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Mr. Nice! posted:For example, the SCOTUS just made it easier today for GOP to strike people from voting rolls. I'm so glad that we didn't let that fake liberal Hillary win. That would have been terrible. There's no difference between republicans and democrats.
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Jun 11, 2018 15:45
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Mr. Nice! posted:The rest of the decisions are pretty boring. You can't use a class action's extension of SoL to file a new class action after the initial class failed to certify, and minnesota is ok for automatically removing a former spouse as a beneficiary. The State of Washington interfered with the fishing rights of native Americans and now they have to redesign a bunch of culverts.
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Jun 11, 2018 15:46
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Syzygy Stardust posted:I think they made it easier for everyone to reduce the chances of voter fraud and enhance trust in the voting system, not just one party. How does un-registering voters decrease fraud potential?!? Also I should know better than to engage this, I suspect.
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Jun 11, 2018 15:57
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mdemone posted:How does un-registering voters decrease fraud potential?!? I believe the theory is that if you move you can be registered two places at once and request a ballot in both places. Like all forms of voter fraud its something that basically never happens. edit: also requesting a ballot of a dead person
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Jun 11, 2018 16:00
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mdemone posted:How does un-registering voters decrease fraud potential?!? Because 3 million illegals voted for Hillary, by using the names of dead people and people who have moved away duh
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Jun 11, 2018 16:01
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Syzygy Stardust posted:I think they made it easier for everyone to reduce the chances of voter fraud and enhance trust in the voting system, not just one party. Sometimes all it takes is just one post to know that someone isn't worth engaging with.
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Jun 11, 2018 16:05
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hobbesmaster posted:I believe the theory is that if you move you can be registered two places at once and request a ballot in both places. Like how almost every Trump is registered to vote in multiple locations.
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Jun 11, 2018 16:12
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Also voting fraud in the USA is so infrequent that it can be called non-existant and the very few cases that do occur are committed by the group that complains about voting fraud the most (conservatives). c.f. trump voters arrested for voting twice in the 2016 presidential election.
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Jun 11, 2018 16:13
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 Opinions! CHINA AGRITECH, INC. v. RESH ET AL. Holding: The Court held in American Pipe that the timely filing of a class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations for all persons encompassed by the class complaint. Where class-action status has been denied, the Court further ruled, members of the failed class could timely intervene as individual plaintiffs in the still-pending action, shorn of its class character. See id., at 544, 552–553. Later, in Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U. S. 345 (1983), the Court clarified American Pipe’s tolling rule: The rule is not dependent on intervening in or joining an existing suit; it applies as well to putative class members who, after denial of class certification, “prefer to bring an individual suit rather than intervene . . . once the economies of a class action [are] no longer available.” … The question presented in the case now before us: Upon denial of class certification, may a putative class member, in lieu of promptly joining an existing suit or promptly filing an individual action, commence a class action anew beyond the time allowed by the applicable statute of limitations? Our answer is no. American Pipe tolls the statute of limitations during the pendency of a putative class action, allowing unnamed class members to join the action individually or file individual claims if the class fails. But American Pipe does not permit the maintenance of a follow-on class action past expiration of the statute of limitations. The instant suit is the third class action brought on behalf of purchasers of petitioner China Agritech’s common stock, alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §78a et seq. In short, the successive complaints each make materially identical allegations that China Agritech engaged in fraud and misleading business practices, causing the company’s stock price to plummet when several reports brought the misconduct to light. See App. 60–100 (Resh complaint), 205–235 (Smyth complaint), 133–156 (Dean complaint). The Exchange Act has a two-year statute of limitations that begins to run upon discovery of the facts constituting the violation. 28 U. S. C. §1658(b). The Act also has a five-year statute of repose. … Theodore Dean, a China Agritech shareholder, filed the first class-action complaint on February 11, 2011, at the start of the two-year limitation period. … On October 4, 2012—within the two-year statute of limitations—Dean’s counsel filed a new complaint (Smyth) with a new set of plaintiffs and new efficient-market evidence. Eight shareholders responded to the PSLRA notice, seeking lead-plaintiff appointment. The District Court again denied class certification, this time on typicality and adequacy grounds. See App. 254. Thereafter, the Smyth plaintiffs settled their individual claims with the defendants and voluntarily dismissed their suit. … Respondent Michael Resh, who had not sought leadplaintiff status in either the Dean or Smyth proceedings and was represented by counsel who had not appeared in the earlier actions, filed the present suit on June 30, 2014, styling it a class action—a year and a half after the statute of limitations expired. We hold that American Pipe does not permit a plaintiff who waits out the statute of limitations to piggyback on an earlier, timely filed class action. The “efficiency and economy of litigation” that support tolling of individual claims, American Pipe, 414 U. S., at 553, do not support maintenance of untimely successive class actions; any additional class filings should be made early on, soon after the commencement of the first action seeking class certification. American Pipe tolls the limitation period for individual claims because economy of litigation favors delaying those claims until after a class-certification denial. If certification is granted, the claims will proceed as a class and there would be no need for the assertion of any claim individually. If certification is denied, only then would it be necessary to pursue claims individually. … The watchwords of American Pipe are efficiency and economy of litigation, a principal purpose of Rule 23 as well. Extending American Pipe tolling to successive class actions does not serve that purpose. The contrary rule, allowing no tolling for out-of-time class actions, will propel putative class representatives to file suit well within the limitation period and seek certification promptly. For all the above-stated reasons, it is the rule we adopt today: Time to file a class action falls outside the bounds of American Pipe. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Lineup: Ginsburg, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Concurrence by Sotomayor. Notes From Other Opinions: Sotomayor (concurring): I agree with the Court that in cases governed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 15 U. S. C. §78u–4, like this one, a plaintiff who seeks to bring a successive class action may not rely on the tolling rule established by American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538 (1974). I cannot, however, join the majority in going further by holding that the same is true for class actions not subject to the PSLRA. To understand why the PSLRA is essential to the conclusion the Court reaches here, recall that this case involves a putative class-action lawsuit brought by a plaintiff with a timely individual claim, joined by coplaintiffs with timely individual claims, on behalf of a putative class of absent class members with timely individual claims. See ante, at 4. One might naturally think, then, that the class claims in the lawsuit are timely. The majority, however, concludes that the named plaintiffs’ and putative class members’ class claims are time barred. At first blush, this result might seem surprising, for the Court has rejected the idea that class claims are categorically different from individual claims. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P. A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U. S. 393, 398 (2010). Although it did not hold that class claims may never be treated differently from individual claims, Shady Grove indicates that there must be a special reason for doing so. Here, the PSLRA supplies that special reason. The PSLRA imposes significant procedural requirements on securities class actions that do not apply to individual or traditionally joined securities claims. See §78u–4(a)(1). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-432_08m1.pdf HUSTED, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE v. A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE ET AL. Brief Background: The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) addresses the removal of ineligible voters from state voting rolls, 52 U. S. C. §20501(b), including those who are ineligible “by reason of” a change in residence, §20507(a)(4). … Respondents contend that Ohio’s process for removing voters on change-of-residence grounds violates this federal law. The Ohio process at issue relies on the failure to vote for two years as a rough way of identifying voters who may have moved. It sends these nonvoters a preaddressed, postage prepaid return card, asking them to verify that they still reside at the same address. Voters who do not return the card and fail to vote in any election for four more years are presumed to have moved and are removed from the rolls. Holding: It has been estimated that 24 million voter registrations in the United States—about one in eight—are either invalid or significantly inaccurate. Pew Center on the States, Election Initiatives Issue Brief (Feb. 2012). And about 2.75 million people are said to be registered to vote in more than one State. Ibid. At issue in today’s case is an Ohio law that aims to keep the State’s voting lists up to date by removing the names of those who have moved out of the district where they are registered. Ohio uses the failure to vote for two years as a rough way of identifying voters who may have moved, and it then sends a preaddressed, postage prepaid card to these individuals asking them to verify that they still reside at the same address. Voters who do not return this card and fail to vote in any election for four more years are presumed to have moved and are removed from the rolls. We are asked to decide whether this program complies with federal law. ... Before the NVRA, some States removed registrants without giving any notice. See J. Harris, Nat. Munic. League, Model Voter Registration System 45 (rev. 4th ed. 1957). The NVRA changed that by providing in §20507(d)(1) that a State may not remove a registrant’s name on change-of-residence grounds unless either (A) the registrant confirms in writing that he or she has moved or (B) the registrant fails to return a preaddressed, postage prepaid “return card” containing statutorily prescribed content. This card must explain what a registrant who has not moved needs to do in order to stay on the rolls, i.e., either return the card or vote during the period covering the next two general federal elections. §20507(d)(2)(A). And for the benefit of those who have moved, the card must contain “information concerning how the registrant can continue to be eligible to vote.” §20507(d)(2)(B). If the State does not send such a card or otherwise get written notice that the person has moved, it may not remove the registrant on change-of-residence grounds. See §20507(d)(1).2 While the NVRA is clear about the need to send a “return card” (or obtain written confirmation of a move) before pruning a registrant’s name, no provision of federal law specifies the circumstances under which a return card may be sent. Accordingly, States take a variety of approaches. … When a State receives a return card confirming that a registrant has left the district, the State must remove the voter’s name from the rolls. §§20507(d)(1)(A), (3). And if the State receives a card stating that the registrant has not moved, the registrant’s name must be kept on the list. See §20507(d)(2)(A). What if no return card is mailed back? Congress obviously anticipated that some voters who received cards would fail to return them for any number of reasons, and it addressed this contingency in §20507(d), which, for convenience, we will simply call “subsection (d).” Subsection (d) treats the failure to return a card as some evidence—but by no means conclusive proof—that the voter has moved. Instead, the voter’s name is kept on the list for a period covering two general elections for federal office (usually about four years). Only if the registrant fails to vote during that period and does not otherwise confirm that he or she still lives in the district (e.g., by updating address information online) may the registrant’s name be removed. §20507(d)(2)(A); see §§20507(d)(1)(B), (3). In addition to these specific change-of-residence requirements, the NVRA also imposes two general limitations that are applicable to state removal programs. First, all such programs must be “uniform, nondiscriminatory, and in compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965.” §20507(b)(1). Second, the NVRA contains what we will call the “Failure-to-Vote Clause.” See §20507(b)(2). At present, this clause contains two parts. The first is a prohibition that was included in the NVRA when it was originally enacted in 1993. It provides that a state program “shall not result in the removal of the name of any person . . . by reason of the person’s failure to vote.” Ibid. The second part, added by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), 116 Stat. 1666, explains the meaning of that prohibition. This explanation says that “nothing in [the prohibition] may be construed to prohibit a State from using the procedures described in [§§20507](c) and (d) to remove an individual from the official list of eligible voters.” §20507(b)(2). ... Since 1994, Ohio has used two procedures to identify and remove voters who have lost their residency qualification. First, the State utilizes the Postal Service option set out in the NVRA. The State sends notices to registrants whom the Postal Service’s “national change of address service” identifies as having moved. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3503.21(B)(1). This procedure is undisputedly lawful. See 52 U. S. C. §20507(c)(1). But because according to the Postal Service “[a]s many as 40 percent of people who move do not inform the Postal Service,”3 Ohio does not rely on this information alone. In its so-called Supplemental Process, Ohio “identif[ies] electors whose lack of voter activity indicates they may have moved.” Record 401 (emphasis deleted). Under this process, Ohio sends notices to registrants who have “not engage[d] in any voter activity for a period of two consecutive years.” Id., at 1509. “Voter activity” includes “casting a ballot” in any election—whether general, primary, or special and whether federal, state, or local. See id., at 1507. ... After sending these notices, Ohio removes registrants from the rolls only if they “fai[l] to respond” and “continu[e] to be inactive for an additional period of four consecutive years, including two federal general elections.” … A pair of advocacy groups and an Ohio resident (respondents here) think that Ohio’s Supplemental Process violates the NVRA and HAVA. They sued petitioner, Ohio’s Secretary of State, seeking to enjoin this process. Respondents alleged, first, that Ohio removes voters who have not actually moved, thus purging the rolls of eligible voters. They also contended that Ohio violates the NVRA’s Failure-to-Vote Clause because the failure to vote plays a prominent part in the Ohio removal scheme: Failure to vote for two years triggers the sending of a return card, and if the card is not returned, failure to vote for four more years results in removal. … Respondents argue (and the Sixth Circuit held) that, even if Ohio’s process complies with subsection (d), it nevertheless violates the Failure-to-Vote Clause—the clause that generally prohibits States from removing people from the rolls “by reason of [a] person’s failure to vote.” §20507(b)(2); see also §21083(a)(4)(A). Respondents point out that Ohio’s Supplemental Process uses a person’s failure to vote twice: once as the trigger for sending return cards and again as one of the requirements for removal. Respondents conclude that this use of nonvoting is illegal. We reject this argument because the Failure-to-Vote Clause, both as originally enacted in the NVRA and as amended by HAVA, simply forbids the use of nonvoting as the sole criterion for removing a registrant, and Ohio does not use it that way. Instead, as permitted by subsection (d), Ohio removes registrants only if they have failed to vote and have failed to respond to a notice. … Respondents put forth one additional argument regarding the Failure-to-Vote Clause. In essence, it boils down to this. So many properly registered voters simply discard return cards upon receipt that the failure to send them back is worthless as evidence that the addressee has moved. As respondents’ counsel put it at argument, “a notice that doesn’t get returned” tells the State “absolutely nothing about whether the person has moved.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 41, 58. According to respondents, when Ohio removes registrants for failing to respond to a notice and failing to vote, it functionally “removes people solely for non-voting” unless the State has additional “reliable evidence” that a registrant has moved. Id., at 49, 71. This argument is based on a dubious empirical conclusion that the NVRA and HAVA do not allow us to indulge. Congress clearly did not think that the failure to send back a return card was of no evidentiary value because Congress made that conduct one of the two requirements for removal under subsection (d). Requiring additional evidence not only second-guesses the congressional judgment embodied in subsection (d)’s removal process, but it also second-guesses the judgment of the Ohio Legislature as expressed in the State’s Supplemental Process. Lineup: Alito, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Gorsuch. Concurrence by Thomas. Dissent by Breyer, joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Dissent by Sotomayor. Notes From Other Opinions: Thomas (concurring): I join the Court’s opinion in full. I write separately to add that respondents’ proposed interpretation of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) should also be rejected because it would raise significant constitutional concerns...As I have previously explained, constitutional text and history both “confirm that States have the exclusive authority to set voter qualifications and to determine whether those qualifications are satisfied.” … The Court’s interpretation of the NVRA was already the correct reading of the statute: The NVRA does not prohibit a State from considering failure to vote as evidence that a registrant has moved. The fact that this reading avoids serious constitutional problems is an additional reason why, in my view, today’s decision is undoubtedly correct. Breyer (dissenting): In identifying registered voters who have likely changed residences by looking to see if those registrants failed to vote, Ohio’s program violates subsection (b)’s express prohibition on “[a]ny State program or activity [that] result[s] in the removal” of a registered voter “by reason of the person’s failure to vote.” §20507(b)(2) (emphasis added). In my view, these words are most naturally read to prohibit a State from considering a registrant’s failure to vote as part of any process “that is used to start, or has the effect of starting, a purge of the voter rolls.” H. R. Rep. No. 103–9, at 15. In addition, Congress enacted the Failure-to-Vote Clause to prohibit “the elimination of names of voters from the rolls solely due to [a registrant’s] failure to respond to a mailing.” Ibid. But that is precisely what Ohio’s Supplemental Process does. The program violates subsection (b)’s prohibition because under it, a registrant who fails to vote in a single federal election, fails to respond to a forwardable notice, and fails to vote for another four years may well be purged. Record 1508. If the registrant had voted at any point, the registrant would not have been removed. See supra, at 7; infra, at 11–14. … In respect to language, §8 says that the function of subsection (d)’s Confirmation Procedure is “to confirm the change of address” whenever the State has already “identif[ied] registrants whose addresses may have changed.” §§20507(c)(1)(A), (d)(2). The function of the Confirmation Procedure is not to make the initial identification of registrants whose addresses may have changed. As a matter of English usage, you cannot confirm that an event happened without already having some reason to believe at least that it might have happened. Black’s Law Dictionary 298 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “confirm” as meaning “[t]o complete or establish that which was imperfect or uncertain”). Ohio, of course, says that it has a ground for believing that those persons they remove from the rolls have, in fact, changed their address, but the ground is the fact that the person did not vote—the very thing that the Failure-to-Vote Clause forbids Ohio to use as a basis for removing a registered voter from the registration roll. Sotomayor (dissenting): I join the principal dissent in full because I agree that the statutory text plainly supports respondents’ interpretation. I write separately to emphasize how that reading is bolstered by the essential purposes stated explicitly in the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) to increase the registration and enhance the participation of eligible voters in federal elections. 52 U. S. C. §§20501(b)(1)–(2). Congress enacted the NVRA against the backdrop of substantial efforts by States to disenfranchise low-income and minority voters, including programs that purged eligible voters from registration lists because they failed to vote in prior elections. The Court errs in ignoring this history and distorting the statutory text to arrive at a conclusion that not only is contrary to the plain language of the NVRA but also contradicts the essential purposes of the statute, ultimately sanctioning the very purging that Congress expressly sought to protect against. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-980_f2q3.pdf SVEEN ET AL. v. MELIN Holding: A Minnesota law provides that “the dissolution or annulment of a marriage revokes any revocable[] beneficiary designation[] made by an individual to the individual’s former spouse.” Minn. Stat. §524.2–804, subd. 1 (2016). That statute establishes a default rule for use when Minnesotans divorce. If one spouse has made the other the beneficiary of a life insurance policy or similar asset, their divorce automatically revokes that designation—on the theory that the policyholder would want that result. But if he does not, the policyholder may rename the ex-spouse as beneficiary. We consider here whether applying Minnesota’s automatic-revocation rule to a beneficiary designation made before the statute’s enactment violates the Contracts Clause of the Constitution. We hold it does not. … [C]limbing divorce rates led almost all States by the 1980s to adopt another kind of automatic-revocation law. So-called revocation-on-divorce statutes treat an individual’s divorce as voiding a testamentary bequest to a former spouse. Like the old common-law rule, those laws rest on a “judgment about the typical testator’s probable intent.” Id., at 239. They presume, in other words, that the average Joe does not want his ex inheriting what he leaves behind. Over time, many States extended their revocation-ondivorce statutes from wills to “will substitutes,” such as revocable trusts, pension accounts, and life insurance policies. … In 1997, Sveen and Melin wed. The next year, Sveen purchased a life insurance policy. He named Melin as the primary beneficiary, while designating his two children from a prior marriage, Ashley and Antone Sveen, as the contingent beneficiaries. The Sveen-Melin marriage ended in 2007. The divorce decree made no mention of the insurance policy. And Sveen took no action, then or later, to revise his beneficiary designations. In 2011, he passed away. In this action, petitioners the Sveen children and respondent Melin make competing claims to the insurance proceeds. The Sveens contend that under Minnesota’s revocation-on-divorce law, their father’s divorce canceled Melin’s beneficiary designation and left the two of them as the rightful recipients. Melin notes in reply that the Minnesota law did not yet exist when her former husband bought his insurance policy and named her as the primary beneficiary. And she argues that applying the laterenacted law to the policy would violate the Constitution’s Contracts Clause, which prohibits any state “Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” Art. I, §10, cl. 1. … The Contracts Clause restricts the power of States to disrupt contractual arrangements. It provides that “[n]o state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” U. S. Const., Art. I, §10, cl. 1. The origins of the Clause lie in legislation enacted after the Revolutionary War to relieve debtors of their obligations to creditors. But the Clause applies to any kind of contract. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U. S. 234, 244–245, n. 16 (1978). That includes, as here, an insurance policy. At the same time, not all laws affecting pre-existing contracts violate the Clause. See El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U. S. 497, 506–507 (1965). To determine when such a law crosses the constitutional line, this Court has long applied a two-step test. The threshold issue is whether the state law has “operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.” Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U. S., at 244. In answering that question, the Court has considered the extent to which the law undermines the contractual bargain, interferes with a party’s reasonable expectations, and prevents the party from safeguarding or reinstating his rights. See id., at 246; El Paso, 379 U. S., at 514–515; Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U. S. 516, 531 (1982). If such factors show a substantial impairment, the inquiry turns to the means and ends of the legislation. In particular, the Court has asked whether the state law is drawn in an “appropriate” and “reasonable” way to advance “a significant and legitimate public purpose.” Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U. S. 400, 411–412 (1983). Here, we may stop after step one because Minnesota’s revocation-on-divorce statute does not substantially impair pre-existing contractual arrangements. True enough that in revoking a beneficiary designation, the law makes a significant change. As Melin says, the “whole point” of buying life insurance is to provide the proceeds to the named beneficiary. Brief for Respondent 16. But three aspects of Minnesota’s law, taken together, defeat Melin’s argument that the change it effected “severely impaired” her ex-husband’s contract. Ibid. First, the statute is designed to reflect a policyholder’s intent—and so to support, rather than impair, the contractual scheme. Second, the law is unlikely to disturb any policyholder’s expectations because it does no more than a divorce court could always have done. And third, the statute supplies a mere default rule, which the policyholder can undo in a moment. Indeed, Minnesota’s revocation statute stacks up well against laws that this Court upheld against Contracts Clause challenges as far back as the early 1800s.3 Lineup: Kagan, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, and Sotomayor. Dissent by Gorsuch. Notes From Other Opinions: Gorsuch (dissenting): The Court’s argument proceeds this way. Because people are inattentive to their life insurance beneficiary designations when they divorce, the legislature needs to change those designations retroactively to ensure they aren’t misdirected. But because those same people are simultaneously attentive to beneficiary designations (not to mention the legislature’s activity), they will surely undo the change if they don’t like it. And even if that weren’t true, it would hardly matter. People know existing divorce laws sometimes allow courts to reform insurance contracts. So people should know a legislature might enact new laws upending insurance contracts at divorce. For these reasons, a statute rewriting the most important term of a life insurance policy—who gets paid—somehow doesn’t “substantially impair” the contract. It just “makes a significant change.” Ante, at 7. Respectfully, I cannot agree. Minnesota’s statute automatically alters life insurance policies upon divorce to remove a former spouse as beneficiary. Everyone agrees that the law is valid when applied prospectively to policies purchased after the statute’s enactment. But Minnesota wants to apply its law retroactively to policies purchased before the statute’s adoption. The Court of Appeals held that this violated the Contracts Clause, which guarantees people the “right to ‘rely on the law . . . as it existed when the[ir] contracts were made.’” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Melin, 853 F. 3d 410, 413 (CA8 2017) (quoting Whirlpool Corp. v. Ritter, 929 F. 2d 1318, 1323 (CA8 1991)). That judgment seems to me exactly right. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-1432_7j8b.pdf WASHINGTON, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES, ET AL. Holding: PER CURIAM. The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court. JUSTICE KENNEDY took no part in the decision of this case. Summary: In 2001, pursuant to an injunction previously entered in this long-running litigation, twenty-one Indian tribes (“Tribes”), joined by the United States, filed a “Request for Determination” — in effect, a complaint — in the federal district court for the Western District of Washington. The Tribes include the Suquamish Indian Tribe, Jamestown S’Klallam, Lower Elwha Band of Klallams, Port Gamble Clallam, Nisqually Indian Tribe, Nooksack Tribe, SaukSuiattle Tribe, Skokomish Indian Tribe, Squaxin IslandTribe, Stillaguamish Tribe, Upper Skagit Tribe, Tulalip Tribes, Lummi Indian Nation, Quinault Indian Nation, Puyallup Tribe, Hoh Tribe, Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation, Quileute Indian Tribe, Makah Indian Tribe, Swinomish Indian Tribal Community, and the Muckleshoot Indian Tribe. The Tribes contended that Washington State (“Washington” or “the State”) had violated, and was continuing to violate, the Treaties by building and maintaining culverts that prevented mature salmon from returning from the sea to their spawning grounds; prevented smolt (juvenile salmon) from moving downstream and out to sea; and prevented very young salmon from moving freely to seek food and escape predators. In 2007, the district court held that in building and maintaining these culverts Washington had caused the size of salmon runs in the Case Area to diminish and that Washington thereby violated its obligation under the Treaties. In 2013, the court issued an injunction ordering Washington to correct its offending culverts. We affirm the decision of the district court. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-269_3eb4.pdf [internal citations inconsistently omitted throughout]
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Jun 11, 2018 16:43
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did ulmont get a namechange or did you log into the wrong account? e: lol either another account or an amazing tribute post
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Jun 11, 2018 16:59
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Neither! Only people who haven't recent wished death upon fellow goons can post, so I'm using my powers for him here. Posting is a super power he doesn't possess at the moment.
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Jun 11, 2018 17:00
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Mr. Nice! posted:Also voting fraud in the USA is so infrequent that it can be called non-existant and the very few cases that do occur are committed by the group that complains about voting fraud the most (conservatives). c.f. trump voters arrested for voting twice in the 2016 presidential election. it's something like .00000003 percent.
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Jun 11, 2018 17:03
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Why would Kennedy recuse himself on a dispute over fish?
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Jun 11, 2018 17:10
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Mr. Nice! posted:For example, the SCOTUS just made it easier today for GOP to strike people from voting rolls. This court is going to chip away at voting rights slowly and steadily every year for the explicit benefit of Republicans and the Democratic party isn't close to up to the challenge of meeting them head on.
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Jun 11, 2018 17:13
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Rigel posted:Why would Kennedy recuse himself on a dispute over fish? He was involved in previous precedings before he was on the court.
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Jun 11, 2018 17:15
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Carillon posted:Notes From Other Opinions: Gorsuch was 100% planning to kill his ex-wife for the insurance money in Minnesota
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Jun 11, 2018 17:21
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Rigel posted:Why would Kennedy recuse himself on a dispute over fish? he worships Asherah, The Great Hunger That Swims In The Sea, and his religious views would therefore unacceptably bias his decision or this, I guess Syzygy Stardust posted:He was involved in previous precedings before he was on the court.
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Jun 11, 2018 17:25
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Groovelord Neato posted:it's something like .00000003 percent. No it's not.
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Jun 11, 2018 18:11
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yeah i hosed up. it's .000003 percent. either way almost nothing.
Groovelord Neato fucked around with this message at 18:19 on Jun 11, 2018 |
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Jun 11, 2018 18:16
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2016 had I think four confirmed cases of voter fraud out of 135 million votes cast, so yeah, that sounds about right.
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Jun 11, 2018 18:20
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Yes, prosecutions for voter fraud are a very reliable proxy for its frequency.
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Jun 11, 2018 18:44
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Syzygy Stardust posted:Yes, prosecutions for voter fraud are a very reliable proxy for its frequency. You're right, paranoid delusions and propaganda are a much better proxy!
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Jun 11, 2018 18:46
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There are few forces as powerful as white fear. This is beyond gross.
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Jun 11, 2018 18:56
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Syzygy Stardust posted:Yes, prosecutions for voter fraud are a very reliable proxy for its frequency. we're not somehow missing 99.99 percent of fraudulent votes.
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Jun 11, 2018 18:57
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The true voter fraud percentage is whatever margin the Democrat won by
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Jun 11, 2018 18:58
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Mr. Nice! posted:For example, the SCOTUS just made it easier today for GOP to strike people from voting rolls. Nobody is in any way surprised that the Roberts court reached such a decision. Gutting the ability and right to vote is literally the only way the GOP will be able to continue to exist (and played a huge role in Trump's election considering several states he won in close margins are GOP-held places that aggressively gently caress with voting). Keeshhound posted:2016 had I think four confirmed cases of voter fraud out of 135 million votes cast, so yeah, that sounds about right. And several of them were white assholes voting for Republicans.
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Jun 11, 2018 19:09
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Groovelord Neato posted:we're not somehow missing 99.99 percent of fraudulent votes. We’re not looking for them.
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Jun 11, 2018 19:13
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I mean, it sounds like a person still has to not vote once in six years AND fail to return a postcard that costs nothing, it's not like they're actively purging the rolls of people who voted six months ago. How many people meeting the above criteria are suddenly going to give enough of a poo poo to vote in year seven?
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Jun 11, 2018 19:18
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Javid posted:I mean, it sounds like a person still has to not vote once in six years AND fail to return a postcard that costs nothing, it's not like they're actively purging the rolls of people who voted six months ago. How many people meeting the above criteria are suddenly going to give enough of a poo poo to vote in year seven? Right so if they do show up in year 7 after not going through their junk mail carefully enough, they should be denied the franchise which is the birthright of every American because (???)
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Jun 11, 2018 19:20
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Evil Fluffy posted:And several of them were white assholes voting for Republicans. I think it was literally three people doing that and one old woman whose husband had died before he could finish filling in his mail ballout, so she finished it and sent it out for him.
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Jun 11, 2018 19:22
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Javid posted:I mean, it sounds like a person still has to not vote once in six years AND fail to return a postcard that costs nothing, it's not like they're actively purging the rolls of people who voted six months ago. How many people meeting the above criteria are suddenly going to give enough of a poo poo to vote in year seven? What if you move? Doesn’t that create duplicate registrations? If they remove you for failing to respond at address A do they remove your record at address B?
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Jun 11, 2018 19:24
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Then they have to reregister like literally anyone else who ignores mail from the government that something is going to expire? "Bothering to read, with your eyeballs, the mail you receive at your residence" is a hilariously low bar.
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Jun 11, 2018 19:24
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Javid posted:Then they have to reregister like literally anyone else who ignores mail from the government that something is going to expire? Just like getting a valid photo ID*? *from a DMV an hour way that's only open once a month.
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Jun 11, 2018 19:27
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Javid posted:Then they have to reregister like literally anyone else who ignores mail from the government that something is going to expire? Ah, yes, the homeless have indeed been allowed to vote for far too long.
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Jun 11, 2018 19:28
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If they actually vote it's not an issue for them. It blows my mind that people are enraged about the miniscule amount of effort required here.
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Jun 11, 2018 19:31
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Javid posted:Then they have to reregister like literally anyone else who ignores mail from the government that something is going to expire? You’re not thinking this through like someone intentionally trying to suppress votes from certain areas.
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Jun 11, 2018 19:31
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Javid posted:Then they have to reregister like literally anyone else who ignores mail from the government that something is going to expire? Selective enforcement comes into play with these types of laws. They're a thin veneer over voter disenfranchisement and were specifically outlawed in 1993 with NVRA. Like these types of laws aren't new. They first came into play in the late 1800s as a part of Jim Crow laws. We have a GiP poster who was removed without notice and it definitely wasn't multiple years worth of time between his last ballot cast. The NVRA specifically disallows using whether or not someone has voted as determinative, but Ohio is doing so and Roberts' majority said go ahead. Make no doubt, these laws are used specifically to disenfranchise voters and have no other legitimate purpose. The dissents explain it all pretty clearly. If we actually had an active congress this wouldn't be a problem, but instead we have the complete abdication of duty from the legislative branch for 8 years running.
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Jun 11, 2018 19:35
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Javid posted:If they actually vote it's not an issue for them. It blowing your mind has more to do with your ignorance of the GOP's open hostility towards voting than anything else. The only way you are surprised or unaware of the US's current ruling party having it a long-standing goal to disenfranchise as many people as possible (from demographics that are heavily Democratic voting) is because you choose to spend no time looking in to why the GOP is pushing for the ability to purge people from voting rolls.
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Jun 11, 2018 19:40
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Javid posted:If they actually vote it's not an issue for them. Because there are literally no good reasons for such laws to exist.
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Jun 11, 2018 19:40
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Javid posted:If they actually vote it's not an issue for them. OK but why does this matter. What is the justification for denying someone their constitutional right to vote for their representatives in government here, some kind of schoolmarm scolding about having enough personal character to *checks notes* uh... show enough respect for the postal service? Is "checking the mail" really an important enough civic virtue that we should be denying people the right to choose their government over it?
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Jun 11, 2018 19:43
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