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Control Volume posted:What if I shove you into a teleporter and keep your old self alive and give it wedgies all day, you loving nerd I sit on you because I'm a colossal fatass. Now who's the bully, shrimp? 
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Apr 11, 2016 21:23
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Why don't you teleport that fat over to mars, butterball *high fives all my buds*
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Apr 11, 2016 21:24
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Control Volume posted:Why don't you teleport that fat over to mars, butterball *high fives all my buds* You think that hurts my feelings? Pshaw! *bitterly fights back tears*
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Apr 11, 2016 21:27
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Who What Now posted:Ok, I'm going to go back on my own advice that I just gave and use an analogy I just thought up. Because the brain is functional when the ring is sentimental, decorative. If I zapped my dick off with a starlight dildo-saber during an ill-advised attempt to spice up my sex-life and Doctor Space Wizard said he could whip me up a new willy in no time, that was exactly the same dimensions, girth and power of my old one I would say yes and I wouldn't mourn the loss of the member that took my space-wife's virginity that magical night 101 years ago because I value my organ for its functional purpose not its sentimental purpose. Same with hear transplant ecetera. The brain is the most important functional thing you can ever have and being able to copy it would be very valuable.
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Apr 11, 2016 21:27
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Control Volume posted:Why don't you teleport that fat over to mars, butterball *high fives all my buds* Two moons is enough for Mars. crowoutofcontext posted:Because the brain is functional when the ring is sentimental, decorative. Your dick doesn't have a consciousness or thoughts and that's a pretty important difference. Kit Walker fucked around with this message at 21:31 on Apr 11, 2016 |
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Apr 11, 2016 21:28
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Kit Walker posted:Two moons is enough for Mars. jesus
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Apr 11, 2016 21:31
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Who What Now posted:You're free to ask me questions back, you know. I'm totally down with typing up endless bullshit navel-gazing, I have nothing better to do at work! I didn't say there was anything wrong with the way it was going, I am fine just trying to be understood. quote:You need to stop using inanimate objects for your analogies, dude. They are just so very awful at encompassing the subject matter in a meaningful manner. If you're going to take this stance, you need to actually explain why. What property do person's have that makes it so you can't remove part of them and still have most of them left. quote:Specifically this one, because you've already agreed that at some point losing a certain amount of what makes you "you" makes you not "you" any more. But that donut is still that donut up until the last bite because there is no emergent property that arrises from it like consciousness does from a brain. So do you want to defend your weird donut-stance or just leave physical objects behind completely? I can use better person-analogues for trying to tease out your point of view if you want, but it would probably be easier if you explained exactly what your actual problem is with partial similarity on a person level so I can address it directly. I think the anology served it's purpose, though, since it revealed we have different views about what makes a donut a donut, indicating we might have a more fundamental disagreement that goes well beyond the concept of what makes a person the same person. quote:"This is a fox" isn't wrong, no, but then going on and saying "and it's the same as all other foxes" would be. Just like saying "this is my clone" would be correct, but then saying "and he is also completely interchangeable with me in all ways" would be wrong. quote:Ok, which are most important to you? What's why? I don't really understand where you are trying to go with this, or how my responses could be relevant or what you mean here. I am afraid we've suffered a massive disconnect at some point. quote:I've always thought that they were Person 1 and Person 2 from the start. That's my point, that your clone is a wholly separate entity to you, an is not you. This goes back to the very beginning of the thread and my position that some people believe that if there is a copy made of your brain there is a 50/50 chance of you being either the copy of the original being wrong; there is a 0% chance of you being the copy because the copy isn't you, it's a new, wholly separate person that just so happens to share your memories and genetics. quote:The point of these questions is to determine when you can no longer say the original and the duplicate are the same person. Then, hopefully, to work our way back and show that the point where the became two separate individuals was the point of creation, and from that point on calling them both "you" is a mistake. I honestly think we might have to start over. quote:I'd like to point out that this is exactly the same scenario I pointed out to you earlier. So I'm glad we've gotten back to it. To answer, the person post-wipe is indeed a new person, yes. If their bodies original memories resurface, the cease to be the post-wipe person and become a new person entirely, one that happens to have memories of both. And I say that this is a distinct, new individual because I believe that this "amalgamation" would act in a way that is significantly different than either the two constituent parts. You think this is wrong, why? I've already explained this. We're definitely going to have to start over... This may take a few more days, I don't have enough time left in the day to go over this all again. Sorry. :/
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Apr 11, 2016 21:31
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I also have no idea why you think I'm redefining terms or how you're getting so confused by what I consider to be very simple and straightforward questions, so yeah, let's start over when you feel the time.
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Apr 11, 2016 21:42
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crowoutofcontext posted:Because the brain is functional when the ring is sentimental, decorative. Right, and why do you assume the new brain will behave exactly like the old brain, especially considering it is experiencing and reacting to different things are the original?
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Apr 11, 2016 21:47
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Kit Walker posted:Two moons is enough for Mars. It's still more like a brain than a wedding ring. I was just saying the brain is valuable precisely because what it allows us to do. Though I am being willfully dense, I DO see how people could actually be very sentimentally connected to the atoms that have made up their brain for the past little while. I Just don't think that translates to anything amounting to objective truth. Here is a question, if one was put inside the transporter, and learned of their mother's death as soon as the transporter was turned on, but only the reconstructed doppelganger gasped and teared up how would you describe the two actions? Telepathy? The information came through the original and the doppelganger reacted to it.
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Apr 11, 2016 21:49
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Actually I'm going to try to do a quick run through to summarize how we got here and see if I can't clear things up and redefine my terms and conditions from the get-go and make some tweaks to keep things more clear: I propose terms. "Person 0" is a person. "Person 1" is the same person but some time later in time, and is the one who decides to use the duplicator. "Person 2A" and "Person 2B" are the immediate results of post-duplication, and are identical in every way except for spatial coordinates. We'll introduce "Person 3A" and "Person 3B" to indicate a later version of these, some period of time down the road. You would consider Person 2B/3B to be the "duplicate" and person 2A/3A to be the "original", but I find the distinction largely irrelevant so long as the copy is accurate. I have argued Person 2A and Person 2B are both equally Person 1, because they have shared history and other dependent attributes like personality/memory/relationships are the same. At this point, I would argue that they are also each other, since the only attribute that differs is position, and I don't consider position to be a component of identity. I have argued Person 2A/3A and Person 2B/3B are both divergent from Person 1 in terms of having the pretty unique life experience of "having been through a duplicator". I would also argue they can both be said to have been and still be Person 1, because Person 1 was their "past self" despite that divergence, due to the shared history, which I think we agree is pretty important to determining whether or not someone is the same throughout time. Probably worth describing shared history for a moment though to make sure - I have been using shared history to describe the series of events and occurrences that has lead them to have the attributes (memory/personality/relationships) they have today. I'm starting to regret having used the term, because I think it has caused some confusion. I have argued that Person 3A and Person 3B have already begun to diverge. They are at this point probably more different from each other than they are from Person 1. They can still both be considered to have been and still be Person 1 by shared history and the fact that they are "Person 1 plus some" having not lost anything of Person 1 yet, but we could not rightly say Person 3A is Person 3B or vice versa, since they have at least a year's worth of history that is not shared, and a lot of their dependent attributes have probably changed based on different life experiences. We both agree their are certain aspects that can override that shared history (destroying a person's memory and personality can accomplish this) and sever identity. Whether it happens to person 3A or person 3B, we seem to agree that if we wipe out their memories and personalities, they can no longer be said to be the same person as Person 1. I would argue that if we wiped out 3A's memories and left 3B's intact, 3B would have more of a right to claim identity with Person 1 than 3A does, but on this we seem to disagree - you seem to claim that despite everything, 3A (memory wiped) and 3B (memory intact) both have no claim to be Person 1. Despite being different people, they still share many parts of what makes them a person - they still have the same parents and the same siblings. They still have many years of identical memories. They still probably have very similar personalities. Despite a year's divergence they are still mostly the same people. Personally, if I was one of them I would consider the other person to be "mostly me". I could see other people justifying a fall into "not me" territory earlier than that. You appear to have a real problem with someone being "mostly me", we can talk about that more if you want.
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Apr 11, 2016 22:00
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Who What Now posted:Right, and why do you assume the new brain will behave exactly like the old brain, especially considering it is experiencing and reacting to different things are the original? It wouldn't act exactly the same because it would be experiencing something new! I also admit if the machine malfunctioned and made a copy of me that was instantly destroyed, I would step out and have a very different reaction than if the machine worked and I stepped out as a reconstructed guy. But since the brain is in a constant state of flux literally any decision I make will raise the same questions.
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Apr 11, 2016 22:01
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crowoutofcontext posted:It's still more like a brain than a wedding ring. I was just saying the brain is valuable precisely because what it allows us to do. Your dick is definitely more like a ring than a brain. Other than the material they're made of, they're both just an arrangement of matter. Your dick has no thoughts, no will of its own.
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Apr 11, 2016 22:02
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Kit Walker posted:Your dick is definitely more like a ring than a brain. Other than the material they're made of, they're both just an arrangement of matter. Your dick has no thoughts, no will of its own. Are thoughts and will distinct from the arrangement of matter that is your brain?
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Apr 11, 2016 22:09
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Shbobdb posted:Are thoughts and will distinct from the arrangement of matter that is your brain? They're an emergent phenomenon I would say. Probably unique among such things for their ability to be self-conscious. Which is to say that unlike how a DVD can play a movie and a copy of that DVD can play that same movie, even if you have two identical brains having identical thoughts, they are only having their own thoughts and not each other's thoughts. If you snuff one out the other will not be aware of this and continue thinking, but you have now robbed the first of ever being able to think again. Truly, as soon as you have two identical brains it would be impossible for them to have the exact same thoughts unless they occupied the exact same position in time and space. Since they wouldn't, they would have distinct thoughts from the moment of creation. Kit Walker fucked around with this message at 22:19 on Apr 11, 2016 |
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Apr 11, 2016 22:15
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Kit Walker posted:Your dick is definitely more like a ring than a brain. Other than the material they're made of, they're both just an arrangement of matter. Your dick has no thoughts, no will of its own. Lol Ok I'll bite A severed dick is more like a ring. A dick is actually connected to the brain, its a sensory part of the brain like the eyes are a part of the brain. The visual part of the brain is useless without the eyes. Imagine a brain without any sensory input. Does it have consciousness? By the way the stomach has neurons in it and is also arguably a "brain structure." This is why if this exercise involved scooping my brain out and putting it in a brainless head I would be very against it and probably fervently arguing that it might actually end up causing a sort of individual death. Your brain would be getting a whole new chemical cocktail from all your new organs and your enteric neuron system that it could constitute a complete personality change. You might transform into somebody unrecognizable to your old self and your loved ones.
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Apr 11, 2016 22:27
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Kit Walker posted:They're an emergent phenomenon I would say. Probably unique among such things for their ability to be self-conscious. If I'm understanding you correctly, the physical brain gives rise to thoughts and thoughts give rise to self consciousness but self consciousness cannot be explained in terms of thoughts and thoughts cannot be explained by the physical brain. Is there something beyond self consciousness that cannot be explained in terms of consciousness? Why not, why does the chain stop there? Is there something before the physical brain? Why not, why start there?
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Apr 11, 2016 22:35
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crowoutofcontext posted:Lol Ok I'll bite The brain absolutely would still have consciousness without sensory input. You'd still have your memories, right? This is just a misdirection, though. None of this addresses the fact that being killed after being cloned wouldn't allow my perception of my consciousness to continue. Show me how I would somehow find my thoughts moving from my current body to the clone and I'll change my mind, but there's no such physical process that would allow that, especially given the terms of the thought experiment. All I've seen so far is people argue that it doesn't matter if you get killed because your perfect copy would run around in your place. It would certainly matter to me, who would be dead! Kit Walker fucked around with this message at 22:43 on Apr 11, 2016 |
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Apr 11, 2016 22:35
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In the real world, people go loving crazy incredibly quickly under sensory deprivation!
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Apr 11, 2016 22:37
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Shbobdb posted:If I'm understanding you correctly, the physical brain gives rise to thoughts and thoughts give rise to self consciousness but self consciousness cannot be explained in terms of thoughts and thoughts cannot be explained by the physical brain. Maybe. But we can't perceive it if there is more so we'll just have to run with what we do know. Shbobdb posted:In the real world, people go loving crazy incredibly quickly under sensory deprivation! Yes, but that doesn't mean they're not still conscious.
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Apr 11, 2016 22:41
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Would you send a clone of yourself to do an incredibly rad but incredibly fatal stunt for youtube views?
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Apr 11, 2016 22:47
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How many clones would you need before you become a unified hivemind uncaring of the death of an individual drone?
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Apr 11, 2016 22:49
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Control Volume posted:Would you send a clone of yourself to do an incredibly rad but incredibly fatal stunt for youtube views? Only if I can teleport him away right before he dies. Control Volume posted:How many clones would you need before you become a unified hivemind uncaring of the death of an individual drone? The real question is, how many cloned arms could I graft onto myself and wire into my neurological system before I can no longer support my own weight and would I be accepted as a Hindu god?
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Apr 11, 2016 22:56
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Kit Walker posted:The brain absolutely would still have consciousness without sensory input. You'd still have your memories, right? I was talking about a brain that never had sensory experiences, so didn't even have the impressions to convert into memories. You obviously conceptualize consciousness in a different manner than most of us debating you. If you fell into a brain dead coma, and in the meantime your entire brain basically went through a complete atomic cleaning, so it was made of new matter when you woke up you wouldn't say you died and were replaced with a copy. In the same way I would say that stepping into the teleporter would be exactly the same but hyper fast.
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Apr 11, 2016 23:02
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crowoutofcontext posted:I was talking about a brain that never had sensory experiences, so didn't even have the impressions to convert into memories. A brain that has never had sensory experiences is irrelevant to this discussion. Whether it has consciousness I'll leave to other philosophers and scientists to discuss. And brain death is irreversible. Unless you mean something like a vegitative state? The brain still functions unconsciously there. The continuity is unbroken.
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Apr 11, 2016 23:15
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Kit Walker posted:The brain absolutely would still have consciousness without sensory input. You'd still have your memories, right? "sensory input" is really vague here. Because the brain is made up of cells, and cells can sense change. If the brain is existing then it's sensing stuff. Not in the classic 5 senses kind of way, but still.
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Apr 11, 2016 23:22
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Kit Walker posted:Maybe. But we can't perceive it if there is more so we'll just have to run with what we do know. I'm fine with running with what we do know, but you seem to have some special knowledge when it comes to consciousness. Consciousness comes from thoughts which come from the brain but the physical brain only gives rise to self consciousness if the brain occupies a narrowly defined set of time and space. For all other sets of time and space that same brain, giving rise to the same thoughts would give rise to a different consciousness? That's a very Buddhist, nonlinear causality. In reality we do sometimes encounter nonlinear causality but it seems to be confined to the quantum level. Since I'm larger than a subatomic particle and traveling at a speed nowhere near c, I can pretty comfortably write off something ultra weird like that.
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Apr 11, 2016 23:41
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Shbobdb posted:I'm fine with running with what we do know, but you seem to have some special knowledge when it comes to consciousness. Consciousness comes from thoughts which come from the brain but the physical brain only gives rise to self consciousness if the brain occupies a narrowly defined set of time and space. For all other sets of time and space that same brain, giving rise to the same thoughts would give rise to a different consciousness? No, that's not what I'm saying at all. I guess maybe think of it in terms of telepathy? Or our lack thereof? If a clone of me is made and even if it's perfect and thinks exactly how I would given the same circumstances, I would not in actuality think or feel what it thinks and feels. My awareness doesn't transfer over to the new body. It still resides in the old one, which will be summarily executed. This is an unwelcome scenario.
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Apr 11, 2016 23:54
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You are reifying the self.
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Apr 12, 2016 00:06
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Kit Walker posted:My awareness doesn't transfer over to the new body. It still resides in the old one, which will be summarily executed. This is an unwelcome scenario. Your awareness, the very same awareness, EMERGES from the new body.
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Apr 12, 2016 00:15
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Shbobdb posted:You are reifying the self. Not really? The self is an emergent property of the totality of my body. But it is of THIS body. A perfect clone would have a self but it would be its own self. We would share nothing other than our physical makeup and memories. That's not enough to make him me. He would be himself. crowoutofcontext posted:Your awareness, the very same awareness, EMERGES from the new body. That's not my awareness, that's his awareness. I would not perceive any of it.
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Apr 12, 2016 00:18
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So in your framework the self is a quale?
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Apr 12, 2016 00:30
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Shbobdb posted:So in your framework the self is a quale? I don't know if that's the right concept. A quale is a property or an experience. Whereas the self is much more than that? Plus the aspect of continuity. I'm sure someone else could put it into better terms. All I can say is that ceasing to experience myself can't be compensated by someone else experiencing myself. Kit Walker fucked around with this message at 00:46 on Apr 12, 2016 |
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Apr 12, 2016 00:43
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Kit Walker posted:
Yes you would, because your personal awareness comes from your brain, and its your brain that has been transferred not some impostor brain.
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Apr 12, 2016 00:44
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crowoutofcontext posted:Yes you would, because your personal awareness comes from your brain, and its your brain that has been transferred not some impostor brain. Please explain the psychic phenomenon that will rocket my awareness to another body as soon as it is created. If we create a clone of me, I won't know what it thinks or feels, right? I won't have any perception of that. So my distinct consciousness will cease as soon as I'm obliterated. If my awareness could somehow travel to that other body uninterrupted, that would be a different story, but that's not the terms of this thought experiment. The brain hasn't been transferred, it has been cloned. Kit Walker fucked around with this message at 00:49 on Apr 12, 2016 |
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Apr 12, 2016 00:47
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Shbobdb posted:You are reifying the self. crowoutofcontext posted:Yes you would, because your personal awareness comes from your brain, and its your brain that has been transferred not some impostor brain. Just because two things are exactly the same in their properties, does not mean they are the same thing.
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Apr 12, 2016 01:19
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So here's the real problem: the televangelists are confusing state information (using the CS term here) with causal information. Every measurable property of a system can be reduced to its state at this time, that is true. Given two states related in time by an infinitesimal amount, it is still possible to say that one leads into another, that is related to but not solely dependent on the information stored in any one of those states. Any motion of an object, internally or externally, must necessarily involve a change in state, yet they can still be called the same object through that change in state. There's nothing recorded in either state to signify that, but the demand that there has to be, as the televangelists continue to claim, is to demand that any causal information must be recorded in state information, which is impossible.
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Apr 12, 2016 01:29
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I have no doubt that every idea in your post has been talked to death already in this thread at least two times.
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Apr 12, 2016 01:39
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I know what you're saying, but it's true of almost every post itt, e.g. - all the little thought experiments are functionally identical. I'm just deploying different language to try and communicate the point effectively, and seeing how it pans out.
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Apr 12, 2016 01:50
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rudatron posted:Are you suggesting that you are not real? The self is an illusion, yo.
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Apr 12, 2016 03:24
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