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ulmont posted:Alito's vote is always easy to figure out. It's always for whatever the wrong opinion is.
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Jun 22, 2018 19:08
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Sydin posted:His analogy is pretty off base. CSLI is collected in the background by a third party - usually without the individual's knowledge even if they technically volunteered to hand it over as part of their provider agreement - and is never touched, managed, or turned over to the individual. Yes that information is about the individual, and in my in-no-way-legal opinion I think that it's sensitive enough information that it shouldn't be something the government can just grab at a whim, but there's a clear difference in the nature of the ownership of CSLI vs handing a valet your keys to park your car. You could make a compelling argument that data isn't really Carpenter's, even though it's about him, which is why we need Katz to step back and ask if in surrendering that data there was a reasonable expectation of privacy (which as Gorsuch himself correctly states there absolutely is). I think the argument here would be that you’re giving the cell phone company your location for the limited purpose of allowing them to maintain a connection, not as a general grant, and so they have no right to consent to a search of it.
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Jun 22, 2018 20:31
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So is the fact that giving them that information is required for you to have a cell phone, and it's basically required to have a cell phone to function in society at this point, at all legally relevant?
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Jun 22, 2018 20:56
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Javid posted:So is the fact that giving them that information is required for you to have a cell phone, and it's basically required to have a cell phone to function in society at this point, at all legally relevant? The Majority posted:Neither does the second rationale underlying the thirdparty
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Jun 22, 2018 21:04
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ulmont posted:The Founders likely understood the term “Officers of the United States” to encompass all federal civil officials who perform an ongoing, statutory duty—no matter how important or significant the duty. See Mascott 454. “Officers of the United States” was probably not a term of art that the Constitution used to signify some special type of official. Based on how the Founders used it and similar terms, the phrase “of the United States” was merely a synonym for “federal,” and the word “Office[r]” carried its ordinary meaning. See id., at 471–479. The ordinary meaning of “officer” was anyone who performed a continuous public duty. Didn't think I'd see Thomas coming out against the theory that Trump is not subject to the foreign emoluments clause.  ulmont posted:Lineup: Gorsuch, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito (solely as to Parts I and II). Concurrence by Gorsuch (Part III), joined by Roberts, Thomas, and Alito. Concurrence in part by Kennedy. Dissent by Ginsburg, joined by Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Gorsuch filed a concurrence to his own opinion? 
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Jun 22, 2018 21:14
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FronzelNeekburm posted:Gorsuch filed a concurrence to his own opinion? He's got the majority decision for parts I&II, but no one else would sign on to part III so even though others agree in judgement no one else agrees on that part.
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Jun 22, 2018 21:29
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evilweasel posted:yeah there are a lot of chunks i agreed with about how the third party doctrine needs to be reviewed and probably thrown out and redone entirely and then he just sort of spirals off into crazytown The Ron Paul
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Jun 23, 2018 16:24
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Sweet Cakes anti gay bakery is going to try to appeal with their case with the SC. I hope they just choose not to hear it.
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Jun 23, 2018 18:02
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Ogmius815 posted:Except (from my non-expert reading not of the dissent but of Ulmont's little blurb), it looks like Gorsuch wants to kill the Katz test completely, which sounds like a judicial nightmare. What about all the protections that have been based on the Katz test? Thomas got to him?
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Jun 24, 2018 04:48
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ulmont posted:Alito's vote is always easy to figure out. The cops always win. yeah his signature as a lower court judge was being so in favor of sweeping powers for police and prosecutors that those same police and prosecutors went "uh slow your roll, we're not totally comfortable where this is headed"
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Jun 24, 2018 04:51
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Well I mean Alito says that the following statute is "ambiguous" quote:Section 1229(a), in turn, provides that the Government shall serve noncitizens in removal proceedings with “written notice (in this section referred to as a ‘notice to appear’) . . . specifying” several required pieces of information, including “[t]he time and place at which the [removal] proceedings will be held.” §1229(a)(1)(G)(i).1 and that it's "a reasonable interpretation" from the government agency that the notice doesn't have to include the information that is explicitly required in the statute 
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Jun 24, 2018 08:10
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Who's ready for some lovely rulings?
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Jun 25, 2018 14:53
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Taerkar posted:Who's ready for some lovely rulings? Hurray! 
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Jun 25, 2018 15:08
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Alito wrote for TX gerrymandering and yeah, it's poo poo. All but one of the obviously racially gerrymandered districts were upheld because, although they were previously found to violate the VRA and failed DoJ preclearance, the court erred in not making the plaintiffs demonstrate (again) that the districts were impermissible and instead automatically shifted the burden to the state, since they had already been shown to be impermissible. Mr. Nice! fucked around with this message at 15:32 on Jun 25, 2018 |
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Jun 25, 2018 15:14
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AMEX doesn't violate anti-trust by preventing merchants from steering customers to lower fee cards.
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Jun 25, 2018 15:18
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 Opinions! OHIO ET AL. v. AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. ET AL. Holding: American Express Company and American Express Travel Related Services Company (collectively, Amex) provide credit-card services to both merchants and cardholders. When a cardholder buys something from a merchant who accepts Amex credit cards, Amex processes the transaction through its network, promptly pays the merchant, and subtracts a fee. If a merchant wants to accept Amex credit cards—and attract Amex cardholders to its business—Amex requires the merchant to agree to an antisteering contractual provision. The antisteering provision prohibits merchants from discouraging customers from using their Amex card after they have already entered the store and are about to buy something, thereby avoiding Amex’s fee. In this case, we must decide whether Amex’s antisteering provisions violate federal antitrust law. We conclude they do not. … Amex, Visa, MasterCard, and Discover are the four dominant participants in the credit-card market. Visa, which is by far the largest, has 45% of the market as measured by transaction volume. Amex and MasterCard trail with 26.4% and 23.3%, respectively, while Discover has just 5.3% of the market. Visa and MasterCard have significant structural advantages over Amex. Visa and MasterCard began as bank cooperatives and thus almost every bank that offers credit cards is in the Visa or MasterCard network. … Amex competes with Visa and MasterCard by using a different business model. While Visa and MasterCard earn half of their revenue by collecting interest from their cardholders, Amex does not. Amex instead earns most of its revenue from merchant fees. Amex’s business model thus focuses on cardholder spending rather than cardholder lending. To encourage cardholder spending, Amex provides better rewards than other networks. … Amex must continually invest in its rewards program. But, to fund those investments, Amex must charge merchants higher fees than its rivals. Even though Amex’s investments benefit merchants by encouraging cardholders to spend more money, merchants would prefer not to pay the higher fees. One way that merchants try to avoid them, while still enticing Amex’s cardholders to shop at their stores, is by dissuading cardholders from using Amex at the point of sale. This practice is known as “steering.” Amex has prohibited steering since the 1950s by placing antisteering provisions in its contracts with merchants. In October 2010, the United States and several States (collectively, plaintiffs) sued Amex, claiming that its antisteering provisions violate §1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §1.5 … Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States.” 15 U. S. C. §1. This Court has long recognized that, “[i]n view of the common law and the law in this country” when the Sherman Act was passed, the phrase “restraint of trade” is best read to mean “undue restraint.” … A small group of restraints are unreasonable per se because they “‘“always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”’” Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U. S. 717, 723 (1988). Typically only “horizontal” restraints—restraints “imposed by agreement between competitors”—qualify as unreasonable per se. Id., at 730. Restraints that are not unreasonable per se are judged under the “rule of reason.” Id., at 723. The rule of reason requires courts to conduct a fact-specific assessment of “market power and market structure . . . to assess the [restraint]’s actual effect” on competition. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U. S. 752, 768 (1984). The goal is to “distinguis[h] between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer’s best interest.” … To determine whether a restraint violates the rule of reason, the parties agree that a three-step, burden-shifting framework applies. Under this framework, the plaintiff has the initial burden to prove that the challenged restraint has a substantial anticompetitive effect that harms consumers in the relevant market. If the plaintiff carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the defendant to show a procompetitive rationale for the restraint. If the defendant makes this showing, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the procompetitive efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means. … Here, the parties ask us to decide whether the plaintiffs have carried their initial burden of proving that Amex’s antisteering provisions have an anticompetitive effect…[T]he plaintiffs rely exclusively on direct evidence to prove that Amex’s antisteering provisions have caused anticompetitive effects in the credit-card market.6 To assess this evidence, we must first define the relevant market. Once defined, it becomes clear that the plaintiffs’ evidence is insufficient to carry their burden. … [T]he relevant market is defined as “the area of effective competition.” Ibid. Typically this is the “arena within which significant substitution in consumption or production occurs.” … As explained, credit-card networks are two-sided platforms. Due to indirect network effects, two-sided platforms cannot raise prices on one side without risking a feedback loop of declining demand. And the fact that two-sided platforms charge one side a price that is below or above cost reflects differences in the two sides’ demand elasticity, not market power or anticompetitive pricing. Price increases on one side of the platform likewise do not suggest anticompetitive effects without some evidence that they have increased the overall cost of the platform’s services. Thus, courts must include both sides of the platform—merchants and cardholders—when defining the credit-card market. … The plaintiffs have not carried their burden to prove anticompetitive effects in the relevant market. The plaintiffs stake their entire case on proving that Amex’s agreements increase merchant fees. We find this argument unpersuasive. … To demonstrate anticompetitive effects on the two-sided credit-card market as a whole, the plaintiffs must prove that Amex’s antisteering provisions increased the cost of credit-card transactions above a competitive level, reduced the number of credit-card transactions, or otherwise stifled competition in the credit-card market. They failed to do so. … In sum, the plaintiffs have not satisfied the first step of the rule of reason. They have not carried their burden of proving that Amex’s antisteering provisions have anticompetitive effects. Amex’s business model has spurred robust interbrand competition and has increased the quality and quantity of credit-card transactions. And it is “[t]he promotion of interbrand competition,” after all, that “is . . . ‘the primary purpose of the antitrust laws.’” Because Amex’s antisteering provisions do not unreasonably restrain trade, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Lineup: Thomas, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Alito, and Gorsuch. Dissent by Breyer, joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Notes From Other Opinions: Breyer (dissenting): I agree with the majority and the parties that this case is properly evaluated under the three-step “rule of reason” that governs many antitrust lawsuits. … Because the majority devotes little attention to the District Court’s detailed factual findings, I will summarize some of the more significant ones here. Among other things, the District Court found that beginning in 2005 and during the next five years, American Express raised the prices it charged merchants on 20 separate occasions. See id., at 195–196. In doing so, American Express did not take account of the possibility that large merchants would respond to the price increases by encouraging shoppers to use a different credit card because the nondiscrimination provisions prohibited any such steering. Id., at 215. The District Court pointed to merchants’ testimony stating that, had it not been for those provisions, the large merchants would have responded to the price increases by encouraging customers to use other, less-expensive cards. Ibid. The District Court also found that even though American Express raised its merchant prices 20 times in this 5 year period, it did not lose the business of any large merchant. Id., at 197. Nor did American Express increase benefits (or cut credit-card prices) to American Express cardholders in tandem with the merchant price increases. Id., at 196. Even had there been no direct evidence of injury to competition, American Express’ ability to raise merchant prices without losing any meaningful market share, in the District Court’s view, showed that American Express possessed power in the relevant market. See id., at 195. The District Court also found that, in the absence of the provisions, prices to merchants would likely have been lower. … The District Court added that it found no offsetting procompetitive benefit to shoppers. Id., at 225–238. Indeed, it found no offsetting benefit of any kind. See ibid. American Express appealed, and the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in its favor. 838 F. 3d 179 (2016). The Court of Appeals did not reject any fact found by the District Court as “clearly erroneous.” See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a)(6). Rather, it concluded that the District Court had erred in step 1 of its rule-of-reason analysis by failing to account for what the Second Circuit called the credit-card business’s “two-sided market” (or “two-sided platform”). 838 F. 3d, at 185–186, 196–200. … In Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U. S. 594, 610 (1953), the Court held that an antitrust court should begin its definition of a relevant market by focusing narrowly on the good or service directly affected by a challenged restraint. … Here, American Express stands accused not of limiting or harming competition for shopper-related card services, but only of merchant-related card services, because the challenged contract provisions appear only in American Express’ contracts with merchants. That is why the District Court was correct in considering, at step 1, simply whether the agreement had diminished competition in merchant-related services. … Even if the majority were right to say that market definition was relevant, and even if the majority were right to further say that the District Court should have defined the market in this case to include shopper-related services as well as merchant-related services, that still would not justify the majority in affirming the Court of Appeals. That is because, as the majority is forced to admit, the plaintiffs made the factual showing that the majority thinks is required. See ante, at 17. … [T]he majority admits that the plaintiffs did show this: they “offer[ed] evidence” that American Express “increased the percentage of the purchase price that it charges merchants . . . and that this increase was not entirely spent on cardholder rewards.” Ante, 17 (citing 88 F. Supp. 3d, at 195–197, 215). Indeed, the plaintiffs did not merely “offer evidence” of this—they persuaded the District Court, which made an unchallenged factual finding that the merchant price increases that resulted from the nondiscrimination provisions “were not wholly offset by additional rewards expenditures or otherwise passed through to cardholders, and resulted in a higher net price.” Id., at 215 (emphasis added). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-1454_5h26.pdf ABBOTT, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, ET AL. v. PEREZ ET AL. Holding: Before us for review are orders of a three-judge court in the Western District of Texas effectively directing the State not to conduct this year’s elections using districting plans that the court itself adopted some years earlier. The court developed those plans for use in the 2012 elections pursuant to our directions in Perry v. Perez, 565 U. S. 388 (2012) (per curiam). We instructed the three-judge court to start with the plans adopted by the Texas Legislature in 2011 but to make adjustments as required by the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act. Id., at 392–396. After those plans were used in 2012, the Texas Legislature enacted them (with only minor modifications) in 2013, and the plans were used again in both 2014 and 2016. Last year, however, the three-judge court reversed its prior analysis and held that some of the districts in those plans are unlawful. After reviewing the repealed 2011 plans, which had never been used, the court found that they were tainted by discriminatory intent and that the 2013 Legislature had not “cured” that “taint.” We now hold that the three-judge court committed a fundamental legal error. It was the challengers’ burden to show that the 2013 Legislature acted with discriminatory intent when it enacted plans that the court itself had produced. The 2013 Legislature was not obligated to show that it had “cured” the unlawful intent that the court attributed to the 2011 Legislature. Thus, the essential pillar of the three-judge court’s reasoning was critically flawed. When the congressional and state legislative districts are reviewed under the proper legal standards, all but one of them, we conclude, are lawful. … In August 2017, having ruled on the repealed 2011 plans, the Texas court finally turned its attention to the plans then in effect—i.e., the plans that had been developed by the court, adopted by the Legislature in 2013, and used in both the 2014 and 2016 elections. The court invalidated the districts in those plans that correspond to districts in the 2011 plan that it had just held to be unlawful, i.e., CD27, CD35, HD32, HD34, HD54, HD55, HD103, HD104, and HD105. In reaching these conclusions, the court pointed to the discriminatory intent allegedly harbored by the 2011 Legislature, and it attributed this same intent to the 2013 Legislature because it had failed to “engage in a deliberative process to ensure that the 2013 plans cured any taint from the 2011 plans.” … Before reaching the merits of these appeals, we must assure ourselves that we have jurisdiction to review the orders at issue. Appellants claim that the orders amount to injunctions and are therefore appealable to this Court under 28 U. S. C. §1253. Appellees disagree, contending that the orders do not qualify as injunctions. We hold that we have jurisdiction because the orders were effectively injunctions in that they barred Texas from using the districting plans now in effect to conduct this year’s elections. … Whenever a challenger claims that a state law was enacted with discriminatory intent, the burden of proof lies with the challenger, not the State...The allocation of the burden of proof and the presumption of legislative good faith are not changed by a finding of past discrimination. “[P]ast discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn governmental action that is not itself unlawful.” Mobile, 446 U. S., at 74 (plurality opinion). The “ultimate question remains whether a discriminatory intent has been proved in a given case.” ... [The 2013 Legislature] enacted, with only very small changes, plans that had been developed by the Texas court pursuant to instructions from this Court “not to incorporate . . . any legal defects.” Perry, 565 U. S., at 394. Under these circumstances, there can be no doubt about what matters: It is the intent of the 2013 Legislature. And it was the plaintiffs’ burden to overcome the presumption of legislative good faith and show that the 2013 Legislature acted with invidious intent. The Texas court contravened these basic principles. Instead of holding the plaintiffs to their burden of overcoming the presumption of good faith and proving discriminatory intent, it reversed the burden of proof. … Once the Texas court’s intent finding is reversed, there remain only four districts that were invalidated on alternative grounds. For three of these districts, the District Court relied on the “effects” test of §2. We reverse as to each of these, but we affirm the District Court’s final holding that HD90 is a racial gerrymander. To make out a §2 “effects” claim, a plaintiff must establish the three so-called “Gingles factors.” These are (1) a geographically compact minority population sufficient to constitute a majority in a single-member district, (2) political cohesion among the members of the minority group, and (3) bloc voting by the majority to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate. Gingles, 478 U. S., at 48–51; LULAC, 548 U. S., at 425. If a plaintiff makes that showing, it must then go on to prove that, under the totality of the circumstances, the district lines dilute the votes of the members of the minority group. Id., at 425–426. [After this, some factual analysis of each district.] Except with respect to one Texas House district, we hold that the court below erred in effectively enjoining the use of the districting maps adopted by the Legislature in 2013. We therefore reverse with respect to No. 17–586; reverse in part and affirm in part with respect to No. 17–626; and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Lineup: Alito, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Gorsuch. Concurrence by Thomas, joined by Gorsuch. Dissent by Sotomayor, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. Notes From Other Opinions: Thomas (concurring): I adhere to my view that §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 does not apply to redistricting. See Cooper v. Harris, 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (concurring opinion) (slip op., at 1) (citing Holder v. Hall, 512 U. S. 874, 922–923 (1994) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment)). Thus, §2 cannot provide a basis for invalidating any district, and it cannot provide a justification for the racial gerrymander in House District 90. Because the Court correctly applies our precedents and reaches the same conclusion, I join its opinion in full. Sotomayor (dissenting): The Court today goes out of its way to permit the State of Texas to use maps that the three-judge District Court unanimously found were adopted for the purpose of preserving the racial discrimination that tainted its previous maps. In reaching its desired result, the majority commits three fundamental errors along the way. First, the majority disregards the strict limits of our appellate jurisdiction and reads into the District Court orders a nonexistent injunction to justify its premature intervention. Second, the majority indulges Texas’ distorted reading of the District Court’s meticulous orders, mistakenly faulting the court for supposedly shifting the burden of proof to the State to show that it cured the taint of past discrimination, all the while ignoring the clear language and unambiguous factual findings of the orders below. Third, the majority elides the standard of review that guides our resolution of the factual disputes in these appeals—indeed, mentioning it only in passing—and selectively parses through the facts. As a result of these errors, Texas is guaranteed continued use of much of its discriminatory maps. ... [I]n denying Texas’ motions for a stay, the District Court took care to make abundantly clear the scope of its orders: “Although the [District] Court found violations [in the congressional and Texas House maps], the [District] Court has not enjoined [their] use for any upcoming elections.” App. 134a–136a. That is the end of the inquiry under our precedent, as our past cases are directly on point. Like in Gunn and Whitcomb, the District Court issued a ruling on the merits against the State. Like in Gunn and Whitcomb, the District Court was clear that those violations required a remedy. Like in Gunn and Whitcomb, the District Court stayed its hand and did not enter an injunction, instead allowing the State an opportunity to remedy the violations. Therefore, like in Gunn and Whitcomb, this Court lacks jurisdiction under §1253 because there is “no order of any kind either granting or denying an injunction— interlocutory or permanent.” … The majority believes that, in analyzing the 2013 maps, the District Court erroneously “attributed [the] same [discriminatory] intent [harbored by the 2011 Legislature] to the 2013 Legislature” and required the 2013 Legislature to purge that taint. Ante, at 9–10. The District Court did no such thing. It engaged in a painstaking analysis of discriminatory intent under Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977), which is critical to understanding why, as explained in Part II–D, infra, the District Court did not improperly presume that the Legislature acted with discriminatory intent. … The District Court followed the guidance in Arlington Heights virtually to a tee, and its factual findings are more than “plausible” in light of the record. To start, there is no question as to the discriminatory impact of the 2013 plans, as the “specific portions of the 2011 plans that [the District Court] found to be discriminatory or unconstitutional racial gerrymanders continue unchanged in the 2013 plans, their harmful effects ‘continu[ing] to this day.’” 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 649 (alteration in original). … In selectively reviewing the record below, the majority attempts to shield itself from the otherwise unavoidable conclusion that the District Court did not err. If forced to acknowledge the true scope of the legal analysis in the orders below, the majority would find itself without support for its insistence that the District Court was singularly focused on whether the Legislature “removed” past taint. And then the majority would have to contend with the thorough analysis of the Arlington Heights factors, Part II–B, supra, that led the District Court to conclude that the 2013 Legislature acted with invidious intent. [then factual challenges on the districts] The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and §2 of the Voting Rights Act secure for all voters in our country, regardless of race, the right to equal participation in our political processes. Those guarantees mean little, however, if courts do not remain vigilant in curbing States’ efforts to undermine the ability of minority voters to meaningfully exercise that right. For although we have made progress, “voting discrimination still exists; no one doubts that.” Shelby County, 570 U. S., at 536. The Court today does great damage to that right of equal opportunity. Not because it denies the existence of that right, but because it refuses its enforcement. The Court intervenes when no intervention is authorized and blinds itself to the overwhelming factual record below. It does all of this to allow Texas to use electoral maps that, in design and effect, burden the rights of minority voters to exercise that most precious right that is “preservative of all rights.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 370 (1886); see Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute, 584 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 5) (“Our democracy rests on the ability of all individuals, regardless of race, income, or status, to exercise their right to vote”). Because our duty is to safeguard that fundamental right, I dissent https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-586_o7kq.pdf [internal citations inconsistently omitted throughout]
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Jun 25, 2018 15:56
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Mr. Nice! posted:Alito wrote for TX gerrymandering and yeah, it's poo poo. All but one of the obviously racially gerrymandered districts were upheld because, although they were previously found to violate the VRA and failed DoJ preclearance, the court erred in not making the plaintiffs demonstrate (again) that the districts were impermissible and instead automatically shifted the burden to the state, since they had already been shown to be impermissible. So translating this into non-lawspeak, it's still something of a punt, one that makes things harder but doesn't substantially change the substance of what's in question?
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Jun 25, 2018 15:56
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Mr. Nice! posted:Alito wrote for TX gerrymandering and yeah, it's poo poo. This is potentially a really bad sign for Hawaii v. Trump: quote:“[P]ast discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn governmental action that is not itself unlawful.” Mobile, 446 U. S., at 74 (plurality opinion). The “ultimate question remains whether a discriminatory intent has been proved in a given case.”
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Jun 25, 2018 15:58
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OddObserver posted:So translating this into non-lawspeak, it's still something of a punt, one that makes things harder but doesn't substantially change the substance of what's in question? No. The challengers have lost in Texas with respect to all but one district.
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Jun 25, 2018 15:59
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OddObserver posted:So translating this into non-lawspeak, it's still something of a punt, one that makes things harder but doesn't substantially change the substance of what's in question? no, it's a very clear signal that the supreme court will continue to go "i don't see anything here" when presented with unmistakable evidence of discriminatory intent, and reverse lower courts that are not similarly ideologically blinded
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Jun 25, 2018 16:03
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ulmont posted:This is potentially a really bad sign for Hawaii v. Trump: I don't think this ruling is saying that actions that happened in the past cannot be used to show intent. EVERYTHING is from the past, obviously It's saying that a past determination of discriminatory intent doesn't create a presumption that subsequent acts are discriminatory Edit: Not to say that it's not lovely, and the conservatives will continue to be bad, but Kennedy might be embarrassed enough by Trump v Hawaii
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Jun 25, 2018 16:05
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Devor posted:I don't think this ruling is saying that actions that happened in the past cannot be used to show intent. EVERYTHING is from the past, obviously Subsequent identical acts.
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Jun 25, 2018 16:07
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The various gerrymandering rules strike me as being a clear example of 'We know this is wrong and terrible but we don't want to do anything about it. Also we're totally not partisan!'.
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Jun 25, 2018 16:07
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Mr. Nice! posted:Subsequent identical acts. Even so, we haven't had a non-injunctive ruling for Trump vs. Hawaii, have we?
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Jun 25, 2018 16:09
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Taerkar posted:The various gerrymandering rules strike me as being a clear example of 'We know this is wrong and terrible but we don't want to do anything about it. Also we're totally not partisan!'. That's why they found the district court in error on a procedural defect that allows for dismissal without touching on the actual merits.
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Jun 25, 2018 16:09
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Devor posted:Even so, we haven't had a non-injunctive ruling for Trump vs. Hawaii, have we? There wasn't even an injunctive ruling in this case. Alito invented one to justify the Court's intervention.
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Jun 25, 2018 16:11
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Mr. Nice! posted:That's why they found the district court in error on a procedural defect that allows for dismissal without touching on the actual merits. Can the districts be challenged again using similar methods used in Wisconsin?
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Jun 25, 2018 16:12
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I'm not sure how the gently caress you would even redraw HD90 without impacting other districts. It's a really odd decision to go 'well only this one is bad sayonara suckers'
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Jun 25, 2018 16:20
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Party Plane Jones posted:I'm not sure how the gently caress you would even redraw HD90 without impacting other districts. It's a really odd decision to go 'well only this one is bad sayonara suckers' It also makes no sense because "gerrymandering" is by goddam definition a property of the geographic and demographic relationships between several districts. Saying "District A is gerrymandered" makes colloquial sense in that the relationship with other districts is implied, but any sensible legal definition would have to consider more than one district simultaneously. We have the worst (5/9ths) of a SC.
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Jun 25, 2018 16:28
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Party Plane Jones posted:I'm not sure how the gently caress you would even redraw HD90 without impacting other districts. It's a really odd decision to go 'well only this one is bad sayonara suckers' Stickman posted:It also makes no sense because "gerrymandering" is by goddam definition a property of the geographic and demographic relationships between several districts. Saying "District A is gerrymandered" makes colloquial sense in that the relationship with other districts is implied, but any sensible legal definition would have to consider more than one district simultaneously. This. It's why their decisions on gerrymandering blow my mind. If one district is gerrymandered, at minimum one other must be as well as districts don't work in a vacuum. The Supreme Court is so goddamned useless, my god.
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Jun 25, 2018 16:39
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That Texas ruling continues to reinforce that nothing short of a Democratic POTUS+Congress purging conservatives from the judiciary is going to unfuck Gerrymandering and voter suppression in the next several decades at best. And god help us if Kennedy retires or a liberal dies while the GOP holds a majority in the Senate.
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Jun 25, 2018 16:51
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“...in reaching its desired result...”
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Jun 25, 2018 16:52
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The other option is the Dems sweep in 2020, gerrymander the gently caress out of everything, and suddenly SCOTUS realizes that gerrymandering is bad
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Jun 25, 2018 16:53
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HappyHippo posted:The other option is the Dems sweep in 2020, gerrymander the gently caress out of everything, and suddenly SCOTUS realizes that gerrymandering is bad Sadly this is about as likely as Dems packing the courts. Crushing blue waves this November and in 2020 are desperately needed but with how much the GOP is actively working to not ensure elections can't be hijacked by outside sources while continuing to ramp up targeted suppression tactics I am less hopeful than what's reflected in the polls.
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Jun 25, 2018 16:57
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I see they also sent the florist case back to the lower courts to be revisited in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop.  We really are one liberal justice dying/retiring under the GOP away from going full on White Man's Theocracy for at least a couple decades.
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Jun 25, 2018 17:20
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This term has convinced me that we need to pack the loving courts. Also impeach Gorsuch.
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Jun 25, 2018 17:32
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FlamingLiberal posted:This term has convinced me that we need to pack the loving courts. Also impeach Gorsuch. I'm especially worried that if we lose one of the liberal justices, the GOP will nominate some 25-year old graduate of Liberty University Law School who will live forever.
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Jun 25, 2018 17:40
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The Macaroni posted:Great username/post combo.
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Jun 25, 2018 17:46
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Most of them have been extremely good.
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Jun 25, 2018 19:27
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| # ? Jun 7, 2024 02:47 |
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Sydin posted:I see they also sent the florist case back to the lower courts to be revisited in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop. Wait what? The lower court ruled against the florist. The ruling in Masterpiece affirms that was the right call unless there was anti-religious animus. Do the justices think there was anti-religious animus in the flower case or do they not even read the rulings they sign onto?
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Jun 25, 2018 20:23
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