Military History Mk. III: One that I know of is an archaic word for dick, another is

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feedmegin: Jul 30, 2008

bewbies posted:

The strategic bombing campaign is one of those things that someone just starting to study WWII tends to latch onto as a good and easy thing to critique.

Plus the general trend towards revisionism in history (where one generation says 'X was good!' and the next one reacts by saying 'no actually X was bad!') meant that Allied actions were pretty much bound to come under more of a microscope by the 60s or so. Plus, unfortunately, ultra-rightwing and outright-Nazi people like to bring it up to try and shade things towards 'actually the Allies were as bad as the Nazis' and so on. Noted Holocaust denier David Irving in particular was a seemingly legit and unbiased historian in the 60s who wrote a book which (in retrospect) heavily exaggerated the casualties from Dresden being bombed by the Allies.

# ? Feb 2, 2018 15:24

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# ? May 27, 2024 10:36

Comrade Gorbash: Jul 12, 2011; My paper soldiers form a wall, five paces thick and twice as tall.

The thing I dislike about arguments over figures like Harris and Haig is that the sides always seem to be casting them as either the worst or blameless.

For Harris in particular, it seems pretty reasonable to say both that he wedded himself to a wrong-headed understanding of the effect and capabilities of strategic bombing and refused to consider evidence that didn't fit his preconceived views to the detriment of his service's wartime performance, AND that he was faithfully executing a strategy determined by higher ups to the best of his ability. He shouldn't be made a scapegoat, but he's not blameless either.

# ? Feb 2, 2018 15:40

Taerkar: Dec 7, 2002; kind of into it, really

Fangz posted:

Didn't we just have the argument that Harris *didn't have access to ULTRA*?

Harris only got the job in 1942. Hamburg was 1943, Cologne was 1942. The Butts 'can't hit a city' report was 1941. The government issued area bombing directive was 1942. Assembling the world's first significant heavy strategic bombing force in a few months isn't easy, buddy.

And it's really facile to say that the Blitz proved strategic bombing can't work. There is one essential difference: Germany was in a land war in Russia. Every 88mm trying to shoot bombers over Germany is one that isn't blasting T34s on the East. Every fighter patrolling the skies isn't downing Sturmoviks over Kursk. Every worker cowering in an air raid shelter isn't assembling Stugs for the front.

And yeah, Harris is kinda an easy scapegoat. He is not making decisions in isolation.

The biggest problem I've had with the claims against the effectiveness of the strategic bombing is the "But the German production went up!" ones that look only at certain war material, ignoring how they were basically scavenging production from other areas to do that.

# ? Feb 2, 2018 15:43

Gort: Aug 18, 2003; Good day what ho cup of tea

Comrade Gorbash posted:

The thing I dislike about arguments over figures like Harris and Haig is that the sides always seem to be casting them as either the worst or blameless.

For Harris in particular, it seems pretty reasonable to say both that he wedded himself to a wrong-headed understanding of the effect and capabilities of strategic bombing and refused to consider evidence that didn't fit his preconceived views to the detriment of his service's wartime performance, AND that he was faithfully executing a strategy determined by higher ups to the best of his ability. He shouldn't be made a scapegoat, but he's not blameless either.

Regarding Haig, I don't think he's at either extreme. In order for him to be the donkey he's made out to be, you'd need to find other commanders who were given similar circumstances and did much better. A couple of his ideas are pretty straight-up correct, like his belief that the Western Front was the only place where the war could be won, and that a unified command under Foch was the way to go.

Taerkar posted:

The biggest problem I've had with the claims against the effectiveness of the strategic bombing is the "But the German production went up!" ones that look only at certain war material, ignoring how they were basically scavenging production from other areas to do that.

Not to mention that you can have a successful strategic bombing campaign and an increase in production together. If German production hits 125% of what it was last year, but strategic bombing prevents it from hitting 150%, that's still effect. Is it efficient compared to other methods of winning the war? That's arguable - would the effort that went into bombing Germany's cities be better spent as lend-lease to the USSR, or with the Eighth Army in Africa, or going towards more destroyers for convoy defense, or over to Singapore? In order to say strategic bombing was an inefficient use of effort you'd have to have some metric for the war-winning efficiency of Britain's wartime actions, and that sounds like a long book I'd be interested in reading.

Gort fucked around with this message at 15:59 on Feb 2, 2018

# ? Feb 2, 2018 15:55

Clarence: May 3, 2012

13th KRRC War Diary, 2nd Feb 1917 posted:

Companies marched independently to the training area, and reported to Capt. NORRIS, at 9-30 a.m. when the "Battalion in the Attack" was practiced. An interesting lecture was given in the school room at 10 o'clock for C.O's and S.O's of the Brigade by O.C. Divisional Signals on "Intercommunication in the Field".
At 1 o'clock the Battalion paraded in column of route with belts, sidearms and F.S. caps under the command of Capt. R.E. Stavert, and marched to the Brigade Sports Ground. C Company Cooker accompanied the Battalion, and supplied tea.On arrival the Battalion was dismissed and the sports commenced. (Programme atttached)
They were a great success, and some French Civilians were among the spectators, but the outstanding feature was the side shows. Each Battalion ran a side show, and the Brigade Signal Section. Our side show consisted of a specially imported "Lady from London", whose hobby was to tell fortunes. She was, however, exceedingly bashful, and even though dressed in black, and heavily veiled, would not show herself, but insisted on staying in a dark tent illuminated only by a lantern, cunningly arranged so that it shone on her clients, and not herself. It was with remarkable accuracy that she told many people what they were, their accomplishments and downfalls, and even in some cases on being asked, predicted the end of the war. It is rumoured that she is well known throughout the Battalion, and feared to be recognized, which accounts in some measure for her almost clerical bashfulness. In the evening the Divisional Cinema gave a good show for A & B Companies, and was crowded out. This took place in the recreation hut which had recently been erected for the troops in this village.

All this is in the battalion war diary, remember.

I feel fantastic!

# ? Feb 2, 2018 16:01

Trin Tragula: Apr 22, 2005

Comstar posted:

Haig at least had pretty bad intel (did he ever get rid of his bad intelligence officer?)

Both Charteris and his equally detestable chief of staff Sir Launcelot Kiggell (no, really), along with a lot of other senior officers at GHQ, were shitcanned after the Third Battle of Ypres and the failure to hold ground taken at Cambrai, to appease Lloyd George. Of course he desperately wanted to be rid of Haig above all others, but whenever he suggested "you know, you could be Commander-in-Chief" to one of the army commanders, they had a rather distressing habit of telling him that they were quite happy with their boss, so get stuffed. Which is something that really doesn't get enough attention, especially considering that Haig was only in post because he spent six months campaigning politically to get himself there.

The tragedy of Haig is not that he was completely clueless and incompetent; it's that he understood that some form of change and learning was required and tried as best he could to make his armies better, but he also totally lacked the insight and ability for original thinking which would have been necessary to make the kind of sweeping reforms in 1915 that might have led to major victories by Easter or autumn 1917. But then as far as I can make out, there's only one senior general in the entire war who did get it right away, and that's Foch. He of course is the source of many of the quotations about the power of elan that appear with monotonous inevitability in any book about 1914, and yet he had the personal flexibility to accept that his theories had failed immediately and entirely and to start thinking of some new ones.

Tias posted:

Hooligan culture is exceedingly alive and well, it's just moved out of the UK.

He was specifically referring to English hooligans and London in particular though

# ? Feb 2, 2018 16:18

Gort: Aug 18, 2003; Good day what ho cup of tea

Victor Hutchinson's POW Diary

Friday 2nd February, 1945

Thaw continued all through the night. We still intend to hold onto the sleigh though we have made up packs in case of ditching the sledge.

At 1000 our American comrades left us to join their other compatriots from the other camps who were billeted in Muskau supposedly in a local cinema. We sent them off with three rousing cheers, and were sorry to see them go.

1030 We hit the trail & realised at once that the sledge had to go. So with a light heart on my part I humped my pack. The keenness of my spirit was soon dulled & had changed to a grim resolve to see the day out before we entered Muskau a distance of 3km.

Our arrival caused a little excitement in the town & the inhabitants saw us pass in stony silence. Most of the shops were shut & their windows were devoid of any goods. Hitler�s photograph stared out at us from many of them. We all foregathered in the town square & intermingled with refugees who had halted for a moment in the flight towards the west. The refugees seemed to be peasants who had left Breslau in their oxcarts; Old crones and wide eyed children stared at us neath a covering of old carpets.

We left Muskau at a spanking pace �it was tough going-but fortunately the weather had improved immensely and there was scarcely a trace of snow to be seen on the fields. We could see German solders laying mines in the woods skirting the roads and as we neared our asylum Grossendorf 7km from Spremberg, there were two large field guns covering the main autobahn. We were split up into parties of hundreds and dumped into barns of various little farms. It was dusk when we arrived & as our Red + parcels were being carried separately in ox-carts they were not available, so for many of us it was hungry to bed. We were too tired to care and were content to sleep. We had marched 21kms with an average pack of 50lbs. I had done 78km without a blister.

I was more fortunate than most.

# ? Feb 2, 2018 16:40

bewbies: Sep 23, 2003; Fun Shoe

Gort posted:

Is it efficient compared to other methods of winning the war?

This is what I'm very interested in - the idea of monetary/industrial efficiency is going to become a huge, huge deal if there is ever a full scale shooting war between modern superpowers and right now we're all extremely bad at analyzing this kind of thing.

# ? Feb 2, 2018 16:46

Jamwad Hilder: Apr 18, 2007; surfin usa

Trin Tragula posted:

He was specifically referring to English hooligans and London in particular though

Ya and I also said it wasn't a perfect example.The point was that people who share the same culture and language, from a geographically limited area, are still willing to fight over nonsense and that motivating a peasant from Province A to kill peasants from Province B may not have been as difficult as we imagine. I can change the post to say South American soccer hooligans if it offends your pride as an Englishman or whatever it is you're upset about.

# ? Feb 2, 2018 16:50

Comrade Gorbash: Jul 12, 2011; My paper soldiers form a wall, five paces thick and twice as tall.

Trin Tragula posted:

The tragedy of Haig is not that he was completely clueless and incompetent; it's that he understood that some form of change and learning was required and tried as best he could to make his armies better, but he also totally lacked the insight and ability for original thinking which would have been necessary to make the kind of sweeping reforms in 1915 that might have led to major victories by Easter or autumn 1917. But then as far as I can make out, there's only one senior general in the entire war who did get it right away, and that's Foch. He of course is the source of many of the quotations about the power of elan that appear with monotonous inevitability in any book about 1914, and yet he had the personal flexibility to accept that his theories had failed immediately and entirely and to start thinking of some new ones.

Fair to say, I think the other reason Haig has the reputation he does is he absolutely was a jackass on a personal level.

Of course, that is also something that can be said of many other commanders of that era specifically, and history in general.

# ? Feb 2, 2018 17:17

Nenonen: Oct 22, 2009; Mulla on aina kolkyt donaa taskussa

Speaking of ULTRA, Helsingin Sanomat made an interview of a 95 year old Bletchley Park veteran. His experience was that while German Enigma code was crackable, Finnish coded messages were outright incomprehensible. Then again, they might as well have been plain text. Alas, it's for subsribers only!

Anyone here have access behind the paywall?

https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000005549256.html

# ? Feb 2, 2018 18:06

Trin Tragula: Apr 22, 2005

Jamwad Hilder posted:

Ya and I also said it wasn't a perfect example.The point was that people who share the same culture and language, from a geographically limited area, are still willing to fight over nonsense and that motivating a peasant from Province A to kill peasants from Province B may not have been as difficult as we imagine. I can change the post to say South American soccer hooligans if it offends your pride as an Englishman or whatever it is you're upset about.

It's more than just an imperfect example, though; you're making a category error. You're talking about how ~~an outsider~~ someone who isn't a peasant might easily persuade a peasant who has no existing desire to fight, to go be in a fight. Also, would I be right in thinking that their societies accept on some level that when the lord comes to raise the levy, you're obliged to fight?

Casuals are well aware that they're committing a major transgression against a whole raft of cultural rules of behaviour; that's the whole point of it. They don't need or want to be persuaded by an individual that what they're doing is justifiable. They just want to go be in a fight.

Trin Tragula fucked around with this message at 19:05 on Feb 2, 2018

# ? Feb 2, 2018 18:16

Geisladisk: Sep 15, 2007

Fangz posted:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dehousing

quote:

The following seems a simple method of estimating what we could do by bombing Germany

Careful analysis of the effects of raids on Birmingham, Hull and elsewhere have shown that, on the average, one ton of bombs dropped on a built-up area demolishes 20�40 dwellings and turns 100�200 people out of house and home.

We know from our experience that we can count on nearly fourteen operational sorties per bomber produced. The average lift of the bombers we are going to produce over the next fifteen months will be about 3 tons. It follows that each of these bombers will in its life-time drop about 40 tons of bombs. If these are dropped on built-up areas they will make 4000�8000 people homeless.

In 1938 over 22 million Germans lived in fifty-eight towns of over 100,000 inhabitants, which, with modern equipment, should be easy to find and hit. Our forecast output of heavy bombers (including Wellingtons) between now and the middle of 1943 is about 10,000. If even half the total load of 10,000 bombers were dropped on the built-up areas of these fifty-eight German towns the great majority of their inhabitants (about one-third of the German population) would be turned out of house and home.

Investigation seems to show that having one's home demolished is most damaging to morale. People seem to mind it more than having their friends or even relatives killed. At Hull signs of strain were evident, though only one-tenth of the houses were demolished. On the above figures we should be able to do ten times as much harm to each of the fifty-eight principal German towns. There seems little doubt that this would break the spirit of the people.

Our calculation assumes, of course, that we really get one-half of our bombs into built-up areas. On the other hand, no account is taken of the large promised American production (6,000 heavy bombers in the period in question). Nor has regard been paid to the inevitable damage to factories, communications, etc, in these towns and the damage by fire, probably accentuated by breakdown of public services.

Christ, the dreary, monstrous math of industrialized total war in that text is horrifying.

"Hmm, so if our bombers fly X sorties on average before being destroyed, and each drops Y tons of bombs, that will on average make Z people homeless per bomber produced"

I need a cross between :eng101:

and

# ? Feb 2, 2018 18:40

Ice Fist: Jun 20, 2012; ^^ Please send feedback to beefstache911@hotmail.com, this is not a joke that 'stache is the real deal. Serious assessments only. ^^

Am I correct in saying that not only did they spend a lot of time coming up with horrifying math like that, but also that it didn't work and that the idea that indiscriminate bombing against population center will break a country's morale is debunked?

# ? Feb 2, 2018 18:45

Polyakov: Mar 22, 2012

Ice Fist posted:

Am I correct in saying that not only did they spend a lot of time coming up with horrifying math like that, but also that it didn't work and that the idea that indiscriminate bombing against population center will break a country's morale is debunked?

Kind of, nobodies morale broke but to say that it "didnt work" is only true if you look at it solely from the perspective of destroying the enemies will to fight.

# ? Feb 2, 2018 18:59

Cyrano4747: Sep 25, 2006; Yes, I know I'm old, get off my fucking lawn so I can yell at these clouds.

Ice Fist posted:

Am I correct in saying that not only did they spend a lot of time coming up with horrifying math like that, but also that it didn't work and that the idea that indiscriminate bombing against population center will break a country's morale is debunked?

Yes and no. Blowing the gently caress out of German cities had some real effects on the war when you factor in all the resources being put into protecting them, the clean up, and any damage actually done to war critical infrastructure.

It didn't break their will and force them to the table, but we DO have an example where exactly that happened: Japan.

It just turns out that you really need the threat of nukes to make it work as intended. A truly one-sided nuclear war where city after city was disappearing under mushroom clouds on only one side probably wouldn't last long. That said, nuclear proliferation quickly made that optimistic scenario impossible.

edit: that said, you also probably need to lump "broke the populations will to fight' and "broke the leadership's will to fight" together. It's the latter that really happened w/ Japan.

# ? Feb 2, 2018 19:01

Panzeh: Nov 27, 2006; "..The high ground"

Cyrano4747 posted:

Yes and no. Blowing the gently caress out of German cities had some real effects on the war when you factor in all the resources being put into protecting them, the clean up, and any damage actually done to war critical infrastructure.

It didn't break their will and force them to the table, but we DO have an example where exactly that happened: Japan.

It just turns out that you really need the threat of nukes to make it work as intended. A truly one-sided nuclear war where city after city was disappearing under mushroom clouds on only one side probably wouldn't last long. That said, nuclear proliferation quickly made that optimistic scenario impossible.

edit: that said, you also probably need to lump "broke the populations will to fight' and "broke the leadership's will to fight" together. It's the latter that really happened w/ Japan.

Keep in mind that optimally, the Germans should not have had the luftwaffe take flight against the bombers because the attrition and resources spent defending the country was quite punishing. However, they could never have gotten away with that. The whole show of defending the cities is very important.

# ? Feb 2, 2018 19:14

Comrade Gorbash: Jul 12, 2011; My paper soldiers form a wall, five paces thick and twice as tall.

Japan is weirdly the case scenario that both shows how to make it work, and debunks RAF Bomber Command's more exuberant contentions. On the one hand, as Cyrano said the atomic bombings were clearly a major factor in Japan's surrender. On the other, XXI Bomber Command really did "make the rubble bounce" - or more accurately, burn - and failed to knock Japan out of the war.

# ? Feb 2, 2018 19:15

Slim Jim Pickens: Jan 16, 2012

Japan just had the (mis)fortune of being an island. Utter defeat isn't as apparent when the enemy doesn't hold any home territory, and everybody was preparing to take a million+ casualties in an invasion before surrender was put on the table. iirc the Japanese military government was holding out on a Soviet brokered peace (lmao) when the nukes started dropping and the Soviets invaded Manchuria. Whatever those obstinate old fucks were thinking, they got shook out of it.

# ? Feb 2, 2018 19:27

Thump!: Nov 25, 2007; Look, fat, here's the fact, Kulak!

Cessna posted:

Huh, cool. Do you still have to deal with the pain-in-the-rear end yo-yo cords?

Yep, still have to clean the connector pins with pencil erasers and still have to lick your finger and lube the o-ring when you connect them.

# ? Feb 2, 2018 19:40

Fangz: Jul 5, 2007; Oh I see! This must be the Bad Opinion Zone!

I don't know how accurate this is but this here argues that the Germans would up spending *27%* of their Wehrmacht budget on anti-aircraft weapons in 1944.

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id...0effort&f=false

Meanwhile you get Bomber command allegedly representing only 7-12% of the British war effort. (And probably less, for the US.)

http://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/horror-and-glory-bomber-command-british-memories-1945

On those numbers, it was ridiculous to ever expect that the Germans could be forced to surrender by just 7% of the British war effort alone, but that strategic bomber was a 'good trade' in terms of distracting the Germans from the Eastern front, even ignoring industrial damage. I'm not sure if these numbers are entirely accurate though, others might have an opinion.

# ? Feb 2, 2018 19:44

AmishSpecialForces: Jul 1, 2008

Tomn posted:

I just started reading Naples '44: An intelligence officer in the Italian labyrinth, and it is fantastic. Every entry is worth quoting for one reason or another - the author has a fine appreciation for the absurd, and is constantly placed in a position to make use of it.

One bit I found interesting here:
It appeared that Lattarullo had a secondary profession producing occasional windfalls of revenue. This had to be suspended in the present emergency. He admitted with a touch of pride to acting as a Zio di Roma - an 'uncle from Rome' - at funerals. Neapolitan funerals are obsessed with face. A man who may have been a near-pauper all his life is certain to be put away in a magnificent coffin, but apart from that no other little touch likely to honour the dead and increase the bereaved family's prestige is overlooked.

The uncle from Rome is a popular character in this little farce. Why should people insist on Rome? Why not Bari or Taranto? But no, Rome it has to be. The uncle lets it be known that he has just arrived on the Rome express, or he shows up at the slum tenement or lowly basso in an Alfa-Romeo with a Roman numberplate and an SPQR badge, out of which he steps in his well-cut morning suit, on the jacket lapel of which he sports the ribbon of a Commendatore of the Crown of Italy, to temper with his restrained and dignified condolences the theatrical display of Neapolitan grief.

Lattarullo said that he had frequently played this part. His qualifications were his patrician appearance, and a studied Roman accent and manner. He never uses the third person singular personal pronoun lui, as all the people who surround him do, but says egli, as they do in textbooks, and he addresses all and sundry with old-fashioned politeness as lei. Where the Neapolitans tend to familiarity and ingratiation, Lattarullo shows a proper Roman aloofness and taciturnity. When Lattarullo meets a man he says buon giorno and leaves it at that, and he goes off with a curt goodbye. This, say the Neapolitans, who are fulsome and cloying in their greetings, is how a real Roman gentleman speaks. If anybody at the wake happens to have noticed Lattarullo about the streets of Naples on other occasions, he takes care to keep it to himself.

Having just spent 3 years living in Naples and traveling Italy extensively those cultural norms and mores are still a thing. We learned Neapolitano, which is a super strong dialect that's almost another language. When we went to Rome and spoke Italian the Romans they would instantly know where we learned the language, then would look down their nose at us and tell us to watch our wallets when we got back home to Naples, since to them everyone in the south is a poor pickpocket (kinda true).

For mil-hist content, the whole country is chock full of cool stuff from all over the ages. Special mention goes to the tiny WWII museum in Anzio. They are still pulling weapons/artifacts out of the bay and have a bunch of first-hand accounts from GI's journals they left.

# ? Feb 2, 2018 20:26

zoux: Apr 28, 2006

Somebody get this guy an account

# ? Feb 2, 2018 20:48

girl dick energy: Sep 30, 2009; You think you have the wherewithal to figure out my puzzle vagina?

How credible is the story/idea that the US considered nuking the poo poo out of Mt. Fuji first as a show of force/warning shot? (As much as you can fire a warning shot with a nuclear weapon, anyways.)

# ? Feb 2, 2018 21:06

Ghetto Prince: Sep 11, 2010; got to be mellow, y'all

Geisladisk posted:

Christ, the dreary, monstrous math of industrialized total war in that text is horrifying.

"Hmm, so if our bombers fly X sorties on average before being destroyed, and each drops Y tons of bombs, that will on average make Z people homeless per bomber produced"

I need a cross between and

Yeah, the guy who wrote that, Lindmann, was a real sociopath. He's also helped Churchill go through with the Bengal famine by writing the justification to divert 60% of shipping from the Indian ocean to the Atlantic.

They had a weird bff/enabler thing going on.

# ? Feb 2, 2018 21:53

C.M. Kruger: Oct 28, 2013

PMush Perfect posted:

How credible is the story/idea that the US considered nuking the poo poo out of Mt. Fuji first as a show of force/warning shot? (As much as you can fire a warning shot with a nuclear weapon, anyways.)

I've never heard of that, but the Psywar people suggested coating Mt. Fuji with black paint or dye. It was quickly nixed because they figured the Japanese would be quick to rally behind a symbol of their "national soul" being defaced, that only "superstitious hicks" would be affected by the defacement, and it would be impractical.

# ? Feb 2, 2018 22:15

Nebakenezzer: Sep 13, 2005; The Mote in God's Eye

Ice Fist posted:

Am I correct in saying that not only did they spend a lot of time coming up with horrifying math like that, but also that it didn't work and that the idea that indiscriminate bombing against population center will break a country's morale is debunked?

I think so. One of the theories of strategic air power is that you could make the people so broken in morale that they would force their leaders to make peace, and that never happened - and what's more, it had the opposite effect on the survivors, making them angry and strengthening the will to fight rather than weakening it. The Atomic bomb is the obvious outlier, but that's a bit different. While the night bombers persisted in the area bombing, advances in technology and tactics also eventually allowed the same sort of precision bombing the daytime bombers were doing - and it was after all another attack that the Germany had to invest scarce resources in.

I'd argue, though that earlier efforts at night bombing were mostly a waste of resources, and fewer raids on Germany / more aircraft patrolling over the Atlantic would have been a much smarter way to do things. Considering Coastal command usually ended up with Bomber Command castoffs anyways, that only makes sense. They were important for morale purposes in Britain initially, but I always think you get the morale raids much more cheaply if that's a thing you want. From the most coldly rational perspective I can summon, bomber aircraft can be put to much better use than killing civilians.

# ? Feb 2, 2018 22:56

Rocko Bonaparte: Mar 12, 2002; Every day is Friday!

Is there any general idea of where Allied bombing could have been better utilized when bringing up how ineffective it was? This kind of speculation gets into gay black bomber territory immediately, but I don't even see any first-level analysis of what would have been better. Like, I'm talking about immediate effects of a "superior" strategy before accounting the inevitable Nash equilibrium that comes from an Axis reaction to the change.

I had heard that it was generally a bigger strain on a nation's industry to be able to knock out their methods of war at the point right before it could be used towards any effectiveness. That is, they made the tank, they trained the crew, they moved it to a staging area before a front, filled it up with gas an ammo, and then you just go and sucker punch it. The bombers didn't have that kind of targeting capability. That also does fly in the face of apparently how well we were doing with knocking out ball bearing plants of all things, which is on the near-complete opposite end of that logistics train.

I do generally agree that the arguments for the bombing as they were did not have the intended effect on morale. I don't think it's too controversial for me to say one shouldn't bank a strategy based on its effect on enemy morale, but rather should just be able to take advantage of low morale if it happens. I've just seen it come up so much that arguments about one's own morale being superior mean the dumbest poo poo happened (French Elan in WW1, Japanese attitudes towards US in WW2, strategic bombing, Vietnam, Operation Iraq Freedom). In the context of bombing civilians, it seems even more counter-productive. After all, what are the civilians going to do... desert the army?

# ? Feb 3, 2018 01:14

Fangz: Jul 5, 2007; Oh I see! This must be the Bad Opinion Zone!

Rocko Bonaparte posted:

Is there any general idea of where Allied bombing could have been better utilized when bringing up how ineffective it was? This kind of speculation gets into gay black bomber territory immediately, but I don't even see any first-level analysis of what would have been better. Like, I'm talking about immediate effects of a "superior" strategy before accounting the inevitable Nash equilibrium that comes from an Axis reaction to the change.

I had heard that it was generally a bigger strain on a nation's industry to be able to knock out their methods of war at the point right before it could be used towards any effectiveness. That is, they made the tank, they trained the crew, they moved it to a staging area before a front, filled it up with gas an ammo, and then you just go and sucker punch it. The bombers didn't have that kind of targeting capability. That also does fly in the face of apparently how well we were doing with knocking out ball bearing plants of all things, which is on the near-complete opposite end of that logistics train.

I do generally agree that the arguments for the bombing as they were did not have the intended effect on morale. I don't think it's too controversial for me to say one shouldn't bank a strategy based on its effect on enemy morale, but rather should just be able to take advantage of low morale if it happens. I've just seen it come up so much that arguments about one's own morale being superior mean the dumbest poo poo happened (French Elan in WW1, Japanese attitudes towards US in WW2, strategic bombing, Vietnam, Operation Iraq Freedom). In the context of bombing civilians, it seems even more counter-productive. After all, what are the civilians going to do... desert the army?

The civilians can fail to turn up to work. US bombing surveys make a big deal out of absenteeism rates.

# ? Feb 3, 2018 01:29

Comrade Gorbash: Jul 12, 2011; My paper soldiers form a wall, five paces thick and twice as tall.

The core argument is that they could have achieved most of the same actual effect with a smaller bomber force. The general view is that actual damage ended up not having nearly as big an effect as proponents argued, but that the diversion of resources was significant. In that case, the difference in actual militarily important effect between a 200 and a 1000 bomber force is negligible.

So it's not so much that the bombers would be used differently - it's that you'd have fewer bombers and more of something else. Even if you restrict it to aircraft, the theory is that more maritime patrol craft, more attack planes, and more transports would have been a better use of that material and manufacturing capability.

# ? Feb 3, 2018 01:32

Mycroft Holmes: Mar 26, 2010; by Azathoth

if i may suggest something, a guy named Sbiper on ah.com is doing a really well researched and written Bomber Command story. It's essentially an academic sent back in time and inhabiting harrises body. dude has like 100 books about bomber command he has read just to write up to September 1944. it's really good. https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/and-they-shall-reap-the-whirlwind.333009/

# ? Feb 3, 2018 01:36

Mycroft Holmes: Mar 26, 2010; by Azathoth

Comrade Gorbash posted:

The core argument is that they could have achieved most of the same actual effect with a smaller bomber force. The general view is that actual damage ended up not having nearly as big an effect as proponents argued, but that the diversion of resources was significant. In that case, the difference in actual militarily important effect between a 200 and a 1000 bomber force is negligible.

So it's not so much that the bombers would be used differently - it's that you'd have fewer bombers and more of something else. Even if you restrict it to aircraft, the theory is that more maritime patrol craft, more attack planes, and more transports would have been a better use of that material and manufacturing capability.

i've seen proposals to just make a bunch more mosquitos and use those instead of 4 engine bombers. i'll see if i can dig up the tl.

# ? Feb 3, 2018 01:37

SeanBeansShako: Nov 20, 2009; Now the Drums beat up again,
For all true Soldier Gentlemen.

Apparently during the height of the guerilla warfare phase of the grind of the Boer War Kitchener for some reason saved and adopted a starling that had got lost in the chimney of his HQ. He grew quite attached to the thing and was quite upset when it got out of it's cage while he was away on business on the front.

When he got back he and a shitload of his own staff and anyone spare at his head quarters (around at least 250 men) spent a whole day searching for the drat thing. Hilariously the man himself was crawling through flower beds to look for the drat bird.

EDIT: He found the bird, least of every problem ever.

SeanBeansShako fucked around with this message at 01:53 on Feb 3, 2018

# ? Feb 3, 2018 01:48

Acebuckeye13: Nov 2, 2010; Ultra Carp

Rocko Bonaparte posted:

Is there any general idea of where Allied bombing could have been better utilized when bringing up how ineffective it was? This kind of speculation gets into gay black bomber territory immediately, but I don't even see any first-level analysis of what would have been better. Like, I'm talking about immediate effects of a "superior" strategy before accounting the inevitable Nash equilibrium that comes from an Axis reaction to the change.

I had heard that it was generally a bigger strain on a nation's industry to be able to knock out their methods of war at the point right before it could be used towards any effectiveness. That is, they made the tank, they trained the crew, they moved it to a staging area before a front, filled it up with gas an ammo, and then you just go and sucker punch it. The bombers didn't have that kind of targeting capability. That also does fly in the face of apparently how well we were doing with knocking out ball bearing plants of all things, which is on the near-complete opposite end of that logistics train.

I do generally agree that the arguments for the bombing as they were did not have the intended effect on morale. I don't think it's too controversial for me to say one shouldn't bank a strategy based on its effect on enemy morale, but rather should just be able to take advantage of low morale if it happens. I've just seen it come up so much that arguments about one's own morale being superior mean the dumbest poo poo happened (French Elan in WW1, Japanese attitudes towards US in WW2, strategic bombing, Vietnam, Operation Iraq Freedom). In the context of bombing civilians, it seems even more counter-productive. After all, what are the civilians going to do... desert the army?

IIRC, Something Albert Speer noted in his memoirs was that in the aftermath of Operation Chastise the RAF and the USAAF failed to perform any significant follow-up raids on the dam, which allowed it to be rebuilt relatively quickly. Speer estimated that, had there been a serious effort to disrupt the repair effort or to carry out similar raids on other Ruhr dams, a major portion of Germany's industrial capacity could have suffered far greater negative effects than they otherwise did.

Acebuckeye13 fucked around with this message at 02:24 on Feb 3, 2018

# ? Feb 3, 2018 02:21

Comstar: Apr 20, 2007; Are you happy now?

Mycroft Holmes posted:

if i may suggest something, a guy named Sbiper on ah.com is doing a really well researched and written Bomber Command story. It's essentially an academic sent back in time and inhabiting harrises body. dude has like 100 books about bomber command he has read just to write up to September 1944. it's really good. https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/and-they-shall-reap-the-whirlwind.333009/

That sounds interesting. What does he do differently or end up doing the same thing?

# ? Feb 3, 2018 02:31

Mycroft Holmes: Mar 26, 2010; by Azathoth

Comstar posted:

That sounds interesting. What does he do differently or end up doing the same thing?

he's really focusing on percision using specialized pathfinders dropping target flares and a bunch of electronic gadgets that existed in real life but were flawed or poorly used. the best part is once the allies land in france he uses lancasters to perform close air support for british troops. theres some haunting imagery in this story.

# ? Feb 3, 2018 05:10

Acebuckeye13: Nov 2, 2010; Ultra Carp

Mycroft Holmes posted:

he's really focusing on percision using specialized pathfinders dropping target flares and a bunch of electronic gadgets that existed in real life but were flawed or poorly used. the best part is once the allies land in france he uses lancasters to perform close air support for british troops. theres some haunting imagery in this story.

I feel like the ghost of Leslie McNair would look poorly on this strategy

# ? Feb 3, 2018 05:14

ughhhh: Oct 17, 2012

Mycroft Holmes posted:

if i may suggest something, a guy named Sbiper on ah.com is doing a really well researched and written Bomber Command story. It's essentially an academic sent back in time and inhabiting harrises body. dude has like 100 books about bomber command he has read just to write up to September 1944. it's really good. https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/and-they-shall-reap-the-whirlwind.333009/

cant seem to read that story even though i signed up for the forum. Is it a closed thread?

# ? Feb 3, 2018 05:33

HEY GUNS: Oct 11, 2012; FOPTIMUS PRIME

C U R S E D S E V E N T E E N T H C E N T U R Y I M A G E

# ? Feb 3, 2018 06:27

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# ? May 27, 2024 10:36

HEY GUNS: Oct 11, 2012; FOPTIMUS PRIME

Rocko Bonaparte posted:

I do generally agree that the arguments for the bombing as they were did not have the intended effect on morale. I don't think it's too controversial for me to say one shouldn't bank a strategy based on its effect on enemy morale, but rather should just be able to take advantage of low morale if it happens. I've just seen it come up so much that arguments about one's own morale being superior mean the dumbest poo poo happened (French Elan in WW1, Japanese attitudes towards US in WW2, strategic bombing, Vietnam, Operation Iraq Freedom). In the context of bombing civilians, it seems even more counter-productive. After all, what are the civilians going to do... desert the army?

i spend half my life in a city that was bombed to poo poo and all it did to their morale was piss them off.
the british still admire themselves for "blitz spirit," coming together under great adversity

the dresden bombing did, however, disrupt rail transport and knock out the light industry in the suburbs. if someone claims that the city was 100% not used for war related activity, they are misinformed or lying

edit: you need to include abu ghraib in your list, the people involved read some dumb goddamned book that claimed arabs were a tribal people who would cower if you were forceful enough and made sure to insult their masculinity. that's why we had them naked and on leashes, specifically that book's ideas about arab manhood

HEY GUNS fucked around with this message at 06:35 on Feb 3, 2018

# ? Feb 3, 2018 06:32

The Something Awful Forums > Archives > Comedy Goldmine > Military History Mk. III: One that I know of is an archaic word for dick, another is

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