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HEY GUNS posted:hitler was a murderous racist who wanted to turn western russia, ukraine, and poland into his version of kansas post-native-american-genocide and he was surprised when we didn't attack him over czechoslovakia so we could give him the opportunity There is no society that has not hard armed conflict, no argument there. The argument with the Second World War is not about the specifics of hitlers war aims or ideology, it is about the wider sociopolitical system that generated him, sustained, supported and empowered him. It is not an argument for socialism or an argument for just layin’ those pistols down bub, but one that argues a complete and systematic reorganisation of society is possible that will eliminate the legitimacy of using force to achieve any aim. Hitler, if anything, is a pretty good argument for the kind of telos hardcore pacifists want, eventually, a world where it is impossible for a leader with violent aims from achieving and utilising power.
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 21:16 |
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# ? Jun 9, 2024 13:57 |
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Cessna posted:I'd hate to tell someone living in Japanese-occupied China "you don't need to go to war" or "no, sanctions will just make them mad" while the Rape of Nanking is going on. No, but you can understand the Wang Jingwei perspective that they could either establish some accommodation and preserve what autonomy they could or throw millions of lives into an endless futile meatgrinder on the vague hope of foreign intervention at some point in the future. An awful lot of people ended up starving to death so Chiang could feed his armies and keep China in the war. I'm not saying Wang was right or cool or good because of course he wasn't, just saying he made those decisions from a place where there wasn't a single good option in sight.
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 21:16 |
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lenoon posted:You’re thinking of the Second World War from the perspective of summer of 1939. Hitler post czechoslovakia and pre Poland, maybe that’s an inevitable “have to kick hitler in the dick” moment. But there’s hundreds of years - or to be more practical, 20 years of actions and choices that led to there being “no option” but war. That whole argument is based on us being prescient about what the consequences of our actions will be; we can learn from the past to do what all sane people wish to do, avoid war, but thats not much help when all the decisions you have made still leave you in a situation where there is no way out but war. Yes, we could have an entirely different history where everything has changed but i dont see exactly how that is a helpful statement, the decisions made in the lead up to that war particularly but i think to many other wars as well were attempts to avoid actually fighting and we still ended up fighting at the end of it.
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 21:16 |
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Oh yeah for sure it’s not the worlds most helpful argument, but it’s one that’s quite widely held in pacifist circles. While I am not a hardcore pacifist in this manner so the argument doesn’t particularly hold much water with me, I do believe that no historical event is inevitable, arguing that any particular one is inevitable is just drawing a line in the sand between when it is and is not appropriate, to the person making the argument, to make historical actors responsible for their actions - to assume prescience. “It was inevitable after x” is choosing a data point on a continuous distribution of actions through time.
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 21:22 |
I once looked up Ottoman Empire rations during World War I to see how their feeding was going.quote:Hunger eventually became a widespread epidemic in the Ottoman military, as rations were small and the nutritional value of food minimal. An active young man needs 2,800 to 3,000 calories a day to function; a soldier in training should consume at least 3,429. Adding weather conditions, the caloric need increases to 4,238 in extreme cold and to 4,738 in hot/tropical conditions. [23] Peacetime daily rations of Ottoman soldiers in training included 900 grams of bread, 600 grams of biscuits, 250 grams of meat, and 150 grams of bulgur plus some butter and salt. These rations more than met the required energy amount.[24] Salim Tamari suggested that for some conscripts, joining the army was a potential escape from sure starvation, especially after famine struck areas in Greater Syria in 1916. Living in army camps, the men entered "into a cycle of disciplined work, and experienced the luxury of three meals a day, consuming meat, buqsumat (army biscuits) and jam."[25] Soldiers, as long as they were stationed in more easily accessible training camps, were fed regular, albeit meager meals. A Turkish reserve officer described the food during training as tea with a few slices of bread and sometimes olives for breakfast; for lunch and dinner cabbage stew or fava bean soup, and once a week green beans with meat. Not fancy meals, but in training no one would starve.[26] 60 grams of white bread (actually more than they got, since the grain would have to be processed) is about 160 calories. 400 grams of bread is just 1,060 calories. Those are regular soldiers on starvation rations.
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 21:31 |
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This is really neat and I'd love more of them but wouldn't any tank work for this strategy? Why not just buy a bunch of whatever contemporary tanks exist. Were the savings on the S-Tank such that that you could get just that many more of them for a given sum, were they more likely to have better readiness because they were simpler to maintain and operate, or did the Swedes just not want to be dependent on foreign supply chains?
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 21:32 |
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Ensign Expendable posted:1938 is when the British realized that their army was kind of poo poo, yeah. Lots of tank programs were launched/expedited at that point, and then they all died as soon as they got Shermans. Our army has always been mediocre at best compared to the dominant Continental power, this is not news.
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 21:37 |
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Cessna posted:Ha! Sure. We all k ow German engineering was a train wreck in WW2. But if you wanted the leading technical and engineering schools in the 19th century, and especially for industrial and scientific equipment, it was Britain or Prussia/Germany. We can make jokes about the Maus or modern German cars all day, but that trope of superior Teutonic engineering came about for a reason in the 19th century.
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 21:41 |
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Cessna posted:Ha! There is good engineering and there is over engineering...
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 21:49 |
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lenoon posted:It is not an argument for socialism....but one that argues a complete and systematic reorganisation of society is possible that will eliminate the legitimacy of using force to achieve any aim. pike is the measure of all things HEY GUNS fucked around with this message at 21:55 on Nov 6, 2018 |
# ? Nov 6, 2018 21:50 |
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Milo and POTUS posted:This is really neat and I'd love more of them but wouldn't any tank work for this strategy? Why not just buy a bunch of whatever contemporary tanks exist. Were the savings on the S-Tank such that that you could get just that many more of them for a given sum, were they more likely to have better readiness because they were simpler to maintain and operate, or did the Swedes just not want to be dependent on foreign supply chains? Yeah, that's exactly the point - any tank would work. The key takeaway here - which I maybe failed to articulate properly - is just that the Swedish army planned to use the strv 103 offensively, just like any other tank. It is a very human trait to look for meaning in all things, even in tank design. The strv 103 is an armored folk etymology on tracks, is what I'm saying. It looks weird and different and to some degree it is weird and different, so it's generally assumed that there must be some kind of operational or tactical reason for that weirdness - but there isn't. It's just a tank. The only reason it is so weird is that the designers thought that would let them build a tank that had protection and armament equivalent to or better than that of a Chieftain, but with considerably lower weight and some unique tactical advantages. It gave a better win probability in war games and simulations and was judged more cost effective than buying a Chieftain. That's all there is to it - it's just a tank like any other tank. It pretty much performed like any other tank of the time too, so it's far less weird than you'd think it is in practice. It sure as hell is interesting from a technical standpoint though - if you're a gigantic nerdlord, that is.
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 21:52 |
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HEY GUNS posted:The spear predates our species by several hundred thousand years. Force and conflict--whether applied in groups or singly--are older than modern humanity. Whatever you envision would no longer be recognizably human, or even recognizably primate. Weirdly enough I was part of the research team that discovered the earliest evidence of mass violence in the archaeological record - Nataruk, Kenya. So far there’s no clear evidence of interpersonal violence on a “war” scale prior to this, and the Schöningen spears are for throwing and associated with a huge animal kill residue (though this is doubtful and it’s very possible the site is a palimpsest of smaller kills) - but man it was a pretty hellish sight to see regardless. Besides chimps, war is, as far as we know so far, a Homo sapiens thing.
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 21:57 |
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TheFluff posted:Yeah, that's exactly the point - any tank would work. The key takeaway here - which I maybe failed to articulate properly - is just that the Swedish army planned to use the strv 103 offensively, just like any other tank. It is a very human trait to look for meaning in all things, even in tank design. The strv 103 is an armored folk etymology on tracks, is what I'm saying. It looks weird and different and to some degree it is weird and different, so it's generally assumed that there must be some kind of operational or tactical reason for that weirdness - but there isn't. It's just a tank. The only reason it is so weird is that the designers thought that would let them build a tank that had protection and armament equivalent to or better than that of a Chieftain, but with considerably lower weight and some unique tactical advantages. It gave a better win probability in war games and simulations and was judged more cost effective than buying a Chieftain. If the turretless tank was a regular tank and tanked just fine, is there a particular reason there were no more turretless tanks after this one?
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 21:57 |
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P-Mack posted:If the turretless tank was a regular tank and tanked just fine, is there a particular reason there were no more turretless tanks after this one? Big turret has a powerful lobbying arm
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 22:07 |
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Someone post that Mike Sparks image where he makes fun of "turret tankists".
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 22:14 |
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P-Mack posted:If the turretless tank was a regular tank and tanked just fine, is there a particular reason there were no more turretless tanks after this one? It turned out to not be a great idea pretty soon after its introduction, because it got hit by a technological development double whammy. Not having a turret is undeniably a disadvantage, because you can't drive in one direction while shooting in another. At the time of its design this was considered to be a feature with limited value and it was acceptable to trade it away in exchange for better protection. However, around 1975 these newfangled computers started to make it possible to make tank guns very accurate even on the move, and suddenly having a turret was actually much more useful and allowed greater mobility without sacrificing your firepower. The disadvantage of lacking a turret and stabilization became a bigger cost, comparatively. At the same time, the better protection that sacrificing the turret had bought became pretty much obsolete. Not having a turret enabled a HEAT standoff screen and an extremely well sloped (but thin) glacis plate. The HEAT screen worked pretty well against many types of HEAT ammunition but newer types were capable of defeating it, at least to some degree. The glacis plate however rapidly became completely obsolete. When the strv 103 was in the prototype/early production stage, it was immune to its own gun at typical combat distances, but by 1970 that was no longer the case, and 1970's 120mm long-rod APFSDS just completely ignored the sloped glacis plate. Instead, the way forward was composite armor and stabilized guns with ballistic computers, as in the M1 Abrams and Leopard 2, which entered service around 1980. It was of course impossible to foresee that development in 1960, though. It's worth keeping in mind though that almost all of the above also applies to other tanks of the strv 103's generation. The Leopard 1, AMX 30, M60 and Chieftain all lacked protection against 120mm APFSDS. Some of them had ballistic computers retrofitted though, but in most cases the fire control never became nearly as good as on the newer generation tanks. TheFluff fucked around with this message at 22:20 on Nov 6, 2018 |
# ? Nov 6, 2018 22:17 |
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P-Mack posted:If the turretless tank was a regular tank and tanked just fine, is there a particular reason there were no more turretless tanks after this one? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VT_tank Stridsvagn-103 served through the cold war and there was no need for a new (read: expensive) domestic design that might have followed on the 103's tracks (hehe) when Soviet Union had fallen and you could buy Leopard 2's off the shelf. Also, I would surmise that gun stabilizer and computer aiming aid development after 1960s had tilted the scales for turreted tanks that now could actually fight from the move, something that is impossible to do with a fixed gun.
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 22:17 |
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Milo and POTUS posted:Big turret has a powerful lobbying arm Turret ball bearing complex
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 22:19 |
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P-Mack posted:If the turretless tank was a regular tank and tanked just fine, is there a particular reason there were no more turretless tanks after this one? There were attempts. The West German VT-1 and early designs of the British MBT-80 project were attempts to make turretless designs in the 70s for the 80s. They didn't succeed. In the West German case because it's a pretty decent tank but: a) The Leopard 2 is also a pretty decent tank that does everything the VT-1 does, and there's no reason to build both; b) The West Germans rate the VT-1 as less suited for their armoured reconnaissance needs.
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 22:21 |
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lenoon posted:Weirdly enough I was part of the research team that discovered the earliest evidence of mass violence in the archaeological record - Nataruk, Kenya. So far there’s no clear evidence of interpersonal violence on a “war” scale prior to this, and the Schöningen spears are for throwing and associated with a huge animal kill residue (though this is doubtful and it’s very possible the site is a palimpsest of smaller kills) - but man it was a pretty hellish sight to see regardless. Besides chimps, war is, as far as we know so far, a Homo sapiens thing. Depends on how you define war. https://www.livescience.com/60431-do-animals-murder-each-other.html
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 22:22 |
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lenoon posted:Weirdly enough I was part of the research team that discovered the earliest evidence of mass violence in the archaeological record - Nataruk, Kenya. So far there’s no clear evidence of interpersonal violence on a “war” scale prior to this, and the Schöningen spears are for throwing and associated with a huge animal kill residue (though this is doubtful and it’s very possible the site is a palimpsest of smaller kills) - but man it was a pretty hellish sight to see regardless. Besides chimps, war is, as far as we know so far, a Homo sapiens thing. edit: all you need is an extremely large slingshot HEY GUNS fucked around with this message at 22:30 on Nov 6, 2018 |
# ? Nov 6, 2018 22:23 |
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Nenonen posted:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VT_tank They actually experimented with stabilization for the strv 103 on several occasions. I think they even made some token attempts at stabilizing the suspension (didn't really work, too much for the hydraulics). What ended up being sorta workable though was stabilizing the sight but not the gun, and then letting the FCS fire when the gun and the sight picture happened to be aligned as the tank was bouncing along. Problem was, you were supposed to lock the strv 103 in elevation when driving around at anything faster than a crawl because otherwise all of the shocks that were normally absorbed by the suspension would also be acting on the hydraulics (which of course wore on it pretty heavily), so there was no guarantees as to when a firing opportunity would become available. e: they also tried some other more or less wacky things in the 70's and 80's, one of which I've posted about in the Airpower thread TheFluff fucked around with this message at 22:30 on Nov 6, 2018 |
# ? Nov 6, 2018 22:26 |
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lenoon posted:Weirdly enough I was part of the research team that discovered the earliest evidence of mass violence in the archaeological record - Nataruk, Kenya. So far there’s no clear evidence of interpersonal violence on a “war” scale prior to this, and the Schöningen spears are for throwing and associated with a huge animal kill residue (though this is doubtful and it’s very possible the site is a palimpsest of smaller kills) - but man it was a pretty hellish sight to see regardless. Besides chimps, war is, as far as we know so far, a Homo sapiens thing.
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 22:30 |
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TheFluff posted:It's worth keeping in mind though that almost all of the above also applies to other tanks of the strv 103's generation. The Leopard 1, AMX 30, M60 and Chieftain all lacked protection against 120mm APFSDS. Some of them had ballistic computers retrofitted though, but in most cases the fire control never became nearly as good as on the newer generation tanks. With the exception of the early Chieftains, those tanks all had ballistic computers. Ballistic computers based on 1950s technology, but ballistic computers nonetheless. The difference between upgraded versions of them and newer generation tanks is also often pretty faint. The M60A3's M21 ballistic computer and the M1 Abrams' M21 ballistic computer were designed to give the same performance, and the West German Leopard 1A5 was basically fitted with the Leopard 2's fire control system. Fire control systems is usually one of the easier and faster ways to upgrade an old tank in the 70s and 80s, so you see a lot of hulls from the 50s and 60s fitted with brand new fire control systems. The lack of a stereoscopic rangefinder and analog ballistic computer is one of the major lacks I'd point to with the Strv 103. Maybe there was a good reason for its absence, but the tank seems eminently suited for it: the accuracy of a stereoscopic rangefinder is limited by magnification and base length, and the Strv 103's hull seems pretty well suited for a wide-based rangefinder. Though this is of course a bit counterfactual: if I'm going all-out in fantasy tank development I might as well get the Europanzer Chieftain with French HEAT rounds, an American engine, and German optics. :P
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 22:43 |
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 22:44 |
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CommunityEdition posted:On the subject, how on the ball was Zack Twamley’s July Crisis podcast special? I don't know how good that was but he can be a bit like when he played a 1994 recording of the Alexandrov ensemble singing the Soviet national anthem and said you could hear the fear of Stalin in their voices
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 22:55 |
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LatwPIAT posted:Though this is of course a bit counterfactual: if I'm going all-out in fantasy tank development I might as well get the Europanzer Chieftain with French HEAT rounds, an American engine, and German optics. :P If that's, to use the joke structure, a "tank made in heaven", what would a "tank made in hell" look like? I imagine it'd use Soviet crew ergonomics and German (Leo 1's) armor, but what else would it have?
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 22:58 |
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Cyrano4747 posted:The big problem with the inevitability narrative is that it removes agency from the only people who actually had some when it comes to national level decision making. Removing agency also absolves people of blame which is a HUGE deal in how we look at WW1 as a historical event. In a more macro sense, while no war is inevitable in the "meteor heading directly for earth" sense, I think that a major conflict between major powers was about as inevitable as such things can be by 1900. There were too much colonial wealth and too many unresolved issues from previous wars and too much gung ho militarism and too much faith in war as a useful means of diplomacy. The guys at the wheel in the early part of the 20th century were sitting on top of a century old machine built from the ground up to carefully balance power...but as soon as that balance failed, to transition to a state of war as quickly as possible. Most of those guys had little to do with the building of this machine, they just inherited the wheel. In a more micro sense, this could be me not being as sophisticated at historiography as the rest of you, but it seems almost like we're putting the norms of early 21st century liberal democracies into the brains of late 19th century nobility and or autocrats. We might find things like personal honor and nobility and nationalism and so on silly, but they were real for these guys, and it mattered in the context of international politics as much as anything else. Of COURSE someone along the line could have said "no war"...but that wasn't what their social upbringing, education, professional development, government policy, and personal beliefs told them to do. I'll contrast WWI with OIF, as an example of a very much not-inevitable war: the people who kicked off Iraq did so despite having numerous other reasonable and plausible options, despite a liberal democratic upbringing that emphasized peace over militarism, despite an at-best questionable threat that posed no significant risk to either their home countries or their international interests, and despite having no meaningful strategy in place that demanded the decision be made. We may also be talking past each other or arguing semantics.
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 22:59 |
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bewbies posted:In a more macro sense, while no war is inevitable in the "meteor heading directly for earth" sense, I think that a major conflict between major powers was about as inevitable as such things can be by 1900. There were too much colonial wealth and too many unresolved issues from previous wars and too much gung ho militarism and too much faith in war as a useful means of diplomacy. The guys at the wheel in the early part of the 20th century were sitting on top of a century old machine built from the ground up to carefully balance power...but as soon as that balance failed, to transition to a state of war as quickly as possible. Most of those guys had little to do with the building of this machine, they just inherited the wheel. OK, but what you're arguing for is the basic line of argument that said armed conflict between the Soviets and the West was inevitable. Too much militarism, too much faith in war as a means of solving problems, too much ideological baggage between them, etc. In fact, a LOT of preparations made by both sides actively assumed as much, especially at the military level. There's a complex political and diplomatic history at the core of why that didn't happen, much like there's a complex political and diplomatic history at the core of why things did kick off in the summer of 1914. quote:In a more micro sense, this could be me not being as sophisticated at historiography as the rest of you, but it seems almost like we're putting the norms of early 21st century liberal democracies into the brains of late 19th century nobility and or autocrats. We might find things like personal honor and nobility and nationalism and so on silly, but they were real for these guys, and it mattered in the context of international politics as much as anything else. Of COURSE someone along the line could have said "no war"...but that wasn't what their social upbringing, education, professional development, government policy, and personal beliefs told them to do. I don't think ti's as much an issue of not believing that those things were important to those people. Quite the opposite, I think most people who argue for WW1 being contingent on a lot of different factors recognize that and are trying to put that back in the forefront. Once you bow to inevitability those motivations go out the window. It's not just about arguing that the war shouldn't have happened, it's about understanding why it happened. Pointing to train timetables and saying that once things got warm it had to go full hot because mobilization is a race (as Tuchman does) ignores all that and bypasses why, exactly, the Germans were so eager to write the Austro-Hungarians a blank check or why the Russians were so quick on the draw to support a not-even third tier power against an empire.
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 23:11 |
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LatwPIAT posted:With the exception of the early Chieftains, those tanks all had ballistic computers. Ballistic computers based on 1950s technology, but ballistic computers nonetheless. The difference between upgraded versions of them and newer generation tanks is also often pretty faint. The M60A3's M21 ballistic computer and the M1 Abrams' M21 ballistic computer were designed to give the same performance, and the West German Leopard 1A5 was basically fitted with the Leopard 2's fire control system. Fire control systems is usually one of the easier and faster ways to upgrade an old tank in the 70s and 80s, so you see a lot of hulls from the 50s and 60s fitted with brand new fire control systems. Stereoscopic/coincidence rangefinders were not really useful below 2000m with 1960's and newer ammunition (and combat distances greater than that were rare in Scandinavia and Western Europe in general). The ballistics were good enough to be rather forgiving of ranging errors. The strv 103 was more accurate at or below 2000m without a rangefinder than the M60A1 AOS with a coincidence rangefinder in comparative trials in the US. The first Leopard 1A5 was delivered in 1987. That's almost 20 years after it (and the strv 103) were first taken into service. The upgrade was made because without it the tank was effectively obsolete, just like the strv 103 (which was replaced by the Leopard 2 a few years later). The Swedish army was very keen on a new tank around 1985 too, but there was no budget at that time. TheFluff fucked around with this message at 23:34 on Nov 6, 2018 |
# ? Nov 6, 2018 23:28 |
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Cyrano4747 posted:OK, but what you're arguing for is the basic line of argument that said armed conflict between the Soviets and the West was inevitable. Too much militarism, too much faith in war as a means of solving problems, too much ideological baggage between them, etc. In fact, a LOT of preparations made by both sides actively assumed as much, especially at the military level. There's a complex political and diplomatic history at the core of why that didn't happen, much like there's a complex political and diplomatic history at the core of why things did kick off in the summer of 1914. Well, I do think that a NATO/WP war was more or less inevitable for many of the same reasons as WWI, except that there was one big, big, big difference between the respective eras that fundamentally changed the risk/reward calculus for both sides and kept everyone's dicks pretty much in their pants. That, and some remarkably skilled diplomacy from both sides. And luck. quote:I don't think ti's as much an issue of not believing that those things were important to those people. Quite the opposite, I think most people who argue for WW1 being contingent on a lot of different factors recognize that and are trying to put that back in the forefront. Once you bow to inevitability those motivations go out the window. It's not just about arguing that the war shouldn't have happened, it's about understanding why it happened. Pointing to train timetables and saying that once things got warm it had to go full hot because mobilization is a race (as Tuchman does) ignores all that and bypasses why, exactly, the Germans were so eager to write the Austro-Hungarians a blank check or why the Russians were so quick on the draw to support a not-even third tier power against an empire. Again it has been quite some time since I read Tuchman, but doesn't her narrative start with the July Crisis? (edit - apparently it actually started with Edwards funeral which I have absolutely no recollection of) anyway Point being, that narrative starts very, very late in the game. By the time her narrative picks up, timetables and mob schedules really were the crux of the issue...they'd long since passed the "long term peace and stability" station at that point. This was reflected not only in the operational stuff, but in their national strategy and policies as well...particularly the Germans. Like, they'd been eyeing their quick war through France for literal decades at that point. Maybe your complaint is more that Tuchman's narrative is insufficiently narrow in scope? Sleepwalkers and George, Nicholas, and Wilhelm, and Dreadnought all get deep into that deep web of diplomacy that led to all of this and I think they do it pretty well but...they are also all really long and really dense. bewbies fucked around with this message at 23:34 on Nov 6, 2018 |
# ? Nov 6, 2018 23:29 |
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Davin Valkri posted:If that's, to use the joke structure, a "tank made in heaven", what would a "tank made in hell" look like? I imagine it'd use Soviet crew ergonomics and German (Leo 1's) armor, but what else would it have? It's hard to get much worse than early production Panzer 68s, which famously activated the turret drive randomly when the radio was used on full power and fired the gun when the cabin heater was turned on. It's basically an AMX-30 but worse in all respects. Though you could probably get a bit further by making it use a British engine and giving it the 152 mm gun from the M551 Sheridan. That way you have a tank that can't drive anywhere, can't survive being shot at, is actively dangerous to the crew and everyone around you, and has a worthless gun. If you want to get into comical ineptitude, switch the loader and gunner so the loader is to the right of the gun and trying to shove 22 kg shells into the breach with their left arm. I also recommend getting rid of the commander's machine gun, because you obviously don't need an AA MG in this day and age!
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 23:31 |
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bewbies posted:
They're also writing, at least in part, in response to Tuchman.
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 23:34 |
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Speaking of WWI, how long does it take for the German distaste for Versailles to actually make it's way into politics? Is it something that's always there, or just trumpeted by the far-right prior to the depression?
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 23:37 |
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TheFluff posted:Stereoscopic and coincidence rangefinders were not really useful below 2000m with 1960's and newer ammunition (and combat distances greater than that were rare in Scandinavia and Western Europe in general). The ballistics were good enough to be rather forgiving of ranging errors. The strv 103 was more accurate at or below 2000m without a rangefinder than the M60A1 AOS with a coincidence rangefinder in comparative trials in the US. That makes sense. The x18 optic is pretty nice. TheFluff posted:The first Leopard 1A5 was delivered in 1987. That's almost 20 years after it (and the strv 103) were first taken into service. The upgrade was made because without it the tank was effectively obsolete, just like the strv 103 (which was replaced by the Leopard 2 a few years later). The Swedish army was very keen on a new tank around 1985 too, but there was no budget at that time. Oh, sure, but I thought that "Some of them had ballistic computers retrofitted though, but in most cases the fire control never became nearly as good as on the newer generation tanks." was not the case.
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 23:38 |
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PittTheElder posted:Speaking of WWI, how long does it take for the German distaste for Versailles to actually make it's way into politics? Is it something that's always there, or just trumpeted by the far-right prior to the depression? It was definitely there the moment that the war ended and the treaty was signed.
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 23:40 |
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THE END OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR: A (Really Short) TIMELINE We'll begin in earnest on the 1st of August 1918, pretty much exactly four years after the start of the war. Some really important things that happened before then: Accidental formation of an Allied Supreme Command: This began in late 1917, at least partly as a Lloyd George plot to stitch up Haig by turning off his manpower tap. In true WWI style, many of the people involved in setting it up thought they were just setting up a Combined Allied Reserve, so that if the predicted major German attack happened, forces from all nations could be quickly rushed to the relevant area, and so prevent political ructions of the "you didn't help when we needed it most" variety. Clemenceau's agreement was only secured by a large raft of concessions on the original plan, the most important being that the French representative on the reserve's governing Board should be Ferdinand Foch and not his wet-blanket staff officer Maxime Weygand. Spring Offensive: The Germans launched a desperate last-gasp offensive to force negotiations before those 4 million Americans could arrive in theatre. They did about as well as they possibly could have done without tanks and with an army that hadn't had a proper cup of coffee or loaf of bread in two years. They might have succeeded either by cutting the BEF off from the Channel Ports, or capturing Paris; they did neither, and while things were very worrying for their opponents for quite a while, in the final analysis they succeeded only in restoring the front in January 1918 to something that looked much more like January 1915. Intentional formation of an Allied Supreme Command: in March, Foch was given the job of officially coordinating British and French forces in response to the Spring Offensive; about a month later he was formally given the title of Supreme Allied Commander with the authority to give orders to the various allied Expeditionary Forces. It doesn't take Lloyd George long to realise how badly this has backfired on him; now if he takes issue with grand strategy he must take it up with Foch (who he cannot sack) instead of Haig (who he could, except nobody wants Haig's job, which is why he tried to stitch Haig up over reserves in the first place). By May Foch has titular control over the Italian front and de facto control over the men at Salonika. Strategic planning: For what I believe is the first time in the war, Foch and GQG plan a general offensive on the Western Front with no specific tactical objectives. The German line will be attacked simultaneously in several widely-flung areas. The objective is only to disrupt the enemy line enough so that their entire position becomes dislocated and they must retreat to avoid being cut off by the new, fast, Renault FT tanks, which will be used explicitly as a cavalry-replacement instrument of exploitation. Success will be reinforced; failure will not be; awkward bits will be bypassed where possible; the success of the entire offensive will not be contingent on capturing this one really nasty dugout. The offensive will not end until the men are totally incapable of fighting; when the enemy retreats, they will be attacked again and again and will not be allowed enough time to dig new defensive positions; the front will not be allowed to ossify again. I will be saying this a lot, but it needs to be repeated over and over again; the end-point, as both Foch and Haig see it, is to put the Germans on the back foot and advance as far as possible before winter, so that the Americans can be set up to deliver the knockout blow in 1919. Tactical planning: Both the BEF and the French have finally escaped the tactical dead end they were stuck in until the end of 1917, the main feature of which was days-long overwhelming artillery bombardments before an offensive. Now that Renaults and British Whippet light tanks are available, and artillery pre-registration, and rear-area bombing, they're once again going to try surprise. Everyone's now confident that a preliminary bombardment is not required to adequately suppress the enemy's artillery and machine guns. Overflying aircraft will be used to drown out the noise of massed tank engines, and the full range of deception tactics will be used in the run-up to the grand offensive. Coordination, but not to a fault: again, Foch wants to put pressure on all the Central Powers at once, but is much less fashed about this than, say, Joffre (quarantined at Versailles for the rest of the war, where his penance is to eat enormous meals and listen to Cadorna talk bollocks) was when trying to coordinate joint offensives in 1915 and 1916 that all had to go off at exactly the same time for maximum effect. Final plans: The BEF and French armies will attack together on the old Somme battlefields. (It's very interesting that we call the Battle of Amiens the Battle of Amiens, and not the Second Battle of the Somme.) After this, another French attack will go in at Noyon, and then the Americans will have a go at shoving the south-east corner of the front away from Verdun. In September there will be a major push out of Macedonia and back into Serbia. The Italians are clearly not ready yet, so their offensive is put back to an unspecified point later in the year. A number of small preliminary attacks will precede the big push. August 1: About now, the Spanish flu mutates and there are fresh outbreaks in Europe, Africa, and North America. This is the form of the virus that will kill up to a hundred million people around the world; it's the double-six that nobody in the Entente armies planned to deal with while fighting the war, and nobody who tries to do alt-hist thinks about because it's impossible to even guess how it might have gone with a live war in 1919. Burn out or get twice as worse? Who knows. August 8: Beginning of the grand offensive. The Germans know it's coming, but are surprised by the location chosen. By noon, British tanks are firmly embedded in the German rear, having advanced about 8 miles, and there is a 15-mile-wide gap blasted in German lines. Ludendorff allegedly says his thing about "black day of the German army". The spearhead is the British 4th Army under Rawlinson, with the oversize Australian and Canadian Corps making up two-thirds of his strength. Cavalry and armoured cars carry out successful harrassing operations to keep the enemy on the run. August 10: The Germans begin a major withdrawal in the Somme sector, but refuse to retreat anywhere else. August 12: Fourth Army is tiring fast; Foch briefly forgets his own theory of opportunism and lobbies for them to attack again in force, as some Germans are approaching some of their old Hindenburg Line positions; but Haig convinces him that something else is in order instead and slows the pursuit; pressure will be maintained with artillery fire and demonstrations. August 17: The French 10th Army attacks directly towards Noyon, for so long the corner of the Western Front. As the retreat from the Somme slows, the retreat out of Noyon begins. August 21: The British 3rd Army attacks towards Bapaume, taking the enemy completely by surprise. Heavy fighting; more retreating. (This is the precise bit of fighting which occurred on the exact Somme battlefields of 1916; they were clean through and heading for Bapaume itself in a few days.) August 26: The British 1st Army attacks at Arras and Aubers with even more success; the entire north-western stretch of the Western Front (except the Ypres salient) has been dislocated and the Germans are now falling back en masse on the Hindenburg Line. August 29: The French re-liberate Noyon. Bapaume is entered, but the Germans try to dig in east of the city. August 31: 1st Army approaches the Wotanstellung, a particularly nasty defensive position guarding the main defences at the Hindenburg Line; Haig urges caution. To the south, Australian troops cross the River Somme unexpectedly and begin to assault Mont Saint-Quentin, a vital observation point and keystone of German defences around Peronne; again it was intended to shield the main Hindenburg Line, which it's done about as well as a chocolate fireguard. September 1: Haig re-affirms that the goal of this series of offensives is to set up the Americans for 1919. September 2: The Wotanstellung is attacked and broken into. Bapaume is secured. September 3: The Germans retreat from the Wotanstellung and Mont Saint-Quentin. September 10: The French 1st Army is approaching St Quentin and the Hindenburg Line. September 12: The AEF attacks the St Mihiel salient outside Verdun, catching the Germans as they prepare a withdrawal. Pershing dreams of advancing all the way to Metz. September 14: The French 10th Army is approaching the Line at Laon. Probing operations conducted reveal the Germans are wobbling badly. September 15: Widespread contact with the advanced outpost zones of the Line. Plans laid for a mass attack on it. September 16: The American advance away from Verdun has stalled out badly, but vital lessons in how not to gently caress up one's supplies while advancing have been learned. First day of the Vardar Offensive in Macedonia. September 17: Breakthrough in Macedonia at Dobro Pole. Faced with the choice of defending Serbia for Germany and A-H, or defending Bulgaria for themselves, the Bulgarians are now seeing the benefits of defending Bulgaria for themselves. September 18: Vardar Offensive halted for while at Doiran. September 19: Start of the (mis-named for propaganda reasons) Battle of Megiddo in Palestine. September 21: Bulgarian forces in Macedonia conducting a general advance to the rear; local forces pursue. Haig considers for the first time that the end of the war might be possible this year, but is still planning to fight into 1919. September 25: Bulgarian deserters now making their own way to the rear in large numbers. End of the Battle of Megiddo; this total defeat for the Ottoman Army destroys morale among their general staff. Advance begins on Damascus, and then towards Aleppo. September 26: The French and Americans launch the Meuse-Argonne Offensive against the south of the Hindenburg Line, far from the initial thrust against it two months ago. Prepatory attacks at the Somme. September 28: Start of the Fifth (and final) Battle of Ypres. They advance six miles, returning to the edge of Passchendaele village in one day. Short-lived military rebellion against the Bulgarian government. Bulgarian delegation travels to Salonika to negotiate an armistice. September 29: British 4th Army attacks the St Quentin Canal, the strongest point of the Hindenburg Line. September 30: BULGARIA EXITS THE WAR. The British component of the force is detached and turns to head into Thrace, towards the Bosphorus and Constantinople. The Italians go into business for themselves and head off towards the Adriatic coast to prevent any backsliding on the Treaty of London. The French and Serbians move to liberate Serbia. St Quentin Canal crossed and pontoon bridges established. October 3rd: Haig receives a memo from Winston Churchill, cautioning him to husband his strength for the decisive offensives of 1920. The German Government resigns. Prince Max of Baden appointed Chancellor as head of a government of national unity. October 4th: Hindenburg Line totally breached at St Quentin. Australian Corps removed from the line for rest, and as it turns out, will not return. The German government formally requests an armistice. The German Army subsequently made several attempts to make a stand after retreating from the Hindenburg Line (it took a week more for it to break to the Meuse-Argonne offensive in the south), and failed every time. By mid-October most of the Western Front was in semi-mobile warfare. Better-fed and better-supplied Germans could probably have found somewhere to dig in and resist for a while; but by now they were fresh out of everything, especially morale. Belgrade was liberated on November 1, and preparations were made for an attack over the Danube; the Italians were well stuck into Dalmatia by this time, and finally got around to launching the Battle of Vittorio Veneto on the 24th of October. By the end of October, Entente forces were 30 miles from the Ottoman border in Thrace and poised to advance on Constantinople. All the Central Powers finally collapsed all together; the Ottoman government signed an armistice on October 30th; the Austro-Hungarian and German Kaisers abdicated their thrones one day apart on November 9th and 10th. So it came to pass that the German army found itself exiting, pursued by a (Canadian) bear, over the Mons-Conde canal. This is the final irony of the First World War. The BEF retreated from Mons during their first major engagement on August 23, 1914. After 1,541 days of the most unimaginably gruelling warfare, they finally made it back on the morning of the eleventh day of the eleventh month. And then the war ended. Postscript: 14 November: Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck, who has, since fleeing Tanzania in 1916, run an entire loop through Mozambique; then back into Tanzania; then out towards Zambia; and who is still entirely at large; is given a telegram informing him that the war is over and he should stand down. 25 November: Lettow-Vorbeck surrenders at Abercorn (now Mbala). Trin Tragula fucked around with this message at 23:51 on Nov 6, 2018 |
# ? Nov 6, 2018 23:47 |
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LatwPIAT posted:It's hard to get much worse than early production Panzer 68s, which famously activated the turret drive randomly when the radio was used on full power and fired the gun when the cabin heater was turned on. It's basically an AMX-30 but worse in all respects. Though you could probably get a bit further by making it use a British engine and giving it the 152 mm gun from the M551 Sheridan. That way you have a tank that can't drive anywhere, can't survive being shot at, is actively dangerous to the crew and everyone around you, and has a worthless gun. That's pretty good, but instead of removing the AAMG why not put it in a comically large commanders cupola a la M60? I'd also suggest some possible "upgrade" paths: - Gas Turbine, but without a fuel capacity expansion - Concrete armour like the Finnish StuGs - Laser Warning System. Not because it's a bad feature in itself, just because the idea of the tank telling you that you are about to die without you being able to do anything about it is terrifying. - Explosive Reactive Armour... but only on the sides, like Chonma-Ho III TheFluff posted:The first Leopard 1A5 was delivered in 1987. That's almost 20 years after it (and the strv 103) were first taken into service. The upgrade was made because without it the tank was effectively obsolete, just like the strv 103 (which was replaced by the Leopard 2 a few years later). The Swedish army was very keen on a new tank around 1985 too, but there was no budget at that time. Equally, proper fire control for early 60s tanks was coming in well before that. Leopard 1A4 was 1974, Leopard AS1 with the Belgian SABCA AVLS FCS in 1976 with the Canadians following suit in 1978, the Chieftain Mk.9 with the IFCS and the M60A3 with M21 in 1978 as well. IFCS was fitted to Challenger without modification and M21 was fitted to the Abrams with no real accuracy difference as Eukie mentioned. The Ikv 91 with its cool Bofors FCS entered service in 1975 and the system was subsequently put on Centurions. There's absolutely no technical reason that the Strv 103 couldn't have been fitted with some description of modern fire control. But as you say, money ruins all the coolest tank ideas.
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# ? Nov 6, 2018 23:55 |
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FrangibleCover posted:The Ikv 91 with its cool Bofors FCS entered service in 1975 and the system was subsequently put on Centurions. It's unclear to me whether those actually are related. I suspect that Bofors was going to make an FCS for the Centurions, it seems likely they'd have developed the Ikv 91's FCS, but I've never gotten confirmation. For all I know they could have bought a Nahal Oz from Elbit.
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# ? Nov 7, 2018 00:13 |
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# ? Jun 9, 2024 13:57 |
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LatwPIAT posted:It's unclear to me whether those actually are related. I suspect that Bofors was going to make an FCS for the Centurions, it seems likely they'd have developed the Ikv 91's FCS, but I've never gotten confirmation. For all I know they could have bought a Nahal Oz from Elbit. Alright, but you could bodge it into a T-55 with a 50% success rate (claimed 100% success rate by Serbian sources) so putting it in an Strv 103 isn't going to be a huge challenge.
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# ? Nov 7, 2018 00:15 |