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Rigel posted:I quickly read through the travel ban injunction decision, and its actually a very reasonable compromise. If it would have been denied completely, that would have been a bad sign for Trump, and if the injunction would have been lifted completely, that would have been a good sign for Trump. What they actually did does not tip their hand at all, and is a reasonable approach if the court is actually undecided. They really shouldn't be undecided. They shouldn't have taken the case. There wasn't a circuit split.
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Jun 26, 2017 16:48
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OddObserver posted:What bothers me about this section is that I am not sure of it's effect on Permanent Residents, who might not be here based on a relation with a US citizen relative or US organization employmenyt. If you are a permanent resident you'll have bona fide relationships with the US, either as a renter or home owner.
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Jun 26, 2017 16:48
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Is today the last day of the term? When are retirements usually announced? i.e. when will it be safe to unclench my butthole over Kennedy?
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Jun 26, 2017 16:48
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OddObserver posted:What bothers me about this section is that I am not sure of it's effect on Permanent Residents, who might not be here based on a relation with a US citizen relative or US organization employmenyt. Green Card holders are not at issue, at all. The 2nd EO Trump signed basically went "woops, sorry, never mind about those people".
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Jun 26, 2017 16:49
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Hieronymous Alloy posted:They really shouldn't be undecided. They shouldn't have taken the case. There wasn't a circuit split. I do not agree, this isn't some arcane application of patent law. What the courts did was a powerful and extraordinary check on the executive, and the SCOTUS should hear the case even if there is no split.
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Jun 26, 2017 16:51
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Hieronymous Alloy posted:They really shouldn't be undecided. They shouldn't have taken the case. There wasn't a circuit split. They take lots of cases where there's no circuit split when the lower court was clearly behaving lawlessly. Especially when the 9th or 6th circuits are involved.
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Jun 26, 2017 16:53
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So no one on the court wanted to keep the injunction as-is or did they just not release a dissent the way the three conservatives did?
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Jun 26, 2017 17:00
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So does this start the 90 day clock ticking before the ban ends?
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Jun 26, 2017 17:03
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AKA Pseudonym posted:So no one on the court wanted to keep the injunction as-is or did they just not release a dissent the way the three conservatives did? Correct, there were 6 votes in favor of allowing the travel ban on a limited basis. (only people who have no bona-fide relationship with the US)
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Jun 26, 2017 17:11
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esquilax posted:So does this start the 90 day clock ticking before the ban ends? The court added that question to be briefed and argued. Trump signed a memo extending the effective date before the 90 days can begin to be when the injunction is fully lifted, so he's gonna argue that the 90 days hasn't started yet.
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Jun 26, 2017 17:13
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Number Ten Cocks posted:They take lots of cases where there's no circuit split when the lower court was clearly behaving lawlessly. Especially when the 9th or 6th circuits are involved. Do you think the lower courts were clearly behaving lawlessly here?
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Jun 26, 2017 17:17
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Hieronymous Alloy posted:Do you think the lower courts were clearly behaving lawlessly here? I think nine Supreme Court justices thought so.
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Jun 26, 2017 17:19
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Number Ten Cocks posted:I think nine Supreme Court justices thought so. true, but you think a lot of obviously wrong things and this is clearly one of them if you read the decision
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Jun 26, 2017 17:22
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evilweasel posted:true, but you think a lot of obviously wrong things and this is clearly one of them if you read the decision "Behaving lawlessly" is conservative for "doing something I don't like" so if you just translate that post into human language it is obviously correct. The 9th and 4th CoA did something Number Ten Cocks didn't like.
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Jun 26, 2017 17:24
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Rigel posted:I do not agree, this isn't some arcane application of patent law. What the courts did was a powerful and extraordinary check on the executive, and the SCOTUS should hear the case even if there is no split. I thought about this, nodded, then thought "but SC time is limited, they could be spending time on cases where there is actual valid disagreement" Then I realized it's probably better this court spends time on this and get it's Korematsu out of the way ASAP
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Jun 26, 2017 17:34
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Yes, interning US citizens and excluding foreign nationals are the same thing. Trump could announce he's bombing the Vatican to eliminate disgusting Catholic influence on American citizens and the only Constitutional issue would be the lack of Congressional authorization. Number Ten Cocks fucked around with this message at 17:40 on Jun 26, 2017 |
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Jun 26, 2017 17:36
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Gorsuch is a writer (a lovely one) that should open a stylistic manual (because he is a lovely writer) or attend some basic legal writing classes (he's a loving hack)
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Jun 26, 2017 17:42
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Ogmius815 posted:Is today the last day of the term? When are retirements usually announced? i.e. when will it be safe to unclench my butthole over Kennedy? Until there's a Democrat in the White House and 51+ Democrats in the Senate it's not safe.
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Jun 26, 2017 17:47
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Number Ten Cocks posted:Yes, interning US citizens and excluding foreign nationals are the same thing. Oh, Korematsu, Dred Scott, take your pick Every horrible historical era has a horrible supreme Court opinion for high school teachers to tsk tsk over a hundred years later Hieronymous Alloy fucked around with this message at 17:52 on Jun 26, 2017 |
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Jun 26, 2017 17:49
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Hieronymous Alloy posted:Oh, Korematsu, Dred Scott, take your pick I can't imagine what the Chinese viceroy is going to direct the reeducation schools to scorn the most. Brown, maybe?
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Jun 26, 2017 18:01
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Number Ten Cocks posted:I can't imagine what the Chinese viceroy is going to direct the reeducation schools to scorn the most. Brown, maybe? At this rate it will be a Russian viceroy, so probably Obergefell. Possibly Loving.
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Jun 26, 2017 18:03
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https://twitter.com/Hegemommy/status/879384837584547840 Lovely.
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Jun 26, 2017 18:08
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So what do we think of Trinity Church? I think the opinion of the court is reasonable, personally.
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Jun 26, 2017 18:18
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EwokEntourage posted:Gorsuch is a writer (a lovely one) that should open a stylistic manual (because he is a lovely writer) or attend some basic legal writing classes (he's a loving hack) No one sane argues that drowning oneself through rising tide doesn't count as suicide, and his analogy is an indictment of literalists
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Jun 26, 2017 18:21
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Number Ten Cocks posted:I can't imagine what the Chinese viceroy is going to direct the reeducation schools to scorn the most. Brown, maybe? I know what all of these words mean individually but I'm really not sure what they mean in this particular order.
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Jun 26, 2017 18:31
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galenanorth posted:No one sane argues that drowning oneself through rising tide doesn't count as suicide, and his analogy is an indictment of literalists I don't care what argument he is making, he is a lovely writer evidenced by his continued abuse of parentheses In no way should that paragraph be held out as gifted prose. I didn't know who podhoretz was at first, so I thought he was mocking gorsuch too, but apparently people think that is good writing. It's not. EwokEntourage fucked around with this message at 18:41 on Jun 26, 2017 |
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Jun 26, 2017 18:37
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Rygar201 posted:So what do we think of Trinity Church? I don't understand Thomas and Gorsuch apparently finding it okay to appropriate tax money to religious schools even outside of the money only being used for playgrounds or other obviously secular purposes. I wonder if they would keep that view with a case where a Muslim school is using tax money to pay teachers who are teaching children about worshipping Muhammad.
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Jun 26, 2017 18:45
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Rigel posted:Correct, there were 6 votes in favor of allowing the travel ban on a limited basis. (only people who have no bona-fide relationship with the US) So does that mean the liberals would let the ban stand or does that mean that partially lifting the injunction doesn't mean anything?
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Jun 26, 2017 18:46
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 Opinions! TRUMP, ET AL. v. INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ET AL. Brief Background: [This is the Trump Muslim travel ban, up for a stay of injunction pending appeal.] Holding: [Not technically a holding, but an order on the application for stay.] To begin, we grant both of the Government’s petitions for certiorari and consolidate the cases for argument...In addition to the issues identified in the petitions, the parties are directed to address the following question: “Whether the challenges to §2(c) became moot on June 14, 2017.”... We grant the Government’s applications to stay the injunctions, to the extent the injunctions prevent enforcement of §2(c) with respect to foreign nationals who lack any bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States. We leave the injunctions entered by the lower courts in place with respect to respondents and those similarly situated, as specified in this opinion... The facts of these cases illustrate the sort of relationship that qualifies. For individuals, a close familial relationship is required. A foreign national who wishes to enter the United States to live with or visit a family member, like Doe’s wife or Dr. Elshikh’s mother-in-law, clearly has such a relationship. As for entities, the relationship must be formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course, rather than for the purpose of evading EO–2. The students from the designated countries who have been admitted to the University of Hawaii have such a relationship with an American entity. So too would a worker who accepted an offer of employment from an American company or a lecturer invited to address an American audience. Not so someone who enters into a relationship simply to avoid §2(c): For example, a nonprofit group devoted to immigration issues may not contact foreign nationals from the designated countries, add them to client lists, and then secure their entry by claiming injury from their exclusion. Lineup: Per curiam. Thomas dissented, joined by Alito and Gorsuch. Notes From Other Opinions: Thomas: I agree with the Court that the preliminary injunctions entered in these cases should be stayed, although I would stay them in full... I agree with the Court’s implicit conclusion that the Government has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits—that is, that the judgments below will be reversed... It would have been reasonable, perhaps, for the Court to have left the injunctions in place only as to respondents themselves...I fear that the Court’s remedy will prove unworkable. Today’s compromise will burden executive officials with the task of deciding—on peril of contempt—whether individuals from the six affected nations who wish to enter the United States have a sufficient connection to a person or entity in this country. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-1436_l6hc.pdf MARISA N. PAVAN, ET AL. v. NATHANIEL SMITH Brief Background: [Are same-sex married couples entitled to have both names on their children's birth certificates?] Holding: Obergefell proscribes such disparate treatment. As we explained there, a State may not “exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples...[I]n listing those terms and conditions—the “rights, benefits, and responsibilities” to which same-sex couples, no less than opposite-sex couples, must have access—we expressly identified “birth and death certificates.” Lineup: Per curiam. Gorsuch dissented, joined by Thomas and Alito. Notes From Other Opinions: Gorsuch: Summary reversal is usually reserved for cases where “the law is settled and stable, the facts are not in dispute, and the decision below is clearly in error.” Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U. S. 785, 791 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Respectfully, I don’t believe this case meets that standard... Before the state supreme court, the State argued that rational reasons exist for a biology based birth registration regime, reasons that in no way offend Obergefell—like ensuring government officials can identify public health trends and helping individuals determine their biological lineage, citizenship, or susceptibility to genetic disorders. In an opinion that did not in any way seek to defy but rather earnestly engage Obergefell, the state supreme court agreed... If there isn’t a problem with a biology based birth registration regime, perhaps the concern lies in this particular regime’s exceptions. For it turns out that Arkansas’s general rule of registration based on biology does admit of certain more specific exceptions. Most importantly for our purposes, the State acknowledges that §9–10–201 of the Arkansas Code controls how birth certificates are completed in cases of artificial insemination like the one before us. The State acknowledges, too, that this provision, written some time ago, indicates that the mother’s husband generally shall be treated as the father—and in this way seemingly anticipates only opposite-sex marital unions. But if the artificial insemination statute is the concern, it’s still hard to see how summary reversal should follow for at least a few reasons...Indeed, it is not even clear what the Court expects to happen on remand that hasn’t happened already. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-992_868c.pdf JESUS C. HERNANDEZ, ET AL. v. JESUS MESA, JR., ET AL. Brief Background: [US Border Patrol agent in the US shot and killed a Mexican citizen on Mexican soil. Can the parents of the victim bring a Bivens action for damages? Is there a 4th amendment violation? And is there qualified immunity for a 5th amendment violation?] Holding: [First, the case is remanded for the Bivens question for the court of appeals to re-analyze in light of the new "special factors" additional exception for Bivens handed down in Ziglar v. Abbasi a few days ago.] [Second, the Court ducks the 4th amendment question as possibly unnecessary based on the Bivens result.] [Third, the Court reverses on the 5th amendment qualified immunity grant but remands for the court of appeals to try again without looking at post-shooting facts.] It is undisputed, however, that Hernández’s nationality and the extent of his ties to the United States were unknown to Mesa at the time of the shooting. The en banc Court of Appeals therefore erred in granting qualified immunity based on those facts...Facts an officer learns after the incident ends—whether those facts would support granting immunity or denying it—are not relevant. Lineup: Per curiam. Thomas dissents. Breyer dissents, joined by Ginsburg. Gorsuch took no part. Notes From Other Opinions: Thomas: When we granted certiorari in this case, we directed the parties to address, in addition to the questions presented by petitioners, “[w]hether the claim in this case may be asserted under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971).” 580 U. S. ___ (2016). I would answer that question, rather than remand for the Court of Appeals to do so...I would decline to extend Bivens and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals on that basis. Breyer: Hernández was protected by the Fourth Amendment. First, the defendant is a federal officer. He knowingly shot from United States territory into the culvert. He did not know at the time whether he was shooting at a citizen of the United States or Mexico, nor has he asserted that he knew on which side of the boundary line the bullet would land... Second, the culvert itself has special border-related physical features. It does not itself contain any physical features of a border... Third, history makes clear that nontechnically speaking, the culvert is the border; and more technically speaking, it is at the least a special border-related area (sometimes known as a “limitrophe” area, see infra, at 4)... Fourth, a jointly organized international boundary commission built, and now administers, the culvert... Fifth, international law recognizes special duties and obligations that nations may have in respect to “limitrophe” areas. Traditionally, boundaries consisted of rivers, mountain ranges, and other areas that themselves had depth as well as length... Sixth, not to apply the Fourth Amendment to the culvert would produce serious anomalies. Cf. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S., at 278 (KENNEDY, J., concurring). The Court of Appeals’ approach creates a protective difference depending upon whether Hernández had been hit just before or just after he crossed an imaginary mathematical borderline running through the culvert’s middle. But nothing else would have changed. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-118_97bf.pdf DAVILA v. DAVIS Brief Background: [Trial counsel challenged a jury instruction and lost. Appellate counsel did not challenge the instruction. Prisoner tries to bring a habeas claim, with an ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel to save his failure to challenge the instruction the first time around.] Holding: The ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel does not provide cause to excuse the procedural default of ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims. Pp. 4–16. (a) In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, this Court held that attorney error committed in the course of state postconviction proceedings—for which the Constitution does not guarantee the right to counsel—cannot supply cause to excuse a procedural default that occurs in those proceedings... (b) This Court declines to extend the Martinez exception to allow a federal court to hear a substantial, but procedurally defaulted, claim of appellate ineffectiveness when a prisoner’s state postconviction counsel provides ineffective assistance by failing to raise it. Lineup: Majority opinion by Thomas, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Alito and Gorsuch. Breyer dissents, joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan. Notes From Other Opinions: Breyer: In my view, this same exception (with the same qualifications) should apply when a prisoner raises a constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U. S. 387, 396 (1985) (Constitution guarantees a defendant an effective appellate counsel, just as it guarantees a defendant an effective trial counsel)... [Example: prisoner claims the trial lawyer was ineffective, but then has the same lawyer on appeal who doesn't make that claim for the obvious reason...why can't they make the claim later?] The basic legal principle that should determine the outcome of this case is the principle that requires courts to treat like cases alike. To put the matter more familiarly, what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. The dissent in Martinez wrote that there “is not a dime’s worth of difference in principle between [ineffective-assistanceof-trial-counsel] cases and many other cases in which initial state habeas will be the first opportunity for a particular claim to be raised,” including “claims asserting ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” 566 U. S., at 19 (opinion of Scalia, J.). I agree. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-6219_i425.pdf TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH OF COLUMBIA, INC. v. COMER Brief Background: [The church applied for grants to replace gravel on their playground with scrap tire material and was denied because the Missouri Constitution says no money can be given to a church.] Holding: The Department’s policy violated the rights of Trinity Lutheran under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by denying the Church an otherwise available public benefit on account of its religious status. Pp. 6–15. (a) This Court has repeatedly confirmed that denying a generally available benefit solely on account of religious identity imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion... (b) The Department’s policy expressly discriminates against otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of their religious character... (c) The Department tries to sidestep this Court’s precedents by arguing that this case is instead controlled by Locke v. Davey. It is not. In Locke, the State of Washington created a scholarship program to assist high-achieving students with the costs of postsecondary education. Scholarship recipients were free to use state funds at accredited religious and non-religious schools alike, but they could not use the funds to pursue a devotional theology degree... (d) The Department’s discriminatory policy does not survive the “most rigorous” scrutiny that this Court applies to laws imposing special disabilities on account of religious status. [Please note footnote 3: This case involves express discrimination based on religious identity with respect to playground resurfacing. We do not address religious uses of funding or other forms of discrimination.] Lineup: Majority opinion by Roberts (other than as to footnote 3), joined by Kennedy, Alito, and Kagan in full, and Thomas and Gorsuch (other than as to footnote 3). Thomas concurred, joined by Gorsuch. Gorsuch concurred, joined by Thomas. Bryer concurred in the judgment. Sotomayor dissented, joined by Ginsburg. Notes From Other Opinions: Thomas: [T]he Court in Locke permitted a State to “disfavor . . . religion” by imposing what it deemed a “relatively minor” burden on religious exercise to advance the State’s antiestablishment “interest in not funding the religious training of clergy.”...This Court’s endorsement in Locke of even a “mil[d] kind,” id., at 720, of discrimination against religion remains troubling. See generally id., at 726–734 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But because the Court today appropriately construes Locke narrowly, see Part III–B, ante, and because no party has asked us to reconsider it, I join nearly all of the Court’s opinion. Gorsuch: First, the Court leaves open the possibility a useful distinction might be drawn between laws that discriminate on the basis of religious status and religious use. See ante, at 12. Respectfully, I harbor doubts about the stability of such a line... Generally the government may not force people to choose between participation in a public program and their right to free exercise of religion...I don’t see why it should matter whether we describe that benefit, say, as closed to Lutherans (status) or closed to people who do Lutheran things (use). It is free exercise either way. For these reasons, reliance on the status-use distinction does not suffice for me to distinguish Locke v. Davey, 540 U. S. 712 (2004)... Second and for similar reasons, I am unable to join the footnoted observation, ante, at 14, n. 3, that “[t]his case involves express discrimination based on religious identity with respect to playground resurfacing.” Of course the footnote is entirely correct, but I worry that some might mistakenly read it to suggest that only “playground resurfacing” cases, or only those with some association with children’s safety or health, or perhaps some other social good we find sufficiently worthy, are governed by the legal rules recounted in and faithfully applied by the Court’s opinion. Breyer: The Court stated in Everson that “cutting off church schools from” such “general government services as ordinary police and fire protection . . . is obviously not the purpose of the First Amendment.” 330 U. S., at 17–18. Here, the State would cut Trinity Lutheran off from participation in a general program designed to secure or to improve the health and safety of children. I see no significant difference. Sotomayor: To hear the Court tell it, this is a simple case about recycling tires to resurface a playground. The stakes are higher. This case is about nothing less than the relationship between religious institutions and the civil government—that is, between church and state. The Court today profoundly changes that relationship by holding, for the first time, that the Constitution requires the government to provide public funds directly to a church. Its decision slights both our precedents and our history, and its reasoning weakens this country’s longstanding commitment to a separation of church and state beneficial to both. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-577_khlp.pdf
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Jun 26, 2017 18:56
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I would be very surprised if Trump doesn't win almost completely on the ban when it gets a full hearing. The executive branch has extremely wide latitude to set pretty much whatever immigration policies they want.
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Jun 26, 2017 19:28
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Jesus, that Trinity Church ruling...
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Jun 26, 2017 20:38
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El Mero Mero posted:Jesus, that Trinity Church ruling... It's interesting how the impact differs there from where you stand. Breyer: The Court stated in Everson that “cutting off church schools from” such “general government services as ordinary police and fire protection . . . is obviously not the purpose of the First Amendment.” 330 U. S., at 17–18. Here, the State would cut Trinity Lutheran off from participation in a general program designed to secure or to improve the health and safety of children. I see no significant difference. Sotomayor: To hear the Court tell it, this is a simple case about recycling tires to resurface a playground. The stakes are higher. This case is about nothing less than the relationship between religious institutions and the civil government—that is, between church and state. The Court today profoundly changes that relationship by holding, for the first time, that the Constitution requires the government to provide public funds directly to a church. Its decision slights both our precedents and our history, and its reasoning weakens this country’s longstanding commitment to a separation of church and state beneficial to both.
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Jun 26, 2017 20:42
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So It Goes posted:I don't understand Thomas and Gorsuch apparently finding it okay to appropriate tax money to religious schools even outside of the money only being used for playgrounds or other obviously secular purposes. I wonder if they would keep that view with a case where a Muslim school is using tax money to pay teachers who are teaching children about worshipping Muhammad. IIRC, Thomas has an extremely narrow view of what counts as establishing a church. Like, not-even-Scalia levels of narrow. If Gorsuch is really signing on to that, that's pretty telling.
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Jun 26, 2017 20:45
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In my (not terribly well educated) view, the Trinity Church decision is actually pretty reasonable on its own (I think Breyer is more or less right). The problem is how the decision will be viewed as the court becomes more right wing over the next decade (thanks a lot, Stein voters, abstainers, and assorted left-wing deadbeats!). I could forsee a future in which five members of SCOTUS decide that states have to effectively subsidies religious institutions beyond secular purpose programs like the one in today's decision.
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Jun 26, 2017 20:46
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ulmont posted:Sotomayor: To hear the Court tell it, this is a simple case about recycling tires to resurface a playground. The stakes are higher. This case is about nothing less than the relationship between religious institutions and the civil government—that is, between church and state. The Court today profoundly changes that relationship by holding, for the first time, that the Constitution requires the government to provide public funds directly to a church. Its decision slights both our precedents and our history, and its reasoning weakens this country’s longstanding commitment to a separation of church and state beneficial to both. But haven't churches been getting public funds for general purposes forever? Taken literally she's saying that the federal government should deny for example disaster relief money to churches because they're churches?
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Jun 26, 2017 20:47
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So It Goes posted:I don't understand Thomas and Gorsuch apparently finding it okay to appropriate tax money to religious schools even outside of the money only being used for playgrounds or other obviously secular purposes. I wonder if they would keep that view with a case where a Muslim school is using tax money to pay teachers who are teaching children about worshipping Muhammad. Pretty danged sure Thomas would, because Clarence Thomas. We don't know enough about Gorsuch's quirks yet to tell whether he's more of an Alito-esque monster or just a boring dumb hyper-textualist
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Jun 26, 2017 20:49
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hobbesmaster posted:But haven't churches been getting public funds for general purposes forever? Taken literally she's saying that the federal government should deny for example disaster relief money to churches because they're churches? yes, she is saying that because it's true. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/nyregion/house-approves-federal-aid-for-churches-damaged-by-hurricane-sandy.html
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Jun 26, 2017 20:56
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botany posted:yes, she is saying that because it's true. I mean the article is about a law explicitly allowing it, was it struck down as unconstitutional? It's not as if churches weren't receiving any money from the government: quote:In some cases, federal aid can be used to reimburse houses of worship for social services they provide, and houses of worship can sometimes qualify for low-interest loans from the Small Business Administration.
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Jun 26, 2017 20:59
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I think Trinity Church is a reasonable holding. I think some of the seven justices will use it as cover when writing less reasonable opinions.
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Jun 26, 2017 21:01
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hobbesmaster posted:I mean the article is about a law explicitly allowing it, was it struck down as unconstitutional? It's not as if churches weren't receiving any money from the government: i linked the article because it goes into the arguments as to why it could be considered unconstitutional and also because it shows that, if you're having a debate about whether or not some specific religious buildings can get disaster relief after a specific natural disaster, clearly "the federal government should deny for example disaster relief money to churches because they're churches" is the status quo, which you seemed to doubt. the bill in question was received in the senate and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. that's the last action taken on the bill. (https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/592/all-actions/) edit: as I understand it the problem with trinity isn't that it's somehow wrong for churches to receive money in special cases. it's that up until today state governments had some leeway in deciding in which cases this was appropriate. this decision for the first time mandates that state governments have to fund churches.
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Jun 26, 2017 21:04
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