klafbang posted:

A public ledger solution would have to support that I can check my vote but that nobody else can. Even stronger, it should be impossible for me to prove to anybody what I voted (to prevent selling votes).

Goodpancakes posted:

This isn't a selling point. Image your system can be compromised in some way you haven't considered. You now have no ability to demonstrate fraud. Those who run the compromised system can elect anyone they choose. It would be the height of arrogance to suggest you have a system that isn't gamable, and strip from people the power to show it is gamable.

Comfy Fleece Sweater posted:

I doubt that, otherwise why is Blockchain so popular right now? If it was as good as you say, nobody would bother with Blockchain. So stop spreading lies

Lambert posted:

How about this: Paper ballots, instead of increasingly complicated voting computers by companies that really don't have a handle on security.

klafbang posted:

Voeting genuinely semss like a good match for something blockchainy. You do not want mining, obviously, but the public ledger alone is a good match. A central database is not a good match: a central database can lie (tell you, you voted for A but count it for B), even if it is tamper-proof (it can just lie about being tamper proof).

A public ledger would not have the problem: everybody can count the results and compare. A ledger system is also better than anything with paper: paper requires manual counting or manual comparison of electronic votes and paper trails.

Paper voting also requires you show up at a designated place and inability or just inconvenience are actual reasons people give for not voting.

A public ledger solution would have to support that I can check my vote but that nobody else can. Even stronger, it should be impossible for me to prove to anybody what I voted (to prevent selling votes). This feels like it can be solved, but I’m pretty sure it hasn’t. Such a system would also have to ensure you cannot prove that somebody has/has not voted yet still ensure that people only get one vote.

Similarly, a convenient system would have to support that nobody can see me voting; if they can see me voting for A, that would allow me to sell my vote. Perhaps it would suffice that I can change my vote anytime until some deadline, but it would have to be untraceable to anybody that I did.

That’s all ignoring the aside in the beginning about “no mining” meaning we’d need something currently non-existing to replace it.

tl;dr: voting genuinely seems like a fair match for “something blockchainy,” but arguments for confuse “could be” for “is.”

Roki B posted:

wat if paper instruments were the most secure


*rand paul literally dies*

Waltzing Along posted:

Where is that graph that shows the big peak then drops with smaller peaks all the way down?
That's exactly what BTC looks like now, more so than before.

klafbang posted:

You’re right, but the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive; as part of the unsolved problems list, I mentioned the system would have to ensure everybody gets at most one vote. A system could ensure that without ensuring that an individual can demonstrate what they specifically voted.

And a big thing is, I would not want “somebody running the system.” Voting is a place where a no-trust-ledger may be worth it. People could get software from any provider they choose, or write their own.

The White Dragon posted:

wow goatsekcd would be perfect for that strip

100 HOGS AGREE posted:

https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1026603800365330432

Facebook Aunt posted:

gary oldmans diary posted:

"these good ideas work well. if you cant make bad ideas work well the science professions are a lie"
ok xkcd. ok

gary oldmans diary posted:

"these good ideas work well. if you cant make bad ideas work well the science professions are a lie"
ok xkcd. ok

gary oldmans diary posted:

"these good ideas work well. if you cant make bad ideas work well the science professions are a lie"
ok xkcd. ok

divabot posted:

oh, i wrote up the OKEx margin trading disaster last week

also: I attempt to explain that eye-watering 20x margin leverage on crypto exchanges tl;dr the exchanges are risking the suckers' money and get them coming and going

let it mellow posted:

like nobody understands how asymmetric cryptography works, u can solve all of this poo poo to legit NIST standards with a cheap as gently caress Luna, why make a bitcoin?

COMRADES posted:

Is that what it is saying? Sounds more like trust the professionals to me?

a cyberpunk goose posted:

The hell?

Burt Sexual posted:

I worked for RSA

Burt Sexual posted:

I worked for RSA

gary oldmans diary posted:

with paper ballot voting all you would need to ensure trust is have multiple people with opposing interests performing separate counts and accumulations of counts at every stage to ensure trust. slower but dead simple

spankmeister posted:

What were you, the crypto janitor?

Facebook Aunt posted:

Yeah, that's how we do it in canada, I've worked as a poll clerk before. Each table gets two (temporary) employees of Elections Canada and a list of ~400 registered voters. Every party is allowed to send a volunteer observer for each table to watch that we are following the rules and not pulling any fast ones. They are allowed to look at our stuff, but not touch it.

At the end of the night we lock up and count the votes. One of the two at the table holds up each ballot and reads off the vote, the other writes it down. The volunteer observers can look at each ballot and keep their own tally. In the event that a ballot looks spoiled or ambiguous the observers can challenge the poll workers interpretation of the ballot right then and there, which brings over a supervisor. At the end of the count if any of the observers got a different vote tally than the poll workers they can challenge the count and force us to recount on the spot until everyone is satisfied. (The ballots all go into sealed envelopes to be archived for a while in case anyone wants to demand a recount after all that.)

It takes hours. The poll staff have to be on site with at least one of each pair having eyes on their poll box for the full 12 hours the polls are open, plus the hours it takes to count your 400 votes and do all the paperwork, so it is at least a 14 hour day. No smoke breaks or coffee breaks, but you can take quick bathroom breaks though that closes your station which can mean grumpy people standing in line while you poop. Not complicated, but very labour intensive.


All this would be worse in the USA though, because you elect multiple guys at once in each riding and also throw in referendums and stuff sometimes. Super labour intensive.

gary oldmans diary posted:

it pins risk of computer voting on developer incompetence