|
Nevvy Z posted:This question isn't "why do they get to do this?" the question is "who is going to make them do otherwise?" Congress. It's literally as simple as them passing a law that says that original jurisdiction cases are mandatory. Congress has the power to overrule the SCOTUS and has done so in the past. I can't remember any of them off the top of my head but some legislation has basically said "this is being passed because the SCOTUS wrongly decided X case."
|
#
?
Feb 23, 2018 22:50
|
|
|
|
| # ? May 9, 2024 04:39 |
|
|
Ceiling fan posted:I think you guys haven't considered the idea that all those precedents have just been overturned. could have sworn that I heard the Senate "SHALL advise and consent" about something oh well, probably wasn't important
|
|
#
?
Feb 23, 2018 22:56
|
|
|
Mr. Nice! posted:Congress. It's literally as simple as them passing a law that says that original jurisdiction cases are mandatory. Congress has the power to overrule the SCOTUS and has done so in the past. I can't remember any of them off the top of my head but some legislation has basically said "this is being passed because the SCOTUS wrongly decided X case." The RFRA was this E: also the Reconstruction Amendments E2: Ooh and the 16th Amendment
|
|
#
?
Feb 23, 2018 22:57
|
|
|
VitalSigns posted:The RFRA was this And the Lilly Ledbetter Act.
|
|
#
?
Feb 23, 2018 23:10
|
|
|
Mr. Nice! posted:Congress. It's literally as simple as them passing a law that says that original jurisdiction cases are mandatory. Congress has the power to overrule the SCOTUS and has done so in the past. I can't remember any of them off the top of my head but some legislation has basically said "this is being passed because the SCOTUS wrongly decided X case." Right. But they aren't. I was putting your point a different way. 
|
|
#
?
Feb 23, 2018 23:11
|
|
|
Ceiling fan posted:I think you guys haven't considered the idea that all those precedents have just been overturned. Is that actually Neil Gorsuch, Justice of the Supreme Court, interpreting that "shall" conveys a duty to do a thing, for example, the document Republicans love to rule-lawyer out of respecting posted:[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court... Like, that "shall" establishes a process that shall take place? Potato Salad fucked around with this message at 23:26 on Feb 23, 2018 |
|
#
?
Feb 23, 2018 23:22
|
|
|
Potato Salad posted:Is that actually Neil Gorsuch, Justice of the Supreme Court, interpreting that "shall" conveys a duty to do a thing, for example, advising and consenting with the president of the United States on court appointments? 
|
|
#
?
Feb 23, 2018 23:24
|
|
|
I'm the admission that Congress was in fact in dereliction of duty. Obama should've sent the army to deliver his appointment letter to the floor of Congress. We've been in a silent coup, and I fear we did not stomp it out hard enough fast enough to escape extreme measures. Holyshit I've become completely unhinged.
|
|
#
?
Feb 23, 2018 23:30
|
|
|
Potato Salad posted:I'm the admission that Congress was in fact in dereliction of duty. The argument being that they have a requirement to advise and that means an up down vote? I buy it.
|
|
#
?
Feb 23, 2018 23:44
|
|
|
Potato Salad posted:Is that actually Neil Gorsuch, Justice of the Supreme Court, interpreting that "shall" conveys a duty to do a thing, for example, 
|
|
#
?
Feb 23, 2018 23:58
|
|
|
Blew beer though my nose laughing
|
|
#
?
Feb 24, 2018 00:23
|
|
|
I am not a lawyer, but I use *shall* in contracts all the time.
|
|
#
?
Feb 24, 2018 01:03
|
|
|
So what’s expected to happen with the Janus case for union fees?
|
|
#
?
Feb 26, 2018 01:47
|
|
|
Shimrra Jamaane posted:So what’s expected to happen with the Janus case for union fees? Unions are hosed, I assume.
|
|
#
?
Feb 26, 2018 02:42
|
|
|
Shimrra Jamaane posted:So what’s expected to happen with the Janus case for union fees?
|
|
#
?
Feb 26, 2018 05:14
|
|
|
Shimrra Jamaane posted:So what’s expected to happen with the Janus case for union fees? When Scalia kicked the bucket, a similar case went 4-4, which kept unions from getting gutted. Janus will probably be 5-4 in favor of allowing public-sector employees to become freeloaders (since unions will have to represent people who can’t be required to pay dues to support the union), which could be catastrophic for organized labor in the US. My understanding is that there’s already a privately sector version of Janus working through the courts, so if Janus goes the way it’s expected to, private sector unions will also get hurt as soon as someone cites Janus as precident. The one upside for organized labor is that Janus might accidentally remove existing restrictions on collective bargaining, which could have some completely unintended consequences. https://theintercept.com/2018/02/25/conservatives-public-sector-unions-janus/
|
|
#
?
Feb 26, 2018 11:30
|
|
|
azflyboy posted:When Scalia kicked the bucket, a similar case went 4-4, which kept unions from getting gutted. Janus will probably be 5-4 in favor of allowing public-sector employees to become freeloaders (since unions will have to represent people who can’t be required to pay dues to support the union), which could be catastrophic for organized labor in the US. Money is speech, worker association is terrorism
|
|
#
?
Feb 26, 2018 18:22
|
|
|
All of the reporters who came out of arguments this morning said that Kennedy went hard after unions, so RIP American workers
|
|
#
?
Feb 26, 2018 18:35
|
|
|
What is the legal basis for requiring unions to represent free riders?
|
|
#
?
Feb 27, 2018 00:05
|
|
|
Stultus Maximus posted:What is the legal basis for requiring unions to represent free riders? The union doesn't represent free riders at the moment in the public sector. Unions have been decimated in all "right to work" states because they cannot afford to represent free riders and have thus lost a significant amount of power. The public sector unions right now have two different types of dues they collect - full member paying dues which are used for both negotiation and lobbying efforts, and then from the ones that opt out they collect a lower amount that is just used for negotiation with management. All the public sector employees are required to contribute at least that portion to their union. The argument from the challengers is that because the negotiation is being done with the government, that it is also political speech and they cannot be forced to support political speech. If this gets held to be correct by the SCOTUS, then all public sector union activity will be considered political speech and thus no compulsory dues from anyone can be collected. This breaks the union's back as it will not have the funds to continue operating in the same way RTW has in the private sector.
|
|
#
?
Feb 27, 2018 00:10
|
|
|
Mr. Nice! posted:The union doesn't represent free riders at the moment in the public sector. Unions have been decimated in all "right to work" states because they cannot afford to represent free riders and have thus lost a significant amount of power. Okay. The piece I read either implied or I misinterpreted to say that unions would have to keep representing everyone in the workplace even if everyone doesn't have to contribute.
|
|
#
?
Feb 27, 2018 00:21
|
|
|
Stultus Maximus posted:Okay. The piece I read either implied or I misinterpreted to say that unions would have to keep representing everyone in the workplace even if everyone doesn't have to contribute. That is the case under whatever state's law this is. However, if all this union activity is "speech," then it is less clear if those laws survive, and several cases have been filed to take as much advantage of a Janus loss by the unions as possible. Edit: Illinois from the transcript. ulmont fucked around with this message at 00:47 on Feb 27, 2018 |
|
#
?
Feb 27, 2018 00:40
|
|
|
As a union member how soon will the ruling be / when do I die
|
|
#
?
Feb 27, 2018 03:24
|
|
|
Uncle Wemus posted:As a union member how soon will the ruling be / when do I die You've been dead for years, giving your life to make money for The Man. Rise up and take back your life, comrade!
|
|
#
?
Feb 27, 2018 05:23
|
|
|
Stultus Maximus posted:Okay. The piece I read either implied or I misinterpreted to say that unions would have to keep representing everyone in the workplace even if everyone doesn't have to contribute. They kind of do. The whole point is that even if you refuse to join and don't contribute, you still benefit from the wage and benefits the union negotiates as an employer is not gonna maintain a separate pay scale and benefit set for the two assholes in the office who won't join the union. The plaintiff here is being willfully obtuse by saying the union, by negotiating on his behalf, is engaging in political speech. He would like to not have to pay them money, even though he'll still benefit from the negotiation the union does. He wants a free ride. This breaks the union as people will stop paying dues and eventually they just won't have the money to operate. Wisconsin passed a law like this in 2010 for public sector unions (Glen Grothman called me a hippie and told me to get a job at the protest). You can look at union membership trends and union activity in WI since then to get an idea of what this looks like for the country. My mom works for the department of corrections there and she says only about a third of her staff is in the union anymore. The contract is basically just dictated by the state now and the union has the resources to fight on one or maybe two critical issues per renewal and that's it.
|
|
#
?
Feb 27, 2018 06:12
|
|
|
Didn't see this mentioned: Supreme Court decision on ‘dreamers’ puts pressure back on Congress to actquote:The Supreme Court declined Monday to intervene in a legal battle over the fate of the “dreamers” under President Trump, effectively extending a temporary reprieve to young undocumented immigrants shielded from deportation and providing Congress more time to come up with a legislative solution. So the dreamers are safe for the time being. The lower court orders mandating the program be continued are still law. That may change if and when the proper appeals channels play out, probably over the summer and into the fall. It's doubtful the Republican Congress would act before the elections. It seems we may have just enough time to get the Democrats seated and get this done with next January (assuming all goes as current trends predict).
|
|
#
?
Feb 27, 2018 06:20
|
|
|
cis autodrag posted:The plaintiff here is being willfully obtuse by saying the union, by negotiating on his behalf, is engaging in political speech. He would like to not have to pay them money, even though he'll still benefit from the negotiation the union does. He wants a free ride. This breaks the union as people will stop paying dues and eventually they just won't have the money to operate. The argument is going beyond just this, too. The argument is that any negotiation a public sector union does is inherently political, because they're public employees whose paychecks come out of government budgets, and therefore how public employees are treated is "government policy" and has unavoidable political aspects. Kennedy seemed to be very sympathetic to that argument, too.
|
|
#
?
Feb 27, 2018 06:48
|
|
|
Main Paineframe posted:The argument is going beyond just this, too. The argument is that any negotiation a public sector union does is inherently political, because they're public employees whose paychecks come out of government budgets, and therefore how public employees are treated is "government policy" and has unavoidable political aspects. Kennedy seemed to be very sympathetic to that argument, too. God this is the stupidest Ron Paul bullshit. The union is nothing more than the workers and their chosen representatives. Its only political in the sense that the idea that workers deserve to be paid enough to survive is somehow a hot political issue in our country.
|
|
#
?
Feb 27, 2018 06:56
|
|
|
cis autodrag posted:God this is the stupidest Ron Paul bullshit. The union is nothing more than the workers and their chosen representatives. Its only political in the sense that the idea that workers deserve to be paid enough to survive is somehow a hot political issue in our country.
|
|
#
?
Feb 27, 2018 07:01
|
|
|
What's the over-under on the latest GOP ACA lawsuit (we're not enforcing the mandate anymore, therefore the whole thing's unconstitutional lol!) actually making it to SCOTUS?
|
|
#
?
Feb 27, 2018 15:58
|
|
|
Grammarchist posted:What's the over-under on the latest GOP ACA lawsuit (we're not enforcing the mandate anymore, therefore the whole thing's unconstitutional lol!) actually making it to SCOTUS? Pretty good. They filed it in the Northern District of Texas, so they probably get a win until SCOTUS.
|
|
#
?
Feb 27, 2018 16:24
|
|
|
Hail fascist Satan, SCOTUS has a doozy for us! https://twitter.com/NPR/status/968508235966828551 5-3, Kagan recused. This is a big win for ICE, and a big win for indefinite arbitrary detainment.
|
|
#
?
Feb 27, 2018 16:51
|
|
|
Main Paineframe posted:Hail fascist Satan, SCOTUS has a doozy for us!
|
|
#
?
Feb 27, 2018 16:57
|
|
|
Main Paineframe posted:Hail fascist Satan, SCOTUS has a doozy for us! Oh holy christ, that's ridiculous.
|
|
#
?
Feb 27, 2018 17:00
|
|
|
Main Paineframe posted:Hail fascist Satan, SCOTUS has a doozy for us! From SCOTUSblog's live thread quote:The Supreme Court essentially held, many years ago, that detained aliens cannot be held indefinitely for constitutional reason. In this case, the Ninth Circuit used that holding to say that the immigration statutes themselves required bond hearings every six months to avoid indefinite detention. The Court said: That's not right, the statutes don't say that. But it remanded for the Ninth Circuit to consider whether the immigrant had valid constitutional claims regarding his detention. Sounds like a very complicated punt?
|
|
#
?
Feb 27, 2018 17:05
|
|
|
Hieronymous Alloy posted:Oh holy christ, that's ridiculous. I'm starting to wonder if it's reasonable to ask non Americans to even COME to the US
|
|
#
?
Feb 27, 2018 17:06
|
|
|
Main Paineframe posted:Hail fascist Satan, SCOTUS has a doozy for us! Motherfucking what? 
|
|
#
?
Feb 27, 2018 17:09
|
|
|
RuanGacho posted:I'm starting to wonder if it's reasonable to ask non Americans to even COME to the US
|
|
#
?
Feb 27, 2018 17:09
|
|
|
RuanGacho posted:I'm starting to wonder if it's reasonable to ask non Americans to even COME to the US https://www.nbcnews.com/business/travel/tourism-u-s-down-trump-took-office-costing-4-6-n840326
|
|
#
?
Feb 27, 2018 17:20
|
|
|
|
| # ? May 9, 2024 04:39 |
|
|
 Opinions! PATCHAK v. ZINKE, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL. Brief Background: Petitioner, David Patchak, sued the Secretary of the Interior for taking land into trust on behalf of an Indian Tribe. While his suit was pending in the District Court, Congress enacted the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act (Gun Lake Act or Act), Pub. L. 113–179, 128 Stat. 1913, which provides that suits relating to the land “shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed.” Patchak contends that, in enacting this statute, Congress impermissibly infringed the judicial power that Article III of the Constitution vests exclusively in the Judicial Branch. [i.e., can Congress take away the power to hear a pending case] Holding: The separation of powers, among other things, prevents Congress from exercising the judicial power. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211, 218 (1995). One way that Congress can cross the line from legislative power to judicial power is by “usurp[ing] a court’s power to interpret and apply the law to the [circumstances] before it.” Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 12). The simplest example would be a statute that says, “In Smith v. Jones, Smith wins.” See id., at ___–___, n. 17 (slip op., at 12–13, n. 17). At the same time, the legislative power is the power to make law, and Congress can make laws that apply retroactively to pending lawsuits, even when it effectively ensures that one side wins. See id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 15–19). To distinguish between permissible exercises of the legislative power and impermissible infringements of the judicial power, this Court’s precedents establish the following rule: Congress violates Article III when it “compel[s] . . . findings or results under old law.” Seattle Audubon, supra, at 438. But Congress does not violate Article III when it “changes the law.” Plaut, supra, at 218. Section 2(b) changes the law. Specifically, it strips federal courts of jurisdiction over actions “relating to” the Bradley Property. Before the Gun Lake Act, federal courts had jurisdiction to hear these actions. See 28 U. S. C. §1331. Now they do not. This kind of legal change is well within Congress’ authority and does not violate Article III. ... First, relying on United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (1872), Patchak argues that §2(b) flatly directs federal courts to dismiss lawsuits without allowing them to interpret or apply any new law. Second, relying on Plaut, 514 U. S. 211, Patchak argues that §2(b) attempts to interfere with this Court’s decision in Patchak I— specifically, its conclusion that his suit “may proceed,” 567 U. S., at 212. We reject both arguments. Section 2(b) does not flatly direct federal courts to dismiss lawsuits under old law. It creates new law for suits relating to the Bradley Property, and the District Court interpreted and applied that new law in Patchak’s suit. Section 2(b)’s “relating to” standard effectively guaranteed that Patchak’s suit would be dismissed. But “a statute does not impinge on judicial power when it directs courts to apply a new legal standard to undisputed facts.” ... Section 2(b) does not unconstitutionally interfere with this Court’s decision in Patchak I. Article III, this Court explained in Plaut, prohibits Congress from “retroactively commanding the federal courts to reopen final judgments.” 514 U. S., at 219. But Patchak I did not finally conclude Patchak’s case. See Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U. S. 696, 711, n. 14 (1974). When this Court said that his suit “may proceed,” 567 U. S., at 212, it meant that the Secretary’s preliminary defenses lacked merit and that Patchak could return to the District Court for further proceedings. It did not mean that Congress was powerless to change the law that governs his case. ... We conclude that §2(b) of the Gun Lake Act does not violate Article III of the Constitution. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, affirmed. Lineup: Thomas, joined by Breyer, Alito, and Kagan  . Concurrence by Breyer. Concurrence by Ginsburg, joined by Sotomayor. Dissent by Roberts, joined by Kennedy and Gorsuch. No majority opinion (so good luck figuring out the narrowest grounds if this comes up again; probably Ginsburg and Sotomayor's opinions).Notes From Other Opinions: Breyer: The statutory context makes clear that this is not simply a case in which Congress has said, “In Smith v. Jones, Smith wins.” See post, at 1, 11–12 (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting). In 2005, the Secretary of the Interior announced her decision to take the Bradley Property into trust for an Indian Tribe, the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians. See 70 Fed. Reg. 25596 (2005). The petitioner brought suit, claiming that the Secretary lacked the statutory authority to do so. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U. S. 379, 382 (2009) (the Indian Reorganization Act gives the Secretary authority to take land into trust only for a tribe under federal jurisdiction in 1934). Congress then enacted the law here at issue. . . Read together, Congress first made certain that federal statutes gave the Secretary the authority to take the Bradley Property into trust, and second tried to dot all the i’s by adding that federal courts shall not hear cases challenging the land’s trust status. The second part, the jurisdictional part, perhaps gilds the lily, perhaps simplifies judicial decisionmaking (the judge need only determine whether a lawsuit relates to the Bradley Property), but, read in context, it does no more than provide an alternative legal standard for courts to apply that seeks the same real-world result as does the first part: The Bradley Property shall remain in trust. Ginsburg: What Congress grants, it may retract. That is undoubtedly true of the Legislature’s authority to forgo or retain the Government’s sovereign immunity from suit. The Court need venture no further to decide this case. . . Congress acted effectively to displace the APA’s waiver of immunity for suits against the United States with a contrary command applicable to the Bradley Property: No action concerning the trust status of that property is currently attended by the sovereign’s consent to suit. For that reason, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upholding the District Court’s dismissal of Patchak’s case. Sotomayor: I agree with the dissent that Congress may not achieve through jurisdiction stripping what it cannot permissibly achieve outright, namely, directing entry of judgment for a particular party. I also agree that an Act that merely deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over a single proceeding is not enough to be considered a change in the law and that any statute that portends to do so should be viewed with great skepticism. See post, at 11–12 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). I differ with the dissent’s ultimate conclusion only because, as JUSTICE GINSBURG explains, the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act (Gun Lake Act), Pub. L. 113–179, 128 Stat. 1913, should not be read to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction but rather to restore the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity. Roberts: Two Terms ago, this Court unanimously agreed that Congress could not pass a law directing that, in the hypothetical pending case of Smith v. Jones, “Smith wins.” Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U. S. ___, ___, n. 17 (2016) (slip op., at 13, n. 17). Today, the plurality refuses to enforce even that limited principle in the face of a very real statute that dictates the disposition of a single pending case. Contrary to the plurality, I would not cede unqualified authority to the Legislature to decide the outcome of such a case. Article III of the Constitution vests that responsibility in the Judiciary alone. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-498_l5gm.pdf JENNINGS ET AL. v. RODRIGUEZ ET AL., INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED Brief Background: [Immigration officials are authorized to detain certain aliens in the course of immigration proceedings while they determine whether those aliens may be lawfully present in the country. The Government is also authorized to detain certain aliens already in the country. After a 2004 conviction, respondent Alejandro Rodriguez, a Mexican citizen and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was detained pursuant to §1226 while the Government sought to remove him. In May 2007, while still litigating his removal, Rodriguez filed a habeas petition, claiming that he was entitled to a bond hearing to determine whether his continued detention was justified. As relevant here, he and the class of aliens he represents allege that §§1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c) do not authorize “prolonged” detention in the absence of an individualized bond hearing at which the Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that detention remains justified. The Ninth Circuit construed §§1225(b) and 1226(c) as imposing an implicit 6-month time limit on an alien’s detention under those sections. After that point, the court held, the Government may continue to detain the alien only under the authority of §1226(a). The court then construed §1226(a) to mean that an alien must be given a bond hearing every six months and that detention beyond the initial 6-month period is permitted only if the Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that further detention is justified.] Holding: In this case we are asked to interpret three provisions of U. S. immigration law that authorize the Government to detain aliens in the course of immigration proceedings. All parties appear to agree that the text of these provisions, when read most naturally, does not give detained aliens the right to periodic bond hearings during the course of their detention. But by relying on the constitutional-avoidance canon of statutory interpretation, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that detained aliens have a statutory right to periodic bond hearings under the provisions at issue. Under the constitutional-avoidance canon, when statutory language is susceptible of multiple interpretations, a court may shun an interpretation that raises serious constitutional doubts and instead may adopt an alternative that avoids those problems. But a court relying on that canon still must interpret the statute, not rewrite it. Because the Court of Appeals in this case adopted implausible constructions of the three immigration provisions at issue, we reverse its judgment and remand for further proceedings. ... In sum, U. S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings under §§1226(a) and (c). The primary issue is the proper interpretation of §§1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c). ... In their complaint, Rodriguez and the other respondents argued that the relevant statutory provisions—§§1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c)—do not authorize “prolonged” detention in the absence of an individualized bond hearing at which the Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that the class member’s detention remains justified. Absent such a bond-hearing requirement, respondents continued, those three provisions would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. ... Part II, that Thomas and Gorsuch do not join: Before reaching the merits of the lower court’s interpretation, we briefly address whether we have jurisdiction to entertain respondents’ claims. We discuss two potential obstacles, 8 U. S. C. §§1252(b)(9) and 1226(e). Under §1252(b)(9): “Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter [including §§1225 and 1226] shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.” This provision does not deprive us of jurisdiction. . . . For present purposes, it is enough to note that respondents are not asking for review of an order of removal; they are not challenging the decision to detain them in the first place or to seek removal; and they are not even challenging any part of the process by which their removability will be determined. Under these circumstances, §1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar. ... We likewise hold that §1226(e) does not bar us from considering respondents’ claims. That provision states: “The Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application of [§1226] shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.” §1226(e). As we have previously explained, §1226(e) precludes an alien from “challeng[ing] a ‘discretionary judgment’ by the Attorney General or a ‘decision’ that the Attorney General has made regarding his detention or release.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U. S. 510, 516 (2003). But §1226(e) does not preclude “challenges [to] the statutory framework that permits [the alien’s] detention without bail.” Id., at 517. Respondents mount that second type of challenge here. ... When “a serious doubt” is raised about the constitutionality of an act of Congress, “it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” ... The Court of Appeals misapplied the canon in this case because its interpretations of the three provisions at issue here are implausible. In Parts III–A and III–B, we hold that, subject only to express exceptions, §§1225(b) and 1226(c) authorize detention until the end of applicable proceedings. And in Part III–C, we hold that there is no justification for any of the procedural requirements that the Court of Appeals layered onto §1226(a) without any arguable statutory foundation. ... Read most naturally, §§1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) []mandate detention of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded. . . . Nothing in the text of §1225(b)(1) or §1225(b)(2) even hints that those provisions restrict detention after six months. ... Like §1225(b), §1226(c) does not on its face limit thelength of the detention it authorizes. In fact, by allowing aliens to be released “only if ” the Attorney General decides that certain conditions are met, §1226(c) reinforces the conclusion that aliens detained under its authority are not entitled to be released under any circumstances other than those expressly recognized by the statute. And together with §1226(a), §1226(c) makes clear that detention of aliens within its scope must continue “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” §1226(a). ... Part III-C, that Sotomayor does join: Nothing in §1226(a)’s text—which says only that the Attorney General “may release” the alien “on . . . bond”—even remotely supports the imposition of either of those requirements. Nor does §1226(a)’s text even hint that the length of detention prior to a bond hearing must specifically be considered in determining whether the alien should be released. ... Because the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that periodic bond hearings are required under the immigration provisions at issue here, it had no occasion to consider respondents’ constitutional arguments on their merits. Consistent with our role as “a court of review, not of first view,” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005), we do not reach those arguments. Instead, we remand the case to the Court of Appeals to consider them in the first instance. Before the Court of Appeals addresses those claims, however, it should reexamine whether respondents can continue litigating their claims as a class. Lineup: Alito (opinion of the Court, except as to Part II), joined by Roberts and Kennedy, joined by Thomas and Gorsuch (other than for Part II), joined by Sotomayor (only for Part III-C). Concurrence by Thomas, joined by Gorsuch (other than footnote 6). Dissent by Breyer, joined by Ginsburg and Sotomayor. Kagan recused. Notes from other Opinions: Thomas: In my view, no court has jurisdiction over this case. Congress has prohibited courts from reviewing aliens’ claims related to their removal, except in a petition for review from a final removal order or in other circumstances not present here. See 8 U. S. C. §1252(b)(9). Respondents have not brought their claims in that posture, so §1252(b)(9) removes jurisdiction over their challenge to their detention. I would therefore vacate the judgment below with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Footnote 6, that Gorsuch does not join: I take no position on whether some of the respondents will face other jurisdictional hurdles, even on review of their final removal orders. See, e.g., §§1252(a)(2)(A), (B). I also continue to agree with Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Demore v. Kim, 538 U. S. 510 (2003), which explained that §1226(e) “unequivocally deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to set aside ‘any action or decision’ by the Attorney General” regarding detention. Breyer: The Court reads the statute as forbidding bail, hence forbidding a bail hearing, for these individuals. In my view, the majority’s interpretation of the statute would likely render the statute unconstitutional. Thus, I would follow this Court’s longstanding practice of construing a statute “so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score.” United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394, 401 (1916). And I would interpret the statute as requiring bail hearings, presumptively after six months of confinement. Cf. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678, 701 (2001). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/15-1204_f29g.pdf MERIT MANAGEMENT GROUP, LP v. FTI CONSULTING, INC. Brief Background: The Bankruptcy Code allows trustees to set aside and recover certain transfers for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate, including, as relevant here, certain fraudulent transfers “of an interest of the debtor in property.” 11 U. S. C. §548(a). It also sets out a number of limits on the exercise of these avoiding powers. Central here is the securities safe harbor, which, inter alia, provides that “the trustee may not avoid a transfer that is a . . . settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . or that is a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” §546(e). Valley View Downs, LP, and Bedford Downs Management Corp. entered into an agreement under which Valley View, if it got the last harness-racing license in Pennsylvania, would purchase all of Bedford Downs’ stock for $55 million. Valley View was granted the license and arranged for the Cayman Islands branch of Credit Suisse to wire $55 million to third-party escrow agent Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania. The Bedford Downs shareholders, including petitioner Merit Management Group, LP, deposited their stock certificates into escrow. Citizens Bank disbursed the $55 million over two installments according to the agreement, of which petitioner Merit received $16.5 million. Although Valley View secured the harness-racing license, it was unable to achieve its goal of opening a racetrack casino. Valley View and its parent company, Centaur, LLC, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Respondent FTI Consulting, Inc., was appointed to serve as trustee of the Centaur litigation trust. FTI then sought to avoid the transfer from Valley View to Merit for the sale of Bedford Downs’ stock, arguing that it was constructively fraudulent under §548(a)(1)(B). Merit contended that the §546(e) safe harbor barred FTI from avoiding the transfer because it was a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of)” two “financial institutions,” Credit Suisse and Citizens Bank. This Court is asked to determine how the safe harbor operates in the context of a transfer that was executed via one or more transactions, e.g., a transfer from A → D that was executed via B and C as intermediaries, such that the component parts of the transfer include A → B → C → D. If a trustee seeks to avoid the A → D transfer, and the §546(e) safe harbor is invoked as a defense, the question becomes: When determining whether the §546(e) securities safe harbor saves the transfer from avoidance, should courts look to the transfer that the trustee seeks to avoid (i.e., A → D) to determine whether that transfer meets the safe-harbor criteria, or should courts look also to any component parts of the overarching transfer (i.e., A → B → C → D)? Holding: The Court concludes that the plain meaning of §546(e) dictates that the only relevant transfer for purposes of the safe harbor is the transfer that the trustee seeks to avoid. ... Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code affords bankruptcy trustees the authority to “se[t] aside certain types of transfers . . . and . . . recaptur[e] the value of those avoided transfers for the benefit of the estate.” ... The particular avoidance provision at issue here is §548(a), which provides that a “trustee may avoid” certain fraudulent transfers “of an interest of the debtor in property.” ... The Code sets out a number of limits on the exercise of these avoiding powers. See, e.g., §546(a) (setting statute of limitations for avoidance actions); §§546(c)–(d) (setting certain policy-based exceptions to avoiding powers); §548(a)(2) (setting limit to avoidance of “a charitable contribution to a qualified religious or charitable entity or organization”). Central to this case is the securities safe harbor set forth in §546(e), which provides (as presently codified and in full): “Notwithstanding sections 544, 545, 547, 548(a)(1)(B), and 548(b) of this title, the trustee may not avoid a transfer that is a margin payment, as defined in section 101, 741, or 761 of this title, or settlement payment, as defined in section 101 or 741 of this title, made by or to (or for the benefit of) a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, financial participant, or securities clearing agency, or that is a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, financial participant, or securities clearing agency, in connection with a securities contract, as defined in section 741(7), commodity contract, as defined in section 761(4), or forward contract, that is made before the commencement of the case, except under section 548(a)(1)(A) of this title.” ... The question before this Court is whether the transfer between Valley View and Merit implicates the safe harbor exception because the transfer was “made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution.” §546(e). . . . Before a court can determine whether a transfer was made by or to or for the benefit of a covered entity, the court must first identify the relevant transfer to test in that inquiry. At bottom, that is the issue the parties dispute in this case. On one side, Merit posits that the Court should look not only to the Valley View-to-Merit end-to-end transfer, but also to all its component parts. Here, those component parts include one transaction by Credit Suisse to Citizens Bank (i.e., the transmission of the $16.5 million from Credit Suisse to escrow at Citizens Bank), and two transactions by Citizens Bank to Merit (i.e., the transmission of $16.5 million over two installments by Citizens Bank as escrow agent to Merit). Because those component parts include transactions by and to financial institutions, Merit contends that §546(e) bars avoidance. FTI, by contrast, maintains that the only relevant transfer for purposes of the §546(e) safe-harbor inquiry is the overarching transfer between Valley View and Merit of $16.5 million for purchase of the stock, which is the transfer that the trustee seeks to avoid under §548(a)(1)(B). Because that transfer was not made by, to, or for the benefit of a financial institution, FTI contends that the safe harbor has no application. The Court agrees with FTI. The language of §546(e), the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader statutory structure all support the conclusion that the relevant transfer for purposes of the §546(e) safeharbor inquiry is the overarching transfer that the trustee seeks to avoid under one of the substantive avoidance provisions. ... By referring back to a specific type of transfer that falls within the avoiding power, Congress signaled that the exception applies to the overarching transfer that the trustee seeks to avoid, not any component part of that transfer. ... As the Seventh Circuit aptly put it, the Code “creates both a system for avoiding transfers and a safe harbor from avoidance—logically these are two sides of the same coin.” 830 F. 3d, at 694; see also Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Fink, 522 U. S. 211, 217 (1998) (“Section 546 of the Code puts certain limits on the avoidance powers set forth elsewhere”). Given that structure, it is only logical to view the pertinent transfer under §546(e) as the same transfer that the trustee seeks to avoid pursuant to one of its avoiding powers. ... Merit contends that in adding the phrase “or for the benefit of ” to the requirement that a transfer be “made by or to” a protected entity, Congress meant to abrogate the 1998 decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in In re Munford, Inc., 98 F. 3d 604, 610 (1996) (per curiam), which held that the §546(e) safe harbor was inapplicable to transfers in which a financial institution acted only as an intermediary. . . . Merit points to nothing in the text or legislative history that corroborates the proposition that Congress sought to overrule Munford in its 2006 amendment. There is a simpler explanation for Congress’ addition of this language that is rooted in the text of the statute as a whole and consistent with the interpretation of §546(e) the Court adopts. A number of the substantive avoidance provisions include that language, thus giving a trustee the power to avoid a transfer that was made to “or for the benefit of ” certain actors. See §547(b)(1) (avoiding power with respect to preferential transfers “to or for the benefit of a creditor”); §548(a)(1) (avoiding power with respect to certain fraudulent transfers “including any transfer to or for the benefit of an insider . . . ”). By adding the same language to the §546(e) safe harbor, Congress ensured that the scope of the safe harbor matched the scope of the avoiding powers. ... For the reasons stated, we conclude that the relevant transfer for purposes of the §546(e) safe harbor is the same transfer that the trustee seeks to avoid pursuant to its substantive avoiding powers. Applying that understanding of the safe-harbor provision to this case yields a straightforward result. FTI, the trustee, sought to avoid the $16.5 million Valley View-to-Merit transfer. FTI did not seek to avoid the component transactions by which that overarching transfer was executed. . . Because the parties do not contend that either Valley View or Merit is a “financial institution” or other covered entity, the transfer falls outside of the §546(e) safe harbor. Lineup: Sotomayor. Unanimous. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-784_gdhk.pdf [internal citations inconsistently omitted throughout] ulmont fucked around with this message at 17:26 on Feb 27, 2018 |
|
#
?
Feb 27, 2018 17:23
|
|