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I'm devastated that we can't get Eff's opinion on the matter.
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Jun 16, 2017 16:37
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Time to sue the Butthole Surfers Actually I think there was a case where Clarence Thomas discussed this scenario last term. I think it was the Maine domestic assault case iirc.
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Jun 16, 2017 16:59
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Jealous Cow posted:^^^^^ ahh thanks. While no tears shed for this girl, I'd be a little worried about the potential criminalization of speech discussing or encouraging euthanasia
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Jun 16, 2017 17:08
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I'm pretty sure half the posts on SA are goons telling other goons to kill themselves
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Jun 16, 2017 17:15
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That's definitely a concern. I think the more immediate argument is that, while her conduct was callous, it wasn't a homicide in the normal sense. The victim was suicidal, and killed himself by his own hand. She didn't provide any material assistance. I'm unsure about the judge's conclusion that she somehow created a duty to act because she (repeatedly) told her boyfriend to kill himself. The closest analogue I can think of are dram shop laws, but in that case, the bar is still materially providing the alcohol. Dead Reckoning fucked around with this message at 17:19 on Jun 16, 2017 |
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Jun 16, 2017 17:15
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Dead Reckoning posted:I think the more immediate argument is that, while her conduct was callous, it wasn't a homicide in the normal sense. The victim was suicidal, and killed himself by his own hand. She didn't provide any material assistance. I'm unsure about the judge's conclusion that she somehow created a duty to act because she (repeatedly) told her boyfriend to kill himself. If you read the Massachusetts supreme court opinion linked earlier from her attempt to quash the indictment, the guy was getting out of his truck and abandoning the suicide attempt when she texted him to get back in the truck and finish the job. Absent her texts, which were specifically intended to result in this guy's death, he would not have died that day. esquilax posted:While no tears shed for this girl, I'd be a little worried about the potential criminalization of speech discussing or encouraging euthanasia Minnesota specifically dealt with that in a case cited in the Massachusetts opinion. Their conclusion was that speech "assisting" suicide could be criminalized but not speech "advising or encouraging" suicide. quote:Prohibiting only speech that assists suicide, combined with the statutory limitation that such enablement must be targeted at a specific individual, narrows the reach to only the most direct, causal links between speech and the suicide. We thus conclude that the proscription against "assist[ing]" another in taking the other's own life is narrowly drawn to serve the State's compelling interest in preserving human life. We therefore reject Melchert-Dinkel's argument that the statutory prohibition against assisting another in committing suicide facially violates the First Amendment.
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Jun 16, 2017 17:20
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Do courts typically distinguish between advocacy (e.g. hemlock society) and incitement (get back in that truck)? I imagine they would no matter how lovely an anti-RTD plaintiff would be.
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Jun 16, 2017 18:22
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FAUXTON posted:Do courts typically distinguish between advocacy (e.g. hemlock society) and incitement (get back in that truck)? I imagine they would no matter how lovely an anti-RTD plaintiff would be. Yes, absolutely they do. This is why it is fine for neonazis to say "black people should be killed" but they get arrested when they say "you, people in this audience I'm speaking to; go kill black people right now."
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Jun 16, 2017 20:24
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cis autodrag posted:Yes, absolutely they do. This is why it is fine for neonazis to say "black people should be killed" but they get arrested when they say "you, people in this audience I'm speaking to; go kill black people right now." There is another layer to this regarding suicide depending on the state that you are in...Minnesota apparently doesn't criminalize suicide, and so "incitement to suicide" isn't a thing.
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Jun 16, 2017 20:40
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The Wisconsin gerrymandering case will be heard next term: http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/gill-v-whitford/ The Court also announced they'll consider the question of if they even have jurisdiction over the case.
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Jun 19, 2017 15:22
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Here's to hoping Kennedy will finally find a standard he can sign off on for challenging gerrymandering.
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Jun 19, 2017 15:49
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evilweasel posted:The Wisconsin gerrymandering case will be heard next term: http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/gill-v-whitford/ This might be one of the most important cases in our lifetimes.
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Jun 19, 2017 15:52
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The Court is also going to decide if Public Sector Unions are a violation of the First Amendment next term, right?
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Jun 19, 2017 15:55
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Rygar201 posted:The Court is also going to decide if Public Sector Unions are a violation of the First Amendment next term, right? Yes, and decide they are. It deadlocked 4-4 when Scalia died.
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Jun 19, 2017 15:56
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evilweasel posted:Yes, and decide they are. It deadlocked 4-4 when Scalia died. Man, this loving country.
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Jun 19, 2017 16:00
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Court ruled in favor of the Slants/Redskins in the offensive trademark case
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Jun 19, 2017 16:02
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On a much less significant note, does the holding in Lee v Tam mean the Redskins are now protected from legal challenges? e: heh
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Jun 19, 2017 16:02
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 Opinions! PACKINGHAM v. NORTH CAROLINA Holding: The North Carolina statute [making it a felony for a registered sex offender “to access a commercial social networking Web site where the sex offender knows that the site permits minor children to become members or to create or maintain personal Web pages.”] impermissibly restricts lawful speech in violation of the First Amendment. Pp. 4–10. (a) A fundamental First Amendment principle is that all persons have access to places where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more. ... (b) This background informs the analysis of the statute at issue. Even assuming that the statute is content neutral and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny, the provision is not “ ‘“narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.” ’ ” McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U. S. ___, ___. ... Two assumptions are made in resolving this case. First, while the Court need not decide the statute’s precise scope, it is enough to assume that the law applies to commonplace social networking sites like Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter. Second, the Court assumes that the First Amendment permits a State to enact specific, narrowly-tailored laws that prohibit a sex offender from engaging in conduct that often presages a sexual crime, like contacting a minor or using a website to gather information about a minor. ... (c) The State has not met its burden to show that this sweeping law is necessary or legitimate to serve its purpose of keeping convicted sex offenders away from vulnerable victims. No case or holding of this Court has approved of a statute as broad in its reach. Lineup: Majority opinion by Kennedy, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Alito concurs in the judgment, joined by Roberts and Thomas. Gorsuch took no part. Notes From Other Opinions: The concurrence is concerned that the Court's opinion equates all of the Internet to public streets and parks. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1194_08l1.pdf ZIGLAR v. ABBASI et al. Holding: [The background here is that the plaintiffs were detained for 3-6 months in Brooklyn following 9/11. They were then removed from the US, and sued under the Bivens cause of action theory "alleging that petitioners detained them in harsh pretrial conditions for a punitive purpose, in violation of the Fifth Amendment; that petitioners did so because of their actual or apparent race, religion, or national origin, in violation of the Fifth Amendment; that the Wardens subjected them to punitive strip searches, in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments; and that the Wardens knowingly allowed the guards to abuse them, in violation of the Fifth Amendment." They have a similar claim under 42 USC 1985(3) for conspiracy to violate equal protection rights.] 1. The limited reach of the Bivens action informs the decision whether an implied damages remedy should be recognized here. [At this point you can tell the plaintiffs are losing.] Pp. 6–14. (a) In 42 U. S. C. §1983, Congress provided a specific damages remedy for plaintiffs whose constitutional rights were violated by state officials, but Congress provided no corresponding remedy for constitutional violations by agents of the Federal Government. In 1971, and against this background, this Court recognized in Bivens an implied damages action to compensate persons injured by federal officers who violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. ... (b) Bivens, Davis, and Carlson were decided at a time when the prevailing law assumed that a proper judicial function was to “provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective” a statute’s purpose. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 433. The Court has since adopted a far more cautious course, clarifying that, when deciding whether to recognize an implied cause of action, the “determinative” question is one of statutory intent. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 286. ... 2. Considering the relevant special factors here, a Bivens-type remedy should not be extended to the claims challenging the confinement conditions imposed on respondents pursuant to the formal policy adopted by the Executive Officials in the wake of the September 11 attacks... The detention policy claims do not include the guard-abuse claim against Warden Hasty. ... (a) The proper test for determining whether a claim arises in a new Bivens context is as follows. If the case is different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by this Court, then the context is new. ... (b) The special factors here indicate that Congress, not the courts, should decide whether a damages action should be allowed. ... 3. The Second Circuit also erred in allowing the prisoner abuse claim against Warden Hasty to go forward without conducting the required special factors analysis. Respondents’ prisoner abuse allegations against Warden Hasty state a plausible ground to find a constitutional violation should a Bivens remedy be implied. But the first question is whether the claim arises in a new Bivens context.... Given this Court’s expressed caution about extending the Bivens remedy, this context must be regarded as a new one. Pp. 23–26. 4. Petitioners are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to respondents’ claims under 42 U. S. C. §1985(3). Pp. 26–32. (a) Assuming that respondents’ allegations are true and well pleaded, the question is whether a reasonable officer in petitioners’ position would have known the alleged conduct was an unlawful conspiracy. ... (b) Here, reasonable officials in petitioners’ positions would not have known with sufficient certainty that §1985(3) prohibited their joint consultations and the resulting policies. There are two reasons. First, the conspiracy is alleged to have been among officers in the same Department of the Federal Government. And there is no clearly established law on the issue whether agents of the same executive department are distinct enough to “conspire” with one another within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. §1985(3). Second, open discussion among federal officers should be encouraged to help those officials reach consensus on department policies, so there is a reasonable argument that §1985(3) liability should not extend to cases like this one. Lineup: Majority opinion by Kennedy with respect to Parts I, II, III, IV-A, and V, joined by Roberts, Thomas and Alito, and with respect to Part IV-B, joined by Roberts and Alito. Concurrence by Thomas. Dissent by Breyer, joined by Ginsburg. Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch took no part. Notes From Other Opinions: The plaintiffs before us today seek damages for unconstitutional conditions of confinement. They alleged that federal officials slammed them against walls, shackled them, exposed them to nonstop lighting, lack of hygiene, and the like, all based upon invidious discrimination and without penological justification. See ante, at 4–5. In my view, these claims are well-pleaded, state violations of clearly established law, and fall within the scope of longstanding Bivens law. For those reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I shall discuss at some length what I believe is the most important point of disagreement. The Court, in my view, is wrong to hold that permitting a constitutional tort action here would “extend” Bivens, applying it in a new context. To the contrary, I fear that the Court’s holding would significantly shrink the existing Bivens contexts, diminishing the compensatory remedy constitutional tort law now offers to harmed individuals. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1358_6khn.pdf MCWILLIAMS v. DUNN, COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL. Holding: 1. Ake clearly established that when certain threshold criteria are met, the state must provide a defendant with access to a mental health expert who is sufficiently available to the defense and independent from the prosecution to effectively “conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.” 470 U. S., at 83. The Alabama courts’ determination that McWilliams received all the assistance to which Ake entitled him was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Pp. 11–16. (a) Three preliminary issues require resolution. First, the conditions that trigger Ake’s application are present. McWilliams is and was an “indigent defendant,” 470 U. S., at 70, and his “mental condition” was both “relevant to . . . the punishment he might suffer,” id., at 80, and “seriously in question,” id., at 70. Second, this Court rejects Alabama’s claim the State was relieved of its Ake obligations because McWilliams received brief assistance from a volunteer psychologist at the University of Alabama. Even if the episodic help of an outside volunteer could satisfy Ake, the State does not refer to any specific record facts that indicate that the volunteer psychologist was available to the defense at the judicial sentencing proceeding. Third, contrary to Alabama’s suggestion, the record indicates that McWilliams did not get all the mental health assistance that he requested. Rather, he asked for additional help at the judicial sentencing hearing, but was rebuffed. Pp. 11–13. (b) This Court does not have to decide whether Ake requires a State to provide an indigent defendant with a qualified mental health expert retained specifically for the defense team. That is because Alabama did not meet even Ake’s most basic requirements in this case. Lineup: Majority opinion by Breyer, joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan. Dissent by Alito, joined by Roberts, Thomas and Gorsuch. Notes From Other Opinions: We granted review in this case to decide a straightforward legal question on which the lower courts are divided: whether our decision in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68 (1985), clearly established that an indigent defendant whose mental health will be a significant factor at trial is entitled to the assistance of a psychiatric expert who is a member of the defense team instead of a neutral expert who is available to assist both the prosecution and the defense.1 The answer to that question is plain: Ake did not clearly establish that a defendant is entitled to an expert who is a member of the defense team. Indeed, “Ake appears to have been written so as to be deliberately ambiguous on this point, thus leaving the issue open for future consideration.” W. LaFave, Criminal Law §8.2(d), p. 449 (5th ed. 2010) (LaFave). Accordingly, the proper disposition of this case is to affirm the judgment below. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-5294_h3dj.pdf MATAL, INTERIM DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE v. TAM Holding: Simon Tam, lead singer of the rock group “The Slants,” chose this moniker in order to “reclaim” the term and drain its denigrating force as a derogatory term for Asian persons. Tam sought federal registration of the mark “THE SLANTS.” The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) denied the application under a Lanham Act provision prohibiting the registration of trademarks that may “disparage . . . or bring . . . into contemp[t] or disrepute” any “persons, living or dead.” 15 U. S. C. §1052(a). Tam contested the denial of registration through the administrative appeals process, to no avail. He then took the case to federal court, where the en banc Federal Circuit ultimately found the disparagement clause facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. Held: the judgment is affirmed. 1. The disparagement clause applies to marks that disparage the members of a racial or ethnic group... 2. The disparagement clause violates the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. Contrary to the Government’s contention, trademarks are private, not government speech... (a) The Government’s argument that this case is governed by the Court’s subsidized-speech cases is unpersuasive. Those cases all involved cash subsidies or their equivalent, e.g., funds to private parties for family planning services in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173, and cash grants to artists in National Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U. S. 569... (b) Also unpersuasive is the Government’s claim that the disparagement clause is constitutional under a “government-program” doctrine, an argument which is based on a merger of this Court’s government-speech cases and subsidy cases. It points to two cases involving a public employer’s collection of union dues from its employees, Davenport v. Washington Ed. Assn., 551 U. S. 177, and Ysursa v. Pocatello Ed. Assn., 555 U. S. 353, but these cases occupy a special area of First Amendment case law that is far removed from the registration of trademarks... (c) The dispute between the parties over whether trademarks are commercial speech subject to the relaxed scrutiny outlined in Central Hudson Gas & Elect. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, need not be resolved here because the disparagement clause cannot withstand even Central Hudson review. Under Central Hudson, a restriction of speech must serve “a substantial interest” and be “narrowly drawn.”... (a) With few narrow exceptions, a fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that the government may not punish or suppress speech based on disapproval of the ideas or perspectives the speech conveys... (b) Regardless of whether trademarks are commercial speech, the viewpoint based discrimination here necessarily invokes heightened scrutiny. Lineup: The lineup is hosed. Majority opinion by Alito, joined for Parts I and III-A by Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Thomas; joined for Part II by Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan; plurality opinion by Alito for Parts III-B [discussing subsidized speech programs], III-C [doctrine related to the collection of union dues by public employers], and IV [Central Hudson commercial speech conclusion], joined by Roberts, Thomas and Breyer. Kennedy concurred, joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan, which may control as to Parts III-B, III-C, and IV of Alito's opinion. Thomas concurred. Gorsuch took no part. Notes From Other Opinions: (Kennedy) The Court is correct in its judgment, and I join Parts I, II, and III–A of its opinion. This separate writing explains in greater detail why the First Amendment’s protectionsagainst viewpoint discrimination apply to the trademark here. It submits further that the viewpoint discrimination rationale renders unnecessary any extended treatment of other questions raised by the parties. [i.e., shut up about the public unions and commercial speech.] (Thomas) I join the opinion of JUSTICE ALITO, except for Part II. Respondent failed to present his statutory argument either to the Patent and Trademark Office or to the Court of Appeals, and we declined respondent’s invitation to grant certiorari on this question. Ante, at 9. I see no reason to address this legal question in the first instance... I also write separately because “I continue to believe that when the government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech in question may be characterized as ‘commercial.’” https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1293_1o13.pdf BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY, ET AL. Holding: A group of plaintiffs, most of whom are not California residents, sued Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (BMS) in California state court, alleging that the pharmaceutical company’s drug Plavix had damaged their health. BMS is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York, and it maintains substantial operations in both New York and New Jersey. Although it engages in business activities in California and sells Plavix there, BMS did not develop, create a marketing strategy for, manufacture, label, package, or work on the regulatory approval for Plavix in the State. And the nonresident plaintiffs did not allege that they obtained Plavix from a California source, that they were injured by Plavix in California, or that they were treated for their injuries in California... Held: California courts lack specific jurisdiction to entertain the nonresidents’ claims. Pp. 4–12. (a) The personal jurisdiction of state courts is “subject to review for compatibility with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”... (b) Settled principles of specific jurisdiction control this case. For a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a claim there must be an “affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State.” Goodyear, supra, at 919 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). When no such connection exists, specific jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the extent of a defendant’s unconnected activities in the State... (c) The nonresident plaintiffs’ reliance on Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U. S. 770, and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U. S. 797, is misplaced. Keeton concerned jurisdiction to determine the scope of a claim involving in-state injury and injury to residents of the State, not, as here, jurisdiction to entertain claims involving no in-state injury and no injury to residents of the forum State. And Shutts, which concerned the due process rights of plaintiffs, has no bearing on the question presented here... (d) BMS’s decision to contract with McKesson, a California company, to distribute Plavix nationally does not provide a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction. It is not alleged that BMS engaged in relevant acts together with McKesson in California or that BMS is derivatively liable for McKesson’s conduct in California. The bare fact that BMS contracted with a California distributor is not enough to establish personal jurisdiction in the State. Pp. 11–12. (e) The Court’s decision will not result in the parade of horribles that respondents conjure up. It does not prevent the California and out-of-state plaintiffs from joining together in a consolidated action in the States that have general jurisdiction over BMS. Alternatively, the nonresident plaintiffs could probably sue together in their respective home States. In addition, since this decision concerns the due process limits on the exercise of specific jurisdiction by a State, the question remains open whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court. Lineup: Majority opinion by Alito, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Sotomayor dissented. Notes From Other Opinions: The majority chides respondents for conjuring a “parade of horribles,” ante, at 12, but says nothing about how suits like those described here will survive its opinion in this case. The answer is simple: They will not. * * * It “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,’” International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 316, to permit plaintiffs to aggregate claims arising out of a single nationwide course of conduct in a single suit in a single State where some, but not all, were injured. But that is exactly what the Court holds today is barred by the Due Process Clause. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-466_1qm1.pdf CHARLOTTE JENKINS, WARDEN v. PERCY HUTTON Holding: Neither Hutton nor the Sixth Circuit has “show[n] by clear and convincing evidence that”—if properly instructed—“no reasonable juror would have” concluded that the aggravating circumstances in Hutton’s case outweigh the mitigating circumstances. Sawyer, 505 U. S., at 336. In fact, the trial court, Ohio Court of Appeals, and Ohio Supreme Court each independently weighed those factors and concluded that the death penalty was justified. On the facts of this case, the Sixth Circuit was wrong to hold that it could review Hutton’s claim under the miscarriage of justice exception to procedural default [of a habeas claim, essentially a federal claim that the states unconstitutionally conducted your trial. These are very tough cases to win as a defendant.]. Lineup: Per Curiam. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-1116_i4dk.pdf ulmont fucked around with this message at 16:08 on Jun 19, 2017 |
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Jun 19, 2017 16:04
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evilweasel posted:Yes, and decide they are. It deadlocked 4-4 when Scalia died. And Alito brought it up again in the Tam case, joined by Roberts, Thomas and Breyer, so the odds are not real great. haveblue posted:On a much less significant note, does the holding in Lee v Tam mean the Redskins are now protected from legal challenges? Yeah - file your "ALL JUDGES ARE BASTARDS" applications now. ulmont fucked around with this message at 16:07 on Jun 19, 2017 |
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Jun 19, 2017 16:05
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ulmont posted:And Alito brought it up again in the Tam case, joined by Roberts, Thomas and Breyer, so the odds are not real great. What do public unions have to do with the PTO 
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Jun 19, 2017 16:11
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Nissin Cup Nudist posted:What do public unions have to do with the PTO it's another argument that government subsidies make government speech (edit for clarity) Justice Alito posted:Finally, the Government urges us to sustain the disparagement Deceptive Thinker fucked around with this message at 16:22 on Jun 19, 2017 |
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Jun 19, 2017 16:19
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Learned about the Tam case from the episode of Opening Arguments that he was on: http://openargs.com/oa33-interview-slants/
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Jun 19, 2017 16:22
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That plavix one, not sure how to feel about that one. On one hand, this type of jurisdiction question always gets used as a cudgel to shield corporations from liability, but then you start reading deeper into it and the crux of it was that the distribution company was in California, but that was basically the substantive extent of involvement with that state jurisdiction. Good precedent, but I'm assuming the case got moved to California by the defense in order to argue the lack of standing, and that's bad for consumers because joe mclipoprotein can't just mercurially manifest as a corporation wherever is most legally convenient and if he did they'd just argue that JMcL LLC wasn't harmed, just it's principal.
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Jun 19, 2017 16:22
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evilweasel posted:Yes, and decide they are. It deadlocked 4-4 when Scalia died. Assuming another conservative doesn't unexpectedly die in his sleep in a hunting lodge, public sector unions are doomed.
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Jun 19, 2017 16:39
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Rigel posted:Assuming another conservative doesn't unexpectedly die in his sleep in a hunting lodge, public sector unions are doomed. Then they would be rapidly replaced with another Federalist Society nut.
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Jun 19, 2017 16:40
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Can someone clarify ZIGLAR v. ABBASI ? If I'm reading this right, they were held without charges and tortured, and the supreme court has ruled that they can't seek damages or compensation?
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Jun 19, 2017 18:08
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tekz posted:Can someone clarify ZIGLAR v. ABBASI ? If I'm reading this right, they were held without charges and tortured, and the supreme court has ruled that they can't seek damages or compensation? That is correct. There is no federal statute that generally authorizes a lawsuit against a federal agent for a violation of the constitution. quote:Indeed, in the 100 years leading up to Bivens, Congress did not provide a specific damages remedy for plaintiffs whose constitutional rights were violated by agents of the Federal Government. The Supreme Court implied a cause of action like that in the Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, and has been backing away from that ever since. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bivens_v._Six_Unknown_Named_Agents quote:In 1971, and against this background, this Court decided Bivens. The Court held that, even absent statutory authorization, it would enforce a damages remedy to compensate persons injured by federal officers who violated the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures.
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Jun 19, 2017 18:22
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So whats the scoring on Ziglar? I have it as a 4-4 push
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Jun 19, 2017 18:55
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Dead Reckoning posted:That's definitely a concern. I don't think it's complicated at all. Didn't she claim she was on the phone as he died? Hearing him go silent for 20 minutes in his car? That isn't really unambiguous. The duty to act was because she knew he was actively in the process of killing himself.
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Jun 19, 2017 19:06
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Spoke Lee posted:I don't think it's complicated at all. Didn't she claim she was on the phone as he died? Hearing him go silent for 20 minutes in his car? That isn't really unambiguous. The duty to act was because she knew he was actively in the process of killing himself. Why would I have a duty to act just because I know someone is committing suicide? Where does that duty come from, legally? Massachusetts law creates a duty to report, but not a duty to act AIUI, and seems to require that the person be at the scene of a crime: https://blog.mass.gov/masslawlib/misc/good-samaritan-laws/ I don't think it's going to turn on a duty that comes from mere (remote) observation of his (likely) suicide.
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Jun 19, 2017 19:22
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Subjunctive posted:Why would I have a duty to act just because I know someone is committing suicide? Where does that duty come from, legally? She didn't do that either.
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Jun 19, 2017 19:30
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Nissin Cup Nudist posted:So whats the scoring on Ziglar? I have it as a 4-4 push 4-2 loss. Sotomayor and Kagan were recused. quote:KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, IV–A, and V, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part IV–B, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and ALITO, J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined. SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.
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Jun 19, 2017 19:54
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Subjunctive posted:I don't think it's going to turn on a duty that comes from mere (remote) observation of his (likely) suicide. It turns on the fact that the dead guy was getting out of the vehicle, aborting the suicide attempt, and only the fact that she texted him and told him to get back in the vehicle and finish the job caused him to finish the job.
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Jun 19, 2017 19:56
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ulmont posted:MATAL, INTERIM DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE v. TAM I wrote a summary of this one in the NFL thread, let me know if I got anything wrong.
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Jun 19, 2017 21:14
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Anyone think Kennedy will side with the liberals on this WI gerrymandering case? The vote on staying the lower court ruling was 5-4 with Kennedy voting to stay. I assume that's not a great sign.
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Jun 19, 2017 21:21
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FlamingLiberal posted:Anyone think Kennedy will side with the liberals on this WI gerrymandering case? The vote on staying the lower court ruling was 5-4 with Kennedy voting to stay. I assume that's not a great sign. This new case is a direct result of a group of mathematicians responding to his reason for his decision last time (the lack of a clear and simple bright-line test for degree of partisanship in a given gerrymander).
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Jun 19, 2017 21:26
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FlamingLiberal posted:Anyone think Kennedy will side with the liberals on this WI gerrymandering case? The vote on staying the lower court ruling was 5-4 with Kennedy voting to stay. I assume that's not a great sign. Not the best sign, no. But my read is that refusing to grant a stay commits you far more than granting one: had he refused to grant the stay it'd be nearly certain he would uphold the lower court. Granting the stay isn't nearly as definitive.
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Jun 19, 2017 21:32
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FlamingLiberal posted:Anyone think Kennedy will side with the liberals on this WI gerrymandering case? The vote on staying the lower court ruling was 5-4 with Kennedy voting to stay. I assume that's not a great sign. Their stolen seat is going to be working for them for the rest of our lifetimes.
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Jun 19, 2017 21:40
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rjmccall posted:I wrote a summary of this one in the NFL thread, let me know if I got anything wrong. Looked pretty good. I could quibble slightly, but only in ways that don't matter in the NFL context at all.
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Jun 19, 2017 22:06
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| # ? May 9, 2024 14:14 |
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ulmont posted:Looked pretty good. I could quibble slightly, but only in ways that don't matter in the NFL context at all. Quibble away! I'm always interested in technicalities.
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Jun 19, 2017 22:19
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