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 Or, for the stateless United Shattered phone screen of America: 
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Feb 21, 2018 07:45
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So is that like 85 D-senators and 385 D-reps?
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Feb 21, 2018 07:54
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Vahakyla posted:So is that like 85 D-senators and 385 D-reps? Well in the first one every city clearly has its own rep, complete with surrounding suburbs, so probably.
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Feb 21, 2018 07:57
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Mr. Nice! posted:A fair map is drawn irrespective of the political leanings of the inhabitants. It shouldn't matter how many people are registered to one party or another when it comes to districting. That's the problem with partisan gerrymandering. Representatives choose districts based on voters that rig it in such a way to guarantee an outcome. The term fair was defined for us, handily, by using the four criteria of compactness, contiguity, equal population, and by trying to not divide political subdivisions. The first three are pretty self explanatory. I think I'm just unfortunately doing a really terrible job of explaining my thought process here. I completely understand why you want to keep cities and counties together. Thing is, I believe that this, in at least the case of Pennsylvania and probably for any state with large liberal urban areas, a map that is "fair to both parties" is at the cost of local governance because you should end up with a couple of districts that Democrats win by a landslide and a larger number of districts that Republicans win by 5-10%. In Pennsylvania, Democrats "waste" a ton of votes because of where they are concentrated. By 538's own analyses, if you draw a map that is blind to party affiliation, the resultant "most compact, contiguous, and equally populated" districts will result in an efficiency gap favorable to Republicans. This is true for both purely algorithmic maps as well as ones that try to adhere to local and county boundaries. These maps by definition are not gerrymandered -- it simply is the case that we have a ton of Democrats in only a minority of the districts. When the court made conscious decisions to correct for local boundaries in ways that turn a "natural" Republican efficiency from +9 to +3, they effectively have found a compact, contiguous, and equally-populated way to siphon Democrats into places where they're needed to win elections. Like I said, I like the outcome of the map. The red districts in this state are infuriating. But we all know that if our courts had four Republicans and three Democrats instead of the other way around, they would use the same tactics to create a compact, contiguous, and equally-populated map that utterly murdered the Democrats. The only way to prevent that from happening is to create politically blind maps by using algorithms that are agnostic to party affiliation.
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Feb 21, 2018 14:17
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tetrapyloctomy posted:I think I'm just unfortunately doing a really terrible job of explaining my thought process here. I completely understand why you want to keep cities and counties together. Thing is, I believe that this, in at least the case of Pennsylvania and probably for any state with large liberal urban areas, a map that is "fair to both parties" is at the cost of local governance because you should end up with a couple of districts that Democrats win by a landslide and a larger number of districts that Republicans win by 5-10%. The computer drawn map up at the top of this page looks a hell of a lot like the map presented by the court.
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Feb 21, 2018 14:55
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Mr. Nice! posted:The computer drawn map up at the top of this page looks a hell of a lot like the map presented by the court. That shouldn't be surprising -- you don't necessarily need to make huge, obvious changes in order to move enough Democrats onto one side or another of the line to skew the results. Again, 538 provides the efficiency gaps for various models, and one that is drawn solely based on making compact, contiguous districts that don't break up localities results in a +9 efficiency gap for Republicans. It's only by consciously futzing with boundaries to favor the odds that Democrats pick up another district or two that you end up with the +3 Republican efficiency gap that the new map has.
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Feb 21, 2018 15:09
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The SCOPA isn't using 538's algorithms to figure out the map. 538 has a lot of credibility in election coverage, but that doesn't mean that they have the perfect model or the exclusive algorithm to chop up districts. I don't believe they started with a +9r map and then modified it until it became +3 dem.
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Feb 21, 2018 15:44
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FAUXTON posted:iirc when you had computers drawing big polygons (like, one of the logic rules was to minimize the number of sides the polygons had) the result was a hilarious D-heavy gerrymander. Just because the result would be d-heavy doesn't make it a gerrymander.
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Feb 21, 2018 15:53
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 Opinions! CNH INDUSTRIAL N.V., ET AL. v. JACK REESE, ET AL. Brief Background: [The dispute is between retirees and their former employer (CNH Industrial in a couple of entities), and whether or not their expired collective bargaining agreement created a vested right to lifetime health care benefits. The question for the court is if the agreement's expiration clause limits all benefits or not, and whether or not the CBA is ambiguous. The Sixth Circuit said yes, based on its case Yard-Man which implied lifetime vesting if the contract was silent for retiree benefits.] Holding: The decision below does not comply with Tackett’s direction to apply ordinary contract principles. True, one such principle is that, when a contract is ambiguous, courts can consult extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intentions. But a contract is not ambiguous unless, “after applying established rules of interpretation, [it] remains reasonably susceptible to at least two reasonable but conflicting meanings.” Here, that means the 1998 agreement was not ambiguous unless it could reasonably be read as vesting health care benefits for life. The Sixth Circuit read it that way only by employing the inferences that this Court rejected in Tackett. The Sixth Circuit did not point to any explicit terms, implied terms, or industry practice suggesting that the 1998 agreement vested health care benefits for life...the only reasonable interpretation of the 1998 agreement is that the health care benefits expired when the collective-bargaining agreement expired in May 2004. “When the intent of the parties is unambiguously expressed in the contract, that expression controls, and the court’s inquiry should proceed no further.” Lineup: Per curiam. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-515_2c83.pdf STATE OF MONTANA v. STATE OF WYOMING AND STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA Brief Background: [Montana sued Wyoming for a violation of the Yellowstone River Compact for reducing water available in the Tongue River at the Stateline between Wyoming and Montana by 1300 acre feet in 2004 and 56 acre feet in 2006. Montana wins.] Judgment: Judgment is awarded in the amount of $20,340, together with prejudgment and post-judgment interest of seven percent (7%) per annum from the year of each violation until paid. Costs are awarded to Montana in the amount of $67,270.87. Lineup: Essentially per curiam (Original Jurisdiction). Kagan recused. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/137orig_new_2cp3.pdf DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS Brief Background: [Paul Somers worked for Digital Realty Trust as a Vice President. Somers alleges that he was fired for reporting suspected securities-law violations to senior management. He did not alert the SEC pre termination or file an administrative complaint within 180 days of termination. The question is if he qualifies as a whistleblower for Dodd-Frank despite not alerting the SEC.] Holding: “When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition,” even if it varies from a term’s ordinary meaning. This principle resolves the question before us. Our charge in this review proceeding is to determine the meaning of “whistleblower” in §78u–6(h), Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision. The definition section of the statute supplies an unequivocal answer: A “whistleblower” is “any individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission.” Leaving no doubt as to the definition’s reach, the statute instructs that the “definitio[n] shall apply” “[i]n this section,” that is, throughout §78u–6....The disposition of this case is therefore evident: Somers did not provide information “to the Commission” before his termination, §78u–6(a)(6), so he did not qualify as a “whistleblower” at the time of the alleged retaliation. He is therefore ineligible to seek relief under §78u–6(h). Lineup: Ginsburg, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Concurrence by Sotomayor, joined by Breyer. Concurrence by Thomas, joined by Alito and Gorsuch. Notes From Other Opinions: [Sotomayor and Thomas are sniping about whether legislative history is ok or not.] Sotomayor: I join the Court’s opinion in full. I write separately only to note my disagreement with the suggestion in my colleague’s concurrence that a Senate Report is not an appropriate source for this Court to consider when interpreting a statute. Thomas: I join the Court’s opinion only to the extent it relies on the text of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 124 Stat. 1376. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-1276_b0nd.pdf CLASS v. UNITED STATES Brief Background: [Class got indicted for having firearms in his jeep, parked in a lot on the US Capitol and thus illegal under 40 USC 5104(e)(1). He alleged violations of the 2nd Amendment and due process. He pled guilty and waived several appeal rights, but said nothing about the right to a direct appeal of constitutionality. He then tried to appeal and the Court of Appeals said he had waived constitutional claims.] Holding: The question is whether a guilty plea by itself bars a federal criminal defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction on direct appeal. We hold that it does not. Class did not relinquish his right to appeal the District Court’s constitutional determinations simply by pleading guilty...Fifty years ago this Court directly addressed a similar claim (a claim that the statute of conviction was unconstitutional). And the Court stated that a defendant’s “plea of guilty did not . . . waive his previous [constitutional] claim.” Lineup: Breyer, joined by Roberts, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan and Gorsuch. Dissent by Alito, joined by Kennedy and Thomas. Notes From Other Opinions: Alito: By my count, the Court identifies no fewer than five rules for ascertaining the issues that can be raised. According to the Court, a defendant who pleads guilty may assert on appeal (1) a claim that “implicates ‘the very power of the State’ to prosecute [him],” ante, at 4, (2) a claim that does not contradict the facts alleged in the charging document, ante, at 5–6, (3) a claim that “‘the facts alleged and admitted do not constitute a crime,’” ante, at 5, and (4) claims other than “case-related constitutional defects that ‘occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea,’” ante, at 6–7 (some internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the Court suggests (5) that such a defendant may not be able to assert a claim that “contradict[s] the terms of . . . [a] written plea agreement,” ante, at 6, but whether this rule applies when the claim falls into one of the prior four categories is left unclear. How these rules fit together is anybody’s guess. And to make matters worse, the Court also fails to make clear whether its holding is based on the Constitution or some other ground... In determining whether a plea of guilty prevents a defendant in federal or state court from raising a particular issue on appeal, the first question is whether the Federal Constitution precludes waiver. If the Federal Constitution permits waiver, the next question is whether some other law nevertheless bars waiver. And if no law prevents waiver, the final question is whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the right to raise the claim on appeal. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-424_g2bh.pdf RUBIN ET AL. v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN ET AL. Brief Background: [Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act gives foreign states sovereign immunity. There are exceptions. Rubin has a judgment against Iran based on one of the exceptions (Iran being a state sponsor of terrorism). The question is if Rubin can attach antiquities owned by Iran and possessed by the University of Chicago.] Holding: Petitioners contend that the property is stripped of its immunity by another provision of the FSIA, §1610(g), which they maintain provides a blanket exception to the immunity typically afforded to the property of a foreign state where the party seeking to attach and execute holds a §1605A judgment. We disagree. Section 1610(g) serves to identify property that will be available for attachment and execution in satisfaction of a §1605A judgment, but it does not in itself divest property of immunity. Rather, the provision’s language “as provided in this section” shows that §1610(g) operates only when the property at issue is exempt from immunity as provided elsewhere in §1610. Petitioners cannot invoke §1610(g) to attach and execute against the antiquities at issue here, which petitioners have not established are exempt from immunity under any other provision in §1610. ... [T]he FSIA similarly provides as a default that “the property in the United States of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment arrest and execution.” §1609. But, again, there are exceptions, and §1610 outlines the circumstances under which property will not be immune. See §1610. For example, subsection (a) expressly provides that property “shall not be immune” from attachment and execution where, inter alia, it is “used for a commercial activity in the United States” and the “judgment relates to a claim for which the foreign state is not immune under section 1605A or section 1605(a)(7) (as such section was in effect on January 27, 2008), regardless of whether the property is or was involved with the act upon which the claim is based.” §1610(a)(7). ... The issue at hand is whether §1610(g) does something more; whether, like the commercial activity exception in §1610(a)(7), it provides an independent exception to immunity so that it allows a §1605A judgment holder to attach and execute against any property of the foreign state, regardless of whether the property is deprived of immunity elsewhere in §1610. We turn first to the text of the statute. Section 1610(g)(1) provides that certain property will be “subject to attachment in aid of execution, and execution, upon [a §1605A] judgment as provided in this section.” The most natural reading is that “this section” refers to §1610 as a whole, so that §1610(g)(1) will govern the attachment and execution of property that is exempted from the grant of immunity as provided elsewhere in §1610. Lineup: Sotomayor, unanimous (other than Kagan, recused). ... If the Court were to conclude that §1610(g) establishes a basis for the withdrawal of property immunity any time a plaintiff holds a judgment under §1605A, each of those provisions would be rendered superfluous because a judgment holder could always turn to §1610(g), regardless of whether the conditions of any other provision were met. ... Beyond their citation to Bank Markazi, petitioners have not directed us to any evidence that supports their position that §1610(g) was intended to divest all property of a foreign state or its agencies or instrumentalities of immunity. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that 28 U. S. C. §1610(g) does not provide a freestanding basis for parties holding a judgment under §1605A to attach and execute against the property of a foreign state, where the immunity of the property is not otherwise rescinded under a separate provision within §1610. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-534_6jfm.pdf MURPHY v. SMITH ET AL. Brief Background: [Murphy won a civil rights suit, with attorney's fees, against his prison guards. The statute says that “a portion of the [prisoner’s] judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant.” The district court awarded 10%. The 7th circuit said it had to be 25%.] Holding: This is a case about how much prevailing prisoners must pay their lawyers. When a prisoner wins a civil rights suit and the district court awards fees to the prisoner’s attorney, a federal statute says that “a portion of the [prisoner’s] judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of attorney’s fees is not greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant.” Whatever else you might make of this, the first sentence pretty clearly tells us that the prisoner has to pay some part of the attorney’s fee award before financial responsibility shifts to the defendant. But how much is enough? Does the first sentence allow the district court discretion to take any amount it wishes from the plaintiff ’s judgment to pay the attorney, from 25% down to a penny? Or does the first sentence instead mean that the court must pay the attorney’s entire fee award from the plaintiff ’s judgment until it reaches the 25% cap and only then turn to the defendant? ... As always, we start with the specific statutory language in dispute. That language (again) says “a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded.” ... First, the word “shall” usually creates a mandate, not a liberty, so the verb phrase “shall be applied” tells us that the district court has some nondiscretionary duty to perform. discretion”). Second, immediately following the verb we find an infinitival phrase (“to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded”) that specifies the purpose or aim of the verb's non-discretionary duty. Third, we know that when you purposefully seek or aim “to satisfy” an obligation, especially a financial obligation, that usually means you intend to discharge the obligation in full. Together, then, these three clues suggest that the court (1) must apply judgment funds toward the fee award (2) with the purpose of (3) fully discharging the fee award. And to meet that duty, a district court must apply as much of the judgment as necessary to satisfy the fee award, without of course exceeding the 25% cap. Lineup: Gorsuch, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito. Dissent by Sotomayor, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer and Kagan. Notes From Other Opinions: Sotomayor: The text of §1997e(d)(2)—“a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant”—and its statutory context make clear that the provision permits district courts to exercise discretion in choosing the portion of a prisoner-plaintiff ’s monetary judgment that must be applied toward an attorney’s fee award, so long as that portion is not greater than 25 percent. I therefore respectfully dissent. In approaching this case, it helps to understand the background of the fee award at issue. On July 25, 2011, petitioner Charles Murphy, a prisoner at the Vandalia Correctional Center in Illinois, reported that his assigned seat at mealtime had food and water on it, which resulted in Murphy being handcuffed and escorted to a segregation building. Once there, Murphy taunted respondent Correctional Officer Robert Smith, who responded by hitting Murphy in the eye and applying a choke hold, causing Murphy to lose consciousness. When Murphy woke up, Officer Smith and respondent Lieutenant Gregory Fulk were pushing him into a cell. His hands were still cuffed behind his back and he fell face-first into the cell and hit his head on a metal toilet. Officer Smith and Lieutenant Fulk then stripped Murphy of his clothes, removed his handcuffs, and left him in the cell without checking his condition. Thirty or forty minutes passed until a nurse arrived to attend to Murphy, who was sent to a hospital. Part of his eye socket had been crushed and required surgery. Despite the procedure, Murphy did not fully recover; almost five years later, his vision remained doubled and blurred. ... Beginning with the neighboring text, it may well be that, standing alone, “to satisfy” is often used to mean “to completely fulfill an obligation.” But the statutory provision here does not simply say “to satisfy”; it says “applied to satisfy.” As a matter of everyday usage, the phrase “applied to satisfy” often means “applied toward the satisfaction of,” rather than “applied in complete fulfillment of.” Thus, whereas an action undertaken “to satisfy” an obligation might, as the majority suggests, naturally be understood as an effort to discharge the obligation in full, ante, at 3, a contribution that is “applied to satisfy” an obligation need not be intended to discharge the obligation in full. Take a few examples: A consumer makes a payment on her credit card, which her agreement with the card company provides shall be “applied to satisfy” her debt. A student enrolls in a particular type of math class, the credits from which her university registrar earlier announced shall be “applied to satisfy” the requirements of a physics degree. And a law firm associate contributes hours to a pro bono matter that her firm has provided may be “applied to satisfy” the firm’s overall billable-hours requirement. In each case, pursuant to the relevant agreement, the payment, credits, and hours are applied toward the satisfaction of a larger obligation, but the inference is not that the consumer, student, or associate had to contribute or even necessarily did contribute the maximum possible credit card payment, classroom credits, or hours toward the fulfillment of those obligations. ... The majority suggests that if Congress had wanted to permit judges to pursue something other than full discharge of the fee award from the judgment, it could have replaced “to satisfy” with “to reduce” or “against.” Ante, at 3. But the majority ignores that Congress also easily could have written §1997e(d)(2) to more clearly express the meaning it and respondents champion...In fact, Congress considered and rejected language prior to enacting the current attorney’s fee apportionment provision that would have done just what the majority claims. ... The rest of the statutory text confirms that district courts have discretion to choose the amount of the judgment that must be applied toward the attorney’s fee award. Specifically, that grant of discretion is evident from Congress’ use of two discretion-conferring terms, “portion” and “not to exceed.” https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-1067_q86b.pdf [internal citations omitted throughout]
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Feb 21, 2018 18:04
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GlyphGryph posted:Just because the result would be d-heavy doesn't make it a gerrymander. It would be if it places 75%+ of the representation with a party holding ~55% of the vote. That's the whole point of gerrymandering.
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Feb 21, 2018 18:37
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ulmont posted:STATE OF MONTANA v. STATE OF WYOMING AND STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA ...what was the point of this? edit: reading again, they appointed a special master and just approved what he said. The closest thing to "small claims" courts states can use to sue each other?
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Feb 21, 2018 18:47
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hobbesmaster posted:edit: reading again, they appointed a special master and just approved what he said. The closest thing to "small claims" courts states can use to sue each other? Basically (sovereign immunity is a bitch), although this case has been going on for several years and Montana has never really gotten what they wanted. https://www.courthousenews.com/montana-wins-in-water-dispute-with-wyoming/ http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/montana-v-wyoming-and-north-dakota/
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Feb 21, 2018 19:05
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FAUXTON posted:It would be if it places 75%+ of the representation with a party holding ~55% of the vote. That's the whole point of gerrymandering. Gerrymandering requires intent to achieve that outcome, though. That level of discrepancy might be strong evidence for intent, but it doesn't mean there is intent, intrinsically. Still probably not fair and worth changing, but not gerrymandering.
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Feb 21, 2018 19:29
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GlyphGryph posted:Still probably not fair and worth changing, but not gerrymandering. You're going to have to define fair much more tightly before you use that term here. More compact? More competitive elections? More minority inclusion? More representative of the political makeup of a state?
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Feb 21, 2018 19:37
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I'd say a random truly party-blind map that gave one party that much of the vote is probably (but not necessarily) violating several concepts of fairness, but still isn't necessarily a gerrymander. I don't think which ones matter to this conversation.
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Feb 21, 2018 19:54
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ulmont posted:] This literally reads like a childe writing a 2nd grade assignment on sentence diagramming. How is this man on the Supreme Court?
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Feb 21, 2018 23:23
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cis autodrag posted:This literally reads like a childe writing a 2nd grade assignment on sentence diagramming. How is this man on the Supreme Court? Because of her emails.
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Feb 21, 2018 23:40
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cis autodrag posted:This literally reads like a childe writing a 2nd grade assignment on sentence diagramming. How is this man on the Supreme Court? Trump, with some help from Mitch McConnell and the fact that we are in the Darkest Timeline. ...but let's remember that Harriet Miers drat near got on the court under GWB and she was even less coherent.
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Feb 21, 2018 23:40
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ulmont posted:Trump, with some help from Mitch McConnell and the fact that we are in the Darkest Timeline. Being nominated is not the same thing as nearly getting it. Almost immediately after being nominated even Republicans were dumping on her and saying she was not a good pick (mainly because she had no judicial record of opposing abortion, still though). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harriet_Miers_Supreme_Court_nomination
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Feb 21, 2018 23:43
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cis autodrag posted:This literally reads like a childe writing a 2nd grade assignment on sentence diagramming. How is this man on the Supreme Court? I knew just from the wording at the start of the decision that it was Gorsuch's writing. That he's probably going to spend the next 40-50 years as a member of the SCOTUS is a loving travesty and I hope the country has such a far left wave at some point that the Dems just go "yeah no gently caress this guy and his stolen seat" and either impeach him or just stack the bench.
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Feb 22, 2018 00:19
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Why does he keep using "you"?!? is he dictating this into a mirror or something?
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Feb 22, 2018 01:03
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Evil Fluffy posted:I knew just from the wording at the start of the decision that it was Gorsuch's writing. That he's probably going to spend the next 40-50 years as a member of the SCOTUS is a loving travesty and I hope the country has such a far left wave at some point that the Dems just go "yeah no gently caress this guy and his stolen seat" and either impeach him or just stack the bench. yeah, alito is evil and thomas is hilariously nuts, but they're both fundamentally qualified to be on the court gorsuch is... not
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Feb 22, 2018 01:07
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Chadderbox posted:Being nominated is not the same thing as nearly getting it. Almost immediately after being nominated even Republicans were dumping on her and saying she was not a good pick (mainly because she had no judicial record of opposing abortion, still though). http://stillangryblog.blogspot.com/2005/10/et-tu-w.html?m=1
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Feb 22, 2018 01:35
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hobbesmaster posted:edit: reading again, they appointed a special master and just approved what he said. The closest thing to "small claims" courts states can use to sue each other? Here's one of the earlier orders and judgments (March 2016), which I think led to the Special Master coming up with the $20K number: quote:The Court having exercised original jurisdiction over this controversy among sovereign States; the issues having been tried before the Special Master appointed by this Court; the Court having considered the briefs on the parties’ exceptions to the Second Interim Report of the Special Master; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS:
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Feb 22, 2018 16:55
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PA GOP is demanding a "do-over", apparently.
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Feb 22, 2018 17:06
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hobbesmaster posted:...what was the point of this? I think the SCOTUS is usually the only court in which states can sue each other. They still have to petition for cert like any other parties though. Could be forgetting something about jurisdiction, maybe there's some gold tassel clause that allows states to file new suits against each other in circuit courts or something. Pretty sure it's SCOTUS only though. Polygynous posted:PA GOP is demanding a "do-over", apparently. The PA GOP already told the PA SC they wouldn't even be trying to submit a map, they tried appealing to the SCOTUS and got noped by Alito, are they seriously going back to the PA SC and asking for a whole new hearing after acting like loving toddlers? FAUXTON fucked around with this message at 17:09 on Feb 22, 2018 |
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Feb 22, 2018 17:06
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FAUXTON posted:I think the SCOTUS is usually the only court in which states can sue each other. They still have to petition for cert like any other parties though. I thought cert was for appellate jurisdiction, for original jurisdiction wouldn't you "just" file your complaint like any other trial court?
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Feb 22, 2018 17:09
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FAUXTON posted:I think the SCOTUS is usually the only court in which states can sue each other. They still have to petition for cert like any other parties though. quote:Article III, section 2, of the Constitution distributes the federal judicial power between the Supreme Court's appellate and original jurisdiction, providing that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in "all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls," and in cases to which a state is a party. In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress made the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction exclusive in suits between two or more states, between a state and a foreign government, and in suits against ambassadors and other public ministers. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the remainder of suits to which a state was a party was to be concurrent, presumably with state courts since the statute did not expressly confer these cases upon the inferior federal courts. So yeah, for states suing each other it's Supreme Court or piss off. In practice the Supreme Court farms all of these out to a Special Master and then just rules on the Special Master's recommendations and objections thereto.
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Feb 22, 2018 17:11
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hobbesmaster posted:I thought cert was for appellate jurisdiction, for original jurisdiction wouldn't you "just" file your complaint like any other trial court? The big pot lawsuit a bunch of bastard states filed against Colorado was denied but I'm probably just wrong on what certiorari actually is.
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Feb 22, 2018 17:12
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hobbesmaster posted:I thought cert was for appellate jurisdiction, for original jurisdiction wouldn't you "just" file your complaint like any other trial court? For original jurisdiction you still have to file a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint. https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/supct/rule_17 The Supreme Court can and occasionally does say "we don't see this as an original jurisdiction case, gently caress off." The most recent one I recall was kicking the suit against Colorado for legalizing the demon weed. https://www.denverpost.com/2016/03/21/supreme-court-denies-oklahoma-and-nebraska-challenge-to-colorado-pot/ http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/nebraska-and-oklahoma-v-colorado/
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Feb 22, 2018 17:13
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FAUXTON posted:The PA GOP already told the PA SC they wouldn't even be trying to submit a map, they tried appealing to the SCOTUS and got noped by Alito, are they seriously going back to the PA SC and asking for a whole new hearing after acting like loving toddlers? Yes.
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Feb 22, 2018 17:19
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Keeshhound posted:Yes. Not quite... I skimmed a few articles and they seem to just have stapled the new map to it and sent it back to SCOTUS?  edit: I can't even https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/pennsylvania-congressional-map-battle-lands-in-supreme-court posted:The filing made late Wednesday asked Justice Samuel Alito to intervene, saying the state Supreme Court overstepped its authority in imposing a new map. Polygynous fucked around with this message at 17:27 on Feb 22, 2018 |
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Feb 22, 2018 17:23
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cis autodrag posted:This literally reads like a childe writing a 2nd grade assignment on sentence diagramming. How is this man on the Supreme Court? gently caress me, thank you for pointing this out. it usually takes me a bit to really wrap my head around these opinions, but i was drawing a total blank on what the hell was going on with this one till i scrolled down. what an utter joke of a person gorsuch is.
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Feb 22, 2018 17:25
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I'm basically waiting for the chode to either write a Scalia-esque opinion that ends up doing the opposite of his political leanings, or starts an opinion with "The Oxford dictionary defines [x] as...".
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Feb 22, 2018 17:33
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FAUXTON posted:The big pot lawsuit a bunch of bastard states filed against Colorado was denied but I'm probably just wrong on what certiorari actually is. The supreme court has permissive jurisdiction over everything it does. They don't have to hear a case if they don't want to do so. While they have original (and exclusive) jurisdiction to hear state v state cases, they don't have to take the case at all if they don't have enough justices willing to hear it.
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Feb 22, 2018 17:43
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Mr. Nice! posted:The supreme court has permissive jurisdiction over everything it does. They don't have to hear a case if they don't want to do so. While they have original (and exclusive) jurisdiction to hear state v state cases, they don't have to take the case at all if they don't have enough justices willing to hear it. Oh that part I know, I just thought all suits had to petition for certiorari, rather than certiorari being a specifically appellate type of petition. Reading the denial of the Prudes, Fascists, Also My Home State  et al v. Colorado suit it would appear the not-Colorado states filed a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint. Or, compliant  .
FAUXTON fucked around with this message at 18:00 on Feb 22, 2018 |
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Feb 22, 2018 17:57
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Cert has to do with appeals. When acting in original jurisdiction the parties file directly with the court. Everything has old latin names because lawyers are obtuse assholes.
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Feb 22, 2018 18:06
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Polygynous posted:Not quite... I skimmed a few articles and they seem to just have stapled the new map to it and sent it back to SCOTUS? What the Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't the PASC basically say in the ruling "the map you have now is unconstitutional, you have until (date) to make a new one or we'll make one ourselves"? Meaning the PA GOP could very well have made a new map themselves instead of throwing a temper tantrum like a bunch of children?
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Feb 22, 2018 18:17
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Mr. Nice! posted:The supreme court has permissive jurisdiction over everything it does. What's the constitutional basis for this - the Constitution says that "the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction", not "the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction unless they don't feel like it that day?" On the appellate side, I get it, because it's explicitly "under such regulations as the Congress shall make," but I don't see a textual hook for the Supreme Court to reject any original jurisdiction case (particularly where the original jurisdiction is exclusive).
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Feb 22, 2018 18:21
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That shall is not directing them to take any case, but rather granting them exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. There still must be a justiciable case or controversy otherwise the court cannot hear the claim.
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Feb 22, 2018 18:23
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