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Slim Jim Pickens posted:British, PoW, Camp? Oh I read that backwards, I was thinking a camp for British POWs "Sure they starve and beat us but dammit they do get results after all."
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Aug 2, 2017 03:36
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Turn left thread! Wait, no, turn right thread! Oh god
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Aug 2, 2017 03:49
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Pontius Pilate posted:Turn left thread! Wait, no, turn right thread! Oh god Sorry  Uh, topic change! With regards to Jobbo Fett's posts on the VVS...are their results typical compared to other countries' air forces, or does it come from, I dunno, rebuilding doctrine and squadrons from scratch after 1941?
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Aug 2, 2017 03:53
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Alchenar posted:So the thing that's distinct and unique about anti-Semitism is that it portrays the Jew as being in a powerful and dangerous position in relation to [group]. You can hypothesise that's a 'scapegoat for elites' mechanism, but then you're relying on a pretty grand conspiracy across Europe through the ages to cynically make ordinary people hate Jews. I don't think antisemitism is particularly unique, its just that peoples in similar positions outside of the European context are inevitably obscure due to being relatively small and dispersed minorities. The Chinese in Southeast Asia in many ways occupy a similar social context. In fact King Vajiravudh of Siam authored an polemical article titled "The Jews of the Orient" condemning the Chinese. In Indonesia they were practically subjected to a genocide and discrimination is still common there and in Malaysia. I have a particular fascination with this event as an example of inter-communal violence. We are accustomed to think of war as a product of individual leaders with distinct plans and carefully coordinated action by their armies. However in many conflicts there are no Presidents or Generals to command armies hither and thither, nor any army at all. Many are the peoples who don't have any sort of leaders at all, nor any authority that can make a man do something he doesn't want at all. Yet somehow they still manage to coordinate collective action. In the Tulsa Race riot nobody intended things to end in a mass street battle, and single person on either side directed the collective decisions to mass together or arm themselves. However as the situation escalated it became a clear example of a security dilemma, with each community upping their own strength in response to an escalation by the other. Without leaders there was nobody who could control deescalation or communicate across lines. And when things did get violent, there was no capacity to back down. When there are no leaders who assume responsibility for collective action, groups are often forced into accepting collective responsibility for even the actions of the worst and most extreme of their members. I see a lot of parallels to the religious violence in places like the Punjab during the partition of India. Security dilemmas and collective action leading to uncontrollable spirals of violence. All based around a difference in what group someone feels they belong in.
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Aug 2, 2017 03:54
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bewbies posted:I'm not sure of the assumption that conscripting slaves in exchange for freedom (or at least a promise of freedom) would have been a disaster. Cleburne was right that it had happened quite a bit throughout history...the Continental Army was like a quarter black or something crazy like that by the end of the revolution. Of course a lot of those guys got sent right back into slavery after the war, but that notwithstanding they served successfully and didn't just start wasting white folk. A few things.
So, none of this really bears comparison to the proposal of conscripting slaves into substantial, segregated, combat units. There is also the issue that the nature of the threat facing the Confederacy, and the opportunity the Union would have represented to any such slave soldiers, was so dramatically different from what was happening in the British-Patriot conflict. Realistically in the American Civil War the South might have been able to raise a very small number of slave soldiers on a volunteer basis with the promise of manumission after victory, but I would be extremely doubtful of their commitment to the cause. By the time the situation was bad enough to get slaveowners to agree, it would have been clear that the South was losing and the slaves could get their freedom by just staying put and waiting for the Union Army to arrive. The Confederacy could have tried conscripting slaves into non-combat roles in order to free whites for combat enlistment, but to a great extent they were already doing that in many places. I don't know how much more an organized national program of slave labor conscription would have done.
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Aug 2, 2017 04:02
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Davin Valkri posted:Sorry The Eastern Front air losses are higher than other areas, due to the nature of low-altitude combat, lots of close air support missions, and the immense strains put on pilots, regardless of nation or training. That being said, its not in a league of its own. Wikipedia states that, for the Battle of Britain has "The Luftwaffe lost 1733 planes, the British, 915." Oddly enough, this contradicts the Wikipedia page of "The Battle of Britain" that states Luftwaffe losses were 1,977 and RAF losses of 1,744. Keeping in mind that sorties were longer, and that a large body of water makes it hard to retrieve downed crews. There's also no ground war to support or interdict, which could've also raised losses to levels seen over Russia. Edit: But yeah, Russia, I think (haven't seen the table yet or finished to book), has the highest losses in pilots/planes. This number is helped by very poor leadership, coordination, and obsolete planes in the early war, as well as  SEND THEM TO THE FRONT to plug gaps and offer some kind of resistance to the Germans.
Jobbo_Fett fucked around with this message at 04:08 on Aug 2, 2017 |
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Aug 2, 2017 04:05
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Jobbo_Fett posted:The Eastern Front air losses are higher than other areas, due to the nature of low-altitude combat, lots of close air support missions, and the immense strains put on pilots, regardless of nation or training. I see. Is there a similar "jump" after June 1944 for US and British losses (since they would have to start ramping up CAS and interdiction), or was the Luftwaffe so depleted by then that the expected losses increase doesn't really show up?
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Aug 2, 2017 04:08
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Davin Valkri posted:I see. Is there a similar "jump" after June 1944 for US and British losses (since they would have to start ramping up CAS and interdiction), or was the Luftwaffe so depleted by then that the expected losses increase doesn't really show up? Bomber losses for the allies varied based on which service (thanks to the split between day and night) as well as fighter cover, but at the point where they made landfall on D-Day, the Luftwaffe was but a shadow of its former self in the west. The constant erosion of pilot quality and serviceable planes meant that life expectancy dropped for newer pilots and they provided less support as the months went on by. The opening of a Western front, in addition to the Mediterranean, seriously affected the Luftwaffes ability to gain air superiority. As for exact numbers, I'm not sure as I haven't looked it up, but yes. Loss increases didn't really happen because the Luftwaffe was either incapable of rising to meet any challenges, or unwilling.
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Aug 2, 2017 04:16
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Squalid posted:Without leaders there was nobody who could control deescalation or communicate across lines. And when things did get violent, there was no capacity to back down. When there are no leaders who assume responsibility for collective action, groups are often forced into accepting collective responsibility for even the actions of the worst and most extreme of their members. That's a really strange way to see things. Think of World War 1, where the existence of a strong hierarchy on all sides didn't do jack poo poo to stop an escalation of conflict - hell, it was in the driving seat, if enslaved to the momentum of the public sentiment it fermented and couldn't quickly shift.
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Aug 2, 2017 04:26
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Bomber losses in the USAAF were brutal. The 8th AF had about as many KIA over the course of the war as the USMC.
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Aug 2, 2017 05:12
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my dad posted:That's a really strange way to see things. Think of World War 1, where the existence of a strong hierarchy on all sides didn't do jack poo poo to stop an escalation of conflict - hell, it was in the driving seat, if enslaved to the momentum of the public sentiment it fermented and couldn't quickly shift. True, security dilemmas are not unique to decentralized decision making. I think difficulties with collective action can also be seen in the European alliance system pre-WWI, with allies bound to support each other as one after the other escalated the crisis. However there are also many historical instances when authorities did order troops to stand down successfully, and the potential for complexly organized action complicates the picture. I'm just interested in how communities are able to spontaneously organize violence especially on large scales. In many cases of communal violence it seems like there's some tipping point, where trust fails. When people who had lived side-by-side lose trust in one another and suddenly become threatening, and then the security dilemma dictates communities must race to overpower one another.
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Aug 2, 2017 05:21
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Squalid posted:True, security dilemmas are not unique to decentralized decision making. I think difficulties with collective action can also be seen in the European alliance system pre-WWI, with allies bound to support each other as one after the other escalated the crisis. However there are also many historical instances when authorities did order troops to stand down successfully, and the potential for complexly organized action complicates the picture. I think you're overlooking some things a bit. Even if we stay within the confines of WWI we can also see examples of collective deescalation - soldiers in opposing trenches forming inofficial lines of communication, mutual agreements, truces, and even warnings of impending disasters in the form of an offensive. Even in an environment of actively escalated hostility, opposing communities were able to overcome their differences, and start forming a common identity of sorts, to the tune of "we poor bastards stuck in this godawful situation for the sake of some rear end in a top hat's imperialism boner". Of course, this gets actively combated by the opposing hierarchies through soldier reassignment (and punishment), propaganda, and an escalation of atrocities. Squalid posted:I'm just interested in how communities are able to spontaneously organize violence especially on large scales. In many cases of communal violence it seems like there's some tipping point, where trust fails. When people who had lived side-by-side lose trust in one another and suddenly become threatening, and then the security dilemma dictates communities must race to overpower one another. The same way anything else gets organized. As horrifying it is to say this, organized violence is a fairly mundane activity, with steps of organization similar to a lot of other things. During the big flood a few years ago, the residents of Sremska Mitrovica could organize emergency flood defense and protect their town on their own when our government colossally hosed up. When a quarter of a million Serbs got ethnically cleansed from Croatia and came to Serbia in a huge human wave about which Milošević's government couldn't give less of a gently caress, the residents of Ruma organized two seemingly opposed activities in parallel - finding whatever shelter and provisions for the coming refugees was possible, and also organizing patrols in the Croatian quarter to make sure none of the refugees can inflict misguided revenge on the local Croats (for the record, the latter proved to be unnecessary, with the exception of a very small number of rich dudes who thought they were due a Croatian house and were easily told to bugger off, the refugees just wanted to survive and caused no trouble). Is organizing violence any more complex than any of these activities? As for the tipping point, it's usually something that only happens after a prolongued period of tension building, and that tension building is often actively guided by something - either a general competition for limited material resources, or a more abstract competition via conflicting identities. For example, I really don't think the Ku Klux Klanners in that town were just minding their own bussiness until violence just sort of happened, you know? A lot of people were jerking off about The Day long before the day actually happened.
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Aug 2, 2017 06:15
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If you want a window into how antagonisms develop over generation then spill over due to a series of pressures the Hutu - Tutsi example is well documented and really enlightening
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Aug 2, 2017 06:23
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Cyrano4747 posted:If you want a window into how antagonisms develop over generation then spill over due to a series of pressures the Hutu - Tutsi example is well documented and really enlightening Do you have specific sources or is looking at the citations on Wikipedia a decent start? Most of what I know is the general course of the genocide but I don't know where to start researching the background of it. Also I'm a bit wary of researching anything past the 60s. Also a related question for future reference, how do you figure what a good source is when you are studying an unfamiliar subject? I never took a college level history class, but I've always loved reading about history and in high school you really don't learn about what is and isn't a good source (I mean maybe they did but I never had to actually work hard to get good grades and kind of slept through most of my classes, which has really been biting me in the rear end since then).
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Aug 2, 2017 08:32
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If it's printed by a university press and costs $200, odds are somebody has peer-reviewed it.
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Aug 2, 2017 08:37
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HEY GAIL posted:i thought most of Jacobin is former LF posters Af is quite indicative of the name being noble, also a lot of Von and De since quite a lot where foreign nobility. There is a database here https://www.riddarhuset.se/organisation/attedatabas/atte-och-vapendatabas/ were the first three should be applicable to your research.
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Aug 2, 2017 09:44
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Slim Jim Pickens posted:Also I would like to alert everybody in this thread that I clicked one of heygal's twitter links and now my twitter interface is permanently German. it's leaking...
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Aug 2, 2017 10:21
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Siivola posted:If it's printed by a university press and costs $200, odds are somebody has peer-reviewed it. Or you could check the bibliography and see if the books the author cites have been reviewed and if they're good or not
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Aug 2, 2017 10:32
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On the cooperation between the VVS and Partisans - A thorn unclipped The partisans were supported by both the VVS and the GVF, and during 1943 there were 3,708 sorties flown by U-2s and R-5s behind Heeregruppe Mitte to deliver 270 tonnes of ammunition and 1,500 personnel, while 2,000 sick and wounded were evacuated for the loss of 6 aircraft and 7 aircrew. -The book actually mentions VVS and Partisan support cooperation several times, and its interesting to see how active they were in regards to that. The Eastern Front is huge, and it clearly shows that the technology wasn't available to stop such missions.
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Aug 2, 2017 15:14
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On German Strategic Bombing in the East The GAZ plant was struck from 4/5 to 22/23 June [1943], with the bombers arriving in a 'Crocodile' (Krokodil) stream. The target was severely damaged, only returning to full production on 18 August. However, it made T-70 light tanks (although the chassis was also used for the SU-76 self-propelled gun), so the raid had little impact upon Soviet tank strength. Among other targets hit during 1,813 sorties was Factory 292 in Saratov, the prime producer of Yak-1s, which some sources state was destroyed or severely damaged on 22/23 June. -It is mentioned that these attacks were conducted at night. -The Russians had 2 search radars and 2 fire control radars. Edit: In the area of Gorkii/Saratov. -No Russian planes were equipped with radars. -Bombing cut communications, preventing coordination between pilot and staff. -Pilot training was lacking, for the Russians.
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Aug 2, 2017 15:25
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Be warned that googling suggests War Over The Steppes contains serious errors. For example:quote:One of the errors seems especially serious: the table III-3 "Soviet air power fuel consumption 1942" (p.114) instead of fuel consumption contains the number of bombs dropped from well-known digest "Soviet Aviation 1941-45 in figures". So the conclusion under the table about VVS consumed 2.75 times more fuel than Luftwaffe is wrong. Really VVS consumed 339,485 tons, not 3,813,367, i.e. far less than Luftwaffe. And it was a big problem for VVS. In other words Hooton gets the basics of the relative forces wrong.
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Aug 2, 2017 15:40
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Hooton!  Anyone got a pic of the digest? I'd love to see if it has the right/wrong info for the other tables in the book.
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Aug 2, 2017 15:44
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Cyrano4747 posted:Bomber losses in the USAAF were brutal. The 8th AF had about as many KIA over the course of the war as the USMC. In the Battle of Berlin (the night air battle in later 1943) the Allies lost something like 1000 heavy bombers, about as many big bombers as the Germans made. So yeah, it was extremely nasty. Jobbo_Fett posted:On German Strategic Bombing in the East Hm. Do you know what bombers the Germans were using for this raid?
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Aug 2, 2017 16:54
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Cyrano4747 posted:Bomber losses in the USAAF were brutal. The 8th AF had about as many KIA over the course of the war as the USMC. Such combat pretty heavily skews towards KIA over WIA.
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Aug 2, 2017 16:59
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Taerkar posted:Such combat pretty heavily skews towards KIA over WIA. True, but it's still loving nuts that as many men died flying bombers over Germany in one of multiple major organizations as died in a major branch of the military.
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Aug 2, 2017 17:24
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Nebakenezzer posted:In the Battle of Berlin (the night air battle in later 1943) the Allies lost something like 1000 heavy bombers, about as many big bombers as the Germans made. So yeah, it was extremely nasty. Wikipedia posted:The command staff of the Luftwaffe used this idea to free their service from the air support role. Robert Ritter von Greim's Luftflotte 6, with support from Luftflotte 4, was assigned seven bomber wings to carry out a strategic bombing offensive[91]—KG 55, KG 3, KG 4, KG 27, KG 51, KG 53 and KG 100.[92] Factory Number No. 466 at Gorkiy with five percent total and one-tenth of all fighter engine production were the targets.[93] Three of the five ball bearings plants were in range, the synthetic rubber plant at Yaroslavl (23 percent of output) and oil refineries along with steel plants were all considered. Surviving intelligence maps show the crude oil and ball bearing plant at Saratov was also considered.[94] In the end phase, the production of tanks and armoured vehicles received the weight of the attacks. The facilities at Gorkiy drew most attention for it produced 15 percent of T-34s and was the largest plant west of the Urals. In error, planners targeted the State Motor Vehicles Plant No. 1 Molotov, the largest automobile plant in the country which produced the less threatening T-60 and T-70. The Krasnoye Sormovo Factory No. 112 was targeted because of its production of munitions. Planes in use during that time would've been: He-177, He-111, Ju-88 Also, maybe some Dornier bombers but that's a wild guess on my part. Found this on KG100's wiki page More wikipedia posted:In March 1943 the group moved to Salon, in southern France and re-equipped with the Lotfernrohr 7D on 2 April.[20] I./KG 100 was based at Stalino from 24 April. It restarted mining and anti-shipping operations over the lower Volga on 13 May. It moved to Seshchinskaya to begin bombing operations against the Molotov tank factory in the Gorki area. Operations began on 1 June 1943. On 7 June it bombed oil refineries and ball bearing factories in Saratov before returning to Stalino to carry out long-range bombing operations over the Caspian Sea, from 7 to 20 June.[20] The 4/5 June operation was carried out by 128 He 111s and Junkers Ju 88 from III./KG 1, KG 3, II and III./KG 4, KG 27, I./KG 100 and II. and III./KG 55 dropped 179 tons of bombs against the No. 1 Molotov plant.[21] Many workshops of wooden construction caught fire. The water-supply was severed and large parts of the plant burned.[21] The blacksmiths, chassis, main conveyor, and spring workshops were destroyed. Living compounds and a child's nursery were also hit. The effect was disastrous for the Soviets.
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Aug 2, 2017 17:28
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Clearly not that disastrous.
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Aug 2, 2017 17:33
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Alchenar posted:Clearly not that disastrous. Well, for the Soviets working at that plant maybe...
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Aug 2, 2017 17:36
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Does Ensign Expendable have any production statistics for the plant at Gorky?
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Aug 2, 2017 18:04
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So I think I can guess, but just to be sure, what in hell are you all referring to when you call people "tankies"?
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Aug 2, 2017 19:56
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Lake Effect posted:So I think I can guess, but just to be sure, what in hell are you all referring to when you call people "tankies"? People who supported Soviet tanks crushing the Hungarian and Czech revolutions, generally a synonym for authoritarian leftists
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Aug 2, 2017 20:00
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contrary to what you might think, it's not Ensign Expendable, whose love for tanks is pure and good. 
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Aug 2, 2017 20:02
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Mao/Stalin etc DID NOTHING WRONG fanatics.
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Aug 2, 2017 20:06
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StashAugustine posted:a synonym for authoritarian leftists Maybe it's because political terms here in the US have gotten ... weird, but that seems like a practical oxymoron. Why not just say communist sympathizers?
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Aug 2, 2017 20:07
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Lake Effect posted:Maybe it's because political terms here in the US have gotten ... weird, but that seems like a practical oxymoron. Why not just say communist sympathizers? Because there are plenty of communists who didn't like it when Soviet tanks rolled over protestors.
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Aug 2, 2017 20:09
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Well, why not say Totalitarians then?
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Aug 2, 2017 20:11
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Lake Effect posted:Well, why not say Totalitarians then?
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Aug 2, 2017 20:12
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Lake Effect posted:Well, why not say Totalitarians then? because they still don't support trump
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Aug 2, 2017 20:13
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Everyone needs a cutesie name
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Aug 2, 2017 20:16
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Fangz posted:because they still don't support trump And Trump supports crushing protests with tanks so 
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