|
Lamebot posted:Can this decision translate over to consumer class action? No, because that was the predecessor Concepcion case. quote:Plain English Holding: Under the Federal Arbitration Act, California must enforce arbitration agreements even if the agreement requires that consumer complaints be arbitrated individually (instead of on a class-action basis).
|
#
?
May 21, 2018 23:21
|
|
|
|
| # ? May 9, 2024 18:17 |
|
|
Arbitration clauses are such a horrible thing when there's an imbalance of power between the involved sides. Works alright with business contracts at times but are completely evil when it's company v person.
|
|
#
?
May 21, 2018 23:25
|
|
|
Now what's stopping companies from putting "You agree that we don't have to follow any laws," in all their employment contracts?
|
|
#
?
May 21, 2018 23:52
|
|
|
I've been doing some stuff with folks involved in the corporate-corporate arbitration world, and it's so bizzare to think that the same legal structure applies to both.
|
|
#
?
May 22, 2018 00:02
|
|
|
Lycus posted:Now what's stopping companies from putting "You agree that we don't have to follow any laws," in all their employment contracts? The arbitrators will without a doubt look at that language as unenforceable. They're professionals.
|
|
#
?
May 22, 2018 00:57
|
|
|
On the one hand, I’m really sympathetic to this Thomas position that the Court should go ahead and make a final ruling when it’s really just questions of law all the way down. On the other hand, hoo boy is he selective about the cases he wants to apply that in.
|
|
#
?
May 22, 2018 01:29
|
|
|
Harrow posted:Boy was this one fun to get a company-wide email about this morning. Jacob Lewis was my mentee at epic and I taught him to hate the place. When he first told me he was suing it was Obama Era and I was so hopeful. gently caress Gorsuch for snatching away our vengeance.
|
|
#
?
May 22, 2018 04:50
|
|
|
jit bull transpile posted:Jacob Lewis was my mentee at epic and I taught him to hate the place. When he first told me he was suing it was Obama Era and I was so hopeful. gently caress Gorsuch for snatching away our vengeance. gently caress  I don't remember if I ever met Jacob. He left when I was still pretty new. Were you still around when all the writers got an email about saving detailed records of our work for evidence for the lawsuit? I'm still angry at the bare minimum attempt at communication about this to current employees. I'm guessing most people here are just going to see the email and move on, which is probably the point, but I bet a lot of tech comm TLs are going to have to field questions they don't have anything approaching an answer for, which sucks.
|
|
#
?
May 22, 2018 14:06
|
|
|
Harrow posted:gently caress I left last July, so probably. I was a developer at that point though.
|
|
#
?
May 22, 2018 18:52
|
|
|
quote:The correct answer cannot be that the tribe always wins no matter what; otherwise a tribe could wield sovereign immunity as a sword and seize property with impunity, even without a colorable claim of right.
|
|
#
?
May 23, 2018 16:55
|
|
|
EwokEntourage posted:god forbid they get some of their land back How do you resolve it when all of the tribes claim the entire nation this way? News: quote:This case requires us to consider whether a public official may, consistent with the First Amendment, ’block’ a person from his Twitter account in response to the political views that person has expressed, and whether the analysis differs because that public official is the President of the United States,” Buchwald said. “The answer to both questions is no.
|
|
#
?
May 23, 2018 18:32
|
|
|
ulmont posted:How do you resolve it when all of the tribes claim the entire nation this way? Roberts' slippery-slope is very different from what actually happened in the case, though. I'm no lawyer, but I feel like there's probably a slight legal difference between your hypothetical "native tribes unilaterally claim the entire US mainland and tell the US government to suck it" and the actual course of events of "native tribe legally buys some land, someone who was illegally using that land claims squatters' rights to take it back".
|
|
#
?
May 23, 2018 19:50
|
|
|
Main Paineframe posted:Roberts' slippery-slope is very different from what actually happened in the case, though. I'm no lawyer, but I feel like there's probably a slight legal difference between your hypothetical "native tribes unilaterally claim the entire US mainland and tell the US government to suck it" and the actual course of events of "native tribe legally buys some land, someone who was illegally using that land claims squatters' rights to take it back". You don't say. It still seems like there should be a forum to adjudicate a land ownership dispute, particularly a cross-border one.
|
|
#
?
May 23, 2018 20:15
|
|
|
Main Paineframe posted:Roberts' slippery-slope is very different from what actually happened in the case, though. I'm no lawyer, but I feel like there's probably a slight legal difference between your hypothetical "native tribes unilaterally claim the entire US mainland and tell the US government to suck it" and the actual course of events of "native tribe legally buys some land, someone who was illegally using that land claims squatters' rights to take it back". Someone who was illegally using that land for literally 70 years, with the previous actual land owner being totally fine with this. If this wasn't a tribe, I don't think there'd be a single question about whether the Lundgrens got to keep that acre. e: Direct quote from the trial judge on that issue - "This is as clear a case as I've had on the bench." Kalman fucked around with this message at 20:30 on May 23, 2018 |
|
#
?
May 23, 2018 20:28
|
|
|
Kalman posted:Someone who was illegally using that land for literally 70 years, with the previous actual land owner being totally fine with this. If this wasn't a tribe, I don't think there'd be a single question about whether the Lundgrens got to keep that acre. Open, Notorious, Exclusive, Adverse, and Continuous? Yeah.
|
|
#
?
May 23, 2018 20:42
|
|
|
ulmont posted:You don't say. It still seems like there should be a forum to adjudicate a land ownership dispute, particularly a cross-border one. There is. It’s the normal court system. The point is that tribes can’t claim sovereign immunity to just default-win legal disputes over land outside of their sovereign territory. Adverse possession is a weird doctrine, and I think this is an unfortunate application of it — it doesn’t seem like moving the fence (which the tribe volunteered to pay to do) would have any disproportionate impact on the Lundgrens (as opposed to e.g. if they’d built anything on the wrong side of the line). But the result isn’t catastrophic to the tribe — they still bought 39 acres of land, it’s just not quite as much as they thought.
|
|
#
?
May 23, 2018 20:45
|
|
|
rjmccall posted:There is. It’s the normal court system. I think you may be confused on the procedural posture of this case.
|
|
#
?
May 23, 2018 20:50
|
|
|
There doesn't seem to be anything out of sort with the indian land case, and it isn't finished. It's going back to the washington supreme court to answer the question as to whether or not the Tribe can assert sovereign immunity because this suit relates to immovable property located in Washington State, purchased by the Tribe in the same manner as a private individual. This seems to have a pretty simple answer as well. This is a dispute between two private landowners, and the Lundgren's absolutely have the best claim. Mr. Nice! fucked around with this message at 20:57 on May 23, 2018 |
|
#
?
May 23, 2018 20:55
|
|
|
rjmccall posted:
If anything, it seems like what happened is that the guy they bought the land from was selling land that wasn't his, so shouldn't they sue for what they were effectively overcharged?
|
|
#
?
May 23, 2018 20:56
|
|
|
ulmont posted:How do you resolve it when all of the tribes claim the entire nation this way? It was a joke
|
|
#
?
May 23, 2018 20:58
|
|
|
Keeshhound posted:If anything, it seems like what happened is that the guy they bought the land from was selling land that wasn't his, so shouldn't they sue for what they were effectively overcharged? They might have a claim against their title company or via some sort of insurance, and depending on the warranties in the deed they may have a claim against the seller. The one acre of land in dispute belongs to the Lundgrens, though.
|
|
#
?
May 23, 2018 20:58
|
|
|
Keeshhound posted:If anything, it seems like what happened is that the guy they bought the land from was selling land that wasn't his, so shouldn't they sue for what they were effectively overcharged? LOL if they accepted a quit claim deed.
|
|
#
?
May 23, 2018 20:59
|
|
|
Mr. Nice! posted:It's going back to the washington supreme court to answer the question as to whether or not the Tribe can assert sovereign immunity because this suit relates to immovable property located in Washington State, purchased by the Tribe in the same manner as a private individual. Which makes you wonder why SCOTUS just didn't rule on that ground, as Thomas suggested. EwokEntourage posted:It was a joke Sure - but the thought experiment is interesting in that it suggests the answer has to be "sovereign immunity does not apply here."
|
|
#
?
May 23, 2018 21:15
|
|
|
ulmont posted:I think you may be confused on the procedural posture of this case. The opinions suggest very strongly that there is unanimous support for denying immunity in these cases; they just 9-0 don’t like the reasoning based on Yakima and 7-2 didn’t want to preempt reargument in the Washington Supreme Court. Nobody thinks that the end result of this is that there’s no forum for adjudicating disputes.
|
|
#
?
May 23, 2018 21:20
|
|
|
ulmont posted:Which makes you wonder why SCOTUS just didn't rule on that ground, as Thomas suggested. I didn't dig into Gorsuch's decision because gently caress that someone else can read that, but generally speaking land disputes are state related matters and it should absolutely be punted back to the state to decide. When only Thomas and Alito are dissenting, they are dissenting on a very odd quibble and one that doesn't even make enough sense to rope in another conservative.
|
|
#
?
May 23, 2018 21:55
|
|
|
Mr. Nice! posted:I didn't dig into Gorsuch's decision because gently caress that someone else can read that, but generally speaking land disputes are state related matters and it should absolutely be punted back to the state to decide. The only open issue is if sovereign immunity applies or not. The land dispute issue is over and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed that part of the trial court already.
|
|
#
?
May 23, 2018 22:14
|
|
|
 Opinions! LAGOS v. UNITED STATES Brief Background: The petitioner, Sergio Fernando Lagos, was convicted of using a company that he controlled (Dry Van Logistics) to defraud a lender (General Electric Capital Corporation, or GE) of tens of millions of dollars. The fraud involved generating false invoices for services that Dry Van Logistics had not actually performed and then borrowing money from GE using the false invoices as collateral. Eventually, the scheme came to light. Dry Van Logistics went bankrupt. GE investigated. The Government indicted Lagos. Lagos pleaded guilty to wire fraud. And the judge, among other things, ordered him to pay GE restitution. The issue here concerns the part of the restitution order that requires Lagos to reimburse GE for expenses GE incurred during its own investigation of the fraud and during its participation in Dry Van Logistics’ bankruptcy proceedings. The amounts are substantial (about $5 million), and primarily consist of professional fees for attorneys, accountants, and consultants. The Government argued that the District Court must order restitution of these amounts under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act because these sums were “necessary . . . other expenses incurred during participation in the investigation . . . of the offense or attendance at proceedings related to the offense.” Holding: The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act is one of several federal statutes that govern federal court orders requiring defendants convicted of certain crimes to pay their victims restitution...to “the victim for lost income and necessary child care, transportation, and other expenses incurred during participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense or attendance at proceedings related to the offense.” §3663A(b)(4) (emphasis added). We here consider the meaning of that italicized phrase. Specifically, we ask whether the scope of the words “investigation” and “proceedings” is limited to government investigations and criminal proceedings, or whether it includes private investigations and civil or bankruptcy litigation. We conclude that those words are limited to government investigations and criminal proceedings. … Our conclusion rests in large part upon the statute’s wording, both its individual words and the text taken as a whole. The individual words suggest (though they do not demand) our limited interpretation. The word “investigation” is directly linked by the word “or” to the word “prosecution,” with which it shares the article “the.” This suggests that the “investigation[s]” and “prosecution[s]” that the statute refers to are of the same general type. And the word “prosecution” must refer to a government’s criminal prosecution, which suggests that the word “investigation” may refer to a government’s criminal investigation. A similar line of reasoning suggests that the immediately following reference to “proceedings” also refers to criminal proceedings in particular, rather than to “proceedings” of any sort. Furthermore, there would be an awkwardness about the statute’s use of the word “participation” to refer to a victim’s role in its own private investigation, and the word “attendance” to refer to a victim’s role as a party in noncriminal court proceedings. … We add a practical fact: A broad reading would create significant administrative burdens. The statute provides for mandatory restitution, and the portion we construe is limited to “necessary . . . other expenses.” §3663A(b)(4) (emphasis added). The word “necessary” would, if the statute is broadly interpreted, invite disputes as to whether particular expenses “incurred during” participation in a private investigation or attendance at, say, a bankruptcy proceeding, were in fact “necessary.” … We add that this interpretation does not leave a victim such as GE totally without a remedy for additional losses not covered by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. GE also brought a civil lawsuit against Lagos for the full extent of its losses, and obtained an over-$30 million judgment against him. The Government says that GE has largely been unable to collect on that judgment, but there is no reason to think that collection efforts related to a criminal restitution award would prove any more successful. The Government makes one additional argument. It points out that GE shared with the Government the information that its private investigation uncovered. And that fact, the Government says, should bring the expenses of that investigation within the terms of the statute even if the “investigation” referred to by the statute is a government’s criminal investigation. The short, conclusive answer to that claim, however, lies in the fact that the statute refers to “necessary child care, transportation, and other expenses incurred during participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense.” §3663A(b)(4) (emphasis added). It does not refer to expenses incurred before the victim’s participation in a government’s investigation began. … For the reasons stated, we conclude that the words “investigation” and “proceedings” in the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act refer to government investigations and criminal proceedings. Consequently Lagos is not obliged to pay the portion of the restitution award that he here challenges. We reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment to the contrary, and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Lineup: Breyer, unanimous. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-1519_o7jp.pdf COLLINS . VIRGINIA Brief Background: During the investigation of two traffic incidents involving an orange and black motorcycle with an extended frame, Officer David Rhodes learned that the motorcycle likely was stolen and in the possession of petitioner Ryan Collins. Officer Rhodes discovered photographs on Collins’ Facebook profile of an orange and black motorcycle parked in the driveway of a house, drove to the house, and parked on the street. From there, he could see what appeared to be the motorcycle under a white tarp parked in the same location as the motorcycle in the photograph. Without a search warrant, Office Rhodes walked to the top of the driveway, removed the tarp, confirmed that the motorcycle was stolen by running the license plate and vehicle identification numbers, took a photograph of the uncovered motorcycle, replaced the tarp, and returned to his car to wait for Collins. … The State Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the warrantless search was justified under the Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception. Holding: This case presents the question whether the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment permits a police officer, uninvited and without a warrant, to enter the curtilage of a home in order to search a vehicle parked therein. It does not. … The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” This case arises at the intersection of two components of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and the protection extended to the curtilage of a home. The Court has held that the search of an automobile can be reasonable without a warrant. ... In announcing each of these two justifications [for the automobile warrant exception: (a) ready mobility of automobiles and (b) pervasive government regulation of automobiles], the Court took care to emphasize that the rationales applied only to automobiles and not to houses, and therefore supported “treating automobiles differently from houses” as a constitutional matter. … Like the automobile exception, the Fourth Amendment’s protection of curtilage has long been black letter law. “[W]hen it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. 1, 6 (2013). “At the Amendment’s ‘very core’ stands ‘the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’” Ibid. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961)). To give full practical effect to that right, the Court considers curtilage—“the area ‘immediately surrounding and associated with the home’”—to be “‘part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.’” … When a law enforcement officer physically intrudes on the curtilage to gather evidence, a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred. Jardines, 569 U. S., at 11. Such conduct thus is presumptively unreasonable absent a warrant. … Just like the front porch, side garden, or area “outside the front window,” Jardines, 569 U. S., at 6, the driveway enclosure where Officer Rhodes searched the motorcycle constitutes “an area adjacent to the home and ‘to which the activity of home life extends,’” and so is properly considered curtilage. … The question before the Court is whether the automobile exception justifies the invasion of the curtilage.2 The answer is no. Applying the relevant legal principles to a slightly different factual scenario confirms that this is an easy case. Imagine a motorcycle parked inside the living room of a house, visible through a window to a passerby on the street. Imagine further that an officer has probable cause to believe that the motorcycle was involved in a traffic infraction. Can the officer, acting without a warrant, enter the house to search the motorcycle and confirm whether it is the right one? Surely not. The reason is that the scope of the automobile exception extends no further than the automobile itself. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U. S. 938, 940 (1996) (per curiam) (explaining that the automobile exception “permits police to search the vehicle”); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U. S. 295, 300 (1999) (“[T]he Framers would have regarded as reasonable (if there was probable cause) the warrantless search of containers within an automobile”). Virginia asks the Court to expand the scope of the automobile exception to permit police to invade any space outside an automobile even if the Fourth Amendment protects that space. Nothing in our case law, however, suggests that the automobile exception gives an officer the right to enter a home or its curtilage to access a vehicle without a warrant. Expanding the scope of the automobile exception in this way would both undervalue the core Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the home and its curtilage and “‘untether’” the automobile exception “‘from the justifications underlying’” it. … Just as an officer must have a lawful right of access to any contraband he discovers in plain view in order to seize it without a warrant, and just as an officer must have a lawful right of access in order to arrest a person in his home, so, too, an officer must have a lawful right of access to a vehicle in order to search it pursuant to the automobile exception. … For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the automobile exception does not permit an officer without a warrant to enter a home or its curtilage in order to search a vehicle therein. We leave for resolution on remand whether Officer Rhodes’ warrantless intrusion on the curtilage of Collins’ house may have been reasonable on a different basis, such as the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Lineup: Sotomayor, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Concurrence by Thomas. Dissent by Alito. Notes From Other Opinions: Thomas (concurring): I join the Court’s opinion because it correctly resolves the Fourth Amendment question in this case. Notably, the only reason that Collins asked us to review this question is because, if he can prove a violation of the Fourth Amendment, our precedents require the Virginia courts to apply the exclusionary rule and potentially suppress the incriminating evidence against him. I write separately because I have serious doubts about this Court’s authority to impose that rule on the States. The assumption that state courts must apply the federal exclusionary rule is legally dubious, and many jurists have complained that it encourages “distort[ions]” in substantive Fourth Amendment law, Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 157 (1978) (White, J., dissenting); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 490 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 111, 112 (2003). … I am skeptical of this Court’s authority to impose the exclusionary rule on the States. We have not yet revisited that question in light of our modern precedents, which reject Mapp’s essential premise that the exclusionary rule is required by the Constitution. We should do so. Alito (dissenting): The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable” searches. What the police did in this case was entirely reasonable. The Court’s decision is not. … If the motorcycle had been parked at the curb, instead of in the driveway, it is undisputed that Rhodes could have searched it without obtaining a warrant. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 9; Reply Brief 1. Nearly a century ago, this Court held that officers with probable cause may search a motor vehicle without obtaining a warrant. … So why does the Court come to the conclusion that Officer Rhodes needed a warrant in this case? Because, in order to reach the motorcycle, he had to walk 30 feet or so up the driveway of the house rented by petitioner’s girlfriend, and by doing that, Rhodes invaded the home’s “curtilage.” … In this case, there is no dispute that the search of the motorcycle was governed by the Fourth Amendment, and therefore whether or not it occurred within the curtilage is not of any direct importance. The question before us is not whether there was a Fourth Amendment search but whether the search was reasonable. And the only possible argument as to why it might not be reasonable concerns the need for a warrant. For nearly a century, however, it has been well established that officers do not need a warrant to search a motor vehicle on public streets so long as they have probable cause. … [W]e should ask whether the reasons for the “automobile exception” are any less valid in this new situation. Is the vehicle parked in the driveway any less mobile? Are any greater privacy interests at stake? If the answer to those questions is “no,” then the automobile exception should apply. And here, the answer to each question is emphatically “no.” The tarp-covered motorcycle parked in the driveway could have been uncovered and ridden away in a matter of seconds. And Officer Rhodes’s brief walk up the driveway impaired no real privacy interests. … While a case-specific inquiry regarding exigency would be inconsistent with the rationale of the motor-vehicle exception, a case-specific inquiry regarding the degree of intrusion on privacy is entirely appropriate when the motor vehicle to be searched is located on private property. After all, the ultimate inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is whether a search is reasonable, and that inquiry often turns on the degree of the intrusion on privacy. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the Court, an affirmance in this case would not mean that officers could perform a warrantless search if a motorcycle were located inside a house. See ante, at 7. In that situation, the intrusion on privacy would be far greater than in the present case, where the real effect, if any, is negligible. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-1027_7lio.pdf CITY OF HAYS, KANSAS, PETITIONER v. MATTHEW JACK DWIGHT VOGT Summary From the Opinion Below Mr. Matthew Vogt alleges a violation of the Fifth Amendment through the compulsion to incriminate himself and the use of his compelled statements in a criminal case. Based on the alleged Fifth Amendment violation, Mr. Vogt invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983, suing (1) the City of Hays, Kansas; (2) the City of Haysville, Kansas; and (3) four police officers. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, reasoning that * the right against self-incrimination is only a trial right and * Mr. Vogt’s statements were used in pretrial proceedings, but not in a trial. We draw four conclusions: 1. The Fifth Amendment is violated when criminal defendants are compelled to incriminate themselves and the incriminating statement is used in a probable cause hearing. 2. The individual officers are entitled to qualified immunity. 3. The City of Haysville did not compel Mr. Vogt to incriminate himself. 4. Mr. Vogt has stated a plausible claim for relief against the City of Hays. Accordingly, we (1) affirm the dismissal of the claims against the four police officers and Haysville and (2) reverse the dismissal of the claim against the City of Hays. Disposition: The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. [Woops, we hosed up taking this case.] https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-1495_e1pf.pdf [internal citations inconsistently omitted throughout]
|
|
#
?
May 29, 2018 16:05
|
|
|
I'm really glad to see collins as a 8-1 case. I think Scalia would have voted with the majority there, as well. Alito is off in left field, and Thomas is still questioning the validity of the amendments that ended the civil war and gave him citizenship, but otherwise not horrible decisions all in all. I also have family from the Hays, KS area so it's nice to see some bullshit get called out.
|
|
#
?
May 29, 2018 16:18
|
|
|
Alito posted:The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable” searches. What the police did in this case was entirely reasonable. The Court’s decision is not. Jesus, Sam. Could you be just a little less fascist?
|
|
#
?
May 29, 2018 16:19
|
|
|
Keeshhound posted:Jesus, Sam. Could you be just a little less fascist? This isn't a particularly insane case for that, however the police officer apparently forgot that houses aren't streets.
|
|
#
?
May 29, 2018 16:24
|
|
|
One weird trick the founders don't want you to know: you can just say "well I think all searches are reasonable no matter what"
|
|
#
?
May 29, 2018 16:35
|
|
|
hobbesmaster posted:This isn't a particularly insane case for that, however the police officer apparently forgot that houses aren't streets. It's the way he laments that "If the motorcycle had been parked at the curb, instead of in the driveway, it is undisputed that Rhodes could have searched it without obtaining a warrant." And "Because, in order to reach the motorcycle, he had to walk 30 feet or so up the driveway of the house rented by petitioner’s girlfriend, and by doing that, Rhodes invaded the home’s “curtilage.” Yes, if it was parked on the street it would be a different situation. That's kind of the point.
|
|
#
?
May 29, 2018 16:54
|
|
|
I feel like half of SCOTUS’ cases in the last 10 years are 4th Amendment cases where the Justices keep having to tell police ‘no, you can’t do that without a warrant’
|
|
#
?
May 29, 2018 17:08
|
|
|
FlamingLiberal posted:I feel like half of SCOTUS’ cases in the last 10 years are 4th Amendment cases where the Justices keep having to tell police ‘no, you can’t do that without a warrant’ Now imagine 50 years ago where these cases never made it out of trial court let alone to an appellate level.
|
|
#
?
May 29, 2018 17:16
|
|
|
Being that I’m not a lawyer and my SC precedent case knowledge is somewhat limited, was there a specific case that kicked this idea off? Miranda?
|
|
#
?
May 29, 2018 17:25
|
|
|
FlamingLiberal posted:Being that I’m not a lawyer and my SC precedent case knowledge is somewhat limited, was there a specific case that kicked this idea off? Miranda? Miranda v. Arizona in 1966 is indeed the pivotal case. here's a good read about the cases represented by that decision: http://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/educational-activities/facts-and-case-summary-miranda-v-arizona
|
|
#
?
May 29, 2018 17:29
|
|
|
FlamingLiberal posted:Being that I’m not a lawyer and my SC precedent case knowledge is somewhat limited, was there a specific case that kicked this idea off? Miranda? Mapp is the one that applied the exclusionary rule (you can't use evidence illegally obtained in a prosecution) to the states: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mapp_v._Ohio Weeks was the prior one that said the federal government couldn't use illegal evidence. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weeks_v._United_States
|
|
#
?
May 29, 2018 17:39
|
|
|
Thomas is against the incorporation of the bill of rights on the states, btw. Thomas almost always will write an opinion bemoaning incorporation anytime states get told they cannot infringe upon a federally protected right.
|
|
#
?
May 29, 2018 17:48
|
|
|
lol that an automobile exception to fundamental constitutional rights exists in the first place the magical rights-negating field generated as a byproduct of the internal combustion engine legitimizes this fishing expedition to find a reason to jail you
|
|
#
?
May 29, 2018 17:51
|
|
|
|
| # ? May 9, 2024 18:17 |
|
|
Mr. Nice! posted:Thomas is against the incorporation of the bill of rights on the states, btw. Thomas almost always will write an opinion bemoaning incorporation anytime states get told they cannot infringe upon a federally protected right. what about the 2nd amendment 
|
|
#
?
May 29, 2018 17:58
|
|
