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Kit Walker
Jul 10, 2010
"The Man Who Cannot Deadlift"

I think the funny thing about Phineas Gage coming up in this discussion is that reports of his personality shift were greatly exaggerated and most of the major changes were temporary.

quote:

A report of Gage's physical and mental condition shortly before his death implies that his most serious mental changes were temporary, so that in later life he was far more functional, and socially far better adapted, than in the years immediately following his accident.

Like, you can shove a rod through a man's brain and if it doesn't kill him there's a chance the rest of his brain will compensate for it. But you can sure as poo poo bet that if you vaporize a man's brain he won't have anything left.

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Peta
Dec 26, 2011

Whoa ... it is almost I am a human animal, which is able to modify and repair itself in cool and dynamic ways, and not a weird special ~self~ that can survive the death of its animal vessel.

Control Volume
Dec 31, 2008

That may be true but the 17th version of Bob is still getting that promotion ahead of you.

SHISHKABOB
Nov 30, 2012

Fun Shoe

Peta posted:

(1) The body does not fully replace itself. As far as we can tell, neurogenesis occurs only in some parts of the brain. Connecting the ship of Theseus to human cell regeneration requires a repudiation of specific scientific knowledge. The whole argument is broken from the get-go. But supposing it's not ...

(2) The instantaneous replacement necessarily leaves a moment during which your entire body does not exist. The same is not true of gradual cell replacement. The two scenarios are not analogous.

(3) This isn't a problem for those of us who define ourselves as human animals. Animals are able to survive cell replacement. They are not able to survive instantaneous incineration in a teleportation chamber.

I took for granted earlier a statement by tuxedo catfish about "retention time" of about 5 years for the body.

Instantaneous does not mean a lack of existence at some point. That's the whole idea of the word instantaneous. One moment of present time it's they're, then it's over there. How can something be instantaneous? Well the motion of an object at rest takes it instantaneously to its next position.

Think about the parabolic trajectory of a projectile, specifically one that goes straight up. There is only an instant of time where the projectile is motionless.

Talking about instantaneous points in time doesn't seem very useful anymore. Especially given special relativity. Or black holes. When does the astronaut land on the black hole, from the perspective of a distant observer? The answer is that the astronaut will never finish their journey from that perspective. If we pretend that the astronaut could survive falling into a black hole, then it would take a finite amount of time to fall in. From the astronaut's perspective.

What's the meaning of an instantaneous moment of time here? What's the meaning of gradual? How do things even change in the first place? Why the gently caress do things even happen holy poo poo someone call the ambulance I'm having an existential crisis.

wateroverfire
Jul 3, 2010
I think the identity problem is a lot more interesting in its older form, which doesn't entail the messy complication of sorting out who a person is.

Various formulations of the paradox exist but I like the Grandfather's Axe the best for being simplest.


quote:

I have an axe handed down from my grandfather to my father to me. My father had to replace the haft and I replaced the head when I got it. Is it still my grandfather's axe?

Kit Walker
Jul 10, 2010
"The Man Who Cannot Deadlift"

wateroverfire posted:

I think the identity problem is a lot more interesting in its older form, which doesn't entail the messy complication of sorting out who a person is.

Various formulations of the paradox exist but I like the Grandfather's Axe the best for being simplest.

Yeah I legitimately think this is far more complicated of a question than the teleporter thing. In the case of the grandfather's axe and the Ship of Theseus the original object can still be crafted from the replaced parts, so you get into all sorts of questions of ownership and the essence of an object. It's significantly easier to view the validity of various sides there. The object itself also doesn't give a poo poo how many times you reconstitute it so that makes it easier to mess around with its properties.

Kit Walker fucked around with this message at 20:23 on Apr 12, 2016

SHISHKABOB
Nov 30, 2012

Fun Shoe

Peta posted:

I think people who say they would use the teleporter - but really people on both sides of this debate - should take a good look at Eric T. Olson's case for animalism ("An Argument for Animalism", "Précis of The Human Animal"). It maybe crystallizes the concerns of a lot of people who wouldn't want to use the teleporter but who deny a mind-body distinction and doubt the explanatory value of psychological continuity.

The basic premise is that humans are animals, i.e., one human is numerically identical with one animal.

The entailment is that identity over time has nothing to do with psychological continuity, qualia, consciousness, the self as some sort of a bare particular, the self as a bundle of traits, etc.

Instead, the persistence of my identity hinges on my persistence as an animal. I am a human. Therefore, I am an animal. Psychological continuity is neither necessary nor sufficient for animals to persist (survive): When a human is conceived, even when it's born, it lacks the properties of a person, and there's a decent chance that in the twilight of its life it won't have those properties either. A human can enter a vegetative state and emerge intact. Olson:
    "It also seems to follow from our being animals that we are only temporarily and contingently people. Or at least that is so if you have to have certain mental properties at a given time to count as a person at that time. If that's what it is to be a person, each human animal starts out as a nonperson and may end up as a nonperson." ("Précis of The Human Animal")
This is why it's perfectly coherent to say that (1) I am an animal/organism, (2) I am a person, and (3) persons are a category of animal.* I'm still baffled that the mutual compatibility of those claims needs to be explained at this level to some people in this thread, but there you have it.

* I said this badly. More precisely: Some animals are persons, or able to be persons, but being a person doesn't seem to depend on being an animal (think gods, angels, highly advanced AI).

Animalism seems like a very pragmatic answer, and works for me. But I'm not happy with it.

Llamadeus
Dec 20, 2005

Boogaleeboo posted:

It's more that some people view the assumptions and intuitions of others as deeply disturbing, like a spider had sex with a heap of poo poo and bile and gave birth to a monstrous opinion they now have to deal with. And we can say that, objectively, almost none of the examples talked about here are even physically possible. On the other hand, the assumptions and intuitions people apply to those hypotheticals are very real, and could apply to other aspects of their life. In which case: You are surprised that people have strong reactions to other people that define "life" differently from them?
I think a perfect atom-by-atom brain disassembler-reassembler is far enough removed from what is practically possible that it doesn't really have any bearing on ordinary morality, ethics, etc. The nature of thought experiment allows us to argue for things that are counterintuitive or disturbing without this having a direct bearing on day-to-day morality.

Control Volume
Dec 31, 2008

A life insurance policy exists wherein if you experience an unnatural death, your last recorded backup is reconstructed at the nearest government mandated cloning station. What is the highest price per month you would pay to be covered under such a policy?

Kit Walker
Jul 10, 2010
"The Man Who Cannot Deadlift"

Llamadeus posted:

I think a perfect atom-by-atom brain disassembler-reassembler is far enough removed from what is practically possible that it doesn't really have any bearing on ordinary morality, ethics, etc. The nature of thought experiment allows us to argue for things that are counterintuitive or disturbing without this having a direct bearing on day-to-day morality.

Until you start earnestly arguing that you'd be fine with your loved ones getting killed so long as they were replaced with their identical duplicates.

Control Volume posted:

A life insurance policy exists wherein if you experience an unnatural death, your last recorded backup is reconstructed at the nearest government mandated cloning station. What is the highest price per month you would pay to be covered under such a policy?

The real question is, would this be cheaper than installing safety features at my MegaMarsMiningCorp and how soon can we set this thing up? We've already had five guys fall into the furnace this week because we haven't bothered installing railings on the catwalk that passes over it and these lawsuits are killing us.

Kit Walker fucked around with this message at 20:58 on Apr 12, 2016

Zachack
Jun 1, 2000




Kit Walker posted:

Until you start earnestly arguing that you'd be fine with your loved ones getting killed so long as they were replaced with their identical duplicates.

Why wouldn't someone be ok with that? Or perhaps why shouldn't they?

Llamadeus
Dec 20, 2005

Kit Walker posted:

Until you start earnestly arguing that you'd be fine with your loved ones getting killed so long as they were replaced with their identical duplicates.
Unless you have a working person duplicator hidden away somewhere I think society will survive these thought-experiment-family-killers.

(Obviously from the point of view of the teleport-continuity people it isn't killing at all, nobody would die, and nobody would notice a difference - not even the person being duplicated.)

Llamadeus fucked around with this message at 21:08 on Apr 12, 2016

Kit Walker
Jul 10, 2010
"The Man Who Cannot Deadlift"

Zachack posted:

Why wouldn't someone be ok with that? Or perhaps why shouldn't they?

I never thought I'd be asked to explain to someone why their loved ones getting killed was a bad thing but here we are.

Llamadeus posted:

(Obviously from the point of view of the teleport-continuity people it isn't killing at all, nobody would die, and nobody would notice a difference - not even the person being duplicated.)

No one has been able to demonstrate how this would occur. I don't even mean "satisfactorily," no one has done it at all and that's what I keep asking about. The clone wouldn't notice, but the original would. Up until they stopped noticing anything at all.

Kit Walker fucked around with this message at 21:38 on Apr 12, 2016

Zachack
Jun 1, 2000




Kit Walker posted:

I never thought I'd be asked to explain to someone why their loved ones getting killed was a bad thing but here we are.

So explain it.

Kit Walker
Jul 10, 2010
"The Man Who Cannot Deadlift"

Zachack posted:

So explain it.

How about instead you explain to a loved one why they should be fine with it?

Llamadeus
Dec 20, 2005

Kit Walker posted:

I never thought I'd be asked to explain to someone why their loved ones getting killed was a bad thing but here we are.


No one has been able to demonstrate how this would occur. I don't even mean "satisfactorily," no one has done it at all and that's what I keep asking about. The clone wouldn't notice, but the original would. Up until they stopped noticing anything at all.
If it were instantaneous or done quickly enough, it wouldn't be noticeable at all. But anyway there have been a bunch of arguments put forward for why there would be a "continuity" of consciousness between clone and original because the clone has all the same memories, the same mental state, the same arrangement of brain stuff, etc etc. This point of view just posits that there isn't anything that sticks to the atoms of your brain that creates continuity, the other stuff is enough and is carried over by the duplicating machine.

Laphroaig
Feb 6, 2004

Drinking Smoke
Dinosaur Gum

wateroverfire posted:

I think the identity problem is a lot more interesting in its older form, which doesn't entail the messy complication of sorting out who a person is.

Various formulations of the paradox exist but I like the Grandfather's Axe the best for being simplest.

Especially relevant as modern science has proven that we are all just patterns, not inviolable entities. Basically we are four-dimensional objects; a set of highly complex wave functions.

For that matter, all objects are four dimensional. Thinking of things entirely in three dimensions won't grasp any sense of identity.

Kit Walker
Jul 10, 2010
"The Man Who Cannot Deadlift"

Llamadeus posted:

If it were instantaneous or done quickly enough, it wouldn't be noticeable at all. But anyway there have been a bunch of arguments put forward for why there would be a "continuity" of consciousness between clone and original because the clone has all the same memories, the same mental state, the same arrangement of brain stuff, etc etc. This point of view just posits that there isn't anything that sticks to the atoms of your brain that creates continuity, the other stuff is enough and is carried over by the duplicating machine.

If you made a clone of me, would I be able to feel what it feels?

Llamadeus
Dec 20, 2005

Kit Walker posted:

If you made a clone of me, would I be able to feel what it feels?
No but there's a chance you'd wake up as the clone. The clone-continuity perspective is just that if you instantly destroy the original you'd be the clone by default.

Kit Walker
Jul 10, 2010
"The Man Who Cannot Deadlift"

Llamadeus posted:

No but there's a chance you'd wake up as the clone. The clone-continuity perspective is just that if you instantly destroy the original you'd be the clone by default.

There is literally 0% chance I'd wake up as the clone. Where is this magic thinking coming from?

crowoutofcontext
Nov 12, 2006

Kit Walker posted:

I never thought I'd be asked to explain to someone why their loved ones getting killed was a bad thing but here we are.

No one has been able to demonstrate how this would occur. I don't even mean "satisfactorily," no one has done it at all and that's what I keep asking about. The clone wouldn't notice, but the original would. Up until they stopped noticing anything at all.


You agree with me that the clone receives all the old memories and the entire personality of the original, right? It doesn't seem like magical thinking or one-way telepathy to you that the clone has the complete contents of your head? All the old memories and the entire personality don't really constitute the true self? The old atoms and continuity matter? I think the process of personality transfer is the same, we disagree on the significance of the outcome. By asking me how the process works we arn't going to get anywhere because we already agree that the original's brain is perfectly replicated, I just identify with that replication as my self while you don't.

I also think that that believing a loved one that has teleported was not who they believed they were and telling them their memories are false and that you are mourning their original would be a bad thing, and ironically you would be traumatizing your actually still-alive and thinking loved one.

Control Volume
Dec 31, 2008

Is it morally acceptable to disown young children who go through a teleporter?

Llamadeus
Dec 20, 2005

Kit Walker posted:

There is literally 0% chance I'd wake up as the clone. Where is this magic thinking coming from?
I dunno, this point of view has been put forward a bunch of times from various people in this thread. The clone has same memories, the same brain, the same consciousness from a non-dualist point of view possibly(!!)

You don't have the accept this as literally true, just make some attempt at not dismissing it as an inconsistent hodgepodge of magic nonsense

Llamadeus fucked around with this message at 22:34 on Apr 12, 2016

Kit Walker
Jul 10, 2010
"The Man Who Cannot Deadlift"

crowoutofcontext posted:

You agree with me that the clone receives all the old memories and the entire personality of the original, right? It doesn't seem like magical thinking or one-way telepathy to you that the clone has the complete contents of your head? All the old memories and the entire personality don't really constitute the true self? The old atoms and continuity matter? I think the process of personality transfer is the same, we disagree on the significance of the outcome. By asking me how the process works we arn't going to get anywhere because we already agree that the original's brain is perfectly replicated, I just identify with that replication as my self while you don't.

I also think that that believing a loved one that has teleported was not who they believed they were and telling them their memories are false and that you are mourning their original would be a bad thing, and ironically you would be traumatizing your actually still-alive and thinking loved one.

It's not a transfer, it's a copy-paste.

Their memories would be real but they'd be a distinct person. If I found myself in that position I'd probably change my name and start a new life. If my original was dead I might try to fall into his patterns but I think there's a good chance I'd do it under slightly different terms. I'd think it would be pretty callous of my loved ones to just accept me as readily as though I was that same person.

Llamadeus posted:

I dunno, this point of view has been put forward a bunch of times from various people in this thread. The clone has same memories, the same brain, the same consciousness from a non-dualist point of view possibly(!!)

You don't have the accept this as literally true, just make some attempt at not dismissing it as an inconsistent hodgepodge of magic nonsense

My stance isn't dualist, you're just too stupid to understand nuance. Two identical things are not the same entity.

Kit Walker fucked around with this message at 22:40 on Apr 12, 2016

crowoutofcontext
Nov 12, 2006

Control Volume posted:

Is it morally acceptable to disown young children who go through a teleporter?

Only if the children are like Kit Walker and agree sincerely that their originals are dead and that they know u cdeep down all their memories of bonding and feelings of kinship are merely the stolen psychic blueprints of their counterpart;s corpses. But those would be pretty crazy kidz.

If prisoners go through the teleporter are they absolved from their crimes?

Llamadeus
Dec 20, 2005

Kit Walker posted:

My stance isn't dualist, you're just too stupid to understand nuance.
I don't know why you feel the need to insult my intelligence, I've barely posted in this thread and only reiterated what other people have posted without offering any counterarguments. I also didn't say anything about your stance in particular either! I think you may be too invested in this debate about a magic teleporter thought experiment....

crowoutofcontext
Nov 12, 2006

Llamadeus posted:

I don't know why you feel the need to insult my intelligence, I've barely posted in this thread and only reiterated what other people have posted without offering any counterarguments. I also didn't say anything about your stance in particular either! I think you may be too invested in this debate about a magic teleporter thought experiment....

Well he finds it morally repugnant and feels that people willing to assume that the authentic self could be replicated are comparable to either nihilists who want to die and also psychopaths who would have no problem watching their loved one die and be replaced with a hologram so it would probably be hard to have not touched nerves even if you knew you were walking on ice.

Speaking of nihilism, Kit Walker, I find it hard that you would start a new life if you woke up a doppleganger and believed yourself an impostor. I would find it utterly impossible because I'm far too attached to my family and friends. Would have a mental breakdown if I had to start a new life. I find that more nihilistic and emotionally unconnected than what I've been positing.

Kit Walker
Jul 10, 2010
"The Man Who Cannot Deadlift"

That's why I clarified that if the original were dead I'd probably try to get back into the place he occupied but it would be under different terms since I'm NOT the original. And if the original were still around I'd probably change my name and maybe something about my appearance to differentiate myself from him, kinda the same way identical twins will do things to assert their individuality. I mean it's not like I could just walk into his job along with him and start working, nor would I assume I could just hang out with his friends like I'm him. I'd probably talk little about the past beyond the day of creation, too.

JerryLee
Feb 4, 2005

THE RESERVED LIST! THE RESERVED LIST! I CANNOT SHUT UP ABOUT THE RESERVED LIST!

crowoutofcontext posted:

Speaking of nihilism, Kit Walker, I find it hard that you would start a new life if you woke up a doppleganger and believed yourself an impostor. I would find it utterly impossible because I'm far too attached to my family and friends. Would have a mental breakdown if I had to start a new life. I find that more nihilistic and emotionally unconnected than what I've been positing.

If you genuinely felt and believed you were an impostor, I can imagine you wanting to distance yourself from your family and friends. I'm sure it happens with certain mental illnesses, in the real world. The problem is with assuming that a post-teleport individual would genuinely believe and feel themselves to be an impostor. I haven't seen any evidence to contradict the idea that they'd simply perceive a smooth continuity of identity (or at least as smooth as any instance of conscious thought appearing to cease and then resuming where it left off, as in the oft-cited examples of sleep or anesthesia).

crowoutofcontext
Nov 12, 2006

Kit Walker posted:

That's why I clarified that if the original were dead I'd probably try to get back into the place he occupied but it would be under different terms since I'm NOT the original. And if the original were still around I'd probably change my name and maybe something about my appearance to differentiate myself from him, kinda the same way identical twins will do things to assert their individuality. I mean it's not like I could just walk into his job along with him and start working, nor would I assume I could just hang out with his friends like I'm him. I'd probably talk little about the past beyond the day of creation, too.

In my view the clone would have exactly the same rights to his past life as the original. Just as a cloned criminal would deserve as much jail-time as his original or a cloned hero be celebrated as much as his original.

Obviously that would cause huge, unsolvable legal and personal which is why this technology would be stupid IRL

Peta
Dec 26, 2011

Llamadeus posted:

I dunno, this point of view has been put forward a bunch of times from various people in this thread. The clone has same memories, the same brain, the same consciousness from a non-dualist point of view possibly(!!)

You don't have the accept this as literally true, just make some attempt at not dismissing it as an inconsistent hodgepodge of magic nonsense

From the perspective of someone who (1) self-identifies as human, (2) identifies all humans as animals, and therefore (3) self-identifies as an animal, "dismissing it as an inconsistent hodgepodge of magic nonsense" is the only sane response.

Kit Walker
Jul 10, 2010
"The Man Who Cannot Deadlift"

JerryLee posted:

If you genuinely felt and believed you were an impostor, I can imagine you wanting to distance yourself from your family and friends. I'm sure it happens with certain mental illnesses, in the real world. The problem is with assuming that a post-teleport individual would genuinely believe and feel themselves to be an impostor. I haven't seen any evidence to contradict the idea that they'd simply perceive a smooth continuity of identity (or at least as smooth as any instance of conscious thought appearing to cease and then resuming where it left off, as in the oft-cited examples of sleep or anesthesia).

This really depends on social conditioning. If the whole of society thought that there was no issue whatsoever, like the pro-teleporter group do, this would be totally correct. But as we can see there would be plenty of people who wouldn't feel that way and I can only imagine that at least some post-teleport copies will start having vague feelings of dissociation. I also guaran-loving-tee that the MegaCorps of that distant future will be pumping out tons of pro-teleporter propaganda and offering jobs at sites that would require teleporters to reach. Sites that they'll never visit in person, opting to count their money back at home.

Peta
Dec 26, 2011

SHISHKABOB posted:

Animalism seems like a very pragmatic answer, and works for me. But I'm not happy with it.

Not happy with the logic or with the implications?

JeffersonClay
Jun 17, 2003

by R. Guyovich

crowoutofcontext posted:

You agree with me that the clone receives all the old memories and the entire personality of the original, right? It doesn't seem like magical thinking or one-way telepathy to you that the clone has the complete contents of your head? All the old memories and the entire personality don't really constitute the true self? The old atoms and continuity matter? I think the process of personality transfer is the same, we disagree on the significance of the outcome. By asking me how the process works we arn't going to get anywhere because we already agree that the original's brain is perfectly replicated, I just identify with that replication as my self while you don't.

If you made a perfect clone and didn't destroy your current body, would you identify as being both the clone and your original self? Would your consciousness be aware of both perspectives simultaneously? Would then killing the clone or the original force your consciousness back into the unitary perspective we all experience currently? If you answer "no" to any of those questions it seems like teleporting would destroy whatever makes you you.

Control Volume
Dec 31, 2008

What if your sister was cloned, and they got in a fight to the death in front of you over their identity, but in the melee you weren't able to see who the victor was. Would you help the survivor dispose of the body?

Zachack
Jun 1, 2000




Kit Walker posted:

How about instead you explain to a loved one why they should be fine with it?

Why would I do that? How they feel about the teleporter is their decision, not mine. Presumably if they are ok with using a teleporter then conveniently I should experience no continuity break when they use it.

Zachack fucked around with this message at 00:34 on Apr 13, 2016

Zachack
Jun 1, 2000




Control Volume posted:

What if your sister was cloned, and they got in a fight to the death in front of you over their identity, but in the melee you weren't able to see who the victor was. Would you help the survivor dispose of the body?

My taxes are high enough, I don't need some maybe-clone clogging up the prison system.

SHISHKABOB
Nov 30, 2012

Fun Shoe

Peta posted:

Not happy with the logic or with the implications?

It doesn't answer my questions.

crowoutofcontext
Nov 12, 2006

JeffersonClay posted:

If you made a perfect clone and didn't destroy your current body, would you identify as being both the clone and your original self?
[/quote]

No, we would be two separate individuals who were once the exact same person.

JeffersonClay posted:

Would your consciousness be aware of both perspectives simultaneously?

No, but perhaps if I was told some horrible news literally right before I was duplicated which didn't "sink in", like say someone yelled that my pet cat died a milisecond before the clone button was pressed, maybe the first second me and my clone would both let out the exact same gasp as our identical brains reacted appropriately and have virtually synonymous thought. That would be strange but we wouldnt be aware of each others reaction. We would VERY quickly start differing as individuals with our own sets of new thoughts and new experiences.

JeffersonClay posted:

Would then killing the clone or the original force your consciousness back into the unitary perspective we all experience currently?

No, he would be a separate individual by then. It would be also killing someone who WAS actually me five minutes ago, very disturbing!

JeffersonClay posted:

If you answer "no" to any of those questions it seems like teleporting would destroy whatever makes you you.

What makes me me is my brain and its organization, which continues to exist exactly as it was in this thought experiment.

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quitequaintquotes
Jan 19, 2016

Your brain and its organization continually changes as time goes on, whether cloned or not. Something has to glue each iteration together over time if you want to claim a continual self exists at all -- otherwise toddler and teenage and adult you are each separate individuals who just happen to share a seed, in much the same way you claim clone you would become a separate individual if original you happened to survive

I really don't see how that kind of glue would jump over to a clone. Remember, you're not magically splitting -- it's being constructed at a place (and possibly time) completely removed from yours, from materials completely removed from yours. And if that's the case, if nothing transfers, death for original you is pretty loving final.

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