crazy!! 
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Apr 11, 2016 17:35
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So let's say I kidnap you, clone you with all your memories, and let the clone live your life. Meanwhile, I torture the original for a hundred years, then shoot it in the head, killing it.. I am hoping you would not agree with this. What if I only torture you for 50 years? For 10? For 1? For one hour? For a single second? What if I just walk into your house, shoot the original you in the face, drag away the original's cooling corpse, and let your clone live your life?
Piell fucked around with this message at 17:38 on Apr 11, 2016 |
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Apr 11, 2016 17:35
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Tuxedo Catfish posted:Again, the clone could do this, and would come to the same conclusion. But for the clone, according to you, the doubt wouldn't be dumb at all. The clone's consciousness would still be continuous and it would still be the same person in five minutes.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:37
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Piell posted:So let's say I kidnap you, clone you with all your memories, and let the clone live your life. Meanwhile, I torture the original for a hundred years, then shoot it in the head, killing it.. I am hoping you would not agree with this. What if I only torture you for 50 years? For 10? For 1? For one hour? For a single second? What if I just walk into your house, shoot the original you in the face, drag away the original's cooling corpse, and let your clone live your life? Duh he wouldn't be dead in any meaningful way so it's w/e 
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Apr 11, 2016 17:41
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Step one: get the most adorable puppy ever, say, an eight week old Step 2: housebreak it (4 more weeks) Step three: scan adorable three month old puppy into machine. Record scan. Step four: puppy reaches six months and is no longer fresh and puppy cute. Flash-Incinerate puppy Replace with scanned three month old puppy Technically not animal abuse because same puppy still there, also puppy never experienced pain
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Apr 11, 2016 17:41
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Brainiac Five posted:But if the only thing that matters is continuity of consciousness, and this is not interrupted by losing consciousness, then teleportation killing you is suddenly very sticky. You're not just losing consciousness. You're dying and a copy of you is being created somewhere else.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:43
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wateroverfire posted:You're not just losing consciousness. You're dying and a copy of you is being created somewhere else. Actually, I'm dying and being resurrected, because there's no difference in qualia between the two instances or any way for differences to emerge, unlike with the psychopathic hypotheticals.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:45
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Piell posted:So let's say I kidnap you, clone you with all your memories, and let the clone live your life. Meanwhile, I torture the original for a hundred years, then shoot it in the head, killing it.. I am hoping you would not agree with this. What if I only torture you for 50 years? For 10? For 1? For one hour? For a single second? What if I just walk into your house, shoot the original you in the face, drag away the original's cooling corpse, and let your clone live your life? I can say, definitively, I'd be morally okay with 10 seconds of clone torture of myself
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Apr 11, 2016 17:45
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Brainiac Five posted:Actually, I'm dying and being resurrected, because there's no difference in qualia between the two instances or any way for differences to emerge, unlike with the psychopathic hypotheticals. This is why so many scientists laugh at "philosophy."
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Apr 11, 2016 17:46
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Piell posted:So let's say I kidnap you, clone you with all your memories, and let the clone live your life. Meanwhile, I torture the original for a hundred years, then shoot it in the head, killing it.. I am hoping you would not agree with this. What if I only torture you for 50 years? For 10? For 1? For one hour? For a single second? What if I just walk into your house, shoot the original you in the face, and let your clone live your life? If you shoot me in the face, you're probably not going to be able to make a functional copy at that instant, what with the giant hole in my face and all. So the clone would have to have been made some time earlier, and probably before the clone even realized what you were up to. This isn't as bad as murder (permanently depriving the world of a person) but it's still pretty bad to erase a chunk of a person's memories without their permission. Plus, like, are you going to get the blood out of my carpet? If I piece together what happened, then even if I believe I'm still me, am I ever going to trust you again?
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Apr 11, 2016 17:46
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More seriously the question I want the answer to is who owns the copyright on the scan data.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:46
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Brainiac Five posted:Actually, I'm dying and being resurrected, because there's no difference in qualia between the two instances or any way for differences to emerge, unlike with the psychopathic hypotheticals. Except that the consciousness of one (you) has been permanently snuffed and a new consciousness (youPrime) has started up. Your clone is not you.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:47
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Peta posted:This is why so many scientists laugh at "philosophy." Pretty sure that's because we're smug assholes, dude.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:47
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wateroverfire posted:Except that the consciousness of one (you) has been permanently snuffed and a new consciousness (youPrime) has started up. Your clone is not you. Can't tell any differences between them, so this requires that someone who's been revived from heart failure or brain death legally be a different person.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:50
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wateroverfire posted:I'm saying you're being a doofus and, though I can't stop you if you're set on living with existential doubt, you are not a seperate consciousness from you five minutes ago except in wordplay. This position is so dumb and naive, I don't even know how to engage it. What is consciousness and how does it persist? You've recreated the immortal soul, given it a new name and are taking its existence as a given.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:50
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Control Volume posted:I can say, definitively, I'd be morally okay with 10 seconds of clone torture of myself Someone should cross post this to the "create a new genre of porn" gbs thread.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:50
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Brainiac Five posted:Can't tell any differences between them, so this requires that someone who's been revived from heart failure or brain death legally be a different person. Heart failure is just a slowdown in or termination of blood circulation. There are zero known survivors of brain death. ???
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Apr 11, 2016 17:59
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Who What Now posted:And the explanations continue to be unsatisfactory. If the two instances are not one-another how can you then turn around and say that they are the same person? It's a direct and total contradiction that you need to resolve in order to have a claim of consistency. Okay, so you've completely changed what I said. It's like you've got some sort of mental block that so immediately rejects my explanation that you can't even honestly consider it. Let me try to break it down for you. I am me, at this point in time. We'll call me "me zero". I am now me at a future point in time. We'll call me "me one". "me one" is still "me zero", right? That because they have a shared past, because "me one" picks up where "me zero" leaves off and is the result of "me zero"'s actions and experiences , "me one" is in fact the same person as "me zero", even though there are notable differences in experiences and memories between the two of them. Still with me? Now, we put "me one" in the duplicator, and then move a bit further into the future after the procedure completes. Then we'll have both individuals go stand against the wall. At this point, we have "me two a" and "me two b". "me two a" is the one you would see as the "original", and we would agree that because of his shared past with "me one", they are the same person, despite having differences in both memory and physical location, because those differences over time are dwarfed the the similarities created by their shared past. "me two b" is the one you would see as the duplicate, and is where we begin to diverge, but I'm not trying to change your mind here, only trying to discuss the difference in our views, so try to stay with me. "me two b" is still the same person as "me one" for the same reason "me two a" is - they have a shared past, as represented by their current state. The memories, scars, and every physical sign of past actions is mirrored equally on both of them - both "me two a" and "me two b" have "me one" as a fundamental component of their being. Both of them are (and by are, we really mean were) the same person as "me one" (and "me zero"). However, "me two a" is not "me two b" by the exact same argument. They have most of a shared past (and might thus be mostly the same person), but from the moment of cloning that history diverged. "me one" is an equal subordinate precursor of both current beings, but each being has a distinct past that is not shared by the other, making them individuals who are merely mostly the same. Much in the same way one zygote splitting to create identical twins creates two distinct people with a shared origin (they both came from the same zygote. You agree with that, right?), the duplicator results in two distinct people with the same origin, "me one". Do you get what I'm trying to say? quote:See the part about it being contradictory and inconsistent. What exactly is contradictory and inconsistent about that explanation? The Belgian posted:I clicked random and got this one, which is also relevant: This is great, thank you for that. I read a few others but didn't catch that one. Shbobdb posted:This position is so dumb and naive, I don't even know how to engage it. He's already stated his position on your disagreement in advance: Thinking this makes you dumb and you should kill yourself.
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Apr 11, 2016 17:59
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Peta posted:This is why so many scientists laugh at "philosophy." Why? It's a perfectly reasonable statement when it comes to regular teleportation
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Apr 11, 2016 18:02
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GlyphGryph posted:Okay, so you've completely changed what I said. It's like you've got some sort of mental block that so immediately rejects my explanation that you can't even honestly consider it. Let me try to break it down for you. Nope, that's just a different segment of the spatiotemporal extension of "me zero," or "me zero" at a different location in spacetime.
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Apr 11, 2016 18:02
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Peta posted:Nope, that's just a different segment of the spatiotemporal extension of "me zero," or "me zero" at a different location in spacetime. Yeah, and if we treat that spatiotemporal extension as a tree, it's the segment that happens before the tree splits into two numerically distinct branches. Also we only ever have a thin slice of the tree in existence at any one time. So consider those "me numbers" to be different slices if you want, the point is that "slice a" is still part of the same living line as "slice b".
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Apr 11, 2016 18:05
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GlyphGryph posted:Yeah, and if we treat that spatiotemporal extension as a tree, it's the segment that happens before the tree splits into two numerically distinct branches. Also we only ever have a thin slice of the tree in existence at any one time. So consider those "me numbers" to be different slices if you want, the point is that "slice a" is still part of the same living line as "slice b". OK but I'm not a tree, I'm a human.
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Apr 11, 2016 18:08
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Hieronymous Alloy posted:More seriously the question I want the answer to is who owns the copyright on the scan data. I think the law is pretty clear on this one, it's the person who made the scan. If that person gets duplicated both resulting people would retain full copyright.
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Apr 11, 2016 18:08
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GlyphGryph posted:Okay, so you've completely changed what I said. It's like you've got some sort of mental block that so immediately rejects my explanation that you can't even honestly consider it. Let me try to break it down for you. And you are arguing that it's fine to kill "me two a" because we still have a "me two b." That, in fact, if you were "me two a" you'd so no problem with getting killed. The other problem is that "me two a" and "me two b" DON'T have the same origin. One has existed for a long time and has not been changed through this process. The other was just created moments ago out of scattered matter and while it shares memories with the former, it does not share thoughts. Kit Walker fucked around with this message at 18:12 on Apr 11, 2016 |
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Apr 11, 2016 18:10
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Peta posted:OK but I'm not a tree, I'm a human. And trees don't actually grow through time either, it's a metaphor. Are you seriously going to try and argue that "me one" and "me zero" are identical despite the obvious differences? Because I'm not sure what your original point is now. Peta posted:Nope, that's just a different segment of the spatiotemporal extension of "me zero," or "me zero" at a different location in spacetime. So? I don't care if you call it a person or a "different segment of the spatiotemporal extension of a person's past", why is that relevant? Kit Walker posted:And you are arguing that it's fine to kill "me two a" because we still have a "me two b." That, in fact, if you were "me two a" you'd so no problem with getting killed. So, are you accepting that they are both "me one", which was the entire point of that digression, or is this just a desperate attempt to change the topic? Also, was my earlier assumption that you'd rather be trapped in a burning building with a 50% chance of death/100% chance of severe injury than use the teleporter correct? GlyphGryph fucked around with this message at 18:15 on Apr 11, 2016 |
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Apr 11, 2016 18:11
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One major problem with the hypothetical is that it presumes perfect transmission of data. This is not only unrealistic, but I suspect scientifically and perhaps even logically impossible, give entropy, Gödel, etc. So the odd results that ensue are because we're dealing with garbage in, garbage out. In practice the procedure would be lossy, and the question then is one of tolerance for degrees of loss.
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Apr 11, 2016 18:15
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GlyphGryph posted:And trees don't actually grow through time either, it's a metaphor. Great. The metaphor doesn't work because my four-dimensional existence isn't a matter of metaphor. The physical me that you'd see if we were standing face to face is the four-dimensional version of me. There isn't really any other version. When 4D me steps into the teleporter, 4D me gets nuked and a 4D copy of 4D me, i.e., a separate entity, begins to exist, in space and time, discretely from the freshly terminated original 4D me. quote:Are you seriously going to try and argue that "me one" and "me zero" are identical despite the obvious differences? Because I'm not sure what your original point is now. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/temporal-parts/ quote:So? I don't care if you call it a person or a "different segment of the spatiotemporal extension of a person's past", why is that relevant? http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/temporal-parts/
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Apr 11, 2016 18:16
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Hieronymous Alloy posted:One major problem with the hypothetical is that it presumes perfect transmission of data. This is not only unrealistic, but I suspect scientifically and perhaps even logically impossible, give entropy, Gödel, etc. I'd argue it doesn't matter all too much because the same is equally true of day to day transmission of consciousness. We don't have perfect memories, we don't carry forward all of our experiences, we lose bits and gain bits. I suspect most pro-teleporter people would think the same way. Ultimately what matters isn't tolerance for degree of loss, to me, but tolerance of kind of loss. Do we lose the bits that are actually important? An scratch on my hand wouldn't worry me identity-wise, but severe brain trauma certainly would.
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Apr 11, 2016 18:18
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This looks really cool (although I'm not sure it resolves anything so much as presents the opposition in more rigor and detail) -- in any case, thank you for sharing.
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Apr 11, 2016 18:19
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