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Who What Now posted:Could you please, for once, answer the question I actually asked? You seem to like to change your own interpretation of the question rather than addressing my responses. In my opinion, I have answered your question satisfactorily. If you disagree, then you must have a problem with the content of my answer or how I answered it and you should address the problem you have rather than simply claiming that I have not answered it. I'm responding to facilitate an interesting philosophical discussion, not to try to satisfy sophistry.
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May 25, 2016 19:01
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twodot posted:You're presuming human wellbeing has an objective meaning. I mean you're right that human beings being the same species and having similar experiences often agree on what wellbeing means, but if you are using common definitions as authoritative you're back to here: I agree with your first point, but the second is a reply to my post which is in fact agreeing with your response to it. I think you replied to the wrong post.
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May 25, 2016 19:03
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twodot posted:You're presuming human wellbeing has an objective meaning. You're right, so let's not presume. Let's try to find out! Okay, since nobody's actually cited an account of moral realism that they think falls short, I'll go ahead and mention that Peter Railton's paper Moral Realism contains a meta-ethical framework that I'd be prepared to endorse and defend. Here's the general outline: First, he gives an account of non-moral (read: instrumental) good, where something is (non-morally) good for an individual just in case it satisfies an objective interest of that individual. An objective interest for an individual is whatever an ideally rational version of that individual would want the actual individual to want. From there, Railton builds moral value out of the observation that what is distinctive about moral rather than non-moral value is that it is impartial. Since we already have an account of what it is for something to be good for someone, all we need for impartial, moral value is to aggregate all those individual goods into what would be objectively good all-things-considered. If it's true that it is logically impossible for there to be objective moral values then there has to be a flaw in Railton's argument (though the converse doesn't hold; if there is a flaw in Railton's argument, nothing directly follows about the status of moral realism in general).
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May 25, 2016 19:04
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Zaradis posted:Agreed. But, again, this is a philosophical discussion, not a sociological one. Let's not pretend that many subjective moralities in agreement have any more logical ground from which to make their moral claims than a single subjective morality. Why would they not have logical ground? They can state their premises and their goal, and then reason from the premises to devise a method of action to achieve the goal. That is a perfectly functioning morality. twodot posted:You're presuming human wellbeing has an objective meaning. I mean you're right that human beings being the same species and having similar experiences often agree on what wellbeing means, but if you are using common definitions as authoritative you're back to here: I am presuming that with sufficient discourse a consensus can be reached whereby either a concurrent definition of human wellbeing can be shared between two or more parties, or that the differences between definitions can be sufficiently articulated as to permit the reduction of the concept to those elements which are shared, and methods of achieving the unshared elements can also be devised. Where two goals are absolutely contradictory, I dunno, have a big fight and go with whoever is left standing or something. Whatever.
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May 25, 2016 19:05
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Zaradis posted:I agree with your first point, but the second is a reply to my post which is in fact agreeing with your response to it. I think you replied to the wrong post. Zaradis posted:Therefore, if morality is subjectively imposed on the world, then to make moral claims necessitates that the person making the claim either actively deny, actively ignore, or be cognitively dissonant about the subjective origin of morality. Juffo-Wup posted:You're right, so let's not presume. Let's try to find out! OwlFancier posted:I am presuming that with sufficient discourse a consensus can be reached whereby either a concurrent definition of human wellbeing can be shared between two or more parties, or that the differences between definitions can be sufficiently articulated as to permit the reduction of the concept to those elements which are shared, and methods of achieving the unshared elements can also be devised.
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May 25, 2016 19:18
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OwlFancier posted:Why would they not have logical ground? They can state their premises and their goal, and then reason from the premises to devise a method of action to achieve the goal. That is a perfectly functioning morality. You are correct. I did not state my point well. They would have logical ground from which to make moral claims. They would not have logical ground from which to claim that others ought to also agree with those moral claims. There is an internal, subjective logic to subjective morality. But I see no good reason why that subjective morality ought to hold sway over those who disagree with it. No opinion is more right or wrong than any other.
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May 25, 2016 19:19
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twodot posted:Sorry, I think your argument is structurally sound, so I was just pointing out that you already addressed where they were going. I also disagree it's an illegitimate way to build a moral system, like here: I see. I don't think it's an illegitimate way to build a moral system, I'm just pointing out that it provides no good grounds for claiming that others ought to agree with your morality. I agree with your point on ignoring the subjective origin of morality. I live my life in essentially the same way. I appreciate that at least two of us here can admit it. 
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May 25, 2016 19:24
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twodot posted:What does a consensus mean? The existence of, for example, crime seems to suggest that at least some people can't reach a consensus. If you mean majority, then that's already been addressed. Crime does not suggest the inability to reach consensus but rather than debate is not the only recourse of humans. The existence of a judicial system suggests that crime is considered to be firstly a failing of communication rather than an irreconcilable difference of opinion. Zaradis posted:You are correct. I did not state my point well. They would have logical ground from which to make moral claims. They would not have logical ground from which to claim that others ought to also agree with those moral claims. There is an internal, subjective logic to subjective morality. But I see no good reason why that subjective morality ought to hold sway over those who disagree with it. No opinion is more right or wrong than any other. Again this is true assuming there are no shared premises or goals between the two subjective opinions. Which I think is rather unlikely. If you share premises and goals you are having what is essentially an internal debate, and I think that the number of things to which this would not apply with sufficient discussion is rather small.
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May 25, 2016 19:25
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twodot posted:I don't see how you define rational without introducing a moral system. The answer to this worry is on pages 176-177 of Railton's paper. To summarize, for an agent to be 'Ideally rational,' for the purposes of the argument, basically just means for that agent to have all relevant knowledge about the situation.
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May 25, 2016 19:27
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OwlFancier posted:Again this is true assuming there are no shared premises or goals between the two subjective opinions. Which I think is rather unlikely. If you share premises and goals you are having what is essentially an internal debate, and I think that the number of things to which this would not apply with sufficient discussion is rather small. Very well, but multiple subjective moral opinions in agreement does nothing to give the internal system to which they agree any grounds from which they may claim their moral opinions apply to those outside of their internal system. That is my entire point. If a community agrees that stealing is wrong then the claim that stealing is wrong is a moral claim that holds within that community. But the community has no good basis from which to morally condemn those outside of their community who believe that stealing is morally right. Additionally, that stealing is morally wrong holds only as long as no community member changes their moral opinion about stealing and no new members who believe that stealing is right join the community.
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May 25, 2016 19:38
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Zaradis posted:Very well, but multiple subjective moral opinions in agreement does nothing to give the internal system to which they agree any grounds from which they may claim their moral opinions apply to those outside of their internal system. That is my entire point. If a community agrees that stealing is wrong then the claim that stealing is wrong is a moral claim that holds within that community. But the community has no good basis from which to morally condemn those outside of their community who believe that stealing is morally right. Additionally, that stealing is morally wrong holds only as long as no community member changes their moral opinion about stealing and no new members who believe that stealing is right join the community. If you can find me a person who can set some premises, goals, and logic that stand up to dispute which prove that Stealing Is Right then I will quite happily become a kleptomaniac. Otherwise, I think I can probably find a flaw in at least one of those three.
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May 25, 2016 19:55
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Juffo-Wup posted:An aside: why think that systems can't justify themselves? Here's a proposition that is a (silly) definition of justification: 'S is justified in believing P just in case P does not entail a contradiction.' Since that proposition doesn't entail a contradiction,* I'm justified in believing it, according to the definition of justification just given. Self-reference isn't always vicious! In fact, it rarely is, which is why Russell's paradox was an important discovery rather than just some obvious thing. Can I get a bit meta and ask what we would accept as an ethics/morality that was "real" in the way the OP wanted? If one is a Platonist, like our OP, then one would consider all facts about all internally consistent systems to be eternally true, no? This presumably includes both a reasonable "perfect morality" and its exact opposite. What identifies one of these things as morals, but not all the others? The way I see it, there are two questions one can ask that are about morality in particular: 1. Is there a universal human morality, upon which any group of clever, sane people would eventually agree? (you could weaken this to "probably agree is almost right, at least most of the time") 2. Is human morality in some sense "universal"? This could mean several things, including "would (social?) aliens agree with us?" and "are the questions and/or answers of human morality in some sense non-arbitrary? Are they distinguished in some sense (mathematically?) from other superficially similar problems?". If the answer to question 1 is "no", I can't see question 2 mattering that much.
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May 25, 2016 20:06
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Dzhay posted:Sorry, I was being too imprecise. Any system could have "I'm right" as an assumption, but it can't always give you a reason to believe it. (Or, if it can, it can't always give you one for believing that and so on... ) Yes. To both. Or rather, probably yes. Or rather, as a matter of instrumental rationality, any proposition can be held come what may against any conceivable evidence as long as one is willing to revise one's background beliefs. I think that there is a meta-ethical framework that is internally consistent, not dependent on any single mind, which is sufficiently similar to our intuitive notions of morality as to be plausible, but sufficiently distinct so as to occasionally yield surprising conclusions. Edit: for specifics, I refer you to the Railton paper I linked and summarized a little ways upthread. Juffo-Wup fucked around with this message at 21:25 on May 25, 2016 |
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May 25, 2016 20:13
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Zaradis posted:You seem to like to change your own interpretation of the question rather than addressing my responses. In my opinion, I have answered your question satisfactorily. If you disagree, then you must have a problem with the content of my answer or how I answered it and you should address the problem you have rather than simply claiming that I have not answered it. I'm responding to facilitate an interesting philosophical discussion, not to try to satisfy sophistry. Let me reiterate the questions you didn't answer for you: Who What Now posted:Before I address this more in depth, are you also saying that morality's only purpose is to reward or to punish? And do you believe that only morality can be or should be the basis of rewarding or punishing actions? To which the only portion of your reply immediately relevant to these questions is: quote:The point of morality is to have some ground from which one can claim that themselves and others ought to commit or not commit certain types of actions and to determine which of those actions deserve praise and which deserve condemnation. Which, granted, does partially answer the first question, and I could assume that you meant that yes, morality's only purpose is to be a basis for reward or punishment, but I don't like making assumptions. It's dishonest and not conducive to a meaningful conversation and as such should always be done as little as possible. So I'll ask you to be more clear; do you believe that morality's only purpose is to be a basis for rewarding and punishing actions? You also ignored the question of whether there can be other bases for a system of rewarding or punishing actions entirely. Again, I could make assumptions, but I try not to in order to be consistent.
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May 25, 2016 20:56
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OwlFancier posted:If you can find me a person who can set some premises, goals, and logic that stand up to dispute which prove that Stealing Is Right then I will quite happily become a kleptomaniac. Certainly. Just like the logical flaws I've pointed out with subjective moral claims. That you don't recognize them does not mean the flaws don't exist. Granted, almost all individuals, generally, ignore the absurdity of holding others accountable for having the same moral opinions as they themselves do. Which is why morality works in a practical sense, but a subjective basis for morality is no more than an opinion and holding others morally accountable to your moral opinions does not hold up logically. Who What Now posted:do you believe that morality's only purpose is to be a basis for rewarding and punishing actions? No, I do not believe that morality's only purpose is to be a basis for rewarding and punishing actions. Per my quote that you just cited, "The point of morality is to have some ground from which one can claim that themselves and others ought to commit or not commit certain types of actions and to determine which of those actions deserve praise and which deserve condemnation." The purpose of morality is to provide a basis for or against certain types of actions, as well as rewarding and punishing those actions. This, to me, seems a very direct answer to your question. Regarding whether or not there can be other bases for a system of rewarding or punishing; if morality is subjective, which I believe that it is, then it is no different than opinion. On this definition then it would seem that there cannot be other bases for a system of rewarding or punishing. You will reward those actions that you believe deserve rewarding and punish those actions that you believe deserve punishment. Why you believe what you do about which actions deserve what response is morality.
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May 25, 2016 21:15
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Zaradis posted:Certainly. Just like the logical flaws I've pointed out with subjective moral claims. That you don't recognize them does not mean the flaws don't exist. Granted, almost all individuals, generally, ignore the absurdity of holding others accountable for having the same moral opinions as they themselves do. Which is why morality works in a practical sense, but a subjective basis for morality is no more than an opinion and holding others morally accountable to your moral opinions does not hold up logically. I can disagree with your moral opinions because the premises they are founded on don't make sense, the logic you apply to them does not follow, or because the goals you are trying for are counterproductive. I can illustrate that your morality is flawed by its own rules. Which is a perfectly valid form of criticism.
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May 25, 2016 21:20
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OwlFancier posted:I can disagree with your moral opinions because the premises they are founded on don't make sense, the logic you apply to them does not follow, or because the goals you are trying for are counterproductive. You cannot illustrate that another's morality is flawed by it's own rules if morality is subjectively imposed on the world. To do so would require appeal to a non-subjective moral standard by which to compare the flawed subjective morality. If a non-subjective morality does not exist then your only recourse is comparison to a different subjective morality, likely your own, which, once again, is simply your opinion against another person's opinion.
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May 25, 2016 21:36
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Zaradis posted:You cannot illustrate that another's morality is flawed by it's own rules if morality is subjectively imposed on the world. To do so would require appeal to a non-subjective moral standard by which to compare the flawed subjective morality. If a non-subjective morality does not exist then your only recourse is comparison to a different subjective morality, likely your own, which, once again, is simply your opinion against another person's opinion. How on earth can I not point out logical flaws in another's logically constructed morality? A morality derives its validity from its logical soundness, if it fails logical scrutiny it loses validity, it's just so much assertion at that point. I don't need an objective truth to compare it to, I can point out its inherent contradictions.
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May 25, 2016 21:39
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Zaradis posted:You cannot illustrate that another's morality is flawed by it's own rules if morality is subjectively imposed on the world. To do so would require appeal to a non-subjective moral standard by which to compare the flawed subjective morality. If a non-subjective morality does not exist then your only recourse is comparison to a different subjective morality, likely your own, which, once again, is simply your opinion against another person's opinion. This is obviously false. Imagine I concoct a system of simple associations, where if something is made of wood I call it a 'Flurg' and if something is taller than I am I call it a 'Beeble,' and further introduce a principle: 'no Flurg is a Beeble.' This is a semantic system that is subjectively imposed on the world, and all it would take for someone to show that it's flawed by its own rules would be to take a longish two-by-four and stand it on its end.
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May 25, 2016 21:45
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OwlFancier posted:How on earth can I not point out logical flaws in another's logically constructed morality? A morality derives its validity from its logical soundness, if it fails logical scrutiny it loses validity, it's just so much assertion at that point. Okay, you don't seem to be following the implications of your own argument. You're essentially saying that morality is subjective but logic is the non-subjective standard by which subjective morality can and should be judged. You make logic the objective standard by which to judge subjective morality and in the very next sentence you say that you don't need an objective standard to judge morality. You're essentially claiming that morality is subjective opinion and that opinions can be judged to be right and wrong by the objective standard of logic. Please explain how this could possibly work. Are subjective opinions about morality of some special type that non-moral subjective opinions are not? Because if this can't be shown then according to your argument we ought to be able to logically determine whether or not it is right to believe that chocolate tastes good. Juffo-Wup posted:This is obviously false. Imagine I concoct a system of simple associations, where if something is made of wood I call it a 'Flurg' and if something is taller than I am I call it a 'Beeble,' and further introduce a principle: 'no Flurg is a Beeble.' This is a semantic system that is subjectively imposed on the world, and all it would take for someone to show that it's flawed by its own rules would be to take a longish two-by-four and stand it on its end. Please see my response above. Also, I never claimed that logic cannot point out flaws in any sorts of systems, I claimed it cannot point out flaws in subjective moral systems without appealing to a non-subjective moral standard. If you disagree, please provide an example of a subjective moral system that can be shown to be morally wrong through the use of logic. Zaradis fucked around with this message at 21:59 on May 25, 2016 |
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May 25, 2016 21:52
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Because if your morality is simply "Always gently caress pheasants" "Never eat toast" and "Sheep are Satan's instruments" then that's not really a morality, it's barely a coherent sentence. I am charitably assuming that there is some sort of thought going on in any form of morality that a human would employ and that humans are not simply walking around adhering to arbitrary, immutable, preprogrammed rules like they're a three-laws compliant android. If a human employs reasoning to construct their morality, and they invariably do in some manner, then that reasoning can be subject to criticism by whatever standard that person appeals to as the basis for their morality. It is often quite possible to point out flaws in a person's reasoning by their own standards of reasoning and the goal of moral philosophy should be to eliminate flaws in your own. As it stands in practice, any moral system which is simple enough to be completely and intuitively consistent is insufficiently interesting for any human to actually employ, and any system employed by an actual human is too complicated to be completely, intuitively, consistent. Thus there is always room for debate.
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May 25, 2016 21:57
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Even more so, if someone's moral theory consisted of the principles 'never eat toast' and 'always eat toast' that'd probably be reasonable grounds for criticism.
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May 25, 2016 22:00
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Zaradis posted:Please see my response above. Also, I never claimed that logic cannot point out flaws in any sorts of systems, I claimed it cannot point out flaws in subjective moral systems without appealing to a non-subjective moral standard. If you disagree, please provide an example of a subjective moral system that can be shown to be morally wrong through the use of logic. Value-laden predicates aren't special, they're just further semantic units. So, if you think the problem with my counterexample was that it wasn't a system of normative associations, then in addition to the case of formal contradiction above, you can just replace 'Flurg' and 'Beeble' in the first counterexample with 'Good' and 'Not good' and it runs the same way. Edit: Wait, are you expecting me to show that a moral system might be 'morally wrong' in the same way that killing is 'morally wrong'? That's just a category error; the normative categories of rightness and wrongness don't apply to propositions. The only measure of a proposition's goodness is its truth value. A proposition can't be 'morally wrong' any more than a number can be true. Juffo-Wup fucked around with this message at 22:20 on May 25, 2016 |
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May 25, 2016 22:12
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OwlFancier posted:Because if your morality is simply "Always gently caress pheasants" "Never eat toast" and "Sheep are Satan's instruments" then that's not really a morality, it's barely a coherent sentence. No, it really is a morality, just not a very good one, at least by mine or your subjective moral standards. I think you recognize this. OwlFancier posted:I am charitably assuming that there is some sort of thought going on in any form of morality that a human would employ and that humans are not simply walking around adhering to arbitrary, immutable, preprogrammed rules like they're a three-laws compliant android. That you can criticize someone's reasoning regarding their opinions does not show that their opinion is wrong. Whether I came to the conclusion that I like the taste of chocolate logically or illogically is irrelevant to the fact that I like the taste of chocolate. If my reasoning about liking the taste of chocolate is flawed it is not going to mean that, once the flaw is discovered, I no longer like chocolate. There is a flaw in the way you continue to treat moral claims as if they are statements of fact and not opinion while holding to the notion that morality is subjectively imposed on the world. This is a contradiction. There is room for debate about morality because morality is subjectively imposed on the world. If it were some strict logical system that you've been proposing then there would be no room for debate. Logical truths are not things which are up for debate. A=A is not a logically debatable statement. Juffo-Wup posted:Value-laden predicates aren't special, they're just further semantic units. So, if you think the problem with my counterexample was that it wasn't a system of normative associations, then in addition to the case of formal contradiction above, you can just replace 'Flurg' and 'Beeble' in the first counterexample with 'Good' and 'Not good' and it runs the same way. Replacing the words in your previous example does not solve the problem. By doing so, you're still comparing moral statements to facts about the world. You're committing a naturalistic fallacy.
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May 25, 2016 22:18
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Zaradis posted:Replacing the words in your previous example does not solve the problem. By doing so, you're still comparing moral statements to facts about the world. You're committing a naturalistic fallacy. The naturalistic fallacy? Like, from G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica? The thing that Moore used to try to show that certain theories of values are wrong? That is the argument you are using to establish that it's impossible to be justified in saying of a theory of value that it is wrong? I'm having a hard time wrapping my head around that one.
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May 25, 2016 22:26
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I think you are talking past each other. Moral systems can contain contradictions. We can say that we don't prefer such systems, but that in itself is also just a preference that can't be logically or empirically backed up. (edit: Clearly we can use logic to demonstrate a contradiction, but since moral systems are subjective the presence of a contradiction isn't objectively bad)
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May 25, 2016 22:28
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twodot posted:I think you are talking past each other. Moral systems can contain contradictions. We can say that we don't prefer such systems, but that in itself is also just a preference that can't be logically or empirically backed up. A contradiction entails all propositions. Standard formal logic permits one to infer the negation of a proposition that entails a contradiction. Refuting a position by showing that it entails a contradiction is the definition of 'logically backed up.' Edit: I didn't think I'd have to cite this, of all things. Juffo-Wup fucked around with this message at 22:33 on May 25, 2016 |
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May 25, 2016 22:31
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Juffo-Wup posted:A contradiction entails all propositions. Standard formal logic permits one to infer the negation of a proposition that entails a contradiction. Refuting a position by showing that it entails a contradiction is the definition of 'logically backed up.'
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May 25, 2016 22:38
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Juffo-Wup posted:The naturalistic fallacy? Like, from G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica? The thing that Moore used to try to show that certain theories of values are wrong? That is the argument you are using to establish that it's impossible to be justified in saying of a theory of value that it is wrong? I'm having a hard time wrapping my head around that one. Sorry, I meant you're committing a reverse naturalistic fallacy. Instead of an is dictating what ought to be, your example wants to show that moral claims have truth value over and above the subjective truth of their internal system through the absurd use of an ought dictating what is. All your example does is show that morality does not dictate the facts of nature, which is a point of contention between no people I know of. But the idea that because a specific morality doesn't dictate the facts of nature is not a reason to claim that that morality is wrong. This is why your example fails. You have to show why a moral claim is morally wrong through the use of logic to produce the conclusion you want to produce.
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May 25, 2016 22:40
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twodot posted:I understand you don't like contradictions and why you don't, I'm saying you can't use logic to demonstrate to someone that does like contradictions they shouldn't like contradictions. That is not, in point of fact, what you said. You said that a reductio ad absurdum argument cannot be logically backed up. Which is nonsense.
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May 25, 2016 22:41
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Juffo-Wup posted:That is not, in point of fact, what you said. You said that a reductio ad absurdum argument cannot be logically backed up. Which is nonsense.
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May 25, 2016 22:43
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Juffo-Wup posted:A contradiction entails all propositions. Standard formal logic permits one to infer the negation of a proposition that entails a contradiction. Refuting a position by showing that it entails a contradiction is the definition of 'logically backed up.' Again, the logical strength or weakness of a path of reasoning that brings one to an opinion is wholly irrelevant to the fact that the person holds that opinion. You're claiming that if I didn't follow sound logic to come to the conclusion that I like the color purple then either I don't like the color purple or I am wrong to like the color purple. Both conclusions are absurd because the fact remains that I like the color purple regardless of any logical path taken to form this opinion.
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May 25, 2016 22:46
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I wasn't asking those questions to Juffo-wup in particular, if anyone else has a view on those they'd like to defend, I'd like to hear it. Zaradis: I'm guessing you'd say "no" to both?
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May 25, 2016 22:46
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Zaradis posted:Sorry, I meant you're committing a reverse naturalistic fallacy. Instead of an is dictating what ought to be, your example wants to show that moral claims have truth value over and above the subjective truth of their internal system through the absurd use of an ought dictating what is. All your example does is show that morality does not dictate the facts of nature, which is a point of contention between no people I know of. But the idea that because a specific morality doesn't dictate the facts of nature is not a reason to claim that that morality is wrong. This is why your example fails. You have to show why a moral claim is morally wrong through the use of logic to produce the conclusion you want to produce. Any claim about a matter of moral fact is a claim about a matter of fact. Any claim about a matter of fact is a question of truth. There is only one sort of truth, there is not a different sort of truth for every domain of knowledge. If I claim P, and P -> Q, and ~Q actually obtains, then P is false and I was wrong. This is true whether the predicates in question are value-laden or not. This is a fundamental property of human discourse. If you are not playing this game, then you are not playing a game with truth as its object. twodot posted:Well it's what I meant to say, and I think both my original post and my edit made that clear. Great, so what you're saying is that logical inference only has psychological motivational force if the person in question is inclined to accept logical inference. That's obvious, and not what is at issue. Nobody thinks that moral facts have magical powers to take control of peoples' wills and force them to do stuff. That is not the function of moral theory, and to criticise it on those grounds is nothing more than a category error. Edit: further, to the extent that you think this is a criticism of moral claims, it generalizes to any truth claim whatsoever. I can't force someone to accept the truth of the universal law of gravitation any more than I can force them to accept that killing is wrong. Of course, you can avoid this implication if you reject that logical inference is truth-preserving per se, but that's not very interesting. Juffo-Wup fucked around with this message at 22:50 on May 25, 2016 |
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May 25, 2016 22:47
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I mean if we're going to chuck logic out of the window then I will beat you up and that is how I demonstrate the superiority of my moral system.
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May 25, 2016 22:48
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Juffo-Wup posted:Any claim about a matter of moral fact is a claim about a matter of fact. Any claim about a matter of fact is a question of truth. There is only one sort of truth, there is not a different sort of truth for every domain of knowledge. If I claim P, and P -> Q, and ~Q actually obtains, then P is false and I was wrong. This is true whether the predicates in question are value-laden or not. This is a fundamental property of human discourse. If you are not playing this game, then you are not playing a game with truth as its object. You are correct only if moral claims are statements of fact. But we both agree that moral claims are subjective impositions on the world, which means they cannot be statements of fact. So your entire argument falls apart. If I say, "it is wrong to steal," what I am essentially saying is that I am of the opinion that it is wrong to steal or that I believe that it is wrong to steal. So your entire example does not apply to moral claims because they are not statements of fact.
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May 25, 2016 22:54
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Zaradis posted:You are correct only if moral claims are statements of fact. But we both agree that moral claims are subjective impositions on the world, which means they cannot be statements of fact. So your entire argument falls apart. If I say, "it is wrong to steal," what I am essentially saying is that I am of the opinion that it is wrong to steal or that I believe that it is wrong to steal. So your entire example does not apply to moral claims because they are not statements of fact. A.) No, I'm correct even if moral claims are merely intended as statements of fact. Which they often are. Sometimes by me. B.) No, I do not agree that moral claims are subjective impositions on the world. I still don't know what that means. I have specifically denied being an emotivist. I have explicitly endorsed moral realism. I have explicitly endorsed a particular argument for and account of moral realism.
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May 25, 2016 22:57
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Juffo-Wup posted:Edit: further, to the extent that you think this is a criticism of moral claims, it generalizes to any truth claim whatsoever. I can't force someone to accept the truth of the universal law of gravitation any more than I can force them to accept that killing is wrong. Of course, you can avoid this implication if you reject that logical inference is truth-preserving per se, but that's not very interesting.
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May 25, 2016 22:57
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OwlFancier posted:I mean if we're going to chuck logic out of the window then I will beat you up and that is how I demonstrate the superiority of my moral system. And if you decide that a subjective moral system is good when its adherents beats me up, and you succeed in beating me up, then your moral system is a good one by your subjective moral standards.
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May 25, 2016 22:58
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twodot posted:You can demonstrate gravitation by observation and logic, and leave it to people to believe or not believe you. I dispute this Edit: If it seems like I'm being glib, I'm sorry. But I've mentioned the Duhem-Quine underdetermination problem multiple times in this thread with varying degrees of explanation. And this distinction is undermined in the first like five pages of the Railton paper I linked. Juffo-Wup fucked around with this message at 23:03 on May 25, 2016 |
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May 25, 2016 22:59
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